United States v. Urbina-Rodriguez , 165 F. App'x 302 ( 2006 )


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  •                                                        United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    F I L E D
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT                 January 27, 2006
    Charles R. Fulbruge III
    Clerk
    No. 05-40495
    Summary Calendar
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    JOSE GUADALUPE URBINA-RODRIGUEZ,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    --------------------
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Texas
    USDC No. 1:04-CR-785-ALL
    --------------------
    Before JOLLY, DAVIS, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Jose Guadalupe Urbina-Rodriguez (Urbina) appeals the
    sentence imposed following his guilty-plea conviction for illegal
    reentry after deportation.   Urbina argues that the district court
    committed reversible plain error when it enhanced his sentence
    pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) based on his prior
    conviction, in Kentucky state court, for sexual abuse.
    The Government argues that Urbina waived his right to raise
    this argument on appeal by “knowingly and intentionally” failing
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
    this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
    under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    No. 05-40495
    -2-
    to raise the issue during sentencing.     Alternatively, the
    Government seeks to enforce the waiver of appeal executed by
    Urbina in the plea agreement.   We reject both contentions.    See
    United States v. McKinney, 
    406 F.3d 744
    , 746 (5th Cir. 2005);
    FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1)(N).
    Under the 2004 version of § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii), a person
    convicted of illegal reentry faces a 16-level increase in their
    base offense level if, prior to deportation, they were convicted
    of a felony that is “a crime of violence.”     The term “crime of
    violence means any of the following:    forcible sex offenses . . .
    or any offense under federal, state, or local law that has an
    element of use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical
    force against the person of another.”
    § 2L1.2, comment. (n.1(b)(iii)).
    When, as here, the statute to which Urbina pleaded guilty
    contained multiple, disjunctive subsections, a district court may
    “look beyond the statute to certain ‘conclusive records made or
    used in adjudicating guilt’ in order to determine which
    particular statutory alternative applies to the defendant’s
    conviction.”   United States v. Gonzalez-Chavez,       F.3d     (5th
    Cir. Nov. 30, 2005), No. 04-40173, 
    2005 WL 3196524
     at *2
    (internal quotation and citation omitted).     “These records are
    generally limited to the ‘charging document, written plea
    agreement, transcript of the plea colloquy, and any explicit
    factual finding by the trial judge to which the defendant
    No. 05-40495
    -3-
    assented.’”      
    Id.
     (citing Shepard v. United States, 
    125 S. Ct. 1254
    , 1257 (2005)).     “Reliance on the PSR will not suffice.”     
    Id.
    Although the defendant in Gonzalez-Chavez was raising his
    challenge to the application of § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) for the
    first time on appeal, we refused to consider facts contained in
    the PSR which related to the alleged conduct of the prior
    offense.   Id.    Because the record contained no other documents
    upon which it could rely to determine whether the prior offense
    fit under the definition of a crime of violence, we remanded the
    case for resentencing.      Id. at *2-3.
    The instant case is controlled by Gonzalez-Chavez, 
    2005 WL 3196524
     at *2.     Accordingly, we VACATE the sentence and REMAND
    for resentencing.
    Urbina also argues that the “felony” and “aggravated felony”
    provisions of 
    8 U.S.C. § 1326
    (b)(1) and (2) are unconstitutional
    in light of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 
    530 U.S. 466
     (2000).
    Urbina’s argument is foreclosed by Almendarez-Torres v. United
    States, 
    523 U.S. 224
    , 235 (1998).     Although Urbina contends that
    Almendarez-Torres was incorrectly decided and that a majority of
    the Supreme Court would overrule Almendarez-Torres in light of
    Apprendi, we have repeatedly rejected such arguments on the basis
    that Almendarez-Torres remains binding.      See United States v.
    Garza-Lopez, 
    410 F.3d 268
    , 276 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 
    126 S. Ct. 298
     (2005).     Urbina properly concedes that his argument is
    No. 05-40495
    -4-
    foreclosed in light of Almendarez-Torres and circuit precedent,
    but he raises it here to preserve it for further review.
    VACATE AND REMAND FOR RESENTENCING.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 05-40495

Citation Numbers: 165 F. App'x 302

Judges: Davis, Jolly, Owen, Per Curiam

Filed Date: 1/27/2006

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 8/2/2023