United States v. Dearieus Duheart ( 2020 )


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  •      Case: 18-31009       Document: 00515318770         Page: 1     Date Filed: 02/21/2020
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    No. 18-31009                         February 21, 2020
    Summary Calendar
    Lyle W. Cayce
    Clerk
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee
    v.
    DEARIEUS DUHEART,
    Defendant - Appellant
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of Louisiana
    USDC No. 3:17-CR-26-1
    Before BARKSDALE, HAYNES, and ENGELHARDT, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM: *
    Dearieus Duheart challenges: his jury conviction of possession, with
    intent to distribute, marihuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1); and his
    within-Sentencing        Guidelines      sentence     of,   inter    alia,     24       months’
    imprisonment.
    For his challenge to his conviction, Duheart contends the evidence is
    insufficient to prove he knowingly possessed the marihuana. In support of this
    * Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir.
    R. 47.5.4.
    Case: 18-31009      Document: 00515318770       Page: 2   Date Filed: 02/21/2020
    No. 18-31009
    assertion, he points to evidence he presented at trial, which he contends
    showed: he had arrived at an alleged drug house only 10 minutes before police
    arrived; and the marihuana belonged to his co-defendant, Derrick Keelen,
    whose assistance Duheart had sought to secure a position at a local factory.
    At the close of the Government’s case, Duheart moved for a judgment of
    acquittal, on which the court deferred ruling. He did not, however, renew his
    motion at the close of all the evidence, and the court never ruled on the original
    motion. The parties do not address whether, given Duheart’s failure to renew
    and the court’s not ruling on the motion, our review of this claim is de novo or
    for plain error. See United States v. Delgado, 
    672 F.3d 320
    , 328–31 (5th Cir.
    2012) (en banc) (holding plain-error review applies where defendant entirely
    failed to move for judgment of acquittal in district court).           “Despite the
    government’s failure to assert plain-error review, it is well-established that our
    court, not the parties, determines the appropriate standard of review.” E.g.,
    United States v. Kalu, 
    936 F.3d 678
    , 680 (5th Cir. 2019) (alteration, citation,
    and internal quotation marks omitted). “Nevertheless, we need not determine
    the standard of review because, assuming arguendo [Duheart’s sufficiency
    claim] [was] sufficiently preserved, [it] still fail[s]”. 
    Id. (citation omitted).
          Because the court deferred ruling on the motion, our review is limited to
    the evidence adduced during the Government’s case-in-chief, which did not
    include the earlier-described evidence relied upon on appeal by Duheart.
    United States v. Carbins, 
    882 F.3d 557
    , 562 n.2 (5th Cir. 2018) (citing Fed. R.
    Crim. P. 29(b); United States v. Brown, 
    459 F.3d 509
    , 523 (2006)). We review
    this evidence, “whether circumstantial or direct, in the light most favorable to
    the government, with all reasonable inferences and credibility choices to be
    made in support of the jury’s verdict”. United States v. Rodriguez, 
    831 F.3d 663
    , 666 (5th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). “We determine only whether a
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    No. 18-31009
    rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
    beyond a reasonable doubt and are mindful that the jury retains the sole
    authority to weigh any conflicting evidence and to evaluate the credibility of
    witnesses.” 
    Id. (alteration, citation,
    and internal quotation marks omitted).
    To obtain a conviction under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), “the government must
    prove [defendant’s] knowing possession of a controlled substance with the
    intent to distribute it” beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Cardenas,
    
    748 F.2d 1015
    , 1019 (5th Cir. 1984) (citations omitted). Possession may be
    actual or constructive. United States v. Meza, 
    701 F.3d 411
    , 419 (5th Cir. 2012)
    (citation omitted). In joint-occupancy-of-residence cases, as in this instance,
    constructive possession is satisfied “only when there is some evidence
    supporting at least a plausible inference that the defendant had knowledge of
    and access to the illegal item”. 
    Id. (emphasis, citation,
    and internal quotation
    marks omitted).
    The evidence presented in the Government’s case-in-chief was, inter alia:
    an officer detected a strong odor of raw marihuana from outside a house; its
    windows were covered, and the house had minimal furniture, which the officer
    testified is consistent with a “trap house” used to package narcotics; upon
    obtaining consent to enter the house, the officer saw a table on which were a
    firearm and large quantities of marihuana in open, vacuum-sealed bags, which
    the officer testified are used to transport marihuana before distribution; and
    Duheart was seated at the table, within arm’s reach of the marihuana, which
    was in plain view. A reasonable jury could conclude, therefore, that Duheart
    knew of the existence of the marihuana and had access to it. See 
    id. at 419–21
    (citations omitted).
    For his sentencing challenge, Duheart contends the court violated the
    Sixth Amendment by relying on acquitted conduct in imposing a two-level
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    No. 18-31009
    dangerous-weapon enhancement, pursuant to Guideline § 2D1.1(b)(1). (The
    jury had acquitted Duheart of possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug-
    trafficking crime and of being a felon in possession of a firearm.) Because he
    did not raise this issue in district court, review is only for plain error. E.g.,
    United States v. Broussard, 
    669 F.3d 537
    , 546 (5th Cir. 2012). Under that
    standard, Duheart must show a forfeited plain error (clear or obvious error,
    rather than one subject to reasonable dispute) that affected his substantial
    rights. Puckett v. United States, 
    556 U.S. 129
    , 135 (2009). If he makes that
    showing, we have the discretion to correct such reversible plain error, but
    generally should do so only if it “seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or
    public reputation of judicial proceedings”. 
    Id. As Duheart
    concedes, his claim is foreclosed by United States v. Watts,
    
    519 U.S. 148
    , 157 (1997) (citation omitted); he contends, however, that Watts
    was undermined by United States v. Booker, 
    543 U.S. 220
    (2005). This claim
    is also foreclosed. United States v. Jackson, 
    596 F.3d 236
    , 243 n.4 (5th Cir.
    2010) (citing United States v. Farias, 
    469 F.3d 393
    , 399 (5th Cir. 2006)).
    AFFIRMED.
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