United States v. Reynaldo Salinas ( 2020 )


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  • Case: 19-50936        Document: 00515557913             Page: 1      Date Filed: 09/09/2020
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Fifth Circuit                                    United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    September 9, 2020
    No. 19-50936                             Lyle W. Cayce
    Summary Calendar                                Clerk
    United States of America,
    Plaintiff—Appellee,
    versus
    Reynaldo Salinas, also known as Reynaldo Salinas, Jr.,
    Defendant—Appellant.
    Appeals from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Texas
    USDC No. 5:17-CR-842-1
    Before Davis, Stewart, and Dennis, Circuit Judges.
    Per Curiam:*
    Reynaldo Salinas appeals his jury trial convictions for attempted
    transfer of obscene material to a minor, see 18 U.S.C. § 1470, and attempted
    coercion and enticement of a minor, see 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b), and his resulting
    cumulative prison term of 180 months and cumulative supervised release
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should
    not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in
    5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    Case: 19-50936      Document: 00515557913            Page: 2   Date Filed: 09/09/2020
    No. 19-50936
    term of 10 years. Before trial, Salinas moved to suppress all the evidence
    gathered by the Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI) in the
    investigation that culminated in his arrest for the crimes of which he was
    ultimately adjudged guilty. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(b)(3)(C). As pertinent
    here, Salinas argued that the investigation violated the Posse Comitatus Act
    (PCA), 18 U.S.C. § 1385. Pretermitting the question of a violation, the
    district court ruled that suppression was not appropriate because Salinas
    failed to demonstrate widespread and repeated violations of the PCA
    sufficient to justify imposition of the exclusionary sanction he sought.
    Salinas’s sole issue on appeal is whether the suppression ruling was
    erroneous.
    Salinas argues that the facts prove a violation of the PCA’s prohibition
    against using the military to enforce civilian laws—including, in this case, the
    federal statutes of conviction. In his view, exclusion of the evidence gathered
    in the AFOSI investigation is required in order to discourage future violations
    of the PCA, violations that he contends are repeated and widespread in the
    military.
    As the district court did, we assume without deciding that the AFOSI
    violated the PCA in investigating Salinas. See Weaver v. Massachusetts,
    
    137 S. Ct. 1899
    , 1911 (2017); United States v. Rodriguez, 
    523 F.3d 519
    , 525 (5th
    Cir. 2008). We note that this court has consistently deferred formulation of
    an exclusionary rule for a PCA violation when the question has arisen. See,
    e.g., United States v. Mullin, 
    178 F.3d 334
    , 342-43 (5th Cir. 1999); United
    States v. Hartley, 
    796 F.2d 112
    , 115 (5th Cir. 1986); United States v. Wolffs,
    
    594 F.2d 77
    , 85 (5th Cir. 1979).
    2
    Case: 19-50936      Document: 00515557913           Page: 3     Date Filed: 09/09/2020
    No. 19-50936
    Evidence will not be excluded because of a violation of the PCA unless
    such violation is “‘widespread and repeated.’” 
    Hartley, 796 F.2d at 115
       (quoting 
    Wolffs, 594 F.2d at 85
    ). In Wolffs, this court stated that “should [it]
    be confronted in the future with widespread and repeated violations of the
    Posse Comitatus Act an exclusionary rule can be fashioned at that 
    time.” 594 F.2d at 85
    . This court’s cautiousness in that regard is consonant with the
    Supreme Court’s teaching that “the deterrence benefits of suppression”
    must “outweigh its heavy costs.” Davis v. United States, 
    564 U.S. 229
    , 237
    (2011); see Hudson v. Michigan, 
    547 U.S. 586
    , 591 (2006); United States
    v. Leon, 
    468 U.S. 897
    , 906 (1984).
    We decline Salinas’s invitation to infer repeated violations of the
    PCA based on the events of this case taken together with seven court cases
    that Salinas cites. As he did not raise this specific argument in the district
    court, review is for plain error. See Puckett v. United States, 
    556 U.S. 129
    , 136
    (2009). The plain error standard requires, in addition to showing that a
    forfeited error was clear or obvious, i.e., not “subject to reasonable dispute,”
    that the defendant show that the error affects his substantial rights. 
    Puckett, 556 U.S. at 135
    ; see United States v. Ellis, 
    564 F.3d 370
    , 377-78 (5th Cir. 2009);
    see also United States v. Trejo, 
    610 F.3d 308
    , 319 (5th Cir. 2010). If the
    defendant discharges his burden of showing a plain error, we have “discretion
    to remedy the error”—discretion that will not be exercised, however, if the
    error has no serious effect on “the fairness, integrity or public reputation of
    judicial proceedings.” 
    Puckett, 556 U.S. at 135
    (internal quotation marks and
    citation omitted).
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    Case: 19-50936      Document: 00515557913           Page: 4   Date Filed: 09/09/2020
    No. 19-50936
    Our review of his brief reveals that Salinas points to at most five
    incidences of PCA violations in the roughly 43-year period between 1974—
    when United States v. Walden, 
    490 F.2d 372
    , 376-77 (4th Cir. 1974), Salinas’s
    oldest cited case, was decided—and 2017, when the AFOSI investigated him.
    But Salinas cites no authority that supports his notion that such few
    incidences in such a considerable time span is what this court had in mind
    when referring to widespread and repeated violations that would justify the
    exclusionary sanction. See 
    Hartley, 796 F.2d at 115
    . A claim that is novel and
    “not entirely clear under the existing case authority” is “doom[ed] . . . for
    plain error.” 
    Trejo, 610 F.3d at 319
    . Moreover, whether exclusion based in
    part on violations occurring many years ago is necessary is a proposition at
    least subject to reasonable debate, given that the required analytical focus
    includes consideration of the “the deterrence benefits of suppression” and
    the social costs of an exclusionary sanction. 
    Davis, 564 U.S. at 237
    ; see 
    Ellis, 564 F.3d at 377-78
    . And that debate does not favor Salinas, who has not
    shown extenuating factors supporting exclusion, such as “systemic error or
    reckless disregard,” in the instant case. Herring v. United States, 
    555 U.S. 135
    , 147 (2009). Consequently, we leave the ruling on the motion to suppress
    undisturbed, and we AFFIRM Salinas’s convictions. See 
    Puckett, 556 U.S. at 135
    -36.
    4