Seudat Bindnarine v. William Barr, U. S. Atty Gen ( 2020 )


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  •      Case: 18-60897      Document: 00515464427         Page: 1    Date Filed: 06/24/2020
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    No. 18-60897                           June 24, 2020
    Summary Calendar
    Lyle W. Cayce
    Clerk
    SEUDAT BINDNARINE,
    Petitioner
    v.
    WILLIAM P. BARR, U. S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,
    Respondent
    Petition for Review of an Order of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    BIA No. A078 953 476
    Before JOLLY, JONES, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM: *
    Seudat Bindnarine is a native and citizen of Guyana. He petitions for
    review of the denial by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) of his motion
    to reopen and terminate his removal proceedings for lack of jurisdiction.
    Relying on Pereira v. Sessions, 
    138 S. Ct. 2105
     (2018), Bindnarine
    contends that his notice to appear (NTA) was defective and consequently
    deprived the immigration court of jurisdiction because it did not state the date
    * Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH
    CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    Case: 18-60897    Document: 00515464427     Page: 2   Date Filed: 06/24/2020
    No. 18-60897
    and time of his removal proceedings. This court has already rejected this
    jurisdictional challenge and concluded that Pereira is limited to the context of
    the stop-time rule in removal proceedings. See Pierre-Paul v. Barr, 
    930 F.3d 684
    , 689-90 (5th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 
    2020 WL 1978950
     (U.S. Apr. 27, 2020)
    (No. 19-779); see also Mauricio-Benitez v. Sessions, 
    908 F.3d 144
    , 148 n.1 (5th
    Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 
    139 S. Ct. 2767
     (2019). Bindnarine’s NTA was not
    defective, because it detailed the nature of the removal proceedings, stated
    their legal basis, and warned about the possibility of in absentia removal;
    moreover, any alleged defect would have been cured because Bindnarine was
    issued a later notice of hearing that included the date and time of his removal
    proceedings. See Pierre-Paul, 930 F.3d at 690-91. We need not decide whether
    Matter of Bermudez-Cota, 
    27 I. & N. Dec. 441
     (BIA 2018), is entitled to
    deference under Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
    Inc., 
    467 U.S. 837
     (1984), or Auer v. Robbins, 
    519 U.S. 452
     (1997), because, in
    decisions such as Mauricio-Benitez and Pierre-Paul, this court reached
    essentially the same conclusion as the BIA regarding the limited reach of
    Pereira without applying Chevron or Auer deference. See Bustamante-Barrera
    v. Gonzales, 
    447 F.3d 388
    , 394 (5th Cir. 2006). Bindnarine thus fails to show
    that the BIA committed legal error in denying his motion to reopen based on
    Pereira. See Ka Fung Chan v. INS, 
    634 F.2d 248
    , 252 (5th Cir. 1981).
    We are without jurisdiction to adjudicate Bindnarine’s claim that the
    BIA should have exercised its discretionary authority to reopen the
    proceedings sua sponte. See Gonzalez-Cantu v. Sessions, 
    866 F.3d 302
    , 306
    (5th Cir. 2017). We need not reach the number-bar issue, including whether
    that issue is exhausted, because our conclusion that the BIA did not commit
    any legal error in denying the motion to reopen moots the number-bar issue.
    DISMISSED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.
    2