United States v. Ramadan Shabazz ( 2020 )


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  •      Case: 19-10896      Document: 00515485334         Page: 1    Date Filed: 07/10/2020
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    No. 19-10896                            July 10, 2020
    Summary Calendar
    Lyle W. Cayce
    Clerk
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee
    v.
    RAMADAN TAJEDEEN SHABAZZ,
    Defendant-Appellant
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Texas
    USDC No. 4:19-CR-143-1
    Before KING, DENNIS, and GRAVES, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM: *
    Ramadan Tajedeen Shabazz, previously convicted of wire fraud, appeals
    the mandatory revocation of his supervised release pursuant to 
    18 U.S.C. § 3583
    (g) and his 24-month revocation sentence. We affirm.
    First, Shabazz argues that the admission of out-of-court statements at
    his revocation hearing violated his due process rights under the Confrontation
    Clause. Our review of this unpreserved issue is for plain error. See Puckett v.
    * Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH
    CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    Case: 19-10896      Document: 00515485334         Page: 2    Date Filed: 07/10/2020
    No. 19-10896
    United States, 
    556 U.S. 129
    , 135 (2009). Accordingly, Shabazz must show (1) a
    forfeited error, (2) that is “clear or obvious, rather than subject to reasonable
    dispute,” and (3) that affected his substantial rights. 
    Id.
     If he does that, we
    have the discretion to correct the error and should do so “only if the error
    seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial
    proceedings.” 
    Id.
     (internal quotation marks, citation, and alteration omitted).
    Shabazz pleaded true to the allegation that he violated a special condition of
    his supervised release by failing to comply with urinalysis drug screening;
    therefore, the district court was statutorily mandated to revoke his supervised
    release. See § 3583(g)(3). Because the revocation of supervised release was
    supported by substantial evidence besides the alleged hearsay testimony,
    Shabazz cannot show that the putative error affected his substantial rights,
    and his argument cannot survive plain error review. See Molina-Martinez v.
    United States, 
    136 S. Ct. 1338
    , 1343 (2016); United States v. Hughes, 237
    F. App’x 980, 981 (5th Cir. 2007). 1
    Next, Shabazz argues that his statutory-maximum revocation sentence
    is substantively unreasonable because the district court undervalued the
    advisory range of imprisonment set forth in policy statement U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4
    and considered two stale convictions that were not counted for purposes of
    calculating his original criminal history score. He acknowledges that this court
    reviews the substantive reasonableness of a revocation sentence under the
    plainly unreasonable standard, United States v. Sanchez, 
    900 F.3d 678
    , 682
    (5th Cir. 2018), but seeks to preserve for further review his argument that
    revocation sentences should instead be reviewed for “unreasonableness.”
    1While unpublished opinions issued on or after January 1, 1996, are not precedential,
    they may be treated as persuasive authority. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4; Ballard v. Burton, 
    444 F.3d 391
    , 401 n.7 (5th Cir. 2006).
    2
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    No. 19-10896
    The district court considered and rejected § 7B1.4, determining that the
    applicable 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a) factors required a harsher sentence, and was
    required to do no more. See United States v. Headrick, 
    963 F.2d 777
    , 782 (5th
    Cir. 1992).   Moreover, we have routinely affirmed statutory-maximum
    revocation sentences imposed in excess of the advisory policy range.        See
    United States v. Warren, 
    720 F.3d 321
    , 332 (5th Cir. 2013). Shabazz therefore
    has not shown an abuse of discretion on the part of the district court. See
    Sanchez, 900 F.3d at 682.
    Finally, Shabazz argues that § 3583(g) is unconstitutional in light of
    United States v. Haymond, 
    139 S. Ct. 2369
     (2019), because it does not require
    a jury determination of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Our review is for
    plain error. See Puckett, 
    556 U.S. at 135
    . The Supreme Court’s decision in
    Haymond addressed the constitutionality of § 3583(k), and the plurality
    opinion specifically declined to “express a view on the mandatory revocation
    provision for certain drug and gun violations in § 3583(g).” 139 S. Ct at 2382
    n.7 (plurality opinion). The application of § 3583(g) therefore was not plain
    error. See United States v. Badgett, 
    957 F.3d 536
     (5th Cir. 2020).
    AFFIRMED.
    3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 19-10896

Filed Date: 7/10/2020

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 7/11/2020