Jarrod Hammonds v. Dallas County ( 2020 )

Case: 19-10297 Document: 00515523431 Page: 1 Date Filed: 08/11/2020
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
August 11, 2020
No. 19-10297
Summary Calendar Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
Jarrod Hammonds,
Plaintiff — Appellant,
versus
Dallas County; City of Dallas; Lashon Butler; Liliana
Gonzalez; Tina Morales; Molly Seanyear; Pamela Pope
Johnson; Edward Lopez, Jr.; David L. Horan; John Doe 1-
20,
Defendants — Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
USDC No. 3:17-CV-1661
Before Smith, Dennis, and Duncan, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
*
Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
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No. 19-10297
Jarrod Hammonds appeals the dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit,
alleging violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and several
federal statutes, following a sheriff’s sale of his property in Duncanville,
Texas, to collect delinquent property taxes. The district court dismissed the
suit, finding the action barred by the Tax Injunction Act (“TIA”), 28 U.S.C.
§ 1341. We affirm.
The TIA withholds federal jurisdiction over any suit to “enjoin,
suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State
law where a plain, speedy, and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of
such State.” Id. It applies with full force to taxes “imposed by
municipalities.” Home Builder’s Ass’n v. City of Madison, 143 F.3d 1006, 1010
n.6 (5th Cir. 1998). The TIA is “a broad jurisdictional impediment to federal
court interference with the administration of state tax systems.” Washington
v. Linebarger, Goggan, Blair, Pena & Sampson, LLP, 338 F.3d 442, 444 (5th
Cir. 2003) (quoting United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Whitman, 595 F.2d 323, 326
(5th Cir. 1979)). Accordingly, we have held the TIA is not limited to suits
directly challenging “taxes only,” but also extends to “the broader activities
of assessing, levying, and collecting taxes.” Id.; see, e.g., Dawson v. Childs, 665
F.2d 705, 710 (5th Cir. Unit A 1982) (TIA barred attempt to enjoin state tax
lien).
The TIA bars this lawsuit. Hammonds challenges the sale of his
property in order to collect delinquent property taxes, penalties, interest, and
fees owed to Dallas County and various other local taxing units. This practice
is authorized by Texas law as a mechanism for tax collection. See Tex. Tax
Code Ann. § 33.41; id. § 33.53. The sale was part of the “collection of [a]
tax under State law.” 28 U.S.C. § 1341; accord Washington, 338 F.3d at 444
(TIA barred challenge to nonpayment penalty). Moreover, Texas state
courts provide “a plain, speedy, and efficient remedy” for Hammonds’
complaints. Id.; see McQueen v. Bullock, 907 F.2d 1544, 1550 (5th Cir. 1990)
(noting that “Texas has a vast arsenal to assure orderly adjudication of
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Case: 19-10297 Document: 00515523431 Page: 3 Date Filed: 08/11/2020
No. 19-10297
serious federal constitutional questions” (cleaned up)); Dawson, 665 F.2d at
710 (Texas state courts provided adequate remedy in action to enjoin state
tax lien); Clark v. Andrews Cty. Appraisal Dist., 76 F. App’x 525, 526 (5th Cir.
2003) (Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment challenges against county taxing
authorities could be adequately adjudicated in Texas state court).
Hammonds argues the TIA does not bar his suit because his property
was not subject to taxation under Texas law. This misses the point: the TIA
bars us from determining whether a state tax was properly administered if the
result may be to “enjoin, suspend or restrain” tax collection. Hammonds also
appears to argue that the TIA does not apply because he alleges violations of
his civil and constitutional rights. But we have consistently applied the TIA
to bar such claims. See, e.g., McQueen, 907 F.2d 1544.
Accordingly, the district court did not err in dismissing Hammonds’s
claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We do not address
Hammonds’s claim, raised for the first time here, that the district court had
jurisdiction over his claims pursuant to an exception to the Anti-Injunction
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283.
AFFIRMED.
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