Edgar Patton v. Phillip Bryant , 584 F. App'x 242 ( 2014 )


Menu:
  •      Case: 14-60148      Document: 00512843567         Page: 1    Date Filed: 11/20/2014
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    No. 14-60148
    FILED
    November 20, 2014
    Summary Calendar
    Lyle W. Cayce
    Clerk
    EDGAR PATTON,
    Plaintiff-Appellant
    v.
    PHILLIP “PHIL” BRYANT; RANDAL THOMAS; MICHAEL “MIKE” HOWIE;
    JOSEPH H. LOPER, JR.; CHARLES MORGAN, III; AUSTIN VOLLOR;
    FRANK G. VOLLOR; CHARLES “DOUG” EVANS; KIMBERLY “KIM” MING;
    CAROLYN CRAWLEY MOORE; MICHAEL “MIKE” FULLER; MORRIS
    SWEAT; WILLIAM “BILL” WALLER, JR.; JIMMY “JIM” HOOD;
    CHRISTOPHER B. EPPS; THREE UNIDENTIFIED U.S. MARSHALS;
    DEFORREST “FORREST” ALLGOOD,
    Defendants-Appellees
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Mississippi
    USDC No. 3:13-cv-485
    Before SMITH, WIENER, and ELROD, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM: *
    Plaintiff-Appellant Edgar Patton, formerly Mississippi prisoner #
    165211, filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that the defendants,
    in relation to his 2009 arrest and subsequent criminal convictions for (1)
    * Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH
    CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    Case: 14-60148     Document: 00512843567    Page: 2   Date Filed: 11/20/2014
    No. 14-60148
    obtaining a thing of value with the intent to defraud and (2) fraudulently using
    identifying information to obtain a thing of value, had violated his
    constitutional rights and miscalculated his sentence. He appeals the district
    court’s dismissal of his complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
    12(b)(6).
    Patton claims that the district court erred by dismissing his claims,
    which called into question the validity of his conviction and sentence, as barred
    under Heck v. Humphrey, 
    512 U.S. 477
    , 486-87 (1994). He argues, based on
    concurring and dissenting opinions in Spencer v. Kemma, 
    523 U.S. 1
    (1998),
    that he should have been allowed to raise his claims in a § 1983 action because
    he is no longer in custody and has no habeas remedy available to challenge the
    validity of his convictions or sentences.    We have rejected that argument
    previously. Randell v. Johnson, 
    227 F.3d 300
    , 301 (5th Cir. 2000).
    Next, Patton challenges the dismissal of his claims with prejudice to the
    extent they were barred by judicial, prosecutorial, and qualified immunity. He
    contends that the defendants were not entitled to immunity because they
    engaged in a private conspiracy against him. Patton’s conclusional allegations
    are insufficient to pierce any applicable immunity. See Arsenaux v. Roberts,
    
    726 F.2d 1022
    , 1024 (5th Cir. 1982); see also Holloway v. Walker, 
    765 F.2d 517
    ,
    522 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding that allegations of conspiracy will not void
    immunity for judicial acts).
    Finally, Patton contends that the district court erred in denying him
    leave to amend his complaint, but he failed to identify any new facts that would
    have affected the disposition of his claims. Amendment is not required if it
    would be futile.     Whitley v. Hanna, 
    726 F.3d 631
    , 648 (5th Cir. 2013),
    cert. denied, 
    134 S. Ct. 1935
    (2014).
    AFFIRMED.
    2