Refugio Avila-Perez v. Loretta Lynch , 672 F. App'x 402 ( 2016 )


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  •      Case: 15-60833      Document: 00513814008         Page: 1    Date Filed: 12/28/2016
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    No. 15-60833
    Summary Calendar
    United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    December 28, 2016
    REFUGIO AVILA-PEREZ, also known as Refugio Avila,
    Lyle W. Cayce
    Clerk
    Petitioner
    v.
    LORETTA LYNCH, U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,
    Respondent
    Petition for Review of an Order of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    BIA No. A091 834 404
    Before BENAVIDES, DENNIS, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM: *
    Refugio Avila-Perez, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review
    of the order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denying his motion to
    reopen his removal proceedings. The BIA denied the motion as untimely and
    declined to reopen the proceedings sua sponte. In his petition for review, Avila-
    Perez argues that the BIA abused its discretion in denying his motion, erred
    in finding that equitable tolling was not warranted, and should have exercised
    * Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH
    CIR. R. 47.5.4.
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    No. 15-60833
    its sua sponte authority to reopen the removal proceedings. He asserts that he
    acted with due diligence because he filed his motion immediately after he
    consulted an attorney and that the BIA’s denial of the motion has resulted in
    a violation of his due process rights.
    We lack jurisdiction to review whether the BIA should have exercised its
    sua sponte authority to reopen the case. See Ramos-Bonilla v. Mukasey, 
    543 F.3d 216
    , 219-20 (5th Cir. 2008). The BIA’s denial of the motion to reopen as
    untimely is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Lugo-Resendez v. Lynch, 
    831 F.3d 337
    , 340 (5th Cir. 2016); Harris v. Boyd Tunica, Inc., 
    628 F.3d 237
    , 239
    (5th Cir. 2010) (reviewing a determination that equitable tolling is not
    warranted for an abuse of discretion). Motions to reopen removal proceedings
    are disfavored, and the moving party must satisfy a heavy burden.
    Altamirano-Lopez v. Gonzales, 
    435 F.3d 547
    , 549 (5th Cir. 2006). To be entitled
    to equitable tolling, an alien must show that he pursued his rights with
    “reasonable diligence” and that an extraordinary circumstance beyond his
    control prevented him from complying with the applicable deadline. Lugo-
    
    Resendez, 831 F.3d at 344
    .
    Avila-Perez has not shown that the BIA abused its discretion. Although
    Avila-Perez relies on United States v. Chapa-Garza, 
    243 F.3d 921
    , 927 (5th Cir.
    2001), to show a change in the law, Chapa-Garza was decided in 2001, and he
    did not file his motion to reopen until 2015. Even if he is correct that he could
    not have filed the motion until 2012 when this court invalidated the post-
    departure bar in Garcia-Carias v. Holder, 
    697 F.3d 257
    (5th Cir. 2012), he did
    not file his motion until three years later in 2015. He states that he filed the
    motion immediately after he consulted an attorney in January 2015, but he
    does not explain why he could not have consulted an attorney at an earlier
    date. Because he did not argue in his motion filed in the BIA that the delay
    2
    Case: 15-60833   Document: 00513814008    Page: 3   Date Filed: 12/28/2016
    No. 15-60833
    should be excused because he had difficulty negotiating immigration laws and
    was an illegal alien and because it did not prejudice the Department of
    Homeland Security, these arguments are unexhausted and will not be
    considered. See Omari v. Holder, 
    562 F.3d 314
    , 319 (5th Cir. 2009). Further,
    contrary to his argument, the change in the law concerning whether his DWI
    conviction is an aggravated felony for removal purposes did not affect the
    validity of the conviction. Finally, Avila-Perez has not shown that the BIA
    violated his due process rights by denying his motion to reopen the
    proceedings.   See Ovalles v. Holder, 
    577 F.3d 288
    , 299 (5th Cir. 2009);
    
    Altamirano-Lopez, 435 F.3d at 550-51
    .
    For the foregoing reasons, Avila-Perez’s petition for review is
    DISMISSED in part for lack of jurisdiction and DENIED in part.
    3