United States v. Angela Williams ( 2020 )

Case: 19-50066 Document: 00515580929 Page: 1 Date Filed: 09/28/2020
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
September 28, 2020
No. 19-50066 Lyle W. Cayce
Summary Calendar Clerk
United States of America,
Plaintiff—Appellee,
versus
Angela Michelle Williams,
Defendant—Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
USDC No. 7:18-CR-37-1
Before Haynes, Willett, and Ho, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
A jury convicted Angela Michelle Williams of possession with intent
to distribute crack cocaine and distribution of cocaine. Law enforcement
officials discovered crack cocaine on Williams’s person during a strip search
after she was arrested for traffic violations.
*
Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
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No. 19-50066
Williams appeals her convictions, arguing that the district court erred
by denying her first motion to suppress, her motion for reconsideration, and
her second motion to suppress. She argues that the evidence of drugs found
on her person during her post-arrest strip search should have been
suppressed because there was not cause to stop her, detain her, or take her to
the jail to be strip searched. She further argues that the evidence does not
support her conviction of distribution of cocaine because the government’s
witnesses were not credible and she cannot be identified in the video
evidence, taken by a cooperating witness, of a controlled drug buy.
In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we review for clear
error the district court’s factual findings, and we review de novo a traffic
stop’s constitutionality, including whether reasonable suspicion existed to
initiate the stop. See United States v. Cervantes, 797 F.3d 326, 328 (5th Cir.
2015). When “a district court’s denial of a suppression motion is based on
live oral testimony, the clearly erroneous standard is particularly strong
because the judge had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the
witnesses.” United States v. Gibbs, 421 F.3d 352, 357 (5th Cir. 2005).
In this case, Detective Sedillo testified at the suppression hearing that
he saw Williams drift between two lanes and change lanes without signaling,
and that he relayed those observations to Officers Rodriguez and Gonzalez,
who conducted the traffic stop. Accordingly, the initial stop was justified
under the doctrine of collective knowledge. See United States v. Ibarra-
Sanchez, 199 F.3d 753, 759-60 (5th Cir. 1999); accord United States v. Molinero
Puente, 778 F. App’x 311, 312 (5th Cir. 2019) (affirming denial of motion to
suppress based on arrest for traffic violations observed by one officer and
communicated to another arresting officer). This collective knowledge also
justifies arresting Williams for the traffic offenses. See Atwater v. City of Lago
Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001).
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No. 19-50066
Furthermore, testimony and body-camera recordings from the traffic
stop demonstrate that Officer Rodriguez observed that Williams had red
eyes, asserted multiple times she had not been drinking, and was
argumentative and “squirrely” during the pat-down search. Officer
Rodriguez could reasonably have suspected that Williams’s failure to
maintain her lane of travel was related to drug or alcohol use, which justified
extending the length of the detention. See Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S.
348, 354–55, 358 (2015) (requiring reasonable suspicion to detain a person
longer than reasonably necessary to complete the mission of the traffic stop).
Because the traffic stop and arrest did not violate Williams’s Fourth
Amendment rights, the district court did not err by denying her pretrial
motions.
Williams preserved her sufficiency-of-the-evidence argument about
her distribution conviction, thereby preserving a de novo standard of review.
See United States v. Frye, 489 F.3d 201, 207 (5th Cir. 2007); United States v.
Resio-Trejo, 45 F.3d 907, 910 n.6 (5th Cir. 1995). Therefore, in considering
the evidence supporting that conviction, we must determine whether “any
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979).
All evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom must be construed in the
prosecution’s favor. United States v. Rodriguez, 553 F.3d 380, 389 (5th Cir.
2008). A jury is free to choose among any reasonable construction of the
evidence, see United States v. Meza, 701 F.3d 411, 422–23 (5th Cir. 2012), and
we will not second-guess the jury’s reasonable determinations of evidentiary
weight and witness credibility, United States v. Mendoza, 522 F.3d 482, 489
(5th Cir. 2008).
To prove that Williams distributed cocaine, the government had to
prove that she “(1) knowingly (2) distributed (3) the controlled substance.”
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United States v. Sotelo, 97 F.3d 782, 789 (5th Cir. 1996). The video of the
controlled buy, plus testimony from the cooperating witness who filmed it,
Detective Sedillo, and a forensic scientist, gave the jury sufficient evidence
to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Williams knowingly distributed
cocaine. See id.
The record does not demonstrate that Williams is entitled to relief on
appeal. Consequently, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
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