United States v. Lawrence Gaderson ( 2020 )


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  • Case: 20-20079     Document: 00515600175         Page: 1     Date Filed: 10/13/2020
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Fifth Circuit                         United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    October 13, 2020
    No. 20-20079                       Lyle W. Cayce
    consolidated with                           Clerk
    No. 20-20102
    Summary Calendar
    United States of America,
    Plaintiff—Appellee,
    versus
    Lawrence Gaderson, also known as LJ, also known as Head,
    Defendant—Appellant.
    Appeals from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Texas
    USDC No. 4:19-CR-134-1
    Before King, Smith, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.
    Per Curiam:*
    Lawrence Gaderson appeals his conviction and within-guidelines
    sentence for possession with intent to distribute a mixture or substance
    *
    Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
    opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
    circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
    Case: 20-20079        Document: 00515600175             Page: 2      Date Filed: 10/13/2020
    No. 20-20079
    c/w No. 20-20102
    containing cocaine base. He contends that the district court erred by
    (1) denying his motion to suppress evidence and (2) assigning criminal
    history points under the Sentencing Guidelines for prior state convictions
    that he is presently challenging on collateral review.
    “In reviewing a district court’s denial of a motion to suppress, we
    review the district court’s findings of fact for clear error and its conclusions
    of law de novo.” United States v. Lopez-Moreno, 
    420 F.3d 420
    , 429 (5th Cir.
    2005) (citation omitted). Here, the district court concluded that the police’s
    seizure of Gaderson and subsequent discovery of narcotics evidence on
    Gaderson’s person were reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. In
    reaching this conclusion, the court determined that the police either had
    reasonable suspicion or probable cause that Gaderson engaged in narcotics
    distribution.
    On appeal, Gaderson challenges only the determination that probable
    cause existed to arrest and search him. He does not dispute—at least not in
    more than a conclusory fashion—the district court’s determinations that (1)
    sufficient reasonable suspicion of criminal activity existed to justify the
    investigatory stop at its inception, or (2) the stop, during which the
    challenged drugs were discovered, did not exceed its lawful scope.1 See
    United States v. Brigham, 
    382 F.3d 500
    , 506–07 (5th Cir. 2004); see generally
    Terry v. Ohio, 
    392 U.S. 1
    , 30 (1968). Gaderson has thus waived appeal of the
    district court’s reasonable suspicion finding. See United States v. Reagan, 596
    1
    In a footnote, Gaderson avers that he “assumes for the sake of argument [his]
    conduct was suspicious,” but states that he “does not concede that there was reasonable
    suspicion of criminal activity to detain him for further investigation.” Gaderson provides
    no further argument or briefing on this subject.
    2
    Case: 20-20079      Document: 00515600175          Page: 3    Date Filed: 10/13/2020
    No. 20-20079
    c/w No. 20-20102
    F.3d 251, 254 (5th Cir. 2010); Brinkmann v. Dallas Cnty. Deputy Sheriff
    Abner, 
    813 F.2d 744
    , 748 (5th Cir. 1987).
    Further, Gaderson fails to show that the officers’ use of drawn
    weapons, handcuffs, physical force, and verbal commands in detaining him
    was unreasonable under the circumstances so as to convert the Terry stop
    into an arrest requiring probable cause ab initio. See United States v. Sanders,
    
    994 F.2d 200
    , 206–08 (5th Cir. 1993). To the contrary, the record contains
    extensive testimony about Gaderson’s violent criminal history and the
    officers’ concerns that Gaderson might be armed when they approached him.
    Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s denial of the motion to suppress.
    See 
    Lopez-Moreno, 420 F.3d at 429
    .
    Finally, Gaderson’s challenge to the calculation of his sentence is not
    ripe for review because he fails to show a sufficient likelihood that the Texas
    courts will set aside his challenged 2007 aggravated-assault convictions. See
    United States v. Carmichael, 
    343 F.3d 756
    , 761 (5th Cir. 2003). We therefore
    lack jurisdiction to consider this issue. See United States v. Magana, 
    837 F.3d 457
    , 460 (5th Cir. 2016).
    The judgment is AFFIRMED in part, and the appeal is
    DISMISSED in part for lack of jurisdiction.
    3