People of Michigan v. Jeremy Dshawn Weatherspoon ( 2014 )


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  •                           STATE OF MICHIGAN
    COURT OF APPEALS
    PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,                                    UNPUBLISHED
    November 20, 2014
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v                                                                   No. 317242
    Ottawa Circuit Court
    JEREMY DSHAWN WEATHERSPOON,                                         LC No. 13-037212-FH
    Defendant-Appellee.
    Before: BOONSTRA, P.J., and DONOFRIO and GLEICHER, JJ.
    PER CURIAM.
    Following a preliminary examination, the district court bound defendant over on charges
    of resisting and obstructing an officer, MCL 750.81d(1), and domestic violence, MCL 750.81(2).
    Defendant sought to quash the information in the circuit court, arguing that the officers illegally
    entered his dwelling. The circuit court agreed and the prosecutor now appeals. Because exigent
    circumstances and the need to provide emergency aid supported the warrantless entry, we reverse
    and remand for continued proceedings.
    I. BACKGROUND
    At defendant’s preliminary examination, Ottawa County Sheriff’s Deputy Tyler
    VanDoeselaar testified that he responded to an early morning report of a possible domestic
    violence situation. The deputy approached the subject apartment and “heard multiple male and
    female voices inside arguing.” The voices “sounded to be yelling amongst each other” and “it
    sounded heated.” Deputy VanDoeselaar knocked, “but no one came to the door and all the
    voices inside quieted.” Two other deputies arrived on the scene, they continued to knock on the
    door and announced their identity for approximately 20 minutes, to no avail. At one point, the
    deputies observed a female peek through the blinds and then disappear.
    Deputy VanDoeselaar spoke to the individual who had contacted 911. That individual
    confirmed “that a domestic [sic] had possibly occurred with a child involved.”1 The deputies
    1
    The victim testified at the preliminary examination that defendant was her boyfriend. She
    alleged that he assaulted her when she tried to leave with her infant and physically forced her to
    reenter the apartment against her will.
    -1-
    then knocked and announced again and warned that if the residents did not answer, the deputies
    “would break the door down.” Ultimately, the deputies resorted to kicking in the door. There
    was an approximately 30-minute delay between the first deputy’s arrival and the entry into the
    apartment. Inside, the deputies secured defendant and his brother while they interviewed
    defendant’s girlfriend, the victim of the domestic violence. Defendant was uncooperative and
    physically resisted, resulting in the resisting and obstructing charge.
    After the district court bound defendant over on charges of domestic violence and
    resisting and obstructing, defendant filed a circuit court motion to quash the information.
    Defendant argued that the domestic violence report combined with arguing voices inside an
    apartment were insufficient grounds “to justify a warrantless, forcible and nonconsensual entry”
    into defendant’s residence. The circumstances did not rise to a level of exigent circumstances, in
    defendant’s estimation. As the entry was illegal, defendant continued, his arrest was illegal and
    defendant was within his right to resist that arrest. See People v Moreno, 
    491 Mich. 38
    ; 814
    NW2d 624 (2012).
    The circuit court conducted a hearing based on the evidence developed at the preliminary
    examination. The circuit court quashed the information, ruling:
    In this case, however, the Court is convinced that, because the police heard no
    specific threats and because the noise inside the building had subsided and had
    done so for 20 minutes, the Court believes that the officers could have and should
    have obtained a warrant for entry, and that . . . the arrest of the defendant is
    tainted by the illegal entry, and he had the right to resist . . . an illegal arrest.
    This appeal followed.
    II. ANALYSIS
    The prosecutor first contends that the circuit court abused its discretion in failing to
    conduct an evidentiary hearing on defendant’s motion to quash, instead relying solely on the
    preliminary examination testimony. See People v Unger, 
    278 Mich. App. 210
    , 216-217; 749
    NW2d 272 (2008) (noting that preserved challenges to the failure to conduct an evidentiary
    hearing are reviewed for an abuse of discretion). The prosecutor raised no objection to this
    practice below, and our review is therefore limited to plain error affecting substantial rights.
    People v Carines, 
    460 Mich. 750
    , 763-764; 597 NW2d 130 (1990). MCR 6.110(D) permits the
    parties in a criminal action to rely on preliminary examination testimony in a post-examination
    motion to exclude evidence. See People v Kaufman, 
    457 Mich. 266
    , 275-276; 577 NW2d 466
    (1998) (holding that the parties in a criminal action may stipulate to resolving a motion to
    suppress on the preliminary examination transcript). Defendant’s motion to quash specifically
    indicated his reliance on the preliminary examination testimony alone. Absent a request from
    the prosecutor for a separate hearing, we can discern no error on the circuit court’s part in this
    regard.
    -2-
    The prosecutor also challenges the substance of the circuit court’s decision to quash the
    information. We review the decision to quash for an abuse of discretion and underlying
    “interpretation of the law related to [the] decision” de novo. People v Waterstone, 296 Mich
    App 121, 152-153; 818 NW2d 432 (2012).
    The prosecutor contended below that the deputies were required to conduct an
    “emergency entry into the residence” because they were “[c]oncerned about the welfare and
    wellbeing of both the female victim in this case and the child.”
    Both the United States and Michigan Constitutions guarantee the right
    against unreasonable searches and seizures. US Const, Am IV, and Const 1963,
    art 1, § 11. The lawfulness of a search or seizure depends on its reasonableness.
    Illinois v McArthur, 
    531 U.S. 326
    ; 
    121 S. Ct. 946
    ; 
    148 L. Ed. 2d 838
    (2001); People
    v Snider, 
    239 Mich. App. 393
    , 406; 608 NW2d 502 (2000). As a general rule,
    searches conducted without a warrant are per se unreasonable under the Fourth
    Amendment unless the police conduct falls under one of the established
    exceptions to the warrant requirement. People v Borchard-Ruhland, 
    460 Mich. 278
    , 293-294; 597 NW2d 1 (1999); People v Davis, 
    442 Mich. 1
    , 10; 497 NW2d
    910 (1993); 
    Snider, 239 Mich. App. at 407
    . [People v Beuschlein, 
    245 Mich. App. 744
    , 749; 630 NW2d 921 (2001).]
    Relevant to this appeal, an “established exception[] to the warrant requirement” exists in
    the presence of “exigent circumstances.” In re Forfeiture of $176,598, 
    443 Mich. 261
    , 266; 505
    NW2d 201 (1993).
    Pursuant to the exigent circumstances exception, . . . the police may enter a
    dwelling without a warrant if the officers possess probable cause to believe that a
    crime was recently committed on the premises, and probable cause to believe that
    the premises contain evidence or perpetrators of the suspected crime. The police
    must further establish the existence of an actual emergency on the basis of
    specific and objective facts indicating that immediate action is necessary to (1)
    prevent the imminent destruction of evidence, (2) protect the police officers or
    others, or (3) prevent the escape of a suspect. [Id. at 271.]
    “Probable cause,” as required to justify a warrantless entry, “exists when the facts and
    circumstances known to the police officers at the time of the search would lead a reasonably
    prudent person to believe that a crime has been or is being committed and that evidence will be
    found in a particular place.” 
    Beuschlein, 245 Mich. App. at 750
    .
    Here, the Ottawa County Sheriff’s Department received a 911 call reporting a possible
    domestic assault. Upon arrival, Deputy VanDoeselaar heard a heated argument inside the
    apartment. Yet, the occupants refused to answer the door even after the deputy identified
    himself as a law enforcement official. Shortly thereafter, deputies observed a female peeking
    from the window blinds. Deputy VanDoeselaar conferred with the reporting individual and
    learned that a child may be involved in the domestic assault situation. The information available
    to the deputies was sufficient to create “probable cause to believe that a crime was recently
    committed on the premises” and that the perpetrator and victim were inside the apartment. In re
    -3-
    
    Forfeiture, 443 Mich. at 271
    . The available information also “establish[ed] the existence of an
    actual emergency” necessitating “immediate action” to protect the victim and child. 
    Id. Defendant contends
    that the 30-minute delay between Deputy VanDoeselaar’s arrival and
    the entry negates any finding of exigent circumstances. We will not adopt a rule that prevents
    law enforcement officials from taking immediate action to protect citizens simply because they
    first investigated the situation to avoid a rash and unnecessary result. In this regard we find
    instructive the opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in United States v Najar,
    451 F3d 710 (CA 10, 2006).2 In Najar, the officers responding to the scene of a reported
    domestic assault waited to force entry until they had knocked several times on the door,
    conducted a perimeter search, and attempted telephone contact with the home’s occupants. 
    Id. at 716-717.
    The Tenth Circuit held, “A delay caused by a reasonable investigation into the
    situation facing the officers does not obviate the existence of an emergency.” 
    Id. at 719.
    Rather
    than use the delay to exclude evidence from the warrantless search, the court commended the
    officers: “[T]he delay was due to the officers’ repeated and increasingly vigorous attempts to
    make contact with the person they could see inside. To their credit, they did not simply batter
    down the door. We applaud their restraint and circumspection.” 
    Id. The prosecutor
    also relies on the “emergency-aid exception” to the warrant requirement.
    Under this exception, “police officers [may] enter a dwelling without a warrant under
    circumstances in which they reasonably believe, based on specific, articulable facts, that some
    person within is in need of immediate aid.” People v Tierney, 
    266 Mich. App. 687
    , 704; 703
    NW2d 204 (2005). “[T]he entry must be limited to the justification therefor, and the officer may
    not do more than is reasonably necessary to determine whether a person is in need of assistance,
    and to provide that assistance.” 
    Beuschlein, 245 Mich. App. at 756
    .
    The deputies arrived at the scene of a domestic assault in which a woman and infant were
    placed in danger. All information led to the conclusion that the woman and child were inside the
    apartment. Arguing was heard when the deputies arrived. The quieting of the argument upon
    the announcement of law enforcement’s arrival did not necessarily reflect the end of the conflict,
    as defendant suggests, but could just as easily have signified an unlawful imprisonment of the
    woman and child, as noted by the prosecutor. Moreover, the deputies did not exceed the scope
    of action permitted under the exception. It was reasonable to handcuff defendant and his brother
    while the deputies interviewed the victim. See Brendlin v California, 
    551 U.S. 249
    , 258; 
    127 S. Ct. 2400
    ; 
    168 L. Ed. 2d 132
    (2007) (“It is . . . reasonable . . . to expect that a police officer at the
    scene of a crime, arrest, or investigation will not let people move around in ways that could
    jeopardize his safety.”)
    2
    Lower federal court decisions are not binding, but we may consider them persuasive. People v
    Fomby, 
    300 Mich. App. 46
    , 50 n 1; 831 NW2d 887 (2013).
    -4-
    Ultimately, the deputies’ warrantless entry into defendant’s apartment was justified under
    two separate exceptions to the warrant requirement. As the entry was legal, the evidence
    uncovered regarding the domestic violence is admissible and defendant was not entitled to resist
    arrest as described in Moreno. The circuit court therefore abused its discretion in quashing the
    information.
    We reverse and remand for further proceedings. We do not retain jurisdiction.
    /s/ Mark T. Boonstra
    /s/ Pat M. Donofrio
    /s/ Elizabeth L. Gleicher
    -5-