United States v. Garansuay ( 2021 )

Case: 19-50964 Document: 00515765608 Page: 1 Date Filed: 03/04/2021
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
March 4, 2021
No. 19-50964
Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
United States of America,
Plaintiff—Appellee,
versus
Alfred Garansuay, also known as Alfred,
Defendant—Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
USDC No. 5:17-CR-391-23
Before Higginbotham, Costa, and Oldham, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
Alfred Garansuay was a “prospect” of the Texas Mexican Mafia
(TMM) and involved in the group’s drug-trafficking activities in San
Antonio. 1 For conduct related to his involvement in TMM, he was charged
*
Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
1
TMM is a hierarchical organization that includes a president, a vice president,
generals, captains, lieutenants, sergeants, soldiers, prospects, and associates.
Case: 19-50964 Document: 00515765608 Page: 2 Date Filed: 03/04/2021
No. 19-50964
with and pleaded guilty to conspiracy to interfere with commerce by threats
or violence and conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute
methamphetamine and heroin. 2 The district court sentenced Garansuay to
concurrent terms of 240 months of imprisonment on the interference-with-
commerce charge and 300 months of imprisonment on the drug-conspiracy
charge. On appeal, he challenges several of the district court’s
determinations under the Sentencing Guidelines, as well as the substantive
reasonableness of his sentence.
We review the district court’s application of the Sentencing
Guidelines de novo and its factual findings for clear error. 3 “There is no clear
error if the district court’s finding is plausible in light of the record as a
whole.” 4
Garansuay initially presents two arguments that he concedes are
foreclosed by our precedents. First, he argues the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments require that he be given the opportunity to cross-examine his
accusers at sentencing, which is foreclosed by United States v. Navarro. 5
Second, he argues the district court was required to find that he knew the
methamphetamine was imported to apply an enhancement under
2
See 18 U.S.C. § 1951; 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(B), 846.
3
See United States v. Gomez-Alvarez, 781 F.3d 787, 791 (5th Cir. 2015).
4
United States v. Cisneros-Gutierrez, 517 F.3d 751, 764 (5th Cir. 2008) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).
5
169 F.3d 228, 236 (5th Cir. 1999) (“[T]here is no Confrontation Clause right at
sentencing . . . .”).
2
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No. 19-50964
§ 2D1.1(b)(5), which is foreclosed by United States v. Serfass. 6 He makes
these arguments solely to preserve them for further review.
Next, Garansuay contends that the district court clearly erred in
finding he: (1) was accountable for over 4.5 kilograms of methamphetamine,
yielding a base offense level of 38; 7 (2) possessed a dangerous weapon in
connection with the drug-trafficking conspiracy, warranting a two-level
enhancement; 8 and (3) used violence during the conspiracy, supporting
another two-level enhancement. 9 These findings were supported by evidence
with sufficient indicia of reliability, including the presentence report,
testimony at sentencing of an agent for the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
and the trial record of Garansuay’s co-defendants. 10 As that evidence was
unrebutted by Garansuay, he fails to show that the district court’s findings
were clearly erroneous. 11
Garansuay also argues the district court clearly erred in finding that
he attempted to obstruct the administration of justice, justifying an additional
two-level enhancement. 12 While that finding was also likely plausible in light
6
684 F.3d 548, 553 (5th Cir. 2012) (“[A] defendant who possesses
methamphetamine that had itself been unlawfully imported is subject to the enhancement,
whether or not he knew of that importation . . . .”).
7
See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(a)(5), (c)(1).
8
See id. § 2D1.1(b)(1).
9
See id. § 2D1.1(b)(2).
10
See United States v. Harris, 702 F.3d 226, 230 (5th Cir. 2012) (per curiam);
United States v. Betancourt, 422 F.3d 240, 246–47 (5th Cir. 2005).
11
See Harris, 702 F.3d at 230–31; United States v. Rodriguez, 602 F.3d 346, 363 (5th
Cir. 2010) (“Because no testimony or other evidence was submitted to rebut the
information in the PSR, the district court was free to adopt the PSR’s findings without
further inquiry or explanation.”).
12
See U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1.
3
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No. 19-50964
of the record, we need not decide this closer issue, as any error in applying
the enhancement was harmless. Removing this enhancement would reduce
Garansuay’s offense level from 48 to 46. With a criminal history of category
IV, his imprisonment range would remain life in prison. 13 Accordingly, any
error committed by the district court in applying this enhancement was
harmless, as it had no impact on Garansuay’s sentencing range. 14
Finally, Garansuay contends that his within-guidelines 300-month
sentence is substantively unreasonable because it does not account
sufficiently for his medical mitigating factors, his close ties to his family, and
the fact that he admitted his actions and pleaded guilty. His arguments on
appeal are nothing more than a disagreement with the district court’s
weighing of the applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, which is insufficient
to rebut the presumption of reasonableness attached to his within-guidelines
sentence. 15
The district court’s judgment is affirmed.
13
See id. Ch. 5, Pt. A n.2.
14
See United States v. Smith, 822 F.3d 755, 765–66 (5th Cir. 2016) (per curiam).
15
See United States v. Hernandez, 876 F.3d 161, 166 (5th Cir. 2017) (per curiam)
(“A sentence within the Guidelines range is presumptively reasonable, and this
presumption is rebutted only if the appellant demonstrates that the sentence does not
account for a factor that should receive significant weight, gives significant weight to an
irrelevant or improper factor, or represents a clear error of judgment in balancing
sentencing factors.”).
4