United States v. Johnson ( 2021 )

Case: 20-30348 Document: 00515768210 Page: 1 Date Filed: 03/05/2021
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
March 5, 2021
No. 20-30348 Lyle W. Cayce
Summary Calendar Clerk
United States of America,
Plaintiff—Appellee,
versus
Cory Darnell Johnson,
Defendant—Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Louisiana
USDC No. 3:19-CR-89-1
Before Davis, Stewart, and Dennis, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
The district court conducted a bench trial and convicted Cory Darnell
Johnson of possessing a firearm after having been convicted of a felony, see
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and sentenced him to a 63-month prison term and a
three-year term of supervised release. Johnson appeals, arguing that the
*
Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
Case: 20-30348 Document: 00515768210 Page: 2 Date Filed: 03/05/2021
No. 20-30348
district court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence seized as the
result of a search that he maintains was illegal. Because we conclude that the
district court did not err in its determination that Johnson lacks standing to
challenge the warrantless, nonconsensual search, we affirm. See United
States v. Pack, 612 F.3d 341, 347 (5th Cir.), opinion modified on denial of reh’g,
622 F.3d 383 (5th Cir. 2010).
Suspecting a traffic violation, an on-duty Louisiana police officer
stopped a Honda Accord driven by Benniesha Brown. Upon searching the
vehicle, the officer found a Smith and Wesson 9 mm handgun in a backpack
on the floorboard near Johnson, who occupied the front passenger seat and
who admitted that the weapon was his. Johnson moved to suppress all
evidence resulting from the search, arguing that the search was
unconstitutional because he had not consented to it, no probable cause for
the search existed, and the officer had no warrant authorizing the search.
Johnson and the officer were the only witnesses at the suppression
hearing. The officer testified that Brown was the registered owner of the
vehicle. Johnson testified that he had a property or possessory interest in the
vehicle because of his long-term unmarried domestic relationship with
Brown and because he had contributed $2,000 to the purchase price and
helped to pick out the vehicle. Noting that Johnson failed to produce
corroborating evidence to support his testimony, the district court declined
to credit that testimony. Additionally, the district court determined that
Johnson failed to establish an actual, subjective expectation of privacy with
respect to the Accord that society would recognize as objectively reasonable.
Consequently, the court determined that Johnson had failed to establish
standing to contest the search. Before trial, the parties stipulated to the
existence of facts sufficient to establish a violation of § 922(g)(1), assuming
the search of the vehicle was legal. See Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191,
2194 (2019); United States v. Ferguson, 211 F.3d 878, 885 n.4 (5th Cir. 2000).
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Case: 20-30348 Document: 00515768210 Page: 3 Date Filed: 03/05/2021
No. 20-30348
The Fourth Amendment guarantees individuals the right to be free of
unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV. A police
stop of a vehicle and the detention of its occupants constitutes a seizure under
the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Brigham, 382 F.3d 500, 506 (5th
Cir. 2004) (en banc); see Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 251 (2007). But
one aggrieved by an illegal search or seizure solely though the introduction of
evidence obtained by an invasion of a third person’s property has not had his
Fourth Amendment rights violated. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133
(1978). Johnson does not argue that his person was illegally seized by virtue
of the stop alone, and he does not claim that anything was taken from his
person. Therefore, to succeed in his challenge to the stop and search of the
Accord, Johnson must first establish that he had either “a property or
possessory interest in the vehicle.” United States v. Riazco, 91 F.3d 752, 754
(5th Cir. 1996); see United States v. Kelley, 981 F.2d 1464, 1467 (5th Cir. 1993).
Johnson does not satisfy his burden. See Riazco, 91 F.3d at 754. The
district court’s assessment of Johnson’s testimony carries great weight on
appeal. See United States v. Santiago, 410 F.3d 193, 197 (5th Cir. 2005).
Johnson’s conclusory assertions about social conventions and shared
automobiles and what the Constitution protects are insufficient to reverse the
district court’s ruling. See Garrido-Morato v. Gonzales, 485 F.3d 319, 321 n.1
(5th Cir. 2007). Because the assessment of the pertinent evidence and the
rejection of Johnson’s conclusory assertions by the district court together
provide a reasonable basis for upholding the suppression ruling, that ruling
will not be disturbed. See United States v. Michelletti, 13 F.3d 838, 841 (5th
Cir. 1994) (en banc).
AFFIRMED.
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