Shrimpers v. US Army Corps ( 2021 )


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  • Case: 20-60281     Document: 00515772530         Page: 1     Date Filed: 03/09/2021
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Fifth Circuit                       United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    March 9, 2021
    No. 20-60281                   Lyle W. Cayce
    Clerk
    Shrimpers and Fishermen of the RGV; Sierra Club; Save
    RGV from LNG,
    Petitioners,
    versus
    United States Army Corps of Engineers,
    Respondent.
    Petition for Review of an Order of
    the United States Army Corps of Engineers
    Agency No. SWG-2015-00114
    Before King, Elrod, and Willett, Circuit Judges.
    Per Curiam:*
    The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers issued a permit for a natural gas
    pipeline authorizing the discharge of fill material into waters of the United
    States. Petitioners now petition for review of that permit, alleging that the
    permit violates the Clean Water Act. But in the time since the permit was
    *
    Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
    opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
    circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
    Case: 20-60281      Document: 00515772530           Page: 2   Date Filed: 03/09/2021
    No. 20-60281
    issued, the project design for the pipeline has changed, and, shortly after this
    action was filed, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers suspended the permit
    while it reconsiders it. For the reasons that follow, we find the petition not
    ripe for review and so this petition is HELD IN ABEYANCE.
    I.
    Petitioners Shrimpers and Fisherman of the RGV, Sierra Club, and
    Save RGV from LNG (collectively, “Petitioners”) challenge whether
    Respondent, the United States Army Corps of Engineers (the “Corps”),
    violated the Clean Water Act, 
    33 U.S.C. § 1251
     et seq., (the “CWA”) in
    issuing a permit for a natural gas pipeline.
    The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) authorized
    Intervenors Rio Grande LNG, LLC and Rio Bravo Pipeline Company, LLC
    (collectively, “Intervenors”) to construct, operate, and maintain a liquefied
    natural gas terminal and pipeline in Texas. In 2016, when Intervenors first
    sought FERC authorization, the terminal would have included six
    liquefaction trains—that is, equipment systems that remove impurities from
    natural gas and cool it to liquid form—and, inter alia, a compressor station
    known as Compressor Station 3.
    After FERC authorized the project, the Corps issued the CWA
    permit. But in the time since FERC’s approval and the issuance of the permit
    the Intervenors have modified their project plan to eliminate two compressor
    stations, including Compressor Station 3, increase the pipeline’s size, and
    use five liquefaction trains instead of six. Accordingly and as requested by
    Intervenors, the permit is currently suspended while the Corps reconsiders
    it.
    Before the Corps suspended the permit, however, Petitioners filed
    this action, challenging the issuance of the permit based on the original
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    No. 20-60281
    design. For the reasons that follow, we find the petition is not ripe for review
    and therefore hold this appeal in abeyance.
    II.
    To determine whether claims are ripe for our review, we evaluate “the
    fitness of the issues for judicial decision and the hardship to the parties of
    withholding court consideration.” Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 
    387 U.S. 136
    , 149
    (1967). As part of this inquiry, in the administrative context, we look to four
    factors: (1) “whether the challenged agency action constitutes ‘final agency
    action,’ within the meaning of Section 10 of the Administrative Procedure
    Act, 
    5 U.S.C. § 704
    ”; (2) “whether the challenged agency action has or will
    have a direct and immediate impact upon the petitioners”; (3) “whether the
    issues presented are purely legal”; “and (4) whether resolution of the issues
    will foster, rather than impede, effective enforcement and administration by
    the agency.” Pennzoil Co. v. Fed. Energy Regul. Comm’n, 
    645 F.2d 394
    , 398
    (5th Cir. 1981) (citing Abbott Labs., 
    387 U.S. at
    149–54).
    III.
    Although the permit was seemingly final when the petition was filed,
    that is no longer the case. To be sure, the permit has been suspended, and a
    suspended permit is not “in effect.” See 
    33 C.F.R. § 325.6
    (a). Further, the
    Corps is reconsidering the permit, and after doing so, it may “reinstate,
    modify, or revoke” it. 
    Id.
     § 325.7(c). Against the backdrop of the four factors
    outlined in Pennzoil Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 
    645 F.2d at 398
    , for assessing ripeness of an agency action, this petition is not yet ripe for
    review.
    First, this permit is no longer final as it does not currently “mark the
    consummation of the agency’s decisionmaking process” and similarly does
    not currently determine “rights or obligations [from which] legal
    consequences will flow.” Bennett v. Spear, 
    520 U.S. 154
    , 177-78 (1997)
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    (cleaned up). This is so due to the suspension and reconsideration
    proceedings. Instead, the permit is now an interim step in the agency’s
    decision-making process. Indeed, this court has previously held that matters
    “still pending before [an agency] . . . [are] not yet ripe for judicial review.”
    La. Power & Light Co. v. Federal Power Comm’n, 
    526 F.2d 898
    , 910 (5th Cir.
    1976).
    This point is underscored by the design changes proposed by
    Intervenors, which may moot some or all of the alleged problems with the
    original design. See Devia v. U.S. Nuclear Regul. Comm’n, 
    492 F.3d 421
    , 426
    (D.C. Cir. 2007) (Garland, J.). Specifically, Petitioners have taken issue with
    the use of six liquefaction trains and Compressor Station 3, but in the new
    plan, the project would only have five liquefaction trains and would eliminate
    Compressor Station 3. To that end, as the Corps considers these design
    changes, they may squarely resolve Petitioners’ concerns and moot these
    arguments. Although Petitioners also challenge whether the Corps
    adequately considered and mitigated temporary impacts, any such
    modification of the permit might likewise address these issues. Plainly, at this
    juncture, it is simply “‘too speculative whether’ the validity of the [permit
    for the original design] is a problem that ‘will ever need solving.’” Devia, 
    492 F.3d at 426
     (quoting Texas v. United States, 
    523 U.S. 296
    , 302 (1998)).
    Second, because no construction has occurred or will occur while the
    permit is suspended, Petitioners have not experienced the necessary
    hardship, that is, a “direct or immediate impact.” Pennzoil Co., 
    645 F.2d at 398
    . To the extent that they might experience hardship in the future, such
    hardship is, at this point, speculative depending on the Corps’
    reconsideration and the potential design changes.
    Third, these concerns are subject to ongoing factual development as
    the Corps reconsiders the permit and are thus not purely legal issues.
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    Specifically, as part of its reconsideration proceedings, the Corps must
    evaluate the proposed changes, which includes a fact-intensive inquiry
    regarding impacts to the waters of the United States.1
    Finally, as this court has previously recognized, deciding issues that
    will be decided again by the agency may ultimately impede the agency’s
    ability to administer and enforce the relevant statute. See Miss. Valley Gas Co.
    v. Fed. Energy Regul. Comm’n, 
    659 F.2d 488
    , 499 (5th Cir. 1981); see also
    Pennzoil Co., 
    645 F.2d at 400
     (noting that courts should not rule on an agency
    decision that the agency “may wish to amend upon reconsideration”). In this
    case, the Corps should first complete its reconsideration of the permit in light
    of the CWA before the court considers the merits, as it is first the
    responsibility of the Corps to enforce the CWA. See Devia, 
    492 F.3d at 426, 428
     (holding a similar petition for review in abeyance where an administrative
    approval was pending). For these reasons, the petition is not yet ripe for
    review.
    IV.
    For the foregoing reasons, we will HOLD THIS PETITION IN
    ABEYANCE until the Corps completes its reconsideration proceedings of
    the currently suspended permit such that there is a live permit for us to
    consider. At such time, the parties are further directed to file supplemental
    briefing regarding their arguments. Finally, at argument, the government
    indicated that the reconsideration proceedings should be concluded by the
    end of March. Accordingly, at the end of March, the government should file
    a letter updating the court as to the status of those proceedings.
    1
    We note that although the suspension letter is not part of the administrative
    record, the court may consider materials outside of the administrative record when ripeness
    is at issue. See Manguriu v. Lynch, 
    794 F.3d 119
    , 120, 121 (1st Cir. 2015).
    5