McCollum v. Lewis ( 2021 )


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  • Case: 18-11480     Document: 00515798473          Page: 1    Date Filed: 03/26/2021
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Fifth Circuit                           United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    March 26, 2021
    No. 18-11480
    Lyle W. Cayce
    Clerk
    Frank D. McCollum, III,
    Plaintiff—Appellant,
    versus
    Gracie G. Lewis, Criminal District Court Number 3;
    Jane Doe, Dallas County Sex-Offender Community
    Supervisor; Leah McDonald, Dallas County Sex-
    Offender Adult Probation Officer; John Wiley Price,
    Dallas County Commissioner; Pete Henschel,
    Psychologist; Stacy Dupler, Sex Offender Therapist,
    Defendants—Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Texas
    USDC No. 3:18-CV-2351
    Before Owen, Chief Judge, and Davis and Dennis, Circuit Judges.
    Per Curiam:*
    The primary question presented in this appeal is whether a judgment
    *
    Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
    opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
    circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
    Case: 18-11480         Document: 00515798473        Page: 2   Date Filed: 03/26/2021
    No. 18-11480
    in favor of inmate Frank D. McCollum regarding his pro se civil rights claims
    would necessarily imply the invalidity of the revocation of his community
    supervision and attendant imposition of a term of imprisonment such that he
    is estopped from bringing those claims. The favorable termination rule
    outlined in Heck v. Humphrey 1 does not appear to foreclose at least one of
    McCollum’s claims. We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment in
    part and vacate in part, and remand for the district court to determine
    whether McCollum should be afforded an opportunity to amend his
    complaint against the sole remaining defendant.
    I
    McCollum sued Texas Criminal District Court Judge Gracie Lewis,
    Dallas County Sex Offender Community Supervision Director Jane Doe,
    Dallas County Sex Offender Adult Probation Officer Leah McDonald, Dallas
    County Commissioner John Price, psychologist Pete Henschel, and sex
    offender therapist Stacy Dupler (collectively, the County), alleging that they
    failed to accommodate or treat McCollum’s mental and physical disabilities
    while he served a term of community supervision during his deferred
    adjudication for aggravated sexual assault of a child under the age of
    fourteen. 2 The state district court revoked that term when it determined that
    McCollum violated multiple supervision conditions. 3         The court then
    adjudicated McCollum guilty of the offense and sentenced him to fifteen
    years of imprisonment. 4 McCollum had pleaded “true” to violating his
    1
    
    512 U.S. 477
     (1994).
    2
    See McCollum v. State, No. 05-15-01056-CR, 
    2016 WL 8115929
    , at *1 (Tex.
    App.—Dallas Oct. 27, 2016, no pet.).
    3
    
    Id.
    4
    
    Id.
    2
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    No. 18-11480
    conditions of supervision by failing to pay community supervision and drug
    testing fees, and by failing to complete community service. 5 Noting that
    proof of even a single violation of community supervision sufficed to support
    revocation, the Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment, holding that
    McCollum’s pleas of true made revocation proper. 6 The appeals court also
    affirmed the district court’s finding that McCollum violated the supervision
    condition requiring him to participate in sex offender treatment. 7
    The “STATEMENT OF CLAIM” section of McCollum’s
    complaint explains that the “substance of this claim is contained in the
    original writ of mandamus” in Appeal No. 17-11251. The complaint also
    refers to a then-pending civil rights case, McCollum v. Valdez. 8 Finally, the
    complaint refers to an addendum. That addendum alleged the acts or
    omissions of each of the listed defendants as follows: Judge Lewis
    established and perpetuated policies for persons with mental illness and
    physical disabilities that prevented McCollum from accessing and enjoying
    services for those in community supervision with mental illness. Officer
    McDonald denied modifications to McCollum’s community supervision
    terms and conditions after being notified by the Dallas Veterans Affairs (VA)
    hospital of his mental illness; denied McCollum access to services and
    programs for persons in community supervision found to have mental illness;
    and created a false narrative that McCollum did not have mental illness or
    other serious health issues.           Community Supervisor Doe enforced
    McDonald’s requirement that McCollum cease and desist claiming mental
    5
    See 
    id.
    6
    Id. at *2.
    7
    Id.
    8
    No. 3:18-CV-1778-L (BT), 
    2018 WL 8343675
     (N.D. Tex. Dec. 26, 2018).
    3
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    No. 18-11480
    and physical disability and report to community service on pain of immediate
    arrest and imprisonment. Commissioner Price established and perpetuated
    policies and procedures in the assignment and dispatch of community service
    workers like McCollum with physical and mental impairments that denied
    them modifications to accommodate their disabilities.            Psychologist
    Henschel established and perpetuated a policy of prohibiting sex offender
    clients from obtaining treatment at the VA hospital for specific neurological
    disorders. Finally, therapist Dupler directed McCollum to obtain and take,
    under pain of discharge from his sex offender therapy program, a selective
    serotonin reuptake inhibitor—a drug contraindicated by McCollum’s
    treatment program at the VA hospital.
    In the writ of mandamus he cites in his complaint, McCollum sought
    various forms of relief, including relief from the allegedly wrongful
    revocation of his deferred adjudication community supervision. McCollum
    described in greater detail the alleged errors of McDonald, Dupler, and
    others in the reporting and treatment of his mental and physical illnesses,
    which he alleged ultimately led to the deterioration of his cognitive and
    psychomotor skills; his inability to comply with the terms of his community
    supervision; his inability to assist in his own defense during his revocation
    proceedings; and his inability to understand his pleas of true during those
    proceedings. In the then-pending civil rights suit McCollum cites, he alleged
    that he was inadequately treated for medical issues while in prison before his
    revocation hearing; that the court should have ordered a competency hearing
    due to his resulting mental state; that he was convicted while he was severely
    impaired; and that the sheriff had ordered the interception of his grievance
    forms.
    McCollum contends that the County’s actions caused “irreparable
    physical, psychological, and emotional harm.” He seeks declaratory and
    injunctive relief and nominal, compensatory, and punitive damages.
    4
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    No. 18-11480
    The magistrate judge interpreted McCollum’s complaint as arising
    under 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     and alleging that the County “established and
    enforced policies that prevented [McCollum] from obtaining medical
    treatment for his mental illness and cerebr[a]-vascular dementia, and which
    ultimately led to the revocation of his community supervision.”        The
    magistrate judge determined that a ruling on these claims would necessarily
    imply the invalidity of the revocation of McCollum’s community
    supervision, adjudication of guilt, and resulting conviction. Thus, Heck
    barred McCollum’s claims, warranting their dismissal as frivolous under 
    28 U.S.C. §§ 1915
    (e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b). McCollum objected, arguing that the
    magistrate judge mischaracterized his contentions; that his claims arose
    “first and foremostly” under the Americans with Disabilities Act and Section
    504 of the Rehabilitation Act; and that he did not allege that the County’s
    deprivation of medical treatment and denials of modifications to his
    community service work assignments had a causal relationship with the
    validity of his underlying conviction and the revocation of his community
    supervision. The district court overruled McCollum’s objections; accepted
    the findings, conclusions, and recommendation of the magistrate judge; and
    dismissed the complaint with prejudice as frivolous under § 915(e)(2)(B).
    McCollum timely filed a notice of appeal.
    McCollum contends that his claims were not barred by Heck because
    his complaint did not mention any causal relationship between his claims and
    his conviction of the underlying charge or the revocation of his community
    supervision, and because his claims did not relate to or implicate his
    conviction of the underlying charge or the revocation of his community
    supervision. We conclude that the district court properly dismissed all but
    one of McCollum’s claims.
    5
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    No. 18-11480
    II
    A district court is directed to dismiss a claim by an inmate or in forma
    pauperis litigant if the complaint is frivolous or fails to state a claim upon
    which relief may be granted. 9 This court reviews a district court’s dismissal
    of a complaint as frivolous for abuse of discretion. 10 “A complaint is frivolous
    if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact.” 11 A complaint lacks an arguable
    basis in law if it is based on an “indisputably meritless legal theory.” 12
    “Pro se prisoner complaints must be read in a liberal fashion and
    should not be dismissed unless it appears beyond all doubt that the prisoner
    could prove no set of facts under which he would be entitled to relief.” 13
    Even liberally construing McCollum’s complaint, Heck bars most of
    McCollum’s claims.
    In Heck, the Supreme Court adopted the favorable termination rule,
    holding that a § 1983 suit must be dismissed if a judgment in the plaintiff’s
    favor “would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence”
    and the plaintiff could not show that his conviction or sentence had been
    invalidated. 14 In Wilkinson v. Dotson, 15 the Supreme Court clarified that a
    “§ 1983 action is barred (absent prior invalidation)—no matter the relief
    9
    
    28 U.S.C. § 1915
    (e)(2)(B).
    10
    Rogers v. Boatright, 
    709 F.3d 403
    , 407 (5th Cir. 2013) (citing Berry v. Brady, 
    192 F.3d 504
    , 507 (5th Cir. 1999)).
    11
    
    Id.
     (quoting Berry, 
    192 F.3d at 507
    ).
    12
    See Neitzke v. Williams, 
    490 U.S. 319
    , 327 (1989).
    13
    Taylor v. Gibson, 
    529 F.2d 709
    , 714 (5th Cir. 1976) (first citing Haines v. Kerner,
    
    404 U.S. 519
     (1972) (per curiam); then citing Watson v. Ault, 
    525 F.2d 886
     (5th Cir. 1976);
    and then citing Campbell v. Beto, 
    460 F.2d 765
     (5th Cir. 1972)).
    14
    Heck v. Humphrey, 
    512 U.S. 477
    , 487 (1994).
    15
    
    544 U.S. 74
     (2005).
    6
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    sought (damages or equitable relief), no matter the target of the prisoner’s
    suit (state conduct leading to conviction or internal prison proceedings)—if
    success in that action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of
    confinement or its duration.” 16 This court performs a Heck analysis by
    “assessing whether a claim is temporally and conceptually distinct from the
    related conviction and sentence,” and by asking “whether the claims are
    necessarily inconsistent with the conviction, or whether they can coexist with
    the conviction or sentence without calling it into question.” 17
    To the extent that McCollum contends that, had he received
    treatment or accommodations for mental illness, he would not have violated
    the terms of his supervision, Heck bars his claims. Success on his claim for
    failure to treat or accommodate, in such an instance, would not be
    independent of the revocation of his supervision.                            Because Heck
    determinations are “analytical and fact-intensive,” 18 we analyze each claim
    in turn.
    As mentioned, McCollum alleges that Judge Lewis “denied [him]
    access to and the enjoyment of the State’s continuum of community-based
    services.” McCollum does not specify those services to which he was denied
    access. Success on this claim may have no relation to the revocation of
    supervision. However, this court may affirm on any grounds supported by
    16
    
    Id. at 81-82
     (emphasis in original).
    17
    Smith v. Hood, 
    900 F.3d 180
    , 185 (5th Cir. 2018) (alteration and internal
    quotation marks omitted) (first quoting Bush v. Strain, 
    513 F.3d 492
    , 498 (5th Cir. 2008);
    and then quoting Ballard v. Burton, 
    444 F.3d 391
    , 400-01 (5th Cir. 2006)).
    18
    Strain, 
    513 F.3d at
    497 (citing Ballard, 444 F.3d at 400-01).
    7
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    the record, 19 and Judge Lewis enjoys absolute judicial immunity from civil
    suit. 20 Thus, the district court properly dismissed this claim against Judge
    Lewis.
    Heck bars McCollum’s claim against Community Supervisor Doe.
    McCollum             alleges      that     Doe        enforced        Probation         Officer
    “McDonald’s . . . requirements that [McCollum] cease and desist in his
    claims of mental and physical disability and report to the Decker Building
    demolition work assignment.” McCollum pleaded true to failing to complete
    his community service assignments, and this plea served as one of the appeals
    court’s grounds for affirming the state district court’s revocation order. 21 A
    judgment in McCollum’s favor on this claim would imply the invalidity of
    this ground of revocation and is thus barred.
    Likewise, Heck bars McCollum’s claims against Probation Officer
    McDonald.             McCollum alleges that McDonald “den[ied] [him]
    modifications to his community supervision terms and conditions upon being
    notified that he had been found to be a person with mental illness . . . and did
    also deny him access to the required continuum of community-based
    programs and services for persons in community supervision . . . and did also
    embark on a campaign to create a false narrative that the plaintiff was not a
    person with mental illness.” McCollum does not specify which terms
    McDonald failed to modify, but the structure of his complaint suggests that
    he challenges those conditions enforced by Community Supervisor Doe
    19
    Maria S. ex rel. E.H.F. v. Garza, 
    912 F.3d 778
    , 783 (5th Cir.) (summary calendar)
    (citing Dr.’s Hosp. of Jefferson, Inc. v. Se. Med. All., Inc., 
    123 F.3d 301
    , 307 (5th Cir. 1997)),
    cert. denied, 
    140 S. Ct. 81
     (2019) (mem.).
    20
    See Adams v. McIlhany, 
    764 F.2d 294
    , 297 (5th Cir. 1985).
    21
    McCollum v. State, No. 05-15-01056-CR, 
    2016 WL 8115929
    , at *1-2 (Tex. App.—
    Dallas Oct. 27, 2016, no pet.).
    8
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    concerning community service work. Again, this challenge implies that it
    would have been unlawful for a Texas state court to revoke McCollum’s
    supervision on this ground. Thus, Heck bars this claim. The same is true for
    McCollum’s claims about being denied access to “the required continuum
    of community-based programs and services.” In the writ of mandamus
    McCollum cites in his complaint, he alleges that this very conduct by
    McDonald led McCollum to involuntarily plead “true” to violating certain
    terms of his supervision.      By McCollum’s own admission, a favorable
    judgment on this claim would imply the invalidity of the revocation order,
    grounded, in part, on his plea.
    McCollum’s      claim      that   Commissioner       Price   denied   him
    modifications to his community service requirements is likewise barred by
    Heck. A favorable judgment on this claim would imply the invalidity of his
    revocation based on his plea of “true” to failing to complete community
    service.
    Heck also bars McCollum’s claims against Dupler. McCollum alleges
    that “Stacy Dupler . . . directed [McCollum] to obtain and take on pain of
    discharge from his program of sex offender therapy a Selective[ ]Serotonin
    Reuptake Inhibitor.” Again, the writ of mandamus challenges this very
    behavior, alleging that Dupler’s actions led to McCollum’s wrongful
    revocation and conviction. Given this challenge, a favorable judgment
    against Dupler would necessarily imply that McCollum improperly pleaded
    “true.” Thus, Heck bars this claim.
    McCollum’s claim against psychologist Henschel, though, is not, at
    least on its face, barred by Heck.           McCollum alleges that Henschel
    “prohibit[ed] sex-offender clients from obtaining treatment and therapy for
    specific neurological disorders.” It is not necessarily the case that McCollum
    would not have violated his supervision conditions had Henschel afforded
    9
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    him treatment. Henschel could have acted unlawfully by denying McCollum
    treatment, and this unlawfulness is not alleged to have any bearing on
    McCollum’s plea of “true,” nor his failure to participate in sex offender
    treatment. Success on this claim, as presently alleged, does not impugn any
    of the appeals court’s grounds for revoking McCollum’s supervision.
    The fact that Heck does not bar McCollum’s claim against Henschel,
    however, does not necessarily mean that this claim will ultimately survive
    dismissal. To plead a constitutional claim under § 1983, McCollum must
    allege that a state actor violated a constitutional right. 22                    McCollum’s
    complaint contains no allegation that Henschel is a state actor, and thus
    would ordinarily be dismissed. But because dismissals of pro se complaints
    are disfavored, we remand to the district court to determine whether
    McCollum should be afforded an opportunity to amend his pleading to cure
    this deficiency. 23
    *        *         *
    For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment
    in part and VACATE in part, and REMAND for the district court to
    determine whether McCollum should be afforded an opportunity to amend
    his complaint.
    22
    Jackson v. City of Hearne, 
    959 F.3d 194
    , 200 (5th Cir. 2020) (citing Johnson v.
    Dall. Indep. Sch. Dist., 
    38 F.3d 198
    , 200 (5th Cir 1994)).
    23
    See Peña v. United States, 
    157 F.3d 984
    , 987 n.3 (5th Cir. 1998).
    10