Anderson v. Martco ( 2021 )

Case: 20-30198 Document: 00515937106 Page: 1 Date Filed: 07/14/2021
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
July 14, 2021
No. 20-30198 Lyle W. Cayce
Summary Calendar Clerk
Larry Anderson, Jr.,
Plaintiff—Appellant,
versus
Martco L.L.C., incorrectly named as Roy O Martin,
Defendant—Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Louisiana
USDC No. 2:18-CV-275
Before Haynes, Willett, and Ho, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
Larry Anderson, Jr., filed this civil action pro se, alleging that the
defendant, MARTCO, L.L.C. (Martco), terminated his employment on
March 6, 2017, in retaliation for Anderson’s claimed use of Family and
Medical Leave Act (FMLA) leave to take his mother to the doctor and in
*
Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
Case: 20-30198 Document: 00515937106 Page: 2 Date Filed: 07/14/2021
No. 20-30198
violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1974 (Title VII). The magistrate judge 1
granted defendant/appellee Martco’s motion for summary judgment and
dismissed Anderson’s claims. The magistrate judge also denied Anderson’s
motion filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) seeking
reconsideration of the grant of summary judgment.
Anderson argues that the district court’s decision to deny his motion
for reconsideration should be reversed because he was terminated for
illegitimate, discriminatory, and retaliatory reasons. He contends that the
magistrate judge erred in ignoring the new evidence he presented (his
mother’s medical records) which he submitted with his reply to Martco’s
opposition to his motion for reconsideration. Martco argues that the
underlying summary judgment ruling has not been appealed or raised as an
issue. In his reply brief, Anderson states that the “issue of Summary
Judgment is not at hand in this appeal.” Anderson’s notice of appeal
specifically stated that he was appealing from the judgment entered on
February 20, 2020, as to the motion for reconsideration as amended. We
thus address only the appeal only from the order denying reconsideration.
See Lockett v. Anderson, 230 F.3d 695, 700 (5th Cir. 2000); United States v.
O’Keefe, 128 F.3d 885, 890 (5th Cir. 1997).
We review a district court’s decision on a Rule 59 motion to
reconsider for abuse of discretion. In re La. Crawfish Producers, 852 F.3d 456,
462 (5th Cir. 2017). “Under this standard of review, the district court’s
decision and decision-making process need only be reasonable.” Templet v.
HydroChem Inc., 367 F.3d 473, 477 (5th Cir. 2004). Rule 59(e) motions serve
“the narrow purpose of allowing a party to correct manifest errors of law or
fact or to present newly discovered evidence.” Id. at 479 (citation omitted).
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The parties consented to proceed before the magistrate judge.
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No. 20-30198
“Reconsideration of a judgment after its entry is an extraordinary remedy
that should be used sparingly.” Id. (citation omitted). Accordingly, a motion
for reconsideration “is not the proper vehicle for rehashing evidence, legal
theories, or arguments that could have been offered or raised before the entry
of judgment.” Id. (citation omitted). A party’s “unexcused failure to
present evidence available at the time of summary judgment provides a valid
basis for denying a subsequent motion for reconsideration.” Id. (citation
omitted).
Anderson’s motion for reconsideration requested the magistrate
judge to reconsider the judgment and look again carefully at all the evidence
already submitted. Anderson included alleged new evidence of his mother’s
medical records, which he contends is relevant to the issues of his need to
bring his mother to the doctor, why he did not show for work, and
discrimination and retaliation for bringing his mother to the doctor. The
magistrate judge noted that Anderson had argued that she should reexamine
the evidence in the case which proved he was wrongfully terminated and
stated that Anderson had not set forth any newly discovered evidence and
had not alleged any intervening change in the law but was seeking a second
attempt to argue the same points alleged in previous pleadings. The
magistrate judge concluded that his attempt to reargue the merits of his case
was improper under Rule 59(e).
Anderson argues that the magistrate judge did not mention or
consider the new evidence of his mother’s medical records. Martco argues
that Anderson’s “newly discovered evidence” consisted of medical records
which were available and discoverable to him at the time of summary
judgment and that he had failed to explain why he did not present this
evidence to the court. In his reply brief, Anderson explains that he did not
present the evidence of his mother’s medical records previously because he
could not gain access without his mother’s permission, but he did not offer
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No. 20-30198
this explanation to the magistrate judge, and he does not assert that he sought
his mother’s permission at the time of summary judgment.
By his motion for reconsideration, Anderson sought to reexamine the
evidence and reargue the same arguments made on summary judgment, and
to the extent he sought to present “new evidence,” his unexplained failure
to present evidence of his mother’s medical records available at the time of
summary judgment provided a valid basis for the magistrate judge to deny his
motion for reconsideration. See Templet, 367 F.3d at 479.
Anderson has failed to make any argument challenging the magistrate
judge’s grant of summary judgment for Martco on his Title VII claim of racial
discrimination. Anderson has abandoned this issue. See Brinkmann v. Dallas
County Deputy Sheriff Abner, 813 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir. 1987). Similarly,
Anderson concedes that the issue of attorney fees “is not at hand,” and he
makes no argument challenging the attorney fee judgment. Anderson has
abandoned this issue as well. See Brinkmann, 813 F.2d at 748.
AFFIRMED.
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