United States v. Leon ( 2021 )


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  • Case: 20-50492      Document: 00515815814         Page: 1    Date Filed: 04/09/2021
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Fifth Circuit
    United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    No. 20-50492
    FILED
    April 9, 2021
    Summary Calendar
    Lyle W. Cayce
    Clerk
    United States of America,
    Plaintiff—Appellee,
    versus
    Christopher Leon,
    Defendant—Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Texas
    USDC No. 5:18-CR-435-2
    Before Davis, Stewart, and Dennis, Circuit Judges.
    Per Curiam:*
    Christopher Leon entered a conditional guilty plea to conspiracy to
    possess with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine, in
    violation of 
    21 U.S.C. §§ 841
    (a)(1), (b)(1)(A), and 846, reserving the right to
    appeal the denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of
    *
    Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
    opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
    circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
    Case: 20-50492      Document: 00515815814          Page: 2       Date Filed: 04/09/2021
    No. 20-50492
    the warrantless search of his vehicle. The district court sentenced Leon
    below the guidelines range to 125 months of imprisonment and imposed a
    five-year term of supervised release.
    On appeal, Leon challenges the denial of his motion to suppress. He
    argues that, contrary to the district court’s determination, the automobile
    exception did not apply and his statement to law enforcement agents should
    have been excluded under the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine.
    We review the district court’s factual findings for clear error and the
    legality of police conduct de novo, viewing the evidence in the light most
    favorable to the prevailing party. United States v. Pack, 
    612 F.3d 341
    , 347 (5th
    Cir.), opinion modified on denial of reh’g, 
    622 F.3d 383
     (5th Cir. 2010).
    “Warrantless searches and seizures are per se unreasonable unless they fall
    within a few narrowly defined exceptions.” United States v. Kelly, 
    302 F.3d 291
    , 293 (5th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
    “Under the automobile exception, police may stop and search a vehicle
    without obtaining a warrant if they have probable cause to believe it contains
    contraband.” United States v. Beene, 
    818 F.3d 157
    , 164 (5th Cir. 2016); see
    United States v. Fields, 
    456 F.3d 519
    , 523 (5th Cir. 2006).
    Leon does not challenge the district court’s factual findings
    underlying its determination that the officers, through their collective
    knowledge, had probable cause to believe that the vehicle contained
    contraband. He has therefore waived any challenge to those factual findings.
    See United States v. Reagan, 
    596 F.3d 251
    , 254 (5th Cir. 2010); Beasley v.
    McCotter, 
    798 F.2d 116
    , 118 (5th Cir. 1986); Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8)(A).
    While the automobile exception “is justified by the mobility of
    vehicles and occupants’ reduced expectations of privacy while traveling on
    public roads,” Beene, 818 F.3d at 164 (citing California v. Carney, 
    471 U.S. 386
    , 392-93 (1985)), the exception applies not only to a vehicle when it “is
    2
    Case: 20-50492      Document: 00515815814           Page: 3    Date Filed: 04/09/2021
    No. 20-50492
    being used on the highways” but also to vehicles that are “readily capable of
    such and [are] found stationary in a place not regularly used for residential
    purposes,” Carney, 
    471 U.S. at 392
    . The fact that Leon had just parked his
    vehicle does not weigh against application of the exception. See Fields, 
    456 F.3d at 523-24
    . Moreover, Leon does not dispute that he parked his vehicle
    on the street in front of his mother’s residence and not within the curtilage
    of that residence.     Thus, although both probable cause and exigent
    circumstances are required to justify the search of a vehicle that is parked
    within a home’s curtilage, see Beene, 818 F.3d at 164, such is not the case here.
    We find no error with the district court’s determination that the
    officers had probable cause, vested through the collective knowledge of the
    officers involved in the investigative operation, to believe that Leon’s vehicle
    contained contraband such that the warrantless search of Leon’s vehicle did
    not run afoul of the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. Guzman, 
    739 F.3d 241
    , 246 (5th Cir. 2014); United States v. Powell, 
    732 F.3d 361
    , 369 (5th
    Cir. 2013); Fields, 
    456 F.3d at 523-24
    . Accordingly, we need not address
    Leon’s argument that his statement should have been suppressed under the
    “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine, as it was not the product of illegal
    search. See United States v. Cotton, 
    722 F.3d 271
    , 278 (5th Cir. 2013). Finally,
    while Leon notes that the admissibility of his statement also hinges on
    whether the statement was voluntary, he provides no legal analysis of that
    issue. Nevertheless, as he acknowledges, he was advised of his rights under
    Miranda v. Arizona, 
    384 U.S. 436
     (1966), before he made any statement to
    the agents; we therefore find no error with the district court’s determination
    that the statement was voluntary. See United States v. Melancon, 
    662 F.3d 708
    , 711 (5th Cir. 2011).
    The district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.
    3