United States v. Leon ( 2021 )

Case: 20-50492 Document: 00515815814 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/09/2021
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
No. 20-50492
FILED
April 9, 2021
Summary Calendar
Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
United States of America,
Plaintiff—Appellee,
versus
Christopher Leon,
Defendant—Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
USDC No. 5:18-CR-435-2
Before Davis, Stewart, and Dennis, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
Christopher Leon entered a conditional guilty plea to conspiracy to
possess with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), and 846, reserving the right to
appeal the denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of
*
Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
Case: 20-50492 Document: 00515815814 Page: 2 Date Filed: 04/09/2021
No. 20-50492
the warrantless search of his vehicle. The district court sentenced Leon
below the guidelines range to 125 months of imprisonment and imposed a
five-year term of supervised release.
On appeal, Leon challenges the denial of his motion to suppress. He
argues that, contrary to the district court’s determination, the automobile
exception did not apply and his statement to law enforcement agents should
have been excluded under the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine.
We review the district court’s factual findings for clear error and the
legality of police conduct de novo, viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prevailing party. United States v. Pack, 612 F.3d 341, 347 (5th
Cir.), opinion modified on denial of reh’g, 622 F.3d 383 (5th Cir. 2010).
“Warrantless searches and seizures are per se unreasonable unless they fall
within a few narrowly defined exceptions.” United States v. Kelly, 302 F.3d
291, 293 (5th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
“Under the automobile exception, police may stop and search a vehicle
without obtaining a warrant if they have probable cause to believe it contains
contraband.” United States v. Beene, 818 F.3d 157, 164 (5th Cir. 2016); see
United States v. Fields, 456 F.3d 519, 523 (5th Cir. 2006).
Leon does not challenge the district court’s factual findings
underlying its determination that the officers, through their collective
knowledge, had probable cause to believe that the vehicle contained
contraband. He has therefore waived any challenge to those factual findings.
See United States v. Reagan, 596 F.3d 251, 254 (5th Cir. 2010); Beasley v.
McCotter, 798 F.2d 116, 118 (5th Cir. 1986); Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8)(A).
While the automobile exception “is justified by the mobility of
vehicles and occupants’ reduced expectations of privacy while traveling on
public roads,” Beene, 818 F.3d at 164 (citing California v. Carney, 471 U.S.
386, 392-93 (1985)), the exception applies not only to a vehicle when it “is
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No. 20-50492
being used on the highways” but also to vehicles that are “readily capable of
such and [are] found stationary in a place not regularly used for residential
purposes,” Carney, 471 U.S. at 392. The fact that Leon had just parked his
vehicle does not weigh against application of the exception. See Fields, 456
F.3d at 523-24. Moreover, Leon does not dispute that he parked his vehicle
on the street in front of his mother’s residence and not within the curtilage
of that residence. Thus, although both probable cause and exigent
circumstances are required to justify the search of a vehicle that is parked
within a home’s curtilage, see Beene, 818 F.3d at 164, such is not the case here.
We find no error with the district court’s determination that the
officers had probable cause, vested through the collective knowledge of the
officers involved in the investigative operation, to believe that Leon’s vehicle
contained contraband such that the warrantless search of Leon’s vehicle did
not run afoul of the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. Guzman, 739
F.3d 241, 246 (5th Cir. 2014); United States v. Powell, 732 F.3d 361, 369 (5th
Cir. 2013); Fields, 456 F.3d at 523-24. Accordingly, we need not address
Leon’s argument that his statement should have been suppressed under the
“fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine, as it was not the product of illegal
search. See United States v. Cotton, 722 F.3d 271, 278 (5th Cir. 2013). Finally,
while Leon notes that the admissibility of his statement also hinges on
whether the statement was voluntary, he provides no legal analysis of that
issue. Nevertheless, as he acknowledges, he was advised of his rights under
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), before he made any statement to
the agents; we therefore find no error with the district court’s determination
that the statement was voluntary. See United States v. Melancon, 662 F.3d
708, 711 (5th Cir. 2011).
The district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.
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