G. Scott v. FDIC , 684 F. App'x 391 ( 2017 )


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  •      Case: 14-60911      Document: 00513939685         Page: 1    Date Filed: 04/04/2017
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT     United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    No. 14-60911                               April 4, 2017
    Lyle W. Cayce
    Clerk
    G. HARRISON SCOTT; JOHNNY C. CROW; SHARRY R. SCOTT,
    Petitioners
    v.
    FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION,
    Respondent
    Petition for Review of an Order of the
    Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
    FDIC No. 12-276K
    FDIC No. 12-277K
    FDIC No. 12-278K
    Before BARKSDALE, GRAVES, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    G. Harrison Scott, Johnny Crow, and Sharry Scott petition for review of
    a final order by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) Board of
    Directors. The FDIC Board found that Petitioners violated Regulation O of the
    Federal Reserve Board (“Regulation O”), 
    12 C.F.R. § 215
    , when the Bank of
    * Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH
    CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    Case: 14-60911    Document: 00513939685     Page: 2   Date Filed: 04/04/2017
    No. 14-60911
    Louisiana made improper loans and failed to collect overdraft fees from Bank
    insiders. For the following reasons, we DENY Scott, Crow, and Scott’s petition.
    BACKGROUND
    On October 22, 2013, the FDIC initiated the present action against Scott,
    Crow, and Scott, individually, and as institution-affiliated parties of the Bank
    of Louisiana. In order to promote compliance with fiduciary obligations, the
    FDIC is empowered to impose civil money penalties (“CMPs”) on bank directors
    for their violations or their bank’s violations of law or regulation. See Lowe v.
    FDIC, 
    958 F.2d 1526
    , 1534-35 (11th Cir. 1992). At the time of the violations at
    issue in this case, the three Petitioners were bank directors: G. Scott was
    President of the Bank, Chairman of the Board of Directors, and a member of
    the Executive Committee. Crow and S. Scott were members of the Board of
    Directors and the Executive Committee.
    In its Notice of Assessment of Civil Money Penalties (“Notice”), the FDIC
    alleged that Scott, Crow, and Scott violated Regulation O when the Bank of
    Louisiana made, and then renewed, loans to Director K, which “involve[d] more
    than the normal risk of repayment.” See 
    12 C.F.R. § 215.4
    (a).
    In October 2009, Director K submitted a loan application to the Bank
    seeking $75,000 in “working capital” to bring current three outstanding loans
    from 2008 totaling approximately $500,000. At the time of the loan application,
    Director K was 81 days past due on the 2008 loans. In addition, he had been
    30 days or more past due on the loans on 26 occasions, and he had been
    assessed late fees 35 times.
    On his application, Director K estimated his annual income as $157,788
    based on previous tax returns. He also disclosed $75,000 in credit card debt.
    As collateral, Director K listed: (1) an assignment of interest in the New
    Orleans Community Housing Development Corporation; (2) an assignment of
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    fees in two cases being handled by his law firm; and (3) a first mortgage on a
    condominium, which had previously been valued at $825,000 and $875,000.
    The mortgage, however, was already pledged as collateral for his 2008 loans.
    In addition, the appraisals of the condominium submitted by Director K were
    over two years old and dated from before the 2008 financial crisis. The Bank of
    Louisiana Board did not obtain an independent appraisal of the condominium’s
    value as of October 2009.
    According to his credit report, Director K was more than 120 days past
    due and $42,412 in arrears on a mortgage loan held by a different bank, and
    between 31 and 60 days past due on two revolving credit lines totaling $7,841.
    After reviewing Director K’s loan application, Petitioner G. Scott wrote a memo
    to the Bank Board, questioning, “[i]f [Director K] cannot pay current loan for
    $100,000, interest only, how can he pay interest on new loan?” Nonetheless,
    the Bank Board and Loan Committee approved Director K’s $75,000, 8 percent
    interest-only loan with the principal due at maturity six months later.
    The day after the Bank Board approved the $75,000 loan, Director K
    made payments totaling $75,000 on one of the 2008 loans. Over the following
    year, Director K was past due on the 2008 and 2009 loans on 20 occasions. In
    July 2010, Director K applied for, and was granted a renewal of, each of the
    2008 and 2009 loans, payable on July 30, 2011.
    The FDIC’s Notice also alleged further Regulation O violations regarding
    Officer P. According to the Notice, the Bank failed to charge Officer P overdraft
    fees on two occasions in December 2010 and January 2011. See 
    12 C.F.R. § 215.4
    (e). In addition, the Bank approved a loan to Officer P and his wife in July
    2011, which was greater than $100,000 and secured by a second mortgage in
    violation of Regulation O. See 
    12 C.F.R. §§ 215.5
    (c)(4) and 337.3(c)(2).
    On February 28, 2014, following discovery, the FDIC moved for partial
    summary disposition against Scott, Crow, and Scott, asserting no genuine
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    issue of material fact regarding the Regulation O violations. On March 27,
    2014, an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) granted the FDIC’s motion for
    partial summary disposition and subsequently conducted a one-day hearing in
    New Orleans, LA, to consider evidence regarding the amount of the CMPs to
    be imposed. On July 2, 2014, the ALJ issued a 29-page Recommended Decision
    recommending that each Petitioner be assessed a CMP of $10,000. The FDIC
    Board of Directors adopted the ALJ’s recommendations on November 18, 2014.
    Petitioners seek review of the FDIC Board’s final order.
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    “[T]he findings of the FDIC Board are to be set aside only if found to be
    unsupported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole.” Bullion v.
    FDIC, 
    881 F.2d 1368
    , 1372 (5th Cir. 1989). “Substantial evidence is such
    relevant evidence a reasonable person would deem adequate to support the
    ultimate conclusion.” Grubb v. FDIC, 
    34 F.3d 956
    , 961 (10th Cir. 1994). The
    FDIC’s standard for summary disposition is similar to the standard for
    summary judgment. See 
    12 C.F.R. § 308.29
    (a); see also In re Cirino, 
    2000 WL 1131919
    , at *23 (FDIC 2000). Consequently, we review a grant of summary
    disposition as if it were a grant of summary judgment. See Abbott v. Equity
    Group, Inc., 
    2 F.3d 613
    , 618 (5th Cir. 1993) (articulating the summary
    judgment standard). “The remedies or penalties directed by the agency are not
    to be disturbed unless they constitute an abuse of discretion or are otherwise
    arbitrary and capricious.” Bullion, 
    881 F.2d at 1372
    .
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    DISCUSSION
    Scott, Crow, and Scott present four issues for our review. 1 They contend
    that the FDIC Board’s findings regarding the approval of loans to Director K
    and Officer P and the failure to assess overdraft fees to Officer P are
    unsupported by substantial evidence. They also claim that the FDIC abused
    its discretion and was arbitrary and capricious by assessing each Petitioner a
    $10,000 CMP. Finally, they argue that the ALJ improperly resolved contested
    facts at the summary disposition stage. None of Petitioners’ arguments are
    persuasive.
    I.      Loans to Director K involved more than a normal risk of
    repayment
    Under Regulation O, “[n]o member bank may extend credit to any insider
    of the bank . . . unless the extension of credit . . . [d]oes not involve more than
    the normal risk of repayment or present other unfavorable features.” See §
    215.4(a)(1)(ii); see also Bullion, 
    881 F.2d at 1374
    . “The Board’s analysis for
    finding more than the normal risk of repayment or other unfavorable features
    looks to whether an objective lender at the time the loan was made would have
    extended the credit based on the available information at that time.” Bullion,
    
    881 F.2d at 1374
    .
    In Bullion, we found a higher than normal risk of repayment based on
    the following factors:
    [1] [T]he lack of documentation as to the loan and also the
    collateral which was before the officers when they made the
    decision to fund the loan, [2] the overvaluation of the assets
    to support the loan, [3] the borrower and the guarantor’s
    1Scott, Crow, and Scott briefed a fifth issue: whether the FDIC Executive Secretary erred by
    denying their motion for reconsideration. However, we lack jurisdiction to consider that issue
    because their petition for review does not specify it. See Fed. R. App. P. 15(a) (requiring that
    a petition for review must “specify the order or part thereof to be reviewed”).
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    potential inability to repay the loan based on the then
    available financial information, and [4] the interest rate set
    was 25% less than the prime rate.
    
    Id. at 1374-75
    . Though we did not provide a specific formula to determine
    whether an objective lender would have extended credit, we stated: “The
    availability of cash to pay off the loan should have been one of the primary
    considerations of the officers approving the loan.” 
    Id. at 1375
    .
    Here, a majority of the factors that we identified as determinative in
    Bullion are also present: (1) Director K’s loan application did not show that he
    could cover his monthly debt service obligations given his approximate
    monthly income—$13,149—and his monthly debt payment—$14,770; (2)
    Director K was chronically delinquent in servicing his debts; and (3) Director
    K pledged collateral for which the Bank had not obtained current appraisals
    even though the most recent appraisals dated from before the 2008 financial
    crisis.
    Scott, Crow, and Scott contend that the loan to Director K did not involve
    a higher than normal risk of repayment because: (1) the loan was eventually
    repaid in full; and (2) the appraised value of the condominium offered to secure
    the loan exceeded the value of the loans. However, we agree with the FDIC
    Board that these facts alone do not establish a genuine dispute of material fact
    regarding the issue. First, evidence that a loan is eventually repaid has no
    bearing on whether a loan involved a higher than normal risk of repayment.
    See Bullion, 
    881 F.2d at 1374
     (defining the relevant inquiry as “whether an
    objective lender at the time the loan was made would have extended credit”).
    Second, while the value of pledged collateral is relevant to any loan
    determination, it is hardly dispositive, especially when a potential borrower
    has not shown “availability of cash to pay off the loan” and a bank is faced with
    insufficient “documentation as to . . . the collateral.” 
    Id. at 1374-76
    . Because
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    Petitioners have not raised a genuine dispute of material fact regarding
    whether the loan to Director K involved a higher than normal risk of
    repayment, we find that the FDIC Board’s grant of summary disposition was
    warranted. See 
    12 C.F.R. § 308.29
    (a).
    II.     Officer P is an “executive officer” within the meaning of
    Regulation O
    As a preliminary matter, Petitioners concede that they are liable under
    Regulation O if Officer P is an “executive officer.” Regulation O states:
    Executive officer of a company or bank means a person who
    participates or has authority to participate (other than in the
    capacity of a director) in major policymaking functions of the
    company or bank, whether or not: the officer has an official
    title; the title designates the officer an assistant; or the
    officer is serving without salary or other compensation. The
    chairman of the board, the president, every vice president,
    the cashier, the secretary, and the treasurer of a company or
    bank are considered executive officers, unless the officer is
    excluded, by resolution of the board of directors or by the
    bylaws of the bank or company, from participation (other
    than in the capacity of a director) in major policymaking
    functions of the bank or company, and the officer does not
    actually participate therein.
    
    12 C.F.R. § 215.2
    (e)(1).
    Here, Scott, Crow, and Scott do not contest that Officer P was a vice
    president. In addition, they acknowledge that Officer P was not “excluded, by
    resolution of the board of directors or by the bylaws of the bank or company,
    from participation . . . in major policymaking functions of the bank or
    company.” 
    Id.
     Given that “every vice president . . . [is] considered [an] executive
    officer[] unless . . . excluded, by resolution of the board of directors or by the
    bylaws of the bank or company, from participation . . . in major policymaking
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    functions of the bank or company,” Officer P is an “executive officer” within the
    meaning of the regulation. 
    Id.
     (emphasis added).
    Scott, Crow, and Scott contend that Officer P should not be considered
    an executive officer because they submitted declarations “averring that Officer
    P did not participate in or have the authority to participate in major
    policymaking functions at the Bank.” However, their argument is not
    supported by the plain language of Regulation O. Given that Petitioners have
    not shown that Officer P was excluded from major policymaking functions by
    resolution of the board of directors or by the bylaws of the bank or company,
    we conclude that he is an executive officer. See 
    id.
    III.   The FDIC did not abuse its discretion in assessing civil
    money penalties
    Any insured depository institution or institution-affiliated party that
    violates Regulation O shall forfeit and pay a CMP of not more than $7,500 for
    each day during which such violation continues. See 
    12 U.S.C. § 1818
    (i)(2)(A);
    
    12 C.F.R. § 308.132
    (c)(3)(i) (2013). The FDIC must consider the following
    mitigating factors when determining an appropriate CMP amount: (1) the size
    of Respondents’ financial resources; (2) the good faith of Respondents; (3) the
    gravity of the violations; (4) the history of previous violations; and (5) such
    other matters as justice may require. See 
    12 U.S.C. § 1818
    (i)(2)(G). The FDIC
    must also perform a 13-factor analysis found in the Interagency Policy
    Regarding the Assessment of CMP’s by the Federal Financial Institutions
    Regulatory Agencies, 
    63 Fed. Reg. 30226
     (May 28, 1998).
    Here, the ALJ held a hearing on April 16, 2014 to determine an
    appropriate CMP amount. Prior to that hearing, Scott, Crow, and Scott each
    stipulated that they had the financial capacity to pay the $10,000 CMP
    requested by the FDIC. After considering the five mitigating factors and
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    performing the required 13-factor analysis based on evidence presented at the
    hearing, the ALJ found that, even though the length of the violations—
    spanning over 22 months—could have generated a penalty of over $5 million,
    a $10,000 CMP for each Respondent was appropriate. Given that the CMP
    amount was within the statutory range and the ALJ correctly considered the
    mitigating factors and 13-factor Interagency Policy Analysis, the FDIC Board’s
    assessment of a $10,000 CMP for each Respondent did not constitute an abuse
    of discretion and was not arbitrary and capricious.
    IV.   The Administrative Law Judge did not improperly resolve
    contested factual issues
    Petitioners contend that the ALJ improperly resolved contested factual
    issues by disregarding relevant evidence, making credibility determinations,
    and ignoring new evidence after the close of summary disposition. After
    reviewing the record, we agree with the ALJ that Petitioners did not present
    evidence, demonstrating a genuine dispute of material fact. See 
    12 C.F.R. § 308.29
    (a). Furthermore, the FDIC Board properly found that Petitioners could
    not proffer new evidence not originally presented before the ALJ after the close
    of summary disposition. See § 308.39(b)(2) (“No exception need be considered
    by the Board of Directors if the party taking exception had an opportunity to
    raise the same objection, issue, or argument before the administrative law
    judge and failed to do so.”). Thus, the ALJ did not improperly resolve contested
    factual issues.
    CONCLUSION
    For the reasons stated above, the petition is DENIED.
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