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Cotter v. Kijakazi ( 2023 )


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  • Case: 22-10953         Document: 00516698741            Page: 1      Date Filed: 04/03/2023
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
No. 22-10953
Summary Calendar                                 FILED
April 3, 2023
Lyle W. Cayce
Hannah M. Cotter,                                                                  Clerk
Plaintiff—Appellant,
versus
Kilolo Kijakazi, Acting Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant—Appellee.
Appeal from the United States United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
USDC No. 4:21-CV-748
Before Stewart, Dennis, and Willett, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
Appellant Hannah M. Cotter applied for social security disability
benefits. An administrative law judge (“ALJ”) denied Cotter’s application
for benefits, finding that she was not disabled. The district court affirmed.
Because the ALJ’s decision to deny Cotter benefits was supported by
substantial evidence, we affirm.
*
This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 22-10953        Document: 00516698741              Page: 2      Date Filed: 04/03/2023
No. 22-10953
“We review the Commissioner’s denial of social security benefits
‘only to ascertain whether (1) the final decision is supported by substantial
evidence and (2) whether the Commissioner used the proper legal standards
to evaluate the evidence.’” Kneeland v. Berryhill,
    850 F.3d 749
    , 753 (5th Cir.
2017) (quoting Whitehead v. Colvin,
    820 F.3d 776
    , 779 (5th Cir. 2016)); see
also
    42 U.S.C. § 405
    (g). The standard of review under § 405(g) is
“exceedingly deferential.” Taylor v. Astrue,
    706 F.3d 600
    , 602 (5th Cir.
2012) (per curiam). A decision is supported by substantial evidence if
“credible evidentiary choices or medical findings support the decision.”
Whitehead,
    820 F.3d at 779
     (quoting Boyd v. Apfel,
    239 F.3d 698
    , 704 (5th Cir.
2001)). “Substantial evidence is ‘more than a mere scintilla but less than a
preponderance.’” Williams v. Admin. Review Bd.,
    376 F.3d 471
    , 476 (5th Cir.
2004) (quoting Ripley v. Chater,
    67 F.3d 552
    , 555 (5th Cir. 1995)).
To determine disability, the Commissioner follows a five-step 1
sequential evaluation process.
    20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520
    (a)(4)(i)-(v),
416.920(a)(4)(i)-(v). The claimant carries the burden of proof at the first four
steps of the process. See Leggett v. Chater,
    67 F.3d 558
    , 564 (5th Cir. 1995).
The burden shifts to the Commissioner at the fifth step to present evidence
of available work in the national economy. Perez v. Barnhart,
    415 F.3d 457
    ,
461 (5th Cir. 2005). The process terminates, however, if the Commissioner
finds at any step that the claimant is, or is not, disabled. Id.;
    20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520
    (a)(4) (“If we can find that you are disabled or not disabled at a step,
1
The five steps inquire whether: (1) the claimant is not presently working; (2) the
claimant has a severe impairment; (3) the impairment is not listed in, or equivalent to, an
impairment listed in Appendix 1 of the Regulations; (4) the impairment prevents the
claimant from doing past relevant work; and (5) the impairment prevents the claimant from
doing any other substantial gainful activity. See C.F.R. § 404.1520; Hampton v. Bowen,
    785 F.2d 1308
    , 1311 (5th Cir.1986).
2
Case: 22-10953     Document: 00516698741          Page: 3   Date Filed: 04/03/2023
No. 22-10953
we make our determination or decision and we do not go on to the next
step.”); 416.920(a)(4).
Here, the ALJ properly found that Cotter was not disabled at step
three of the sequential evaluation process because she did not have an
impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled a
listing of mental health impairments, as defined by the Commissioner. The
ALJ’s decision in this regard was supported by medical evaluations from
three doctors, the last of which reported Cotter’s bipolar disorder to be in
“full remission.” Cotter’s medical records also demonstrate that her mental
health issues were well-managed through prescription medications. See
Perez,
    415 F.3d at 461
     (“If the Commissioner’s fact findings are supported by
substantial evidence, they are conclusive.”). Even if Cotter had met her
burden in the first four steps of the sequential evaluation process, the ALJ
also properly found at step five that Cotter retained the ability to perform
work that existed in significant numbers in the national economy, as
demonstrated by the unchallenged testimony of a vocational expert.
AFFIRMED.
3