Autin v. Goings ( 2023 )

Case: 21-30678 Document: 00516718445 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/19/2023
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
____________ FILED
April 19, 2023
No. 21-30678
Lyle W. Cayce
____________ Clerk
Troy Autin,
Plaintiff—Appellee,
versus
Robert Goings, Sergeant; Lance Wallace, Sergeant; Jonathan
Stringer, Lieutenant,
Defendants—Appellants.
______________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana
USDC No. 2:20-CV-1214
______________________________
Before Wiener, Stewart, and Engelhardt, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam: *
Troy Autin, an inmate at Rayburn Correctional Center (“RCC”),
filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit against several prison officers claiming that
they violated his Eighth Amendment rights during two incidents that
happened during his incarceration. The officers moved for summary
judgment, arguing that the suit was barred by Heck v. Humphrey and that they
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*
This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
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were entitled to qualified immunity. 512 U.S. 477 (1994). The district court
denied their motion. The officers appealed. For the following reasons, we
REVERSE the district court’s order denying the officers’ motion for
summary judgment and VACATE the district court’s amended order.
I. Background
A. Use of Force Incidents
In his complaint, Autin alleged that two separate use of force incidents
took place at RCC involving Sergeant Robert Goings, Lieutenant Lance
Wallace, and Lieutenant Jonathan Stringer (collectively “the officers”). As
to the first, he alleged that Goings escorted him into the Wind Unit
Lieutenant’s Office which is an office, without cameras. Goings told Autin
that he would be strip-searched unless he gave him any drugs he had. Autin
gave Goings the pills in his sock and turned to leave the office. Goings then
allegedly lost his temper and put Autin “in a choke hold and choked him and
told him he was going to kill him.” Goings then “viciously beat” Autin.
Autin alleged that Stringer entered the room and was informed by Goings
that Autin had tried to swallow something. Stringer allegedly joined the
attack. Goings then handcuffed Autin and escorted him from the office to
the infirmary and back to his unit via a corridor called the Sun Unit Walk.
Autin alleged that the second use of force incident took place at this time.
While being escorted back to his cell through the Sun Unit Walk,
Stringer allegedly noticed blood on his pants, became angry, threw Autin to
the ground, and began to hit him. Wallace then entered the room and began
kicking Autin in the ribs. Both Wallace and Stringer “viciously stomped on”
Autin, causing injuries. Autin alleged that he sustained broken ribs, neck
damage, loss of blood, two black eyes, facial swelling, organ failure, and he
was unable to either walk or defecate. It was later determined that Autin had
not swallowed anything.
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B. Disciplinary Hearing
With respect to the first incident involving Goings and Stringer, Autin
received a disciplinary report which claimed that he had contraband, hit and
struggled with corrections officers, and disobeyed their orders. Autin also
received a disciplinary report for the second incident involving Stringer and
Wallace which stated that Autin struggled with corrections officers and
disobeyed orders. Autin’s position, as stated in his various complaints and
deposition, is that he was factually innocent of the charges. The prison
disciplinary board held separate hearings regarding the disciplinary reports
and found Autin guilty of all charged rule violations. As a result of the first
incident, Autin forfeited 30 days of good-time, was transferred to extended
lockdown for 90 days, and was ordered to pay restitution. He forfeited 120
days of good-time for the second incident.
C. District Court Proceedings
Autin filed a civil rights suit in Louisiana state court against RCC,
Goings, and Wallace, claiming that the officers violated his Eighth
Amendment rights through the use of excessive force during the two above-
described incidents. Autin subsequently amended his complaint, adding
claims against Stringer. The officers removed the case to the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana and asserted qualified
immunity as a defense.
In November 2020, Goings and Wallace moved for summary
judgment on the grounds that Autin’s claims were barred by Heck. On
March 31, 2021, the district court denied Goings and Wallace’s motion for
summary judgment (“March order”), concluding that Autin’s claims were
not barred by Heck. In support of its ruling, the district court reasoned that
Autin “adequately alleged a claim for excessive force that occurred after he
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was restrained during both incidents.” Goings and Wallace did not
immediately appeal that order.
Instead, Goings, Wallace, and Stringer moved for summary judgment
for a second time in August 2021, contending that Autin’s claims were Heck-
barred and that they were entitled to qualified immunity. On September 30,
2021, the district court denied the officers’ second summary judgment
motion (“September order”). It construed their second motion for summary
judgment as a motion for reconsideration of its March 31, 2021 order and did
not revisit the merits of the issues related to Heck or address the issue of
qualified immunity. The officers then appealed the Heck and qualified
immunity rulings in the March 31 and September 30 orders. On November
17, 2021, the district court entered an amended order specifically addressing
the merits of the Heck-bar as to Stringer and the issue of qualified immunity
as to all three officers (“November order”). The officers timely amended
their notice of appeal to include the November order. Fed. R. App. P.4
(a)(1)(A).
II. Standard of Review
We review a denial of summary judgment de novo. See Boudreaux v.
Swift Transp. Co., Inc., 402 F.3d 536, 540 (5th Cir. 2005). We review a
denial of a motion to reconsider for abuse of discretion. Austin v. Kroger Tex.,
L.P., 864 F.3d 326, 329 (5th Cir. 2017). “A trial court abuses its discretion
when its ruling is based on an erroneous view of the law or a clearly erroneous
assessment of the evidence.” Id. (internal citation omitted).
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III. Discussion
A. Jurisdiction
We begin with jurisdiction. There are three orders relevant to this
appeal: the March, September, and November orders. The first is the March
order denying Goings and Wallace’s motion for summary judgment which
only addressed whether Autin’s claims were Heck-barred. While that order
was immediately appealable, Goings and Wallace did not timely appeal this
order, so we cannot review it. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A).
After Autin amended his complaint to add Stringer, all three officers
moved again for summary judgment on the ground that Autin’s claims were
Heck-barred, and they raised qualified immunity as an affirmative defense.
The district court construed this as a motion for reconsideration and, in its
September order, held that the claims were not Heck-barred but was silent as
to qualified immunity. The officers timely appealed the September order.
Finally, the district court entered the November order, which was an
amended order, where it provided more reasoning and discussed qualified
immunity for the first time. The officers timely appealed the November order
as well.
The collateral order doctrine vests us with jurisdiction over the
officers’ appeal of the September order for two reasons. First, the district
court declined to rule on qualified immunity in its September order when it
was so obligated. See Armstrong v. Ashley, 918 F.3d 419, 422 (5th Cir. 2019);
see also Ramirez v. Guadarrama, 3 F.4th 129, 133 (5th Cir. 2021) (per curiam)
(holding that the district court’s failure to decide qualified immunity “at the
earliest possible stage of the litigation” is “immediately appealable”).
Second, the September order rejected the officers’ argument that the case
was Heck-barred. Sappington v. Bartee, 195 F.3d 234, 236 (5th Cir. 1999); see
also Poole v. City of Shreveport, 13 F.4th 420, 426 (5th Cir. 2021) (“[A] district
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court’s denial of summary judgment is reviewable and subject to reversal if
the claim is barred under Heck.”) (quotation and citation omitted).
Defendants raised qualified immunity in their second summary judgment
motion, but the district court did not address the issue until it rendered its
November order when it no longer had jurisdiction. See Alice L. v. Dusek, 492
F.3d 563, 564 (5th Cir. 2007) (holding that “[a] notice of appeal from an
interlocutory order does not produce a complete divestiture of the district
court’s jurisdiction over the case,” but it does divest it “of jurisdiction over
those aspects of the case on appeal”).
We now turn to the merits of the officers’ second motion for summary
judgment.
B. Application of Heck
Under Heck, a plaintiff is barred from bringing a § 1983 suit for
damages if success on the claim would necessarily “imply the invalidity of his
conviction or sentence.” 512 U.S. at 487. A plaintiff may only bring a § 1983
claim for damages if the prior conviction is “reversed on direct appeal,
expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized
to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” Id. at 486–87.
Autin argues that the Supreme Court did not intend for Heck to apply
to prison disciplinary hearings. He further argues that the Heck line of cases
does not apply to a § 1983 action which does not seek a judgment at odds with
the prisoner’s conviction or sentence to be served. See Muhammad v. Close,
540 U.S. 749, 750–52 (2004)). “Thus, where the remedy did not set aside
a disciplinary hearing with restoration of good-time credits, the Edwards
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line of cases was not implicated.” 1 Autin contends that he did not allege that
the “disciplinary charges against [him] resulted in a forfeiture of any
good-time credits” or “otherwise affect[ed] the length of [his] prison
sentence.” He avers that because he is not seeking to reduce his sentence,
there is no legal or factual basis to apply Heck to this case and urges this court
to affirm the district court’s denial of summary judgment.
The officers argue the opposite. They contend that they are entitled
to qualified immunity from Autin’s Eighth Amendment excessive force
claims because those claims are Heck-barred. They aver that Autin’s Eighth
Amendment claims have not yet accrued and, therefore, he fails to state a
claim for the violation of a constitutional right. Citing Edwards, the officers
argue that even though Heck arose out of a criminal prosecution, the Supreme
Court extended the doctrine to cover prison disciplinary actions. Edwards v.
Edwards, 520 U.S. 641, 648 (1997) (holding that a claim for damages that
implied the invalidity of a disciplinary hearing conviction [was] not
cognizable under § 1983). They point out that this court has routinely “held
that the Heck doctrine applies to prison disciplinary actions where the inmate
lost good time.” See Clark v. Stalder, 154 F.3d 186, 189 (5th Cir. 1998) (en
banc) (holding a prisoner cannot bring a § 1983 suit that implies the invalidity
of a “conviction,” including “the finding of guilt on the disciplinary charge”
in a prison disciplinary proceeding).
We are persuaded by the officers’ argument on this issue. This court
has repeatedly held that “[f]or purposes of Heck, a conviction . . . includes a
ruling in a prison disciplinary proceeding that results in a change to the
prisoner’s sentence, including the loss of good-time credits.” Gray v. White,
18 F.4th 463, 467 (5th Cir. 2021) (quotation and citation omitted).
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1
Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641 (1997).
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“Therefore, Heck precludes § 1983 litigation in the prison-disciplinary-
proceeding context where it would ‘negate [the prisoner’s] disciplinary
conviction’ if negating that conviction would ‘affect[] the duration of his
sentence by restoring his good-time credits.’” Id. (quoting Bourne v. Gunnels,
921 F.3d 484, 491 (5th Cir. 2019)). “Whether the plaintiff in fact seeks the
restoration of good-time credits, rather than another remedy such as
damages, is immaterial.” Id. (citing Aucoin v. Cupil, 958 F.3d 379, 383 (5th
Cir. 2020)).
Our decision in Santos is also instructive. See Santos v. White, 18 F.4th
472 (5th Cir. 2021), cert. denied, 213 L. Ed. 2d 1040, 142 S. Ct. 2817 (2022).
There, we first concluded that, because the plaintiff’s disciplinary violations
resulted in the loss of good-time credits, those findings were “convictions”
for purposes of Heck. Id. at 475. We “considered the contradictions between
[the plaintiff’s] allegations and the reports that had accompanied [his]
disciplinary sanctions and concluded that a ruling in his favor ‘would directly
challenge the validity of his convictions.’” Id. (quoting Santos v. White, No.
16-00598, 2020 WL 86445, at *3 (M.D. La. Jan. 7, 2020)). Heck thus barred
the consideration of some of the plaintiff’s claims in his § 1983 suit. Id. We
also determined that there was confusion as to which facts applied to the
convictions, and because there were different remedies sought, it was not
sufficient to deem all of the plaintiff’s claims “‘intertwined’ with his loss of
good-time credits.” Id. at 476. Rather, in applying Heck, we reasoned that “a
court must bar only those claims that are ‘necessarily at odds with’ the
disciplinary rulings, and only with those rulings that resulted in the loss of
good-time credits.” Id. at 476–77 (citing Aucoin, 958 F.3d at 383).
Consequently, we held that a fact-specific analysis informed by the elements
was necessary to establish those violations. Id.
Here, Autin’s claims are Heck-barred because any judgment in his
favor would necessarily imply the invalidity of the deprivation of his good-
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time credits. Id. The basis for the loss of his good-time credits are the
disciplinary convictions being challenged. See Edwards, 520 U.S. at 646. To
prevail in his § 1983 suit, Autin would be required to negate his conviction
which would result in the reinstatement of good-time credits, which in turn,
is prohibited under Heck. See Bourne, 921 F.3d at 491.
Although Autin does not outright request the reinstatement of his
good-time credits, by maintaining his complete innocence as to all charges,
he directly challenges an element of each criminal offense and proof of fact.
See Aucoin, 958 F.3d at 383 (holding that maintaining innocence was
“necessarily inconsistent with the validity of the [administrative]
conviction.”). Unlike in Santos, there is no confusion as to which facts apply
to the convictions. Each of Autin’s alleged excessive force claims directly
relate to his charges that underly his disciplinary convictions, thus
intertwining his § 1983 claim with his loss of good-time credits. Santos, 18
F.4th at 476. A judgment in his favor would mean that the elements of the
charges against him were not satisfied. 2 Furthermore, all of Autin’s claims
implicate Heck because they challenge the validity of his conviction rather
than the circumstances or conditions of his confinement. See Id. at 476.
In sum, the district court abused its discretion by holding that Autin’s
claims were not Heck-barred. See Austin, 864 F.3d at 329 (citing United States
v. Yanez Sosa, 513 F.3d 194, 200 (5th Cir. 2008) (holding that “[a] trial court
abuses its discretion when its ruling is based on an erroneous view of the
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2
Neither Aucoin v. Cupil, 958 F.3d 379, 384 (5th Cir. 2020), nor Bush v. Strain, 513
F.3d 492, 498–99 (5th Cir. 2008), call for a different result. In those cases, the plaintiffs
“surrendered” before the officer exercised force, and the force was “discrete” from the
plaintiffs’ conduct that resulted in the sentence. Aucoin, 958 F.3d at 383–84; see also Bush,
513 F.3d at 497–98. Thus, we held that the basis of the plaintiffs’ convictions was
“temporally and conceptually distinct from the excessive force claims.” Aucoin, 958 F.3d
at 384 (quoting Bush, 513 F.3d at 498).
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law.”). Moreover, because Heck plainly requires dismissal of Autin’s claims,
we need not reach the question of qualified immunity.
Finally, with respect to the November order, we note that the district
court entered it after the officers filed their notice of appeal. But the district
court was without jurisdiction to do so because the order purported to decide
“aspects of the case on appeal”—i.e., the qualified immunity and Heck
issues. Alice, 492 F.3d at 564. Consequently, we vacate the district court’s
November order.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE its September 30, 2021
order denying the officers’ second motion for summary judgment and
VACATE its November 17, 2021 amended order.
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