Benny Montgomery v. Dyland Hale , 648 F. App'x 444 ( 2016 )


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  •      Case: 15-50742      Document: 00513507019         Page: 1    Date Filed: 05/16/2016
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    United States Court of Appeals
    No. 15-50742
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    May 16, 2016
    Lyle W. Cayce
    BENNY MONTGOMERY,                                                                  Clerk
    Plaintiff–Appellant,
    versus
    DYLAND HALE, Tactics Officers, Midland Police Department;
    B.J. LAND, Lieutenant Supervisor, Midland Police Department;
    CARLOS PIZANO, Police Officer, Midland Police Department;
    DOMINGUEZ, Police Officer, Midland Police Department,
    Defendants–Appellees.
    Appeals from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Texas
    USDC No. 7:15-CV-106
    Before HIGGINBOTHAM, SMITH, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM: *
    Benny Montgomery, Texas prisoner # 1589407, moves for leave to
    proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) following the dismissal of his 42 U.S.C.
    * Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH
    CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    Case: 15-50742     Document: 00513507019      Page: 2   Date Filed: 05/16/2016
    No. 15-50742
    § 1983 complaint alleging that members of the Midland Police Department
    used excessive force in a 2008 arrest. The district court sua sponte dismissed
    the complaint under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e) and 1915A based on a determination
    that it was not timely filed. See, e.g., Gartrell v. Gaylor, 
    981 F.2d 254
    , 256 (5th
    Cir. 1993). We construe Montgomery’s motion as a challenge to the district
    court’s certification that the appeal is not taken in good faith. See Baugh v.
    Taylor, 
    117 F.3d 197
    , 202 (5th Cir. 1997). We must determine “whether the
    appeal involves legal points arguable on their merits (and therefore not frivo-
    lous).” Howard v. King, 
    707 F.2d 215
    , 220 (5th Cir. 1983) (internal quotation
    marks and citation omitted).
    Assuming, arguendo, that Montgomery was denied a fair opportunity to
    establish equitable tolling in the district court, we grant the motion for IFP,
    but we dispense with further briefing and affirm. Texas’s equitable-tolling
    principles control. See Rotella v. Pederson, 
    144 F.3d 892
    , 897 (5th Cir. 1998).
    Texas courts sparingly apply equitable tolling and look, inter alia, to
    whether a plaintiff diligently pursued his rights. See Hand v. Stevens Transp.,
    Inc. Emp. Benefit Plan, 
    83 S.W.3d 286
    , 293 (Tex. App.―Dallas 2002, no pet.).
    Montgomery does not cite any state precedent to show that Texas has applied
    equitable tolling in circumstances similar to those he alleges. Moreover, even
    if federal equitable-tolling principles are considered, “attorney negligence,
    however styled, does not provide a basis for equitable tolling.” Holland v. Flor-
    ida, 
    560 U.S. 645
    , (2010); Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 
    498 U.S. 89
    , 96
    (1990). Montgomery’s suggestion of intentional deception by his attorney is
    entirely conclusional and is thus insufficient to support a claim for equitable
    tolling. See, e.g., United States v. Riggs, 
    314 F.3d 796
    , 799 (5th Cir. 2003).
    Furthermore, Montgomery has not shown a diligent pursuit of his rights. See
    
    Hand, 83 S.W.3d at 293
    .
    2
    Case: 15-50742       Document: 00513507019   Page: 3   Date Filed: 05/16/2016
    No. 15-50742
    The dismissal of the complaint as frivolous counts as a strike under
    28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). See Adepegba v. Hammons, 
    103 F.3d 383
    , 387–88 (5th Cir.
    1996). Montgomery is advised that if he accumulates three strikes, he will not
    be able to proceed IFP in any civil action or appeal while he is incarcerated or
    detained in any facility unless he is under imminent danger of serious physical
    injury. See § 1915(g).
    The motion to proceed IFP is GRANTED. The judgment is AFFIRMED.
    3