United States v. Barajas ( 2021 )

Case: 20-10582 Document: 00515966988 Page: 1 Date Filed: 08/05/2021
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
August 5, 2021
No. 20-10582
Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
United States of America,
Plaintiff—Appellee,
versus
Marco Barajas,
Defendant—Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
USDC No. 4:19-CR-364-2
Before Smith, Stewart, and Willett, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
Marco Barajas pled guilty to participating in a widespread conspiracy
involving the possession and distribution of methamphetamine. He was
sentenced to 198 months’ imprisonment. He now appeals asserting that the
district court erred by failing to sua sponte order a competency hearing prior
*
Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
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No. 20-10582
to accepting his guilty plea. Because we disagree, we AFFIRM the district
court’s judgment.
I. Factual & Procedural Background
Barajas pled guilty, without a plea agreement, to conspiracy to
distribute and possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 (a)(1), (b)(1)(C), 846. The district court
sentenced Barajas to 198 months of imprisonment, a 12-month downward
variance from the low end of the guidelines range, and imposed a three-year
term of supervised release. Barajas filed this appeal.
II. Standard of Review
We ordinarily apply an abuse-of-discretion standard of review in cases
challenging a district court’s failure to sua sponte order a competency
hearing. See United States v. Messervey, 317 F.3d 457, 463 (5th Cir. 2002);
United States v. Davis, 61 F.3d 291, 303 (5th Cir. 1995). But in cases where
the defendant has failed to make a competency objection during the guilty
plea hearing and does not seek to withdraw his guilty plea in the district court,
we have reviewed for plain error. See United States v. Montoya, 838 F. App’x
898, 898 (5th Cir. 2021) (per curiam) (unpublished); United States v.
Villarreal, 405 F. App’x 833, 833 (5th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (unpublished).
Because Barajas loses under either standard, we need not determine which
applies here.
III. Discussion
A district court’s decision to conduct a competency hearing
implicates both constitutional and statutory law. The conviction of a mentally
incompetent defendant violates the Due Process Clause. See Pate v. Robinson,
383 U.S. 375, 378 (1966). A defendant therefore has a procedural due process
right to a competency hearing if the evidence before the district court “raises
a bona fide doubt as to [the] defendant’s competence to stand trial.” Id. at
385 (internal quotation marks omitted). A defendant is “competent to stand
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trial if he has the present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable
degree of rational understanding and has a rational as well as factual
understanding of the proceeding[] against him.” United States v. Joseph, 333
F.3d 587, 589 (5th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Under the constitutional standard, a district court should conduct a
competency hearing if it “receive[s] information which, objectively
considered, should reasonably have raised a doubt about [the] defendant’s
competency and alerted him to the possibility that the defendant could
neither understand the proceedings or appreciate their significance, nor
rationally aid his attorney in his defense.” United States v. Williams, 819 F.2d
605, 607 (5th Cir. 1987) (citation omitted); see Medina v. California, 505 U.S.
437, 448 (1992) (noting that the key is whether the defendant had “the
capacity to participate in his defense and understand the proceedings against
him”).
Similarly, 18 U.S.C. § 4241 provides that the district court, either
upon motion of a party or sua sponte, shall order a competency evaluation “if
there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant may presently be
suffering from a mental disease or defect rendering him mentally
incompetent to the extent that he is unable to understand the nature and
consequences of the proceedings against him or to assist properly in his
defense.” 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a). A party may file a motion for a competency
hearing, or the district court may sua sponte order a hearing, “[a]t any time
after the commencement of a prosecution for an offense and prior to the
sentencing of the defendant.” Id.
Whether “reasonable cause” exists to evaluate the defendant’s
competency is left to the sound discretion of the district court. Messervey, 317
F.3d at 463. Nevertheless, “[t]o determine whether there is ‘reasonable
cause’ to doubt a defendant’s competence, we consider: (1) any history of
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irrational behavior, (2) the defendant’s demeanor at trial, and (3) any prior
medical opinion on competency.” Id. “Significantly, ‘the presence or
absence of mental illness or brain disorder is not dispositive’ as to
competency.” United States v. Mitchell, 709 F.3d 436, 440 (5th Cir. 2013)
(quoting Mata v. Johnson, 210 F.3d 324, 329 n.2 (5th Cir. 2000)).
Barajas argues for the first time on appeal that the district court
violated his due process rights, as well as the provisions of
18 U.S.C. § 4241(a), by failing to sua sponte order a competency hearing. He
avers that the information before the district court showed that he suffered
from a debilitating mental defect caused by a gunshot wound to the head and
should have raised a reasonable doubt about his competency. In support of
his argument, he cites to his mother’s testimony at the preliminary detention
hearing, the information adduced at his plea hearing, and the information
contained in the presentence report (“PSR”). We will examine each of these
sources now.
A. Preliminary Detention Hearing
At the preliminary detention hearing, Barajas’s mother testified
regarding the issue of pre-trial detention. She recounted that Barajas had
been shot in the head six years ago and that he suffered from short-term
memory issues. She explained that as a result of the injury, Barajas had
received temporary Social Security disability payments and had been treated
by a physician. She concluded, however, that Barajas had “been successfully
growing as a man” during the past six years and that he had been able to hold
down a job at AutoZone.
B. Plea Hearing
At the plea hearing, Barajas’s attorney advised the court that he had
no reason to think that Barajas was not fully competent and capable of
entering a guilty plea. He further stated that he had no reason to believe that
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Barajas’s decision to plead guilty was not knowingly, voluntarily, and
intelligently made. At times during the plea hearing, the district court
questioned Barajas directly. Barajas responded to the district court’s
questions with no apparent difficulty and provided his age, date of birth, and
education and employment history. He also explained that he had not been
under the care of a physician or psychiatrist during the last six months. When
asked whether he had ever been treated for narcotics or alcohol addiction,
Barajas described his “struggle with addiction” and his use of marijuana to
help manage his seizures after his head injury. When asked whether he
believed he suffered from “any kind of emotional or mental disability or
problem,” Barajas responded, “I don’t really know.” The district court
reframed the question and asked Barajas whether he felt like he was “okay
mentally,” to which Barajas replied, “On a good day, yeah. On a bad day, I
don’t really feel like getting up out of bed, Your Honor.”
The district court then asked Barajas’s attorney whether he had
observed any indications of a mental problem during his interactions with
Barajas. His attorney responded, “Not in terms of understanding the
proceedings.” He then acknowledged that Barajas had previously suffered a
head injury and stated that while he occasionally had to repeat things, he
“never at any point thought he did not understand the proceedings or what
was going on around him.”
Barajas confirmed to the district court that he knew he was in court to
offer his plea, and he understood that he was planning to enter a plea of guilty.
He also confirmed that he had read and signed the factual resume and that he
had his attorney strike certain facts in the resume about which he had no
knowledge before he signed it. He further stated that his attorney had
explained the legal meaning of the factual resume and that he “understood
very well.” The district court asked Barajas if his attorney reviewed the
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factual resume with him “as many times as he needed . . . to understand it,”
and Barajas replied, “Yes, Your Honor.”
The district court thereafter accepted the plea explaining that Barajas
was “fully competent and capable of entering an informed plea, and that his
plea of guilty to the offense charged by Count 2 of the information in this case
is a knowing and voluntary plea supported by an independent basis in fact
containing each of the essential elements of that offense, and that such plea
did not result from force, threats, or promises.”
C. Presentence Report
The PSR reflected that Barajas sustained a gunshot wound to his head
on April 5, 2013, was in a coma for two weeks, and required a month of
rehabilitation. Medical records from 2019 confirmed that ballistic fragments
remained in his head. He reported that he was diagnosed with bipolar
disorder after the shooting incident and that he suffered from anxiety and
panic attacks. He continued that he had previously received outpatient
treatment and prescription medication but that he had not taken any
medication since 2019. He stated that he continued to have seizures and
memory and coordination issues. Medical records confirmed that he had
been prescribed medication for seizures and that he had requested a
psychology consultation during his incarceration because “he occasionally
sees shadows, hears indistinguishable voices, and suffers from anxiety.” As
of the date of the PSR, there was no record that he had received any mental
health treatment.
The PSR also noted that, a year after the shooting, Barajas attended
South Texas Vocational Technical Institute in McAllen, Texas, and obtained
his massage therapist license. Thereafter, he had several jobs. He worked as
a cook for several months and reported that he was a home health care
provider for his grandmother for eighteen months. He was most employed
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recently at AutoZone, where he worked for six months before being arrested
for the instant offense.
We now examine this evidence under the applicable factors to
determine whether the district court erred in failing to sua sponte order a
competency hearing prior to accepting Barajas’s guilty plea. See Messervey,
317 F.3d at 463.
1. History of Prior Irrational Behavior
Barajas points to his statements to his probation officer that he “sees
shadows [and] hears indistinguishable voices” as evidence of his irrational
behavior. However, there is no other information in the record or in Barajas’s
medical records to substantiate these post-plea complaints. Additionally,
Barajas gave no indication during the plea hearing that he was experiencing
auditory or visual hallucinations and there is no other evidence in the record
of any prior irrational behavior. Accordingly, this factor weighs against the
necessity of ordering a competency hearing.
2. Defendant’s Demeanor at Trial
Barajas asserts that the record shows that he refused to unequivocally
commit to being mentally competent when questioned by the district court.
This argument, however, is misguided. The district court did not ask Barajas
about his mental competency; rather, the district court asked Barajas whether
he believed that he suffered from an emotional or mental disability or
problem and Barajas responded that he did not know. When the district court
clarified by asking Barajas whether he was “okay mentally,” he simply
replied that he had some good days and other days when he did not want to
get out of bed.
Barajas’s unremarkable responses here do not qualify as evidence of
mental incompetency. As an initial matter, whether he had mental or
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emotional problems or a mental illness “is not dispositive as to [his]
competency.” Mitchell, 709 F.3d at 440 (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). Furthermore, the record reveals that Barajas’s overall
demeanor during the proceedings supports the government’s argument that
he acted appropriately and that “his conversation with the district court was
coherent, responsive, and goal-directed.” Barajas provided rational
responses to the district court’s questions and was able to intelligently
discuss his education, work experience, and struggle with addiction. He
rarely asked the district court to repeat a question during his plea hearing.
Further, the record shows that Barajas was able to discuss his case with his
attorney and to identify facts for his attorney that were either unknown to
him or did not accurately represent his conduct in the offense. Consequently,
this factor also weighs against the necessity of a competency hearing.
3. Prior Medical Opinion on Competency
Finally, Barajas contends that receiving Social Security disability
benefits and his self-reported mental health diagnoses are tantamount to a
medical declaration of incompetency. Again, his argument falls short. As an
initial matter, Barajas cites to no case in support of his argument regarding
receipt of Social Security disability. Further, while he asserts that “he had
been deemed so mentally disabled by the State of Texas that he had received
Social Security Disability payments,” the record does not contain a final
diagnosis or any verified declaration regarding his mental competency.
Likewise, while the PSR references some evidence of medical treatment for
seizures and anxiety, it does not contain any reference to medical records
speaking to Barajas’s competency. This factor weighs against the necessity
of a competency hearing.
Regarding his past diagnoses, Barajas points our attention to our prior
unpublished opinion in United States v. Fuentes, 38 F.3d 568, 1994 WL
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574184, at *13 (5th Cir. 1994). There, this court held that the district court
erred in failing to grant a competency hearing where the defendant had
reported hearing voices and had been hospitalized for mental health
problems. Id. In that case, however, we noted that “[a]n addendum to the
PSR indicated that [the defendant’s] mental history had been verified by
medical records obtained from several doctors who had treated him. The
PSR also indicated that the medical records were available for the district
court to review.” Id. Here, on the other hand, Barajas has failed to provide
this court with adequate medical records detailing his mental history or
supporting his claims of mental incompetency. Although Barajas has self-
reported several issues involving his mental health, he has failed to provide
medical records verifying his claims. For this reason, he is not entitled to the
relief that was warranted in Fuentes.
In sum, our review of the applicable factors indicates that the district
court’s decision not to order a competency hearing was reasonable given the
evidence before it. See Messervey, 317 F.3d at 463. Additionally, the record
reveals that the information before the district court provided no reason to
question whether Barajas understood the nature and consequences of the
proceedings against him and was able to aid his attorney in his defense. See
18 U.S.C. § 4241(a); see also Mitchell, 709 F.3d at 441 (finding no abuse of
discretion where a defendant, who was diagnosed with a schizophrenic
disorder and made “illogical and rambling statements” in the district court
but otherwise exhibited a “basic awareness and understanding of the
proceedings”). Accordingly, we hold that the district court did not err in
failing to sua sponte order a competency hearing.
IV. Conclusion
The district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.
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