Bowman v. Orleans Parish School Board , 141 F. App'x 291 ( 2005 )

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT July 18, 2005
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 04-31266
Summary Calendar
ODEAL BOWMAN
Plaintiff - Appellant
v.
ORLEANS PARISH SCHOOL BOARD
Defendant - Appellee
--------------------
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana, New Orleans
2:03-CV-843
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Before WIENER, BENAVIDES, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Plaintiff-Appellant Odeal Bowman (“Bowman”) appeals the
district court’s denial of her motion for judgment as a matter of
law or, alternatively, for a new trial following a jury verdict
and entry of judgment in favor of Defendant-Appellee the Orleans
Parish School Board (the “School Board”). For the reasons that
follow, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
On March 25, 2003, Bowman filed a complaint alleging, inter
alia, that the School Board discriminated against her in
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
No. 04-31266
-2-
violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 621, et seq. (“ADEA”). A jury trial of Bowman’s ADEA claim was
held on November 15, 2004. The jury returned a verdict for the
School Board, finding that the School Board had not unlawfully
discriminated against Bowman on the basis of her age by failing
to promote her to the position of school principal. Thereafter,
Bowman filed a motion for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b) or, alternatively, a motion
for a new trial pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
59(a). The district court denied Bowman’s post-trial motions on
the ground that it could not conclude that there was no legally
sufficient evidentiary basis upon which the jury could have found
for the School Board. This appeal by Bowman followed.
We review a district court’s denial of a motion for judgment
as a matter of law de novo, applying the same standard as the
district court. Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 576
n.9 (5th Cir. 2001). The district court properly grants a motion
for judgment as a matter of law only if the facts and inferences
point so strongly in favor of one party that reasonable minds
could not disagree. See id. “In ruling on a Rule 50 motion
based upon the sufficiency of the evidence, we ‘consider all of
the evidence--not just that evidence which supports the
non-mover’s case--but in the light and with all reasonable
inferences most favorable to the party opposed to the motion.’”
No. 04-31266
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Info. Communication Corp. v. Unisys Corp., 181 F.3d 629, 633 (5th
Cir. 1999).
The ultimate issue in an age discrimination case is “whether
the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff.”
Olitsky v. Spencer Gifts, Inc., 964 F.2d 1471, 1478 (5th Cir.
1992). The burden of persuading the trier of fact that the
defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff
remains at all times with the plaintiff. See St. Mary’s Honor
Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 507 (1993); see also Armendariz v.
Pinkerton Tobacco Co., 58 F.3d 144, 149 (5th Cir. 1995) (“In an
ADEA case, the critical test is that the plaintiff must prove
that age actually played a role in and had a determinative
influence on the employer’s decision-making process.”) (internal
quotations omitted).
In the instant case, Bowman did not meet her burden of proof
because she presented no evidence that the School Board even
considered her age, much less that the School Board intentionally
discriminated against her due to her age. Moreover, considering
the evidence in the light most favorable to the School Board, we
cannot conclude that the facts and inferences point so strongly
to a finding of intentional discrimination that reasonable minds
could not disagree about whether the School Board’s conduct was
motivated by Bowman’s age. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment
of the district court denying Bowman’s motion for judgment as a
matter of law or, alternatively, for a new trial.