United States v. Cedillo ( 2021 )


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  • Case: 20-11094     Document: 00515974296         Page: 1     Date Filed: 08/11/2021
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Fifth Circuit                          United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    August 11, 2021
    No. 20-11094                      Lyle W. Cayce
    Summary Calendar                         Clerk
    United States of America,
    Plaintiff—Appellee,
    versus
    Andrew Cedillo,
    Defendant—Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Texas
    USDC No. 1:20-CR-3-1
    Before Southwick, Oldham, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.
    Per Curiam:*
    Andrew Cedillo entered a conditional guilty plea to possession with
    the intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine in violation of
    
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (a)(1) and (b)(1)(B)(viii), reserving the right to appeal the
    district court’s denial of his motion to suppress the evidence. He was
    *
    Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
    opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
    circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
    Case: 20-11094      Document: 00515974296           Page: 2     Date Filed: 08/11/2021
    No. 20-11094
    sentenced to 160 months of imprisonment, to be followed by five years of
    supervised release. On appeal, he argues that the traffic stop was not
    supported by reasonable suspicion and that the good-faith exception may not
    be used to justify a pretextual traffic stop conducted without probable cause
    or reasonable suspicion.
    We decline to decide whether Cedillo preserved his arguments by
    sufficiently raising a challenge in the district court to the good-faith exception
    when based on an error in the law and involving a pretextual stop, see United
    States v. Scroggins, 
    599 F.3d 433
    , 448 (5th Cir. 2010), because his arguments
    lack merit under any standard of review, see United States v. Fernandez, 
    559 F.3d 303
    , 330 (5th Cir. 2009).
    The constitutionality of a traffic stop is examined under the two-
    pronged analysis described in Terry v. Ohio, 
    392 U.S. 1
     (1968). United States
    v. Pack, 
    612 F.3d 341
    , 349–50 (5th Cir. 2010), modified on other grounds on
    denial of reh’g, 
    622 F.3d 383
     (5th Cir. 2010). First, we determine whether the
    stop was justified at its inception. Pack, 612 F.3d at 350. “For a traffic stop
    to be justified at its inception, an officer must have an objectively reasonable
    suspicion that some sort of illegal activity, such as a traffic violation,
    occurred, or is about to occur, before stopping the vehicle.” United States v.
    Lopez-Moreno, 
    420 F.3d 420
    , 430 (5th Cir. 2005). Reasonable suspicion can
    rest on a mistaken understanding of the law if the mistake is objectively
    reasonable. Heien v. North Carolina, 
    574 U.S. 54
    , 60, 66 (2014).
    The officer who stopped Cedillo testified that he observed Cedillo’s
    vehicle fail to maintain a single lane of travel multiple times, in violation of
    Texas Transportation Code § 545.060(a). We view this evidence in the light
    most favorable to the Government and conclude that the officer’s action in
    stopping Cedillo was justified at its inception because he had reasonable
    suspicion that Cedillo violated § 545.060(a), and, even if he erred in
    2
    Case: 20-11094      Document: 00515974296          Page: 3    Date Filed: 08/11/2021
    No. 20-11094
    determining that he had a legal basis to stop Cedillo’s vehicle, his mistake of
    law was objectively reasonable. See Heien, 574 U.S. at 68; Pack, 612 F.3d at
    347; see also Leming v. State, 
    493 S.W.3d 552
    , 556–61 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016)
    (plurality op.). Despite Cedillo’s arguments to the contrary, it is well-settled
    that a traffic stop, even if pretextual, does not violate the Fourth Amendment
    if the officer making the stop has probable cause or reasonable suspicion to
    believe that a traffic violation has occurred. Whren v. United States, 
    517 U.S. 806
    , 810–12 (1996).
    Accordingly, the district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.
    3