David Hardy v. Ernest Gonzalez , 551 F. App'x 253 ( 2014 )


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  •      Case: 13-40385      Document: 00512500334         Page: 1    Date Filed: 01/14/2014
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    No. 13-40385                              January 14, 2014
    Summary Calendar
    Lyle W. Cayce
    Clerk
    DAVID MARK HARDY,
    Plaintiff-Appellant
    v.
    ERNEST GONZALEZ, Assistant United States Attorney; ROBERT GERARD
    ARAMBIDE, Public Defender; TOMMY MOORE, Paris Police Department;
    ANSEN AMIS, Lamar County Sheriff's Deputy; MIKE BOAZ, NLISD resource
    officer; HAROLD MCCLURE, Sulphur Springs Police Department;
    BRITTANY JUANITZ INGRAM, Lamar County resident; MICHAEL LUTZ,
    Immunized co-conspirator; DOES (NUMBERS 1-25),
    Defendants-Appellees
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Texas
    USDC No. 4:12-CV-766
    Before DAVIS, SOUTHWICK, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM: *
    David Mark Hardy, federal prisoner # 14486-078, proceeding pro se and
    in forma pauperis, appeals the district court’s dismissal of his civil action
    raising claims allegedly arising under the Racketeering Influenced and
    * Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH
    CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    Case: 13-40385     Document: 00512500334      Page: 2   Date Filed: 01/14/2014
    No. 13-40385
    Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. § 1961. Hardy was convicted by
    a jury of conspiracy to possess with intent to manufacture or distribute 500
    grams or more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of
    methamphetamine, and he was sentenced to 360 months of imprisonment. His
    conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal.          United States v.
    Hardy, 393 F. App’x 205 (5th Cir. 2010). His 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion was
    denied by the district court on October 12, 2012. Hardy v. United States, 
    2012 WL 4863155
    (E.D. Tex. 2012).
    On November 1, 2012, Hardy filed this civil action against various people
    involved in his prosecution and conviction, alleging that the defendants
    “knowingly participated in offenses involving fraud connected with a case
    under Title 11, some of whose actions caused a sequence of events which forced
    HARDY and his wife into bankruptcy under Chapter 7, then corruptly, through
    acts of racketeering, attempted to cover it up.” Hardy filed bankruptcy in
    February 2006. His bankruptcy was discharged on April 6, 2006. Hardy was
    tried and convicted in November 2008. He alleged that the actions of the
    defendants to prosecute him for a non-existent offense made them liable for his
    bankruptcy.
    The district court determined that because Hardy had sued people
    associated with his conviction, and because the events occurring from 2005 to
    2008 described in Hardy’s complaint as violating RICO also resulted in his
    conviction, “a judgment in Hardy’s favor would necessarily imply the invalidity
    of his conviction.” The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state
    a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) as barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 
    512 U.S. 477
    (1994), because Hardy had not shown that his conviction had been
    invalidated. The district court further determined that even if Heck did not
    bar some of his claims, his claims would still have to be dismissed under the
    2
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    No. 13-40385
    two year statute of limitations, noting that the complained of events occurred
    in 2005 to 2008 and that his lawsuit filed in November 2012 was too late.
    Hardy argues that the district court erred in dismissing his RICO claims
    as time barred by applying the two year personal injury statute of limitations.
    He notes that he filed his complaint on November 1, 2012, and he contends
    that the district court erred in using the date his complaint was docketed,
    November 26, 2012. He argues that a four year statute of limitations with an
    “injury discovery” accrual rule applies to his civil RICO claims, citing Rotella
    v. Wood, 
    147 F.3d 438
    (5th Cir. 1998), affirmed by, 
    528 U.S. 549
    (2000).
    A dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted
    under § 1915A is reviewed under the same de novo standard as a dismissal
    under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Black v. Warren, 
    134 F.3d 732
    ,
    733-34 (5th Cir. 1998).
    Hardy is correct that the mailbox rule applies and that the filing date of
    his complaint was November 1, 2012. See Cooper v. Brookshire, 
    70 F.3d 377
    ,
    379-80 (5th Cir. 1995) (applying mailbox rule to prisoner’s pro se civil rights
    complaint).   Hardy certified that he delivered his complaint to prison
    authorities on November 1, 2012. He is also correct that a four year statute of
    limitations applies to civil RICO claims, and that such claims accrue when the
    injury is discovered. See 
    Rotella, 528 U.S. at 552-55
    . However, if Heck applies
    to Hardy’s claims, the statute of limitations issue need not be decided. See
    Stephenson v. Reno, 
    28 F.3d 26
    , 27-28 (5th Cir. 1994) (noting that if Heck
    applies, the claims have not yet accrued and so the statute of limitations is not
    a concern).
    In Heck v. Humphrey, the Supreme Court held that, in order to recover
    damages for an allegedly unconstitutional conviction, or for “harm caused by
    actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid,” a
    3
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    prisoner must show that the conviction or sentence has been “reversed on
    direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal
    authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal
    court's issuance of a writ of habeas 
    corpus.” 512 U.S. at 486-87
    . We applied
    Heck in Stephenson v. 
    Reno, 28 F.3d at 27
    , a case in which a federal prisoner
    alleged civil rights violations and civil RICO claims. We determined that
    Stephenson’s civil rights action constituted a challenge to the fact or length of
    his confinement and was barred by 
    Heck. 28 F.3d at 27-28
    .
    A close reading of his complaint shows that Hardy’s RICO claims were
    focused on recovering damages for the loss of his employment and his
    bankruptcy, and that he was not seeking to invalidate his conviction. Whether
    a judgment in Hardy’s favor necessarily implies the invalidity of his conviction
    under Heck is not clear. Assuming arguendo that Hardy’s civil RICO claims
    are not barred by Heck, they are untimely, even applying the four year statute
    of limitations. Hardy alleged repeatedly that his injury was the loss of his
    employment and his bankruptcy, which occurred in 2005 and 2006. Applying
    the “injury discovery” rule for civil RICO claims adopted in Rotella, Hardy had
    four years from, at the latest, April 6, 2006, the date of discharge of his
    bankruptcy. Although Hardy argues that a “separate accrual” rule should
    apply, he does not identify any injury subsequent to the date of his bankruptcy
    in 2006. Thus, even applying the four year statute of limitations, Hardy’s
    RICO claims in his complaint filed on November 1, 2012, are time barred. The
    district court did not err in dismissing Hardy’s complaint under § 1915A(b)(1).
    See 
    Black, 134 F.3d at 733-34
    .
    Hardy’s appeal is without arguable merit and is frivolous. See Howard
    v. King, 
    707 F.2d 215
    , 219-20 (5th Cir. 1983). Because the appeal is frivolous,
    it is dismissed. See 5TH CIR. R. 42.2. The dismissal of this appeal as frivolous
    4
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    and the district court’s dismissal count as strikes for purposes of 28 U.S.C.
    § 1915(g). See Adepegba v. Hammons, 
    103 F.3d 383
    , 387-88 (5th Cir. 1996).
    Hardy is cautioned that once he accumulates three strikes, he may not proceed
    IFP in any civil action or appeal filed while he is incarcerated or detained in
    any facility unless he is under imminent danger of serious physical injury. See
    § 1915(g).
    APPEAL DISMISSED AS FRIVOLOUS; SANCTION WARNING
    ISSUED.
    5