Levi Coleman, Sr. v. H.C. Price Company, et ( 2014 )


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  •      Case: 13-30150   Document: 00512476009   Page: 1   Date Filed: 12/18/2013
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT     United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    December 18, 2013
    No. 13-30150
    Lyle W. Cayce
    Clerk
    LEVI COLEMAN, SR., Deceased; BARBARA COLEMAN; SHIRLEY
    COLEMAN MORELAND; LEVI COLEMAN, JR.; STANLEY NEWTON; ET
    AL,
    Plaintiffs - Appellants
    v.
    OFS, INCORPORATED, individually and as successor in interest to Oil Field
    Sales and Service, Incorporated; ATLANTIC RICHFIELD COMPANY,
    individually and as successor in interest to Arco Oil and Gas Corporation,
    also known as Arco Oil & Gas Company; BP PRODUCTS NORTH
    AMERICA, INCORPORATED, individually and as successor in interest to
    Amoco Oil Company and American Oil Company; CHEVRON USA,
    INCORPORATED, inidividually and as the parent company and successor to
    Gulf Oil Corporation and Gulf Oil Exploration & Production Company, and
    Texaco, Incorporated, the successor to Texas Company; EXXON MOBIL
    CORPORATION, individually and as successor in interest to Exxon
    Corporation and Mobil Exploration & Producing Southeast, Incorporated;
    SHELL OFFSHORE, INCORPORATED; SHELL OIL COMPANY; SWEPI,
    L.P., individually and as successor in interest to Shell Western E&P,
    Incorporated; UNION OIL COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA; SUPERIOR OIL
    COMPANY; PACKARD PIPE TERMINALS, L.L.C., formerly named as
    Packard Pipe Terminals, Incorporated,
    Defendants - Appellees
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Louisiana
    USDC No. 2:11-CV-2937
    Case: 13-30150      Document: 00512476009         Page: 2    Date Filed: 12/18/2013
    No. 13-30150
    Before OWEN, SOUTHWICK, and GRAVES, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    This is an appeal from a partial final judgment which dismissed certain
    plaintiffs’ state law survival claims as untimely. The district court found that
    the limitations period governing survival claims in Louisiana is peremptive
    and thus not subject to tolling or interruption. We certify the dispositive
    question of whether the relevant time period is prescriptive or peremptive to
    the Louisiana Supreme Court.
    I. Factual and Procedural Background
    Plaintiffs-Appellants in this class action litigation are pipe yard workers
    and surviving beneficiaries of pipe yard workers. Plaintiffs’ tort claims arise
    out of the pipe yard workers’ occupational exposure to radioactive oil field
    waste materials including Technologically Enhanced Naturally Occurring
    Radioactive Materials (“TENORM”) and other hazardous substances.
    Plaintiffs allege that, unknown to the workers, pipe cleaning, pipe
    maintenance, and yard maintenance resulted in their exposure to TENORM,
    which caused or contributed to the development of various diseases, health
    problems, and deaths. Defendants-Appellees are multiple oil companies who
    contracted with employers of the workers. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants
    were aware of the dangers of TENORM and were aware of the workers’
    exposure, but failed to warn the workers or the public of the environmental
    and health dangers.
    The Coleman family originally filed survival claims and wrongful death
    claims in state court based on Levi Coleman’s TENORM exposure. The action
    * Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH
    CIR. R. 47.5.4.
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    was amended multiple times to add additional plaintiffs.             Defendants
    eventually removed the action to the Eastern District of Louisiana under the
    Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d), 1453. The district court denied
    a motion to remand. Multiple defendants filed motions to dismiss certain of
    the survival claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6),
    asserting that all survival claims filed more than one year after the decedent’s
    death were untimely.       Plaintiffs argued that the applicable one-year
    limitations period for survival claims, see La. Civ. Code art. 2315.1, did not
    begin to run until Plaintiffs discovered the connection between the decedents’
    deaths and the toxic tort exposure. Plaintiffs alternatively argued that the
    one-year   limitations   period   was   preempted     by   the   Comprehensive
    Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”), 42
    U.S.C. § 9658.
    After briefing and oral argument on the limitations issues, the district
    court dismissed certain of the survival actions as untimely. The district court
    determined that both before and after a 1986 amendment to the statute, the
    Article 2315.1 limitations period for survival claims is peremptive, rather than
    prescriptive, and is not subject to interruption or suspension for any reason.
    The district court dismissed all survival claims filed more than one year after
    the decedent’s death. The district court designated and certified its order of
    partial dismissal as an appealable final judgment under Federal Rule of Civil
    Procedure 54(b). Plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration arguing that the
    district court did not address their argument regarding CERCLA preemption.
    The district court denied the motion for reconsideration, holding that according
    to circuit precedent, CERCLA does not preempt peremptive periods. Plaintiffs
    timely appealed.
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    No. 13-30150
    II. Discussion
    This case involves the application of Louisiana law. To determine
    Louisiana law, we first look to the final decisions of the Supreme Court of
    Louisiana. See In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 
    495 F.3d 191
    , 206 (5th Cir.
    2007) (citing Am. Int’l Specialty Lines Ins. Co. v. Canal Indem. Co., 
    352 F.3d 254
    , 260 (5th Cir. 2003)). In the absence of a final decision by the Supreme
    Court of Louisiana, we “must make an Erie guess and determine, in our best
    judgment, how that court would resolve the issue if presented with the same
    case.” 
    Id. When making
    the Erie guess, we “must employ Louisiana’s civilian
    methodology, whereby we first examine primary sources of law: the
    constitution, codes, and statutes.” 
    Id. “Louisiana Civil
    Code article 2315.1 grants to designated beneficiaries a
    right of action to recover the damages that a person suffered and would have
    been entitled to recover from a tortfeasor, if that person had lived.” Barber v.
    Employers Ins. Co. of Wausau, 2011-0357 (La. App. 1 Cir. 6/28/12), 
    97 So. 3d 454
    , 461; see La. Civ. Code art. 2315.1(A). Article 2315.1(A) provides:
    If a person who has been injured by an offense or quasi offense
    dies, the right to recover all damages for injury to that person, his
    property or otherwise, caused by the offense or quasi offense, shall
    survive for a period of one year from the death of the deceased in
    favor of [specified beneficiaries].
    The primary issue on appeal is whether the one-year limitations period
    provided by Article 2315.1 is prescriptive or peremptive. “Prescriptive periods”
    are also known as statutes of limitation, while “peremptive periods” are also
    known as statutes of repose. This court has described the difference:
    A statute of limitations extinguishes the right to prosecute an
    accrued cause of action after a period of time. It cuts off the
    remedy. It is remedial and procedural. A statute of repose limits
    the time during which a cause of action can arise and usually runs
    from an act of a defendant. It abolishes the cause of action after
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    the passage of time even though the cause of action may not have
    yet accrued.
    Servicios-Expoarma, C.A. v. Indus. Mar. Carriers, 
    135 F.3d 984
    , 989 (5th Cir.
    1998) (quoting Harding v. K.C. Wall Prods., Inc., 
    831 P.2d 958
    , 967 (Kan.
    1992)). In other words, “prescription merely prevents the enforcement of a
    right by action; in contrast, peremption destroys the right itself.” La. Civ. Code
    art. 3458, 1982 rev. cmt. (b) (citing Pounds v. Schori, 
    377 So. 2d 1195
    (La.
    1979); Flowers, Inc. v. Rausch, 
    364 So. 2d 928
    (La. 1978)). In Louisiana,
    “[w]hen prescription applies, the prescriptive period does not begin to run until
    the plaintiff has actual or constructive knowledge of the facts which would
    entitle him to bring suit.” Ayo v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 
    771 F.2d 902
    , 907
    (5th Cir. 1985) (citations omitted); see 
    Barber, 97 So. 3d at 464
    (describing the
    Louisiana doctrine of “contra non valentem agere non currit praescriptio, which
    means prescription does not run against a person who could not bring suit”)
    (citing Jenkins v. Starns, 11-1170 (La.1/24/12), 
    85 So. 3d 612
    , 623). By contrast,
    when peremption applies, the limitations period is not subject to tolling or
    interruption and runs regardless of whether a plaintiff had knowledge of his
    cause of action. See 
    Ayo, 771 F.2d at 907
    ; La. Civ. Code art. 3461 (“Peremption
    may not be renounced, interrupted or suspended.”). “Whether a particular
    time period is prescriptive or peremptive is a matter determined by the
    Louisiana courts.” 
    Ayo, 771 F.2d at 906
    .
    In 1986, the Louisiana legislature amended and restructured Article
    2315, placing wrongful death and survival actions into separate provisions. 1
    Compare La. Civ. Code art. 2315.1 (survival action) with La. Civ. Code art
    2315.2 (wrongful death action); see 
    Barber, 97 So. 3d at 462
    (describing the
    1On appeal, Appellants do not challenge the district court’s holding that the pre-1986
    version of Article 2315 provided for a peremptive period in survival actions.
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    amendment). The text of the amended statute is ambiguous. On one hand,
    Article 2315.1, which governs survival actions, still provides that the right to
    recover “shall survive for a period of one year from the death of the deceased. .
    . .” La. Civ. Code art. 2315.1(A). By contrast, the amended Article 2315.2,
    which governs wrongful death actions, provides that “[t]he right of action
    granted by this Article prescribes one year from the death of the deceased.” La.
    Civ. Code art. 2315.2(B).      The difference in language between the two
    provisions may indicate different meanings. See 
    Barber, 97 So. 3d at 462
    (“This
    distinct difference in phrasing [between Articles 2315.1 and 2315.2] reflects
    the difference between peremption, which extinguishes a right upon the
    expiration of the peremptive period, and liberative prescription, which merely
    sets a time limit within which one is allowed to seek enforcement of a right.”).
    On the other hand, a new provision included in both the amended Articles
    2315.1 and 2315.2 provides that “[t]he right of action granted under this Article
    is heritable, but the inheritance of it neither interrupts nor prolongs the
    prescriptive period defined in this Article.” La. Civ. Code arts. 2315.1(C),
    2315.2(C). This express reference to a “prescriptive period” in both Articles
    may indicate that both time periods are intended to be prescriptive.          See
    Watkins v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 2012-0477 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/29/13), 
    117 So. 3d 548
    , 553 (“[T]he explicit language in Article 2315.1 C, describing the delay as
    a ‘prescriptive period,’ is the ‘best evidence’ that the legislature intends what
    it says in the codal article itself.”) (footnote omitted); see also 
    12 La. Civ
    . L.
    Treatise, Tort Law § 5:9 (2d ed.) (stating that the question of whether the
    Article 2315.1 period is prescriptive or peremptive “should be considered
    settled” by the reference to a “prescriptive period” in Article 2315.1).
    The Louisiana Supreme Court has not spoken on the issue of whether
    the time period in the amended Article 2315.1 is prescriptive or peremptive.
    Further, there are conflicting decisions from the Louisiana appellate courts.
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    Compare 
    Barber, 97 So. 3d at 462
    -63 (holding that the time period is
    peremptive), with 
    Watkins, 117 So. 3d at 551-53
    (holding that the time period
    is prescriptive), writ of review granted, No. 13-CC-1545 (La. November 8,
    2013).
    Whether the time period defined by Article 2315.1 is peremptive or
    prescriptive is determinative of this case. The only other issue on appeal is
    whether Article 2315.1 is preempted by CERCLA, 42 U.S.C § 9658, if the time
    period for a survival claim is peremptive. The CERCLA issue becomes relevant
    only if it is decided that the limitations period is peremptive. If it is
    prescriptive, it is subject to the Louisiana doctrine of contra non valentem, see
    
    Jenkins, 85 So. 3d at 623
    , and there is no need to address CERCLA preemption.
    Louisiana Supreme Court Rule XII provides for certification to that court
    when there are state law questions determinative of issues before us, and
    “there are no clear controlling precedents in the decisions of the supreme court
    . . . .” Rules of the Supreme Court of Louisiana, Rule XII, § 1. The parties have
    not moved this court to certify the question to the Louisiana Supreme Court,
    but the Rule further provides that certification “may be invoked by . . . any
    circuit court of appeal of the United States upon its own motion . . . .” 
    Id. § 2.
    As this court has previously stated, we are aware that “certification is not a
    panacea for resolution of those complex or difficult state law questions which
    have not been answered by the highest court of the state,” In re Katrina Canal
    Breaches Litig., 
    613 F.3d 504
    , 509 (5th Cir. 2010) (internal alteration omitted)
    (quoting Transcon. Gas Pipeline Corp. v. Transp. Ins. Co., 
    958 F.2d 622
    , 623
    (5th Cir. 1992)), but “certification may be advisable where important state
    interests are at stake and the state courts have not provided clear guidance on
    how to proceed.” 
    Id. (quoting Free
    v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 
    164 F.3d 270
    , 274 (5th
    Cir. 1999)). The question of whether Article 2315.1 includes a peremptive or
    prescriptive period involves important state interests, as the answer will
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    define the time period governing all survival actions brought in Louisiana.
    Given that the Louisiana Supreme Court has not spoken on this issue, and the
    Louisiana appellate courts are divided, we find that certification is advisable.
    III. Question Certified
    The interpretation of Article 2315.1 is a matter of Louisiana law that will
    determine the outcome of this case and there are no clear controlling
    precedents from the Louisiana Supreme Court. Thus, we certify the following
    question of law to the Louisiana Supreme Court:
    Whether, after the 1986 amendment to the statute, the one-year
    limitations period for a survival action contained in La. Civ. Code
    Article 2315.1 is prescriptive or peremptive.
    IV. Conclusion
    We disclaim any intent that the Louisiana Supreme Court confine its
    reply to the precise form or scope of the legal question we certify. We transfer
    to the Supreme Court of Louisiana the record and appellate briefs in this case
    with our certification. This panel retains cognizance of this appeal pending
    response from the Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    We CERTIFY the question stated to the Louisiana Supreme Court.
    8