Luis Argueta-Marquez v. Eric Holder, Jr. , 583 F. App'x 321 ( 2014 )

Case: 13-60626 Document: 00512807105 Page: 1 Date Filed: 10/17/2014
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-60626 United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
LUIS MIGUEL ARGUETA-MARQUEZ, October 17, 2014
Lyle W. Cayce
Petitioner Clerk
v.
ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., U. S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent
Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
BIA No. A200 138 160
Before JOLLY and JONES, Circuit Judges, and GODBEY, District Judge*.
PER CURIAM:**
We have reviewed the briefs, pertinent portions of the record, and the
applicable law. The Immigration Judge (“IJ”) determined that Argueta-
Marquez was not a credible witness and that he had failed otherwise to
establish that “it is more likely than not that he . . . would be tortured if
removed to” El Salvador. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2). The Board of
* District Judge of the Northern District of Texas, sitting by designation.
**Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH
CIR. R. 47.5.4.
Case: 13-60626 Document: 00512807105 Page: 2 Date Filed: 10/17/2014
No. 13-60626
Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ’s determination, and, given the
inconsistencies and omissions in Argueta-Marquez’s testimony and the
insufficiency of his corroborating evidence, we find no reversible error in its
doing so. 1 The petition for review is, therefore,
DENIED.
1In previous cases, we have apparently assumed that the REAL ID Act’s standard for
assessing credibility in the context of an asylum claim, found at 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii),
applies also to credibility determinations in the context of claims that, like Argueta-
Marquez’s, are asserted under the Convention Against Torture. See, e.g., Wang v. Holder,
569 F.3d 531, 540 (5th Cir. 2009). We need not reach that question here, because the agency’s
adverse-credibility determination is supported by substantial evidence under either
§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii)’s standard or the “heart of the applicant’s claim” standard articulated in
pre-REAL ID Act caselaw.
2