Kendricks v. Methodist Children's Home ( 2022 )

Case: 21-50336 Document: 00516259102 Page: 1 Date Filed: 03/29/2022
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
March 29, 2022
No. 21-50336
Lyle W. Cayce
Summary Calendar Clerk
Sheila Denise Kendricks,
Plaintiff—Appellant,
versus
Methodist Children’s Home,
Defendant—Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
USDC No. 6:19-CV-518
Before Southwick, Oldham, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
Shelia Kendricks, an African American woman over the age of forty,
sued Methodist Children’s Home, making a series of allegations related to
age, gender, and race discrimination. Her suit arose from her termination by
Methodist. Kendricks’s arguments are no more substantiated on appeal than
*
Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
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No. 21-50336
they were before the trial court; therefore we affirm the judgment of the trial
court.
I.
Kendricks worked for Methodist for eleven years, from 2007 until
2018. In May 2018, Kendricks underwent surgery and then took unpaid leave
under the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2601. While on leave,
Kendricks applied for two other jobs within Methodist and was not selected
for either position. Both individuals hired for the positions were under forty
and not African American. While on leave, Kendricks also filed a complaint
with Methodist regarding a possibly racially discriminatory hiring practice
suffered by one of her coworkers.
In July 2018, while she remained on leave, Methodist fired Kendricks
for refusing to accept managerial decisions and refusing to “work
appropriately with others[.]” Kendricks had allegedly been interfering with
patient-care and “stirring the pot” while on leave. In response, Kendricks
filed suit in federal district court in September 2019. The district court
ultimately discerned six claims: Methodist discriminated against Kendricks
based on her age, race, or disability by not hiring her for the jobs she applied
for in 2018 or another job she applied for in 2015; Methodist retaliated against
her for reporting potential discrimination; her termination while on leave
violated the Family Medical Leave Act; Methodist violated Texas labor laws;
and Methodist’s tortious conduct merited punitive damages. Both
Kendricks and Methodist filed motions for summary judgment prior to the
start of discovery. After the parties conducted some discovery, the district
court granted Methodist’s motion for summary judgment. Kendricks now
appeals.
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II.
Kendricks’s briefing consists of summary statements supported by
scattered citations to case law. Because Kendricks is pro se, we construe her
pleadings liberally. But on appeal her arguments must still be adequately
briefed; otherwise, they will be “deemed abandoned.” Coleman v. Lincoln
Parish Detention Center, 858 F.3d 307, 309 (5th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (citing
Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 224-25 (5th Cir. 1993); Brinkmann v. Dallas
Cnty. Deputy Sheriff Abner, 813 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir. 1987)).
Kendricks raises a number of arguments: (1) that the district court
lacked jurisdiction to hear this case because Kendricks did not plead facts to
establish a Family Medical Leave Act claim; (2) that a scheduling order was
not properly submitted in the district court; (3) that the district court did not
apply the summary judgment standard from Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
56; (4) that the district court committed numerous procedural and
evidentiary errors; and (5) that she should be allowed to file a supplemental
brief related to why two individuals were essential parties in the case before
the district court.
First, Kendricks’s arguments related to jurisdiction are misguided.
The district court had subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331because Kendricks alleged claims arising out of federal law, specifically Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621, and the Americans with Disabilities Act,
42 U.S.C. § 12111. Further, the attachments to her complaint specifically
mention the Family Medical Leave Act and her leave taken thereunder. Her
contention that the district court lacked jurisdiction is therefore without
merit.
Regarding the alleged deficiencies of the scheduling order, we have
long noted that district courts have significant discretion to manage their
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dockets. S&W Enters., L.L.C. v. SouthTrust Bank of Ala., NA, 315 F.3d 533,
536–37 (5th Cir. 2003); Woodson v. Surgitek, Inc., 57 F.3d 1406, 1417 (5th Cir.
1995); Smith v. Legg (In re United Mkts. Int’l, Inc.), 24 F.3d 650, 654 (5th Cir.
1994). In her mere two lines of argument, Kendricks provides nothing to
suggest the district court abused its discretion.
Third, Kendricks’s arguments related to the district court’s summary
judgment are characterized by two assertions: (1) that Methodist’s affidavits
were perjurious because they were silent on an attempt by Kendricks to
secure a promotion in 2015, and (2) that the affidavits contained
unsubstantiated statements that the individuals hired in 2018 were more
qualified than Kendricks. The case law Kendricks offers in arguing that the
omissions invalidated the affidavits refers to affidavits used to obtain search
warrants. See United States v. Clapp, 46 F.3d 795 (8th Cir. 1995). As her
argument is wholly unsupported beyond this, it is inadequately briefed. Her
other assertion, that the unsubstantiated statements were improper, ignores
the text of the affidavits. The statements regarding the other individuals’
promotion are wholly premised on the best of the affiants’ knowledge and
belief. This is exactly what Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c)(4) requires.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4). Thus, these arguments are also without merit.
Finally, Kendricks requests leave to file a supplemental brief
concerning a second, uncited case that is also allegedly on appeal. This
“second case” appears to be an attempt by Kendricks to re-join two
individuals to the underlying suit after they successfully moved for dismissal
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). As Kendricks makes no
argument related to the Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal beyond paraphrasing other
Rules of Civil Procedure to argue that the two former defendants were
essential parties, her argument is without merit.
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The remainder of Kendricks’s contentions are inadequately briefed
summary statements, such that we will not address them. Coleman, 858 F.3d
at 309 (citing Yohey, 985 F.2d at 224-25; Brinkmann, 813 F.2d at 748).
AFFIRMED.
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