Glover v. Lopez ( 2022 )


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  • Case: 21-40734      Document: 00516290485         Page: 1     Date Filed: 04/22/2022
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Fifth Circuit                                 United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    April 22, 2022
    No. 21-40734                            Lyle W. Cayce
    Clerk
    DeIra Glover,
    Plaintiff—Appellant,
    versus
    Brenda Lopez, Sergeant, Combes Police Department, Individually and
    Official Capacity; Eloy Cano, Justice of the Peace, Precinct 5, 2,
    Individually and Official Capacity; Fabian Limas, Criminal Law Hearing
    Officer, Individually and Official Capacity; Cameron County, Texas,
    Defendants—Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Texas
    USDC No. 1:21-CV-107
    Before Jones, Duncan, and Engelhardt, Circuit Judges.
    Per Curiam:*
    Pretrial detainee DeIra Glover, Cameron County, Texas, inmate
    # 281552, seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) on appeal from the
    dismissal of his 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     lawsuit for failure to state a claim, pursuant
    *
    Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
    opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
    circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
    Case: 21-40734       Document: 00516290485          Page: 2    Date Filed: 04/22/2022
    No. 21-40734
    to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, and denial of his Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e)
    motion.       By such motion, Glover is challenging the district court’s
    certification that any appeal would not be taken in good faith because, for the
    reasons relied upon in the order of dismissal, he will not present
    a nonfrivolous appellate issue. See Baugh v. Taylor, 
    117 F.3d 197
    , 202 (5th
    Cir. 1997).
    Before this court, Glover asserts that he is financially eligible to
    proceed IFP, and he conclusionally renews his assertion that the bail imposed
    was excessive and violative of his due process rights. He abandons by failing
    to brief any argument renewing his claim that the arresting officer erred in
    failing to give notice of the complaint against him prior to his arrest. See
    Yohey v. Collins, 
    985 F.2d 222
    , 224-25 (5th Cir. 1993). With respect to his
    excessive bail claim, he has abandoned by failing to brief any meaningful
    appellate challenge to the district court’s determination that his allegations
    did not give rise to a constitutional claim. See id.; Brinkmann v. Dallas Cnty.
    Deputy Sheriff Abner, 
    813 F.2d 744
    , 748 (5th Cir. 1987); see also Fed.
    R. App. P. 28(a)(8). To the extent that he asserts that the judges who set
    his bail failed to follow state law and guidelines, such claim does not give rise
    to a cognizable § 1983 claim. See Lefall v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 
    28 F.3d 521
    , 525 (5th Cir. 1994). Inasmuch as he complains that the judge who denied
    bail failed to state reasons for the denial, the district court found that the
    reasons were included in the written bail orders. Further, even if additional
    reasons were required, the court found such reasons to be implicit in the
    record as Glover was facing at least 32 separate felony charges related to
    sexual misconduct with children. Glover briefs no argument challenging that
    finding. See Yohey, 
    985 F.2d at 224-25
    .
    If his IFP motion is very liberally construed, Glover additionally
    asserts that the justice of the peace who signed his arrest warrants never
    properly assumed his role as a magistrate and that the criminal court thus
    2
    Case: 21-40734      Document: 00516290485          Page: 3    Date Filed: 04/22/2022
    No. 21-40734
    lacks jurisdiction over him. This court will not consider the claim as it was
    raised for the first time in his Rule 59(e) motion. See U.S. Bank Nat. Ass’n v.
    Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 
    761 F.3d 409
    , 426 (5th Cir. 2014). Similarly,
    Glover’s claim that he was denied a second bail hearing on expanded charges
    in one of his pending criminal proceedings will not be considered as it was
    raised for the first time in his third proposed amended complaint, and he fails
    to demonstrate that the district court abused its discretion in implicitly
    denying his Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2) motion to amend. See
    Simmons v. Sabine River Auth. La., 
    732 F.3d 469
    , 477-78 (5th Cir. 2013); see
    also In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litigation, 
    495 F.3d 191
    , 205 (5th Cir. 2007);
    Koch v. Puckett, 
    907 F.2d 524
    , 530 (5th Cir. 1990).
    The appeal is without arguable merit and is thus frivolous. See Howard
    v. King, 
    707 F.2d 215
    , 220 (5th Cir. 1983). Because the appeal is frivolous,
    the motion to proceed IFP is DENIED, and the appeal is DISMISSED.
    See Baugh, 
    117 F.3d at
    202 & n.24; 5th Cir. R. 42.2.
    The district court’s dismissal of the complaint for failure to state
    a claim and the dismissal as frivolous of this appeal each count as a strike
    under § 1915(g). See Adepegba v. Hammons, 
    103 F.3d 383
    , 388 (5th Cir. 1996),
    abrogated in part on other grounds by Coleman v. Tollefson, 
    575 U.S. 532
    , 537
    (2015). Glover is WARNED that if he accumulates three strikes, he will no
    longer be allowed to proceed IFP in any civil action or appeal filed while he is
    incarcerated or detained in any facility unless he is under imminent danger of
    serious physical injury. See 
    28 U.S.C. § 1915
    (g).
    3