Carlisle v. McNair ( 2023 )


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  • Case: 22-30031        Document: 00516746273             Page: 1      Date Filed: 05/10/2023
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Fifth Circuit                                 United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    ____________                              FILED
    May 10, 2023
    No. 22-30031                       Lyle W. Cayce
    ____________                              Clerk
    Taylor Carlisle, individually and as Representative Member of a Class;
    Emile Heron, individually and as Representative Member of a Class,
    Plaintiffs—Appellants,
    versus
    Joe McNair, also known as Joseph Thomas McNair; Newell
    Normand; McNair & McNair, L.L.C.; Philadelphia
    Indemnity Insurance Company,
    Defendants—Appellees,
    Sheriff Joseph P. Lopinto, III,
    Appellee.
    ______________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Louisiana
    USDC No. 2:16-CV-3767
    ______________________________
    Before Higginbotham, Southwick, and Willett, Circuit Judges.
    Per Curiam:*
    _____________________
    *
    This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
    Case: 22-30031         Document: 00516746273               Page: 2       Date Filed: 05/10/2023
    No. 22-30031
    Taylor Carlisle and Emile Heron, two former participants in Jefferson
    Parish’s Drug Court, brought this civil rights action under 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
    .
    They alleged members of the Drug Court, acting in their official and
    individual capacities, violated their constitutional rights to due process by
    jailing them for technical program violations and for giving them “flat time”
    sentences that did not allow credit for good behavior. Appellants also brought
    state law negligence claims against a court-contracted counselor. The district
    court dismissed claims against most Drug Court staff members, and this
    court affirmed those dismissals on two occasions.1 This court also affirmed a
    district court’s denial of Carlisle’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 2
    Carlisle and Heron now appeal following the district court’s final orders
    dismissing claims against the local sheriff and a court-contracted counselor.
    We find five issues briefed on appeal.3
    _____________________
    1
    See generally Carlisle v. Mussal, 
    774 F. App’x 905
     (5th Cir. 2019) (unpublished)
    (per curiam); Carlisle v. Klees, 
    786 F. App’x 493
     (5th Cir. 2019) (unpublished) (per curiam).
    2
    Carlisle v. Lopinto, No. 20-30720, 
    2022 WL 1778548
    , at *1–2 (5th Cir. June 1,
    2022) (unpublished) (per curiam). In 2018, this court reversed the district court’s
    conclusion that Carlisle’s habeas petition was moot. Carlisle v. Normand, 
    745 F. App’x 223
    ,
    224 (5th Cir. 2018) (unpublished) (per curiam).
    3
    Appellants’ briefing does not clearly convey their arguments. Appellants listed
    eighteen issues but failed to adequately brief most of those positions with legal arguments
    and citations to the record. Failure to adequately brief an issue on appeal constitutes waiver.
    See Roy v. City of Monroe, 
    950 F.3d 245
    , 251 (5th Cir. 2020). And an appellant’s contentions
    must provide “citations to the authorities and parts of the record on which the appellant
    relies,” as well as “a short conclusion stating the precise relief sought.” FED. R. APP. P.
    28(a)(8), (9).
    2
    Case: 22-30031           Document: 00516746273              Page: 3       Date Filed: 05/10/2023
    No. 22-30031
    This court reviews the grant of a motion to dismiss and a motion for
    summary judgment de novo.4 We review a district court’s denial of a motion
    to amend for abuse of discretion.5
    First, Appellants argue that the district court erred in rejecting their
    overdetention claim against Sheriff Joseph Lopinto. But the district court
    found, and Appellants do not contest, that authorities detained them at all
    times pursuant to court orders. Appellants’ claim therefore attacks the drug
    court’s sentence and is barred by Heck v. Humphry, which requires a § 1983
    plaintiff whose claims would necessarily “render a conviction or sentence
    invalid” to prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on appeal
    or collateral attack.6 Appellants can make no such showing here, so their
    overdetention claim may not proceed under § 1983.
    Second, Carlisle contests the district court’s dismissal of his state tort
    claim against Joseph McNair, a court-contracted counselor who evaluated
    Drug Court participants. McNair assessed Carlisle only once, in January
    2013. The district court determined that McNair did not have a therapist–
    patient relationship with Carlisle and that McNair’s activity did not cause
    Carlisle’s alleged harm given that the ultimate decision-making power
    “rested with the judges administering the program.” Appellants do not argue
    on appeal that McNair owed any duty to them, obliquely challenging only the
    district court’s power to dismiss insufficient claims under Federal Rule of
    _____________________
    4
    Copeland v. Wasserstein, Perella & Co., 
    278 F.3d 472
    , 477 (5th Cir. 2002) (citation
    omitted).
    5
    Marucci Sports, L.L.C. v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 
    751 F.3d 368
    , 378 (5th
    Cir. 2014).
    6
    
    512 U.S. 477
    , 486 (1994).
    3
    Case: 22-30031        Document: 00516746273               Page: 4      Date Filed: 05/10/2023
    No. 22-30031
    Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).7 Carlisle therefore fails to show that the district
    court erred in dismissing his state law tort claim on the merits.
    Third, Carlisle contests the district court’s determination that any
    state law claims against McNair arising prior to April 27, 2015, were
    prescribed.8 The district court determined that the drug court imposed all
    sanctions before that date, and Carlisle was therefore aware of facts that
    would put a reasonable person on notice that McNair committed any of the
    alleged wrongs against him. On appeal, Carlisle cites mainly federal case law
    discussing tolling in employment claims under the continuing violation
    doctrine. This argument is inapposite, and Carlisle points to no facts alleging
    that McNair continued to cause him harm after April 27, 2015. Carlisle’s
    argument does not show that the district court erred in finding claims arising
    before that date prescribed.
    Fourth, Appellants argue that McNair acted with deliberate
    indifference to the conditions of Appellants’ confinement. The district court
    concluded that McNair was entitled to qualified immunity, dismissing “all §
    1983 claims for damages against McNair” with prejudice. Appellants do not
    challenge the district court’s determination that McNair retained qualified
    immunity, which bars relief on the deliberate indifference claim. Appellants
    also point to no facts indicating that McNair knew of and disregarded an
    _____________________
    7
    See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
    556 U.S. 662
    , 678 (2009) (“To survive a motion to dismiss,
    a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to
    relief that is plausible on its face.’”) (citation omitted).
    8
    Appellants filed their complaint on April 27, 2016, see Complaint, Carlisle v.
    Normand, 2:16-CV-3767 (E.D. La. Apr. 27, 2016) (Dkt. No. 1), and the statute of limitations
    is one year.
    4
    Case: 22-30031          Document: 00516746273                Page: 5       Date Filed: 05/10/2023
    No. 22-30031
    excessive risk to Appellants’ health or safety.9 Appellants demonstrate no
    error in the district court’s grant of qualified immunity to McNair.
    Fifth, Appellants challenge the district court’s denial of their motion
    to file a Fourth Amended Complaint. A “district court properly exercises its
    discretion under Rule 15(a)(2) when it denies leave to amend for a substantial
    reason, such as undue delay, repeated failures to cure deficiencies, undue
    prejudice, or futility.”10 The district court reasoned that Appellants were
    “simply shifting their claims in response to the Court’s rulings, and that the
    Sheriff would be unduly prejudiced at this stage of litigation if Plaintiffs were
    allowed to significantly amend the claims against him, particularly given the
    status of his pending Motion for Summary Judgment.” Appellants argue that
    they had good cause to amend and that the district court lacked a substantial
    reason to deny the motion but provide no reasons specific to their case. We
    are satisfied that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave
    to file a sixty-page amended complaint in these circumstances.
    Appellants fail to show district court error in any orders rejecting
    claims brought against individuals conducting work related to the Drug
    Court. We AFFIRM.
    _____________________
    9
    See Farmer v. Brennan, 
    511 US 825
    , 837 (1994).
    10
    U.S. ex rel. Spicer v. Westbrook, 
    751 F.3d 354
    , 367 (5th Cir. 2014).
    5