United States v. Winchel ( 2023 )

Case: 21-10233 Document: 00516754853 Page: 1 Date Filed: 05/18/2023
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
No. 21-10233 FILED
May 18, 2023
Lyle W. Cayce
United States of America, Clerk
Plaintiff—Appellee,
versus
Christian Winchel,
Defendant—Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Texas
USDC No. 3:19-CV-2290
Before Jolly, Jones, and Ho, Circuit Judges.
E. Grady Jolly, Circuit Judge:*
Christian Winchel, a federal prisoner, was convicted on his plea of
guilty to child pornography crimes. After sentencing, Winchel filed this 28
U.S.C. § 2255 motion, challenging the validity of his guilty plea, on the basis
that he received ineffective assistance of counsel (“IAC”). Therefore, he
argues that his guilty plea was involuntary, and that his conviction should be
vacated.
*
This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
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The district court denied his motion. On appeal, Winchel contends
that the district court erred in denying his IAC claims and abused its
discretion in denying his requests for discovery and for an evidentiary
hearing. For the reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM.
I.
We begin with an overview of the investigation that led to Winchel’s
conviction. Between 2012 and 2014, the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(“FBI”) investigated “Website A.” Website A allowed users to post and
access images and videos depicting child pornography. During their
investigation, the FBI determined that one account on Website A bore
Winchel’s IP address. The FBI used this information to support a search
warrant of Winchel’s residence, and a search led to the discovery and seizure
of computers, tapes, and other digital storage equipment that contained
thousands of videos and images depicting sexually graphic and exploitative
images of children. In an interview with the FBI, Winchel ultimately
admitted that he was producing child pornography videos so that he could
trade the videos online.
A grand jury charged Winchel with (1) production of child
pornography; (2) transporting and shipping child pornography; and (3) two
counts of possession of prepubescent child pornography. Winchel later
pleaded guilty to all charges except for one count of possession of
prepubescent child pornography, which the Government dismissed pursuant
to his plea agreement. Winchel’s plea agreement contained a waiver of his
appellate and postconviction rights.
At his rearraignment, Winchel stated that he was “glad it was over”
and that there were no excuses for his “completely inappropriate and
unacceptable behavior.” Winchel’s counsel advised the court that Winchel
“chose on his own” to forgo trial, despite having “nothing to lose,” and that
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he pleaded guilty, in part out of consideration for the families and victims.
His counsel argued for mitigation because of his decision. Winchel also stated
that he understood the nature of the charges against him, was satisfied with
counsel’s advice and representation, and was pleading guilty voluntarily. The
district court sentenced him to a total of 600 months of imprisonment and
entered a restitution order.
Later, Winchel had second thoughts. After his 600-month sentence
began, he moved for post-conviction relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. He
attacked the validity of his plea based on two primary IAC claims, which in
his mind rendered his plea involuntary. First, he alleged that counsel failed
to retain an expert to investigate tactics used by law enforcement to obtain
his IP address. Second, he alleged that counsel failed to move for suppression
of the evidence based on the “international silver-platter doctrine.” 1
Winchel claimed that but for these deficiencies, he would not have entered
the plea and would have demanded a jury trial. Winchel also requested
discovery and an evidentiary hearing on this motion.
The magistrate judge rejected Winchel’s arguments. First, the
magistrate judge determined that Winchel’s guilty plea was knowing and
voluntary. The magistrate judge further found that Winchel’s plea
agreement waived his pre-plea IAC claims because his claims were “not
fundamentally related to the entry of his voluntary plea.”
The magistrate judge then addressed Winchel’s requests for
discovery and an evidentiary hearing. The magistrate judge concluded that
because Winchel’s claims regarding the voluntary nature of his plea
1
The “international silver platter doctrine” is a term that the Second Circuit
adopted with respect to potential exclusion of evidence obtained from foreign law
enforcement sources. United States v. Getto, 729 F.3d 221, 227–28 (2d Cir. 2013).
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“lack[ed] merit for reasons wholly supported by the record,” an evidentiary
hearing was unnecessary and discovery was moot.
The district court adopted the findings, conclusions, and
recommendation of the magistrate judge and denied Winchel’s § 2255
motion. This appeal followed.
II.
We review a district court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal
conclusions de novo. See United States v. Cavitt, 550 F.3d 430, 435 (5th Cir.
2008). “[W]e may affirm for any reason supported by the record, even if not
relied on by the district court.” United States v. Gonzalez, 592 F.3d 675, 681
(5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
III.
A.
We first address whether the district court erred when it adopted the
magistrate judge’s finding that Winchel’s IAC claims were not related to the
entry of his voluntary plea and were therefore barred by his plea agreement.
It is true that “once a guilty plea has been entered, all nonjurisdictional
defects in the proceedings against a defendant are waived.” Cavitt, 550 F.3d
at 441 (quoting Smith v. Estelle, 711 F.2d 677, 682 (5th Cir. 1983)). And this
waiver “includes claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.” United States
v. Glinsey, 209 F.3d 386, 392 (5th Cir. 2000). But there is an exception to this
rule that applies here: A guilty plea does not waive IAC claims when
“[counsel’s] ineffectiveness is alleged to have rendered the guilty plea
involuntary.” Id.Here, Winchel alleged that his plea was involuntary because of
counsel’s constitutionally-ineffective performance. Specifically, Winchel
alleged that, but for counsel’s failure to investigate the Government’s tactics
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used to obtain his IP address and move for suppression of that evidence, he
would not have pleaded guilty, and instead, he would have proceeded to trial.
Stated differently, in challenging the competency of counsel’s performance
with regards to filing a motion to suppress, Winchel challenged the
voluntariness of his guilty plea.
The magistrate judge, however, did not see it that way. The magistrate
judge instead concluded that Winchel’s claims were “not fundamentally
related to the entry of his voluntary plea” and that therefore his plea
agreement waived his IAC claims. But the magistrate judge was mistaken
because this court treats allegations of counsel’s failure to investigate viable
grounds for suppressing evidence, as challenges to the validity of a guilty plea.
See, e.g., United States v. Shepherd, 880 F.3d 734, 741–46 (5th Cir. 2018)
(finding counsel’s failure to investigate exculpatory evidence affected
voluntariness of plea). Accordingly, the district court erred in adopting the
magistrate judge’s finding that Winchel’s IAC claims were not related to the
voluntariness of his plea and were therefore barred by his plea agreement.
B.
Thus, having held that the district court erred in concluding that
Winchel’s plea agreement barred any consideration of his IAC claims, we
must now ask whether to remand to allow the district court to first consider
those claims. Here, we think that remand is unnecessary because other
independent grounds in the record allow us to affirm the district court’s
denial, see Day v. Quarterman, 566 F.3d 527, 537 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing Scott
v. Johnson, 227 F.3d 260, 262 (5th Cir. 2000)); that is, Winchel has failed to
provide contemporaneous evidence showing that counsel’s alleged deficient
performance caused him prejudice.
To prevail on his IAC claims, Winchel must show that (1) counsel’s
performance “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness” and (2)
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that he was prejudiced as a result. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
687–88 (1984). To demonstrate prejudice in the context of his guilty plea,
Winchel must show that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded
guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52,
59 (1985). But we must be cautious not to upset Winchel’s guilty plea solely
because of his “post hoc assertions” that he would not have pleaded guilty
but for counsel’s deficient performance. Lee v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1958,
1967 (2017). To address this concern, we look to “contemporaneous
evidence to substantiate a defendant’s expressed preferences” at the time of
his pleading. Id.Here, Winchel argues that he would not have pleaded guilty if counsel
(1) had hired an expert and investigated the Government’s IP evidence, and
(2) had moved to suppress evidence, asserting the “international silver-
platter doctrine.” The record, however, does not support these arguments.
To the contrary, the record shows that counsel did investigate the
Government’s IP evidence and that counsel did hire an expert to evaluate
Winchel’s claims. The Government submitted an unchallenged affidavit
from counsel indicating that (1) he was paid to hire a computer expert, and
that (2) he hired and consulted with that expert. See also United States v.
Newton, No. 19-11196, 2022 WL 4116914, at *2 (5th Cir. Sept. 9, 2022) (per
curiam) (citing counsel’s affidavit as grounds for upholding the denial of
relief on an IAC claim). Counsel’s affidavit also indicates that following the
expert’s investigation, Winchel and counsel discussed options on how to
proceed, including filing a motion to suppress. Ultimately, the record shows
they jointly decided against filing such a motion.
And even if counsel “erred” as Winchel alleges, Winchel has not
provided contemporaneous evidence that but for those errors, he would have
insisted on going to trial. Indeed, the record shows that Winchel rejected
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filing a motion to suppress. He instead chose to plead guilty primarily to focus
on mitigating his sentence. For example, at sentencing, Winchel’s counsel
argued for a reduced sentence in the light of Winchel’s decision to forgo trial
and spare his victims and their families. Moreover, it is relevant to Winchel’s
state of mind that only after the judge sentenced him to 600 months in prison
did he express dissatisfaction with his plea agreement and counsel’s
performance. See Young v. Spinner, 873 F.3d 282, 287 (5th Cir. 2017) (noting
that defendant’s failure to seek to withdraw plea prior to sentencing weighs
against a finding of prejudice).
Accordingly, because Winchel cannot show that he was prejudiced by
counsel’s performance, we affirm the district court’s denial of Winchel’s §
2255 motion.
IV.
To sum up: We hold that the district court was incorrect to conclude
that Winchel’s plea agreement barred his IAC claims. Nevertheless, the
district court’s judgment denying Winchel’s § 2255 motion is affirmed
because Winchel has failed to show that he was prejudiced by counsel’s
purportedly deficient performance. Accordingly, the district court’s
judgment denying Winchel’s § 2255 motion is AFFIRMED. 2
AFFIRMED.
2
Because we have held that the record shows Winchel’s IAC claims are facially
meritless, we also hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Winchel’s request for an evidentiary hearing. United States v. Reed, 719 F.3d 369, 374 (5th
Cir. 2013) (citing Cavitt, 550 F.3d at 442) (“A defendant is entitled to an evidentiary
hearing on his § 2255 motion only if he presents ‘independent indicia of the likely merit of
[his] allegations.’”). For the same reasons, the district court did not err in denying
Winchel’s request for discovery because Winchel has failed to demonstrate good cause for
additional discovery. United States v. Webster, 392 F.3d 787, 801 (5th Cir. 2004).
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