Hallcy v. Lumpkin ( 2023 )


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  • Case: 23-10473        Document: 00516809732             Page: 1      Date Filed: 07/05/2023
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Fifth Circuit
    ____________
    United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    No. 23-10473
    Summary Calendar                                  FILED
    ____________                                     July 5, 2023
    Lyle W. Cayce
    Mark DeWayne Hallcy,                                                               Clerk
    Petitioner—Appellant,
    versus
    Bobby Lumpkin, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice,
    Correctional Institutions Division,
    Respondent—Appellee.
    ______________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Texas
    USDC No. 5:23-CV-42
    ______________________________
    Before Jolly, Jones, and Ho, Circuit Judges.
    Per Curiam: *
    Mark DeWayne Hallcy, Texas prisoner # 2149848, has filed this
    interlocutory appeal from the district court’s denial of his motions for
    appointment of counsel, expansion of the record, and release on bail pending
    the disposition of his 
    28 U.S.C. § 2254
     petition. We construe Hallcy’s notice
    _____________________
    *
    This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
    Case: 23-10473       Document: 00516809732          Page: 2   Date Filed: 07/05/2023
    No. 23-10473
    of appeal as a motion seeking release on bail pending the conclusion of this
    appeal.
    As an initial matter, because the district court’s order denying the
    motions for appointment of counsel and for expansion of the record was
    neither a final order nor an appealable interlocutory or collateral order, we
    lack jurisdiction to consider Hallcy’s appeal from the denial of those motions.
    See Brinar v. Williamson, 
    245 F.3d 515
    , 517 (5th Cir. 2001); Thomas v. Scott,
    
    47 F.3d 713
    , 715-16 (5th Cir. 1995). However, we exercise jurisdiction over
    the instant appeal from the denial of Hallcy’s motion for release pending
    review of his habeas petition. See Calley v. Callaway, 
    496 F.2d 701
    , 702 (5th
    Cir. 1974).
    To obtain release on bail pending review of a habeas petition, or
    pending an appeal in a § 2254 case, the petitioner must (1) raise a substantial
    constitutional claim with a high probability of success and (2) demonstrate
    that “extraordinary or exceptional circumstances” exist that require his
    release from prison “to make the habeas remedy effective.” Id. Hallcy
    claims violations of the Ex Post Facto and Due Process clauses, essentially
    arguing that he has a constitutional right to have his earned good-time credits
    applied to his eight-year sentence, which would result in his immediate
    release.
    Because the grant of parole is discretionary, we have repeatedly held
    that Texas law does not create a liberty interest in parole that is protected by
    the Due Process Clause. See Teague v. Quarterman, 
    482 F.3d 769
    , 774 (5th
    Cir. 2007). Further, to the extent Hallcy challenges any good-time credits
    that were forfeited, “there is no protected liberty interest in the restoration
    of good time credits.” Hallmark v. Johnson, 
    118 F.3d 1073
    , 1079-80 (5th Cir.
    1997).     To the extent Hallcy claims he should have been released on
    mandatory supervision, his arguments do not implicate due process concerns
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    Case: 23-10473     Document: 00516809732           Page: 3   Date Filed: 07/05/2023
    No. 23-10473
    because Texas law provides that mandatory supervision is unavailable to
    offenders who were convicted of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon.
    See Teague, 
    482 F.3d at 777
    ; Tex. Penal Code § 22.02(a)(2), (b) (2009);
    Tex. Gov’t Code § 508.149(a)(7) (2017).
    Further, retroactive changes in parole laws may violate the Ex Post
    Facto Clause, see Garner v. Jones, 
    529 U.S. 244
    , 249-50 (2000), but
    “speculative, attenuated and conjectural effects are insufficient” to
    demonstrate an ex post facto violation, Hallmark, 
    118 F.3d at 1078
     (internal
    quotation marks and citation omitted). Hallcy has not shown that there has
    been any change in state law since the time of his conviction that is being
    applied retroactively and, thus, has not shown an ex post facto violation. See
    Garner, 
    529 U.S. at 249-50
    . To the extent that Hallcy argues that the denial
    of his state habeas application without a hearing or written reasons
    constitutes a substantial constitution claim, a challenge to infirmities in a
    state habeas proceeding is not cognizable on federal habeas review. Rudd v.
    Johnson, 
    256 F.3d 317
    , 320 (5th Cir. 2001).
    Because the district court did not base its decision on an error of law
    or an erroneous assessment of the evidence, it did not abuse its discretion by
    denying Hallcy’s motion for release on bail pending disposition of his habeas
    petition. See United States v. Olis, 
    450 F.3d 583
    , 585 (5th Cir. 2006); United
    States v. Castillo, 
    430 F.3d 230
    , 238 (5th Cir. 2005). Further, to the extent
    that Hallcy requests release on bail while this appeal is pending, he has also
    failed to make the requisite showing. See Calley, 
    496 F.2d at 702
    .
    Given the foregoing, the judgment of the district court is
    AFFIRMED in part, the appeal is DISMISSED in part for lack of
    jurisdiction, and Hallcy’s motion for release on bail pending appeal is
    DENIED.
    3