Lincoln v. Harris County Sheriff's Ofc ( 2023 )


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  • Case: 23-20092        Document: 00516869594             Page: 1      Date Filed: 08/23/2023
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Fifth Circuit
    United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    ____________                                           FILED
    August 23, 2023
    No. 23-20092                                     Lyle W. Cayce
    Summary Calendar                                        Clerk
    ____________
    Roosevelt L. Lincoln, also known as Roosevelt L. Linicomn,
    Jr.,
    Plaintiff—Appellant,
    versus
    Harris County Sheriff’s Office/Health Systems;
    Precinct 4 Constable Riley; Constable Precinct 4
    Officer 1; Constable Precinct 4 Officer 2; Harris
    County Constable’s Office for Precinct 4, Complaint
    Tracking System; Gaston Casillas,
    Defendants—Appellees.
    ______________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Texas
    USDC No. 4:20-CV-4207
    ______________________________
    Before Jones, Willett, and Duncan, Circuit Judges.
    Per Curiam:*
    _____________________
    *
    This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
    Case: 23-20092      Document: 00516869594           Page: 2     Date Filed: 08/23/2023
    Roosevelt L. Lincoln moves for leave to proceed in forma pauperis
    (IFP) on appeal. The district court dismissed his pro se 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
    complaint without prejudice for failure to timely serve the named defendants
    in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m), and it subsequently
    denied his series of motions seeking relief under Federal Rules of Civil
    Procedure 59(e) and 60(b). We liberally construe Lincoln’s pro se notice of
    appeal, which does not specify the judgment or order from which the appeal
    is taken, to designate the judgment of dismissal and the denials of all
    postjudgment motions. See Fed. R. App. P. 3(c)(1)(B); Haines v. Kerner,
    
    404 U.S. 519
    , 520 (1972); Williams v. Henagan, 
    595 F.3d 610
    , 616 (5th Cir.
    2010).
    We must examine the basis of our jurisdiction, sua sponte, if
    necessary. Mosley v. Cozby, 
    813 F.2d 659
    , 660 (5th Cir. 1987). “[T]he timely
    filing of a notice of appeal in a civil case is a jurisdictional requirement.”
    Bowles v. Russell, 
    551 U.S. 205
    , 214 (2007). Once the district court denied
    Lincoln’s Rule 59(e) motion on November 30, 2022, the 30-day period for
    filing his notice of appeal from the judgment of dismissal and the Rule 59(e)
    denial commenced. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A) and (4)(A)(iv). The
    filings of his subsequent Rule 60(b) motions, which raised arguments
    substantially identical to those raised in his Rule 59(e) motion, did not toll the
    Rule 4 appellate deadline. Charles L.M. v. Northeast Independent School Dist.,
    
    884 F.2d 869
    , 870-71 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding that, once district court denied
    appellant’s first Rule 59(e) motion, Rule 4 appeal period began running and
    was not interrupted by filing of second motion to reconsider raising same
    arguments). Thus, the March 8, 2023 notice of appeal is untimely as to the
    judgment of dismissal, the denial of Rule 59(e) relief, and the December 8,
    2022 denial of Rule 60(b) relief. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A) and
    (4)(A)(iv). We therefore have jurisdiction to consider only Lincoln’s timely
    appeal from the February 14, 2023 dismissal of his December 19, 2022, and
    Case: 23-20092      Document: 00516869594          Page: 3      Date Filed: 08/23/2023
    January 23, 2023 Rule 60(b) motions, which motions contended that he had
    been prevented from timely serving the defendants by his wrongful
    incarceration. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A); Bowles, 
    551 U.S. at 214
    ;
    Williams v. Chater, 
    87 F.3d 702
    , 705 (5th Cir. 1996) (explaining that denial of
    Rule 60(b) motion is separately appealable, but such appeal does not bring up
    underlying judgment for review).
    Lincoln’s IFP motion challenges the district court’s determination
    that the appeal is not taken in good faith. See Baugh v. Taylor, 
    117 F.3d 197
    ,
    202 (5th Cir. 1997). Our inquiry into whether the appeal is taken in good faith
    “is limited to whether the appeal involves ‘legal points arguable on their
    merits (and therefore not frivolous).’” Howard v. King, 
    707 F.2d 215
    , 220
    (5th Cir. 1983) (citation omitted).
    Lincoln does not address the court’s dismissal of his December 2022
    and January 2023 Rule 60(b) motions for lack of jurisdiction and as moot; he
    has therefore abandoned any challenge to the dismissal on those grounds.
    See Yohey v. Collins, 
    985 F.2d 222
    , 225 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that pro se
    appellant must brief arguments to preserve them); Brinkmann v. Dallas Cnty.
    Deputy Sheriff Abner, 
    813 F.2d 744
    , 748 (5th Cir. 1987) (observing that failure
    to identify any error in district court’s analysis is same as if appellant had not
    appealed). Further, although Lincoln contends that he was prevented from
    serving the defendants because he was wrongly incarcerated for
    approximately four months between April and August 2022, the district
    court reasoned that he had been afforded ample time and opportunity when
    he was not incarcerated to serve the defendants (his suit had been pending
    for over one year and 10 months when the court dismissed it), and he does
    not substantively address this rationale. See Brinkmann, 
    813 F.2d at 748
    . He
    thus raises no nonfrivolous argument that the district court abused its
    discretion by dismissing his December 2022 and January 2023 Rule 60(b)
    Case: 23-20092     Document: 00516869594       Page: 4    Date Filed: 08/23/2023
    motions. See Bailey v. Cain, 
    609 F.3d 763
    , 767 (5th Cir. 2010); Howard, 
    707 F.2d at 220
    .
    Lincoln’s motion to proceed IFP is DENIED, and his appeal is
    DISMISSED in part for lack of jurisdiction and in remaining part as
    frivolous. See Bowles, 
    551 U.S. at 214
    ; Baugh, 
    117 F.3d at
    202 & n.24; 5th
    Cir. R. 42.2.