Hernandez v. West Texas Treasures ( 2023 )

Case: 22-50048 Document: 00516861743 Page: 1 Date Filed: 08/17/2023
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
____________ FILED
August 17, 2023
No. 22-50048 Lyle W. Cayce
____________ Clerk
Alejandro Hernandez; Edith Schneider-Hernandez,
Plaintiffs—Appellants,
versus
West Texas Treasures Estate Sales, L.L.C.; Linda Maree
Walker; Aaron Anthony Enriquez,
Defendants—Appellees.
______________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
USDC No. 3:21-CV-96
______________________________
Before Wiener, Graves, and Douglas, Circuit Judges.
James E. Graves, Jr., Circuit Judge:
Pro se Plaintiffs-Appellants Alejandro Hernandez and his wife, Edith
Schneider-Hernandez, appeal the dismissal of their claims against Defend-
ant-Appellees West Texas Treasures Estate Sales, L.L.C., Linda Maree
Walker, and Aaron Anthony Enriquez (jointly, the “Defendants”) arising
from an encounter they had at an estate sale. Because the district court
abused its discretion, we VACATE and REMAND.
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No. 22-50048
Plaintiffs allege that, in April 2021, they attended an estate sale
organized by the Defendants, during which Walker requested that they wear
face masks because of concerns about the COVID-19 pandemic. Plaintiffs
informed Walker that they had disabilities that exempted them from the mask
requirement and requested an accommodation under the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA). According to the Complaint, Hernandez suffers
from asthma, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and a scarred deviated
septum, all of which hinder his breathing. Schneider-Hernandez alleges that
she suffers from PTSD, multiple endocrine disorders, and spinal muscular
atrophy that affects her ability to breathe and swallow.
In response to the request, Walker instructed the Plaintiffs to make an
appointment. But when Schneider-Hernandez asked for a specific time,
Walker yelled, “[H]ow about I don’t know when!” Schneider-Hernandez
claims that she felt threatened and told Hernandez that they should leave.
However, according to the Plaintiffs, tensions escalated when Walker pushed
Hernandez into Schneider-Hernandez, asserting that she had the power to
discriminate against anyone for any reason and ordered the Plaintiffs to va-
cate the premises. Enriquez joined in by yelling that the estate sale was a pri-
vate business and they could do as they pleased. The Plaintiffs subsequently
left and later discovered that Schneider-Hernandez had lost her glasses dur-
ing the altercation. Hernandez attempted to contact Walker about the lost
glasses using the phone number on her business card, but Enriquez answered
the call and refused to listen to Hernandez or pass on the message to Walker.
Instead, Enriquez instructed Hernandez not to return to their business and
abruptly ended the conversation.
This suit followed. Plaintiffs sued the Defendants for violations of Ti-
tles III and V of the ADA as well as assault and battery under state law. Soon
after, the Defendants filed an answer, and more than a month later, they filed
an amended answer and a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under
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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). In addition, they filed a motion for
sanctions and to declare the Plaintiffs vexatious litigants.1 Plaintiffs filed re-
sponses to both motions. Most relevant to this appeal, in their response to
the Defendants’ motion to dismiss, Plaintiffs asked the district court to allow
them the chance to amend their claims before dismissal if the court deter-
mined that the complaint lacked a sufficient factual basis.
On August 19, 2021, the district court dismissed the action in part. As
to the discrimination claims under Title III, the court found that Hernandez
did not properly allege that he is disabled under the ADA. Additionally, it
found that even if both of the Plaintiffs were disabled, they failed to show that
they were discriminated against based on their disabilities. It also found that
even if the Plaintiffs could establish a connection between their refusal to
wear masks and the ban, not wearing a mask during the COVID-19 pandemic
is considered a direct threat and, therefore, is not protected under the ADA.
Regarding the retaliation claims under Title V, the district court ruled that
the Plaintiffs’ Complaint did not provide enough facts to suggest that they
engaged in a protected activity under the ADA by refusing to wear masks or
that the Defendants discriminated against them. The district court then dis-
missed the remaining state law claims without prejudice pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1367(c) and denied all pending motions as moot. Plaintiffs now ap-
peal.
It is well settled that before dismissing a complaint, a pro se plaintiff
should be given an opportunity to amend his complaint to remedy any defi-
ciencies. Bazrowx v. Scott, 136 F.3d 1053, 1054 (5th Cir. 1998). In other words,
leave to amend should be liberally granted, when the plaintiff might be able
to state a claim based on the underlying facts and circumstances. See Brewster
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1
These motions were not appealed, and therefore, are not before us.
3
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v. Dretke, 587 F.3d 764, 767–68 (5th Cir. 2009). Nevertheless, a district court
is not obligated to grant a futile motion to amend, for instance, when “the
plaintiff has already pleaded his best case.” Id. at 768 (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted).
We generally review the district court’s denial of leave to amend a
complaint for an abuse of discretion. Legate v. Livingston, 822 F.3d 207, 211
(5th Cir. 2016). “This court has a strong preference for explicit reasons in
denying leave to amend, and we have expressly stated that motions to amend
should be freely granted and that a district court’s failure to explain its rea-
sons for denying the motion typically warrants reversal.” N. Cypress Med.
Ctr. Operating Co., Ltd. v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 898 F.3d 461, 478 (5th Cir.
2018) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (emphasis in original).
But if the “justification for the denial is readily apparent, a failure to explain
is unfortunate but not fatal to affirmance if the record reflects ample and ob-
vious grounds for denying leave to amend.” Id. (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted).
After reviewing the record, we agree with the district court that the
Plaintiffs did not adequately state sufficient facts in their complaint to sup-
port their claims of disability discrimination. However, accepting the allega-
tions as true and construing all reasonable inferences in the Plaintiffs’ favor,
they may be able to supply additional allegations to support a plausible claim.
The district court’s opinion essentially concedes that it could have benefited
from more detailed pleadings, specifically about the severity of Hernandez’s
asthma and the impact of PTSD on the Plaintiffs’ daily activities. However,
the district court did not address the Plaintiffs’ request for an opportunity to
amend their Complaint. Thus, the basis for its decision not to allow leave to
amend is unknown. Given our well-established precedent, this was an abuse
of discretion. See Bazrowx, 136 F.3d at 1054.
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The district court put forth two alternative holdings for its decision to
dismiss the complaint, neither of which we deem provides sufficient justifi-
cation for dismissal. A district court’s grant of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dis-
miss is reviewed de novo. Vizaline, L.L.C. v. Tracy, 949 F.3d 927, 931 (5th
Cir. 2020). We accept all well-pleaded facts as true, construing all reasonable
inferences in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Heinze v. Tesco Corp.,
971 F.3d 475, 479 (5th Cir. 2020). “But we do not accept as true conclusory
allegations, unwarranted factual inferences, or legal conclusions.” Id. (inter-
nal quotation marks and citations omitted). “To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) mo-
tion to dismiss, a complaint ‘does not need detailed factual allegations,’ but
must prove the plaintiff’s grounds for entitlement to relief—including factual
allegations in a complaint that when assumed to be true ‘raise a right to relief
above the speculative level.’” Cuvillier v. Taylor, 503 F.3d 397, 401 (5th Cir.
2007) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
First, the district court concluded that the Plaintiffs failed to plead
facts showing that it is plausible they were discriminated against based on
their disabilities. We disagree. According to the Complaint, the Plaintiffs re-
quested an ADA accommodation from Walker after she asked them to wear
masks. Walker responded by telling them to make an appointment, but when
Schneider-Hernandez asked for a timeframe, Walker yelled that she did not
know. As the Plaintiffs were trying to leave the estate sale, Walker pushed
Hernandez into Schneider-Hernandez and stated that she could discriminate
against anyone for any reason. Later, when Hernandez spoke to Enriquez on
the phone, he yelled at him and told Hernandez not to come back to their
business.
Accepted as true, as we are required to do at this stage, the Plaintiffs
allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. The facts put forth suggest that the Defendants
failed to provide a reasonable accommodation, as the Plaintiffs were expelled
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from the estate sale and explicitly instructed not to return after Schneider-
Hernandez inquired about scheduling an appointment. At this point, that is
all that is necessary.2 See Taylor, 503 F.3d at 401.
Second, the district court held that, even if the Plaintiffs had suffi-
ciently pleaded that they were excluded because of their disability, the “di-
rect threat” defense applies. The ADA provides a defense to a private entity
if an “individual poses a direct threat to the health or safety of others.” 42
U.S.C. § 12182. The term “direct threat” refers to a “significant risk to the
health or safety of others that cannot be eliminated by a modification of poli-
cies, practices, or procedures or by the provision of auxiliary aids or ser-
vices.” Id. “The existence, or nonexistence, of a significant risk must be de-
termined from the standpoint of the person who refuses the . . . accommoda-
tion, and the risk assessment must be based on medical or other objective
evidence.” Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 649 (1998).
There is limited guidance regarding the suitability of a district court
employing the direct-threat defense under Title III at the motion-to-dismiss
stage. However, Title I of the ADA includes parallel direct-threat provisions
that apply in the employment context. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 649; see 42 U.S.C.
§§ 12111(3), 12113(b). Under that framework, we have held that whether an
individual is a direct threat under Title I “is a complicated, fact intensive de-
termination, not a question of law,” and that the determination should be
made “after weighing all of the evidence about the nature of the risk and the
potential harm.” Rizzo v. Child.’s World Learning Ctrs., Inc., 84 F.3d 758, 764
_____________________
2
Because we reverse the dismissal of the Plaintiffs’ disability discrimination
claims, we also reverse on their retaliation claims. On remand, the district court may con-
sider the parties’ other arguments related to these claims.
6
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(5th Cir. 1996). Further, “[a]s with all affirmative defenses, the employer
bears the burden of proving that the employee is a direct threat.” Id.We have held that it is generally inappropriate for a court to consider
affirmative defenses on a motion to dismiss if it forces the court to look at
matters outside of the complaint. EPCO Carbon Dioxide Products, Inc. v. JP
Morgan Chase Bank, NA, 467 F.3d 466, 470 (5th Cir. 2006). We read Title
III’s direct-threat provision as analogous to Title I’s, and therefore find that
the district court’s determination that the Plaintiffs were a direct threat to
others as a matter of law was premature.
In sum, the district court erred by denying without explanation the
Plaintiffs’ request for an opportunity to amend their complaint, and by hold-
ing that the Plaintiffs failed to establish their prima facie case, at least at this
stage. Accordingly, the district court’s judgment is VACATED and RE-
MANDED for further proceedings.
7