Covington v. City of Madisonville, TX ( 2023 )

Case: 22-20311 Document: 00516863090 Page: 1 Date Filed: 08/18/2023
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
____________ FILED
August 18, 2023
No. 22-20311 Lyle W. Cayce
____________ Clerk
Laura Covington,
Plaintiff—Appellant,
versus
City of Madisonville, Texas,
Defendant—Appellee.
______________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
USDC No. 4:13-CV-3300
______________________________
Before Dennis, Engelhardt, and Oldham, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam: *
Plaintiff-Appellant Laura Covington (“Laura”) appeals the district
court’s summary judgment dismissal of her municipal liability claims, as-
serted pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against Defendant-Appellee City of
Madisonville. As detailed in our opinion in her previous appeal, 1 Laura seeks
to hold the City liable for monetary damages and other relief relating to her
_____________________
*
This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
1
See Covington v. City of Madisonville, Texas, No. 18-20723, 812 F. App’x 219, 222 (5th Cir.
May 15, 2020).
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No. 22-20311
unlawful arrest, which occurred after her ex-husband, Sergeant Jeffrey Cov-
ington of the Madisonville Police Department (“Jeffrey”), had a “confiden-
tial informant” plant methamphetamine in her vehicle in order to bring about
her arrest, prosecution, and loss of child custody. On remand, the district
court granted the City’s motion for summary judgment, dismissing Laura’s
claims based on its determination that the City’s Chief of Police lacks the
“final policymaking authority” required for municipal liability under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. Having carefully reviewed the parties’ submissions, applica-
ble law, and relevant portions of the record in this matter, we AFFIRM.
“As with other questions of state law relevant to the application of
federal law, the identification of those officials whose decisions represent the
official policy of the local governmental unit is itself a legal question to be
resolved by the trial judge before the case is submitted to the jury.” Jett v.
Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 737 (1989); see also Gros v. City of Grand
Prairie, 181 F.3d 613, 617 (5th Cir. 1999) (“[W]hether an official has been
delegated final policymaking authority is a question of law for the judge, not
[one] of fact for the jury.”). Thus, the trial judge must “review[] the relevant
legal materials, including state and local positive law, as well as custom or
usage having the force of law,” to “identify those officials or governmental
bodies who speak with final policymaking authority . . . concerning the action
alleged to have caused the particular constitutional or statutory violation at
issue.” Jett, 491 U.S. at 737 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
“A municipality can be held liable only when it delegates
policymaking authority, not when it delegates decisionmaking authority.”
Longoria Next Friend of M.L. v. San Benito Indep. Consol. Sch. Dist., 942 F.3d
258, 271 (5th Cir. 2019). “The fact that an official’s decisions are final is
insufficient to demonstrate policymaker status.” Zarnow v. City of Wichita
Falls, Tex., 614 F.3d 161, 167 (5th Cir. 2010) (emphasis added). Thus,
“discretion to exercise a particular function does not necessarily entail final
2
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No. 22-20311
policymaking authority over that function.” Bolton v. City of Dallas, Tex., 541
F.3d 545, 549 (5th Cir. 2008).
Here, though acknowledging that both sides can point to evidence
favorable to their positions, the district court found:
[O]n balance, while Chiefs [of Police] Clendennen and May
possessed some level of discretionary or decision-making
authority, the summary judgment evidence fails to establish
that the City Council expressly or impliedly delegated them
policymaking authority. While the evidence cited by [Laura]
suggests that the police chiefs at times claimed some level of
authority to follow city policy or not, the fact that they did not
follow the policies (or created their own unwritten policies)
cannot serve as evidence of “policymaking” on behalf of the
city. On the contrary, the minutes of the City Council strongly
demonstrate that the Chiefs lacked final policymaking
authority.
The district court also noted that that “the police chief’s subordinate role
and lack of final policymaking authority is corroborated by Chief May’s dec-
laration,” which “suggests that the police chief was, at most, a “deci-
sionmaker.”
Ultimately, the district court concluded:
The police chief’s orders may set the tone and direct the day-
to-day police activities, but he is not an official policymaker for
the City. Absent final policymaking authority, neither the po-
lice chiefs’ alleged decision not to supervise Jeffrey nor their
alleged ratification of Jeffrey’s unlawful conduct can qualify as
official city policy. [Laura’s] § 1983 municipal liability claims
therefore fail as a matter of law.
As we previously have acknowledged, “there’s a fine distinction
between a policymaker and a decisionmaker.” Zarnow, 614 F.3d at 167. At
the same time, “the elements of the Monell test exist to prevent a collapse of
3
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the municipal liability inquiry into a respondeat superior analysis. Id. (citing Bd.
of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty., Okla. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 415 (1997)).
On the instant record, we find no error in the district court’s evidentiary
assessment. Accordingly, the district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.
4