CLC Equipment Co. v. Brewer (In Re Value-Added Communications, Inc.) , 139 F.3d 543 ( 1998 )


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  •                           UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    For the Fifth Circuit
    No. 97-11022
    Summary Calendar
    In the Matter of: VALUE-ADDED COMMUNICATIONS, INC.,
    Debtor.
    __________________________________
    CLC EQUIPMENT COMPANY,
    Appellant,
    VERSUS
    CHARLES BREWER, Trustee of Value-Added Communications Litigation Trust,
    Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    For the Northern District of Texas
    May 6, 1998
    Before WISDOM, DUHÉ, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    The CLC Equipment Company (CLC) leased a telephone processing system to Value-Added
    Communications, Inc. (VAC). VAC used that system to service the Minnesota state prisons under
    VAC’s contract with the state to operate a telephone system for the inmates. VAC granted CLC a
    security interest in VAC’s contract with Minnesota (the Site Leases), including the proceeds and
    revenues earned under that contract. In 1995, VAC filed a voluntary bankruptcy petition under
    Chapter 11. The bankruptcy court avoided CLC’s security interest, finding that the financing
    statements were insufficient to perfect CLC’s security interests in the revenues and proceeds of the
    Site Leases. The district court affirmed that judgment on appeal. Now, we affirm.
    I.
    On March 14, 1994, VAC and CLC entered into an Equipment Lease Agreement (the
    Equipment Lease) under which CLC leased to VAC a System 20 inmate call processing system
    including coin-operated pay telephones. VAC installed this telephone system at five Minnesota state
    correctional facilities under VAC’s Site Leases with the state. The Minnesota priso n officials
    collected the money from the inmates for their use of the system.
    The collateral at issue in this dispute is approximately $181,000 from inmates who used the
    telephone system VAC leased from CLC. The parties agree that there was a valid security agreement
    covering these funds. That security agreement states:
    [VAC] hereby grants, transfers and conveys to CLC all of its right, title and interest
    in and to each location Equipment Lease (“Site Lease”) identified in Schedule “A”
    and in and to all revenues, rents, income and profits arising from each of said Site
    Leases and in and to each and every right lessee as to said Site Leases.
    [VAC] hereby grants to CLC a security interest in (i) all of Lessee’s contract rights
    in said Site Leases, (ii) all of Lessee’s rights to receipts pursuant to said Site Leases,
    and (iii) the proceeds, products, additions, replacements, substitutions, and extensions
    of said Site Leases.
    On April 18, 1994 and April 20, 1994, CLC filed financing statements with the Texas Secretary of
    State and the Minnesota Secretary of State. Those financing statements described the collateral as
    follows:
    All equipment and other personal property and all modifications and additions thereto
    and replacements and substitutions therefore, in whole or in part, now or hereafter
    covered by that Equipment Lease Agreement dated 3/14/94 and all schedules now or
    hereafter referencing said lease between Secured Party, as lessor, and Debtor, as
    lessee. Secured Party and Debtor have entered into a valid lessor-lessee relationship
    and this is a precautionary filing only. * Proceeds of collateral are also covered but
    without power of sale.
    The financing statements did not refer to VAC’s contract with Minnesota.
    After VAC filed its Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition, CLC claimed a security interest in the
    $181,000 collected by Minnesota under its contract with VAC. The Trustee of VAC’s bankruptcy
    estate attacked that security interest, arguing that the financing statements were inadequate to cover
    the money collected under the Site Leases. The bankruptcy court agreed. The financing statements
    covered the equipment described in the Equipment Lease as well as the proceeds of that equipment,
    but the financing statements made no reference to the Site Leases or the revenues and proceeds of
    2
    those Site Leases. The funds at issue here were revenues from the Site Leases. On appeal, the
    district court affirmed.
    II.
    To determine whether CLC’s security interest was perfected, we apply Minnesota law.1 A
    financing statement must reasonably describe the collateral that is covered by the security interest.
    “A collateral description in a financing statement should be held adequate to perfect a security interest
    in an item of property if the description reasonably provides prospective creditors with inquiry notice
    regarding the type of property at issue.”2 Collateral descriptions are liberally construed, and the
    identification of a particular type of collateral is usually sufficient.3
    Our first step in evaluating these financing statements is to determine whether these
    statements provide adequat e notice “so that a subsequent creditor would reasonably make further
    inquiry.”4 The financing statements refer to equipment and personal property covered by the
    Equipment Lease as well as proceeds of that collateral. A creditor making a reasonable inquiry would
    consult the Equipment Lease. The express language of the financing statements covers no more than
    the items in the Equipment Lease. A reasonable inquiry, then, would be limited to that agreement
    because, to perfect a security interest, the financing statement must describe the collateral.5 These
    1
    See Howard Thornton Ford. Inc. v. Fitzpatrick, 
    892 F.2d 1230
    , 1232 (5th Cir. 1990).
    2
    World Wide Tracers, Inc. v. Metropolitan Protection, Inc., 
    384 N.W.2d 442
    , 447 (Minn.
    1986).
    3
    Id.; Thorp Comm. Corp. v. Northgate Indus., 
    654 F.2d 1245
    , 1249 (8th Cir. 1981); Minn.
    Stat. § 336.9-402(1).
    4
    Production Credit Assoc. v. Bartos, 
    430 N.W.2d 238
    , 241 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988).
    5
    CLC argues that a reasonable inquiry in this case includes looking at the security agreement.
    We disagree. Article 9 financing statements are intended to give notice of the collateral covered by
    security interests.
    The theory of notice filing is that a reasonable diligent searcher will be put on notice
    not only of a security interest but also on notice of what collateral is covered by the
    security agreement. Thus, no reported case upholds total omission of a description
    from the financing statement. Such a financing statement fails in one of its
    fundamental notice funct ions. . . . [T]he reasonable searcher may safely conclude
    3
    financing statements do not describe collateral beyond that in the Equipment Lease.
    The funds at issue here are not described in the Equipment Lease, nor are they proceeds of
    the items described. “Proceeds includes whatever is received upon the sale, exchange, collection or
    other disposition of collateral or proceeds.”6 The funds collected from the prisoner were the product
    of the use of the equipment. Use is not a disposition of the co llateral within the meaning of the
    definition of “proceeds”.7 If fruits and products from the use of collateral were treated as proceeds,
    every creditor with a security interest in equipment would have a security interest in all items
    produced from the equipment as well as the revenues earned by the equipment. The revenues earned
    from the inmate’s use of the equipment were the proceeds of the Site Leases.8 CLC’s financing
    statements do not cover those leases.
    III.
    For the foregoing reasons, the judgment is AFFIRMED.
    that collateral not described in the financing statement is not encumbered, at least not
    by this creditor.
    James J. White & Robert S. Summers, 4 Uniform Commercial Code 208 (4th ed. 1995). CLC
    drafted the financing statement and chose to describe the collateral in more detail than was required.
    CLC’s narrow descript ion excluded the Site Leases and the revenues and proceeds from the Site
    Leases from its coverage. CLC must live with the consequences of the collateral description it
    drafted.
    6
    Minn. Stat. § 336.8-306(1).
    7
    See Kingsley v. First American Bank, 
    865 F.2d 975
    , 980-1 (8th Cir 1989).
    8
    CLC attempts to argue that the money received from the inmates for the use of the telephones
    is “proceeds” of the equipment leased to VAC. CLC relies upon In re Cleary Brothers Construction
    Co., 
    9 B.R. 40
    , 41 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1980), Feldman v. Philadelphia Nat’l Bank, 
    408 F. Supp. 24
    ,
    37-38 (E.D. Pa. 1976), and In re Keneco Financial Group, 
    131 B.R. 90
    (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1991).
    Each of those cases illustrates the flaw in CLC’s argument. The rent received for the use of the assets
    in those cases was proceeds of the lease contracts, not the physical items leased. In the present case,
    the money received from the inmates is, without question, proceeds of the Site Equipment Leases
    between VAC and the state. CLC’s security interest is unperfected because the financing statements
    omitted any description of those Site Leases or the category of collateral under which those leases
    fall.
    4