Dorothy Wheeler v. Glay Collier, II , 596 F. App'x 323 ( 2015 )


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  •       Case: 14-30961             Document: 00512956505   Page: 1   Date Filed: 03/04/2015
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    No. 14-30961                   United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    In the Matter of: DOROTHY MARIE WHEELER,                                    March 4, 2015
    Lyle W. Cayce
    Debtor                                                         Clerk
    ------------------------------
    DOROTHY MARIE WHEELER,
    Appellee
    v.
    GLAY H. COLLIER, II; THOMAS C. MCBRIDE; MCBRIDE & COLLIER,
    Appellants
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Louisiana
    U.S.D.C. No. 5:11-CV-01670
    Before SMITH, PRADO, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Appellants Glay H. Collier, II, Thomas C. McBride, and McBride &
    Collier appeal the district court’s contempt order. The district court ordered
    *Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH
    CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    Case: 14-30961    Document: 00512956505     Page: 2   Date Filed: 03/04/2015
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    Appellants 1) to pay $10,000 in sanctions for contempt and 2) to cease and
    desist filing and advertising Chapter 7 consumer “No Money Down”
    bankruptcies. 1 Because Appellants did not receive notice that the hearing was
    being held for the purpose of issuing criminal-contempt sanctions or an
    injunction, we vacate the district court’s order insofar as it issues criminal
    sanctions and enjoins Appellants.
    I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    Collier and McBride were partners of the law firm McBride & Collier. 2
    Collier advertised and performed “No Money Down” bankruptcies, whereby he
    would pay the court costs up front. 3 Collier represented Dorothy May Wheeler
    in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding.
    Wheeler then filed an adversarial complaint against Collier, McBride,
    and the firm. Wheeler alleged, inter alia, that Collier debited her bank account
    after the filing of the bankruptcy petition, in violation of 11 U.S.C. § 362 and
    § 524. 4 Wheeler further alleged Appellants acted as “debt relief agencies,” and
    therefore violated 11 U.S.C. §§ 526(c) and 528(a) by failing to provide Wheeler
    with clear fee agreement. 5 Appellants filed a motion to dismiss, which the
    Bankruptcy court denied. 6 They then filed a request for a jury trial 7 and the
    case proceeded in the United States District Court for the Western District of
    Louisiana. 8
    On June 12, 2014, the district court held a status conference. The
    corresponding minute entry states:
    1 ROA.3195–96.
    2 See ROA.2883–84.
    3 ROA.3266–67
    4 ROA.98; ROA.105–07.
    5 ROA.108–10.
    6 ROA.356–57.
    7 ROA.381.
    8 See ROA.397.
    2
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    The court determined that an oral argument and evidence hearing
    will be held in this matter on July 14, 2014, beginning at 9:30 a.m.
    Counsel shall be prepared to present evidence and argue: (1)
    whether Defendants violated 11 USC § 528, and (2) whether the
    Defendants should be held in contempt under § 105 for violating
    the discharge injunction under 11 USC §[ ]524(a)(2).
    The court also set a pretrial conference for August 20th and reset the jury trial
    for October 21st. 9
    At the July 14th hearing, Collier testified about his bankruptcy practice
    and his representation of Wheeler. 10 After the hearing, the district court
    entered judgment and closed the case. The district court found Appellants in
    violation of 11 U.S.C. §§ 526 and 528 and found them in contempt under
    11 U.S.C. § 105 for violating 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2). The court awarded to
    Wheeler $1,300 in disgorgement, $10,000 in damages “under the equity power
    of Section 105,” $30,000 in punitive damages, and attorney’s fees. 11
    The district court also awarded “$10,000 as sanctions for contempt,
    payable to the Clerk of the Court.” Finally, “as part of the sanctions imposed,”
    the court ordered Appellants 1) “to cease and desist all Chapter 7 consumer
    ‘No Money Down’ bankruptcies” and 2) to “remove or cancel all advertising in
    all media of ‘No Money Down’ Chapter 7 consumer bankruptcies.” The court
    stated the advertisements “shall not resume without prior written orders of
    this court.” 12 Collier, McBride, and the firm now appeal the $10,000 sanction
    and the injunctions.
    II. DISCUSSION
    We have jurisdiction over this appeal of a final judgment pursuant to 28
    U.S.C. § 1291. “We review a contempt order for abuse of discretion, and we
    9 ROA.2852–53.
    10 ROA.3465–69.
    11 Appellants have since settled with Wheeler. See Blue Br. 19.
    12 ROA.3195–96.
    3
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    review the district court’s underlying factual findings under the clearly
    erroneous standard.” FDIC v. LeGrand, 
    43 F.3d 163
    , 166 (5th Cir. 1995). We
    also “review the district court’s grant of an injunction for an abuse of discretion,
    and underlying questions of law de novo.” Newby v. Enron Corp., 
    302 F.3d 295
    ,
    301 (5th Cir. 2002).
    A.    The Monetary Sanction
    The district court ordered Appellants to pay $10,000 in sanctions to the
    Clerk of the Court. Appellants argue that this constitutes a criminal-contempt
    sanction and that the court failed provide sufficient notice that it was holding
    a hearing for criminal contempt.
    1.    Nature of the Sanction
    The sufficiency of notice hinges on whether the district court’s sanction
    constituted a criminal- or civil- contempt judgment. A court’s “contempt order
    or judgment is characterized as either civil or criminal depending upon its
    primary purpose.” In re Bradley, 
    588 F.3d 254
    , 263 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting
    Lamar Fin. Corp. v. Adams, 
    918 F.2d 564
    , 566 (5th Cir. 1990)). A sanction is
    criminal if its purpose “is to punish the contemnor and vindicate the authority
    of the court.” 
    Lamar, 918 F.2d at 566
    . A sanction is civil, on the other hand, if
    its purpose is to “coerce the contemnor into compliance with a court order, or
    to compensate another party for the contemnor’s violation.” Id.; see also In re
    
    Bradley, 588 F.3d at 263
    . “A key determinant to this inquiry is whether the
    penalty imposed is absolute or conditional on the contemnor’s conduct.” 
    Lamar, 918 F.2d at 566
    .
    For example, “a lump sum fine that punishes past conduct is criminal,
    while a fine that accrues on an ongoing basis in response to noncompliance is
    civil.” In re 
    Bradley, 588 F.3d at 263
    ; accord Int’l Union, United Mine Workers
    of Am. v. Bagwell, 
    512 U.S. 821
    , 829 (1994) (“A flat, unconditional fine . . .
    announced after a finding of contempt is criminal if the contemnor has no
    4
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    subsequent opportunity to reduce or avoid the fine through compliance.”
    (internal quotation marks omitted)).
    We hold that the $10,000 in sanctions constitutes a criminal-contempt
    sanction. It is not compensatory, as it was payable to the Clerk of the Court.
    See In re 
    Bradley, 588 F.3d at 264
    (“The present proceeding is a remedial civil
    contempt proceeding, because the bankruptcy court held [the contemnor] liable
    to the bankruptcy estate rather than imposing a fine payable to the court.”).
    Nor is it remedial because it “does not remedy the consequences of defiant
    conduct,” 
    id. at 263–64.
    Moreover, the sanction is unconditional and punitive,
    as it was not dependent on Appellants’ future conduct. See 
    Lamar, 918 F.2d at 566
    (“The [sanction] had a purely punitive purpose because it was not
    conditioned upon the future conduct of the [contemnors].”); United Mine
    
    Workers, 512 U.S. at 829
    . Because the district court issued a criminal-contempt
    sanction, we now address whether Appellants were provided with sufficient
    notice prior to the hearing.
    2.       Notice
    In a minute entry, the district court described the July 14th hearing as
    follows:
    The court determined that an oral argument and evidence hearing
    will be held in this matter on July 14, 2014, beginning at 9:30 a.m.
    Counsel shall be prepared to present evidence and argue: (1)
    whether Defendants violated 11 USC § 528, and (2) whether the
    Defendants should be held in contempt under § 105 for violating
    the discharge injunction under 11 USC §[ ]524(a)(2). 13
    Appellants argue that this was insufficient to provide notice of a criminal-
    contempt proceeding. We agree.
    13   ROA.2852.
    5
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    Even where the district court has the power to issue a criminal-contempt
    sanction,     “procedures   are   mandated    which    protect   the   contemnor’s
    constitutional rights.” 
    Lamar, 918 F.2d at 567
    . Federal Rule of Criminal
    Procedure 42(a) requires that the contemnor have notice that the proceeding
    is criminal in nature. The absence of the word “criminal” in the contempt notice
    is relevant to the notice inquiry, but not fatal. Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Allied Pilots
    Ass’n, 
    968 F.2d 523
    , 530 (5th Cir. 1992). The omission of the word “criminal”
    may be fatal if the notice “fails to describe the conduct which forms the basis
    for the contempt charge or if the conduct could be the basis for civil coercive
    contempt proceedings.” 
    Id. at 530–31.
          In Lamar, this Court vacated on notice grounds a criminal-contempt
    sanction against the defendant for failure to produce documents in pretrial
    
    discovery. 918 F.2d at 565
    –67. The district court ordered the defendants to
    appear “to show cause why they should not be held in contempt for their failure
    to comply with the order compelling production.” 
    Id. at 566.
    Because this order
    gave no indication that the contempt proceeding was criminal, we vacated the
    criminal portion of the sanctions. 
    Id. at 567.
    By contrast, in American Airlines,
    we upheld criminal sanctions because the contempt notice stated the court
    would “take up the matter of possible contempt of court and sanctions, if any,
    to be imposed . . . because of [plaintiff and plaintiff’s counsel’s] conduct in
    falsely representing” that certain declarations filed with the court had been
    properly 
    executed. 968 F.2d at 526
    . Although the notice did not include the
    word criminal, we found sufficient notice because it described past conduct that
    was “not subject to coercive civil sanctions.” 
    Id. at 531.
          Here the contempt notice only referenced contempt pursuant to 11
    U.S.C. § 105 for violations of the discharge injunction. 14 This provision,
    14   ROA.2852.
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    however, provides grounds for civil contempt, and therefore does not provide
    sufficient notice of a criminal-contempt proceeding. See Terrebonne Fuel &
    Lube, Inc. v. Placid Ref. Co., 
    108 F.3d 609
    , 613–14 (5th Cir. 1997) (per curiam);
    Griffith v. Oles (In re Hipp, Inc.), 
    895 F.2d 1503
    , 1515–16 (5th Cir. 1990).
    Because Appellants were not on notice that the hearing would implicate
    criminal-contempt sanctions, we vacate the portion of the order imposing a
    $10,000 sanction payable to the Clerk of the Court.
    C.     The Injunctions
    The district court, “as part of the sanctions imposed,” ordered Appellants
    “to immediately cease and desist all Chapter 7 consumer ‘No Money Down’
    bankruptcies.” The court also ordered Appellants “to remove or cancel all
    advertising in all media of ‘No Money Down’ Chapter 7 consumer
    bankruptcies,” which was not to be resumed “without prior written orders”
    from the court. 15
    Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(a) requires “notice to the adverse
    party” before an injunction may issue. 16 This rule has “constitutional as well
    as procedural dimensions.” Parker v. Ryan, 
    960 F.2d 543
    , 544 n.1 (5th Cir.
    1992). Thus, Rule 65(a), “with few exceptions, implies ‘a hearing in which the
    defendant is given a fair opportunity to oppose the application and to prepare
    for such opposition.’” Williams v. McKeithen, 
    939 F.2d 1100
    , 1105 (5th Cir.
    1991) (quoting Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Bhd. of Teamsters & Auto Truck
    Drivers Local No. 70 of Alameda, 
    415 U.S. 423
    , 432 n.7 (1974)).
    15 ROA.3195–96.
    16 Although this Rule refers to “preliminary injunctions,” we apply it to the district
    court’s injunctions because they were issued sua sponte in an order closing the case without
    any trial on the merits. See Quershi v. United States, 
    600 F.3d 523
    , 526–27 (5th Cir. 2010)
    (applying Rule 65(a) notice standards to a pre-filing injunction issued sua sponte by a district
    court).
    7
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    The court only notified Appellants to “be prepared to present evidence
    and argue: (1) whether Defendants violated 11 USC § 528, and (2) whether the
    Defendants should be held in contempt under § 105 for violating the discharge
    injunction under 11 USC §[ ]524(a)(2).” 17 Nothing in the minute entry suggests
    that the court was considering enjoining Appellants’ No Money Down
    bankruptcy practice. See 
    Williams, 939 F.2d at 1105
    (“There is no evidence that
    appellants-sheriffs were on notice that the June 25 hearing was held for any
    purpose other than to rule on the motion to vacate the May 25 injunction; they
    were therefore unprepared and not on notice to oppose the June 25 preliminary
    injunction issued at that hearing.”). Thus, we vacate the district court’s
    injunctions. See 
    id. at 1105–06
    (vacating the injunction). 18
    III. CONCLUSION
    For the foregoing reasons, we VACATE the district court’s order insofar
    as it imposes $10,000 in sanctions and enjoins Appellants and REMAND.
    17 ROA.2852.
    18 We do not reach Appellants’ argument that the injunctions are impermissibly broad
    under In re Stewart, 
    647 F.3d 553
    , 556–58 (5th Cir. 2011). We leave the scope of any
    injunctions imposed on remand to the district court’s careful consideration.
    8