United States v. Reginald Green ( 2019 )


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  •      Case: 19-40097       Document: 00515235325         Page: 1     Date Filed: 12/13/2019
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    United States Court of Appeals
    No. 19-40097
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    Summary Calendar                   December 13, 2019
    Lyle W. Cayce
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                                                     Clerk
    Plaintiff - Appellee
    v.
    REGINALD EDWARD GREEN,
    Defendant - Appellant
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Texas
    USDC No. 1:18-CR-18-1
    Before BARKSDALE, HAYNES, and ENGELHARDT, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM: *
    Reginald Edward Green challenges his jury-trial conviction for, as an
    inmate, forcibly resisting a federal officer engaged in the performance of his
    official duties, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 111(a). Green asserts the district
    court abused its discretion in admitting into evidence “Government’s Exhibit
    3”, a photograph of Green in the prison medical center shortly after the
    * Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir.
    R. 47.5.4.
    Case: 19-40097     Document: 00515235325      Page: 2   Date Filed: 12/13/2019
    No. 19-40097
    incident. Green objected to the exhibit’s admission at trial under both Federal
    Rules of Evidence 401 and 403; he addresses only Rule 403 on appeal.
    Rule 403 provides:     “The court may exclude relevant evidence if its
    probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the
    following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue
    delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence”. Fed. R.
    Evid. 403. Green’s overruled district-court objection was based solely on “the
    fact that the defendant [was] photographed in handcuffs [was] prejudicial and
    it outweigh[ed] the probative value”. Green does not address this specific issue
    on appeal. He has, therefore, abandoned it for failure to brief. E.g., Frank v.
    Garner, 
    95 F.3d 54
    , 54 (5th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (unpublished) (citation
    omitted).
    Instead, Green presents two new contentions on appeal: (1) the exhibit’s
    admission was more prejudicial than probative, in violation of due process; and
    (2) the court erred in not providing a limiting instruction. Because these
    objections were not preserved in district court, review is only for plain error.
    E.g., United States v. Broussard, 
    669 F.3d 537
    , 546 (5th Cir. 2012). (Our court
    does not consider Green’s contention, raised for the first time in his reply brief,
    that the court abused its discretion in admitting Government’s Exhibit 3
    because it contains various notations and prejudicial indicia.           See, e.g.,
    CenturyTel of Chatham, LLC v. Sprint Commc’ns Co., 
    861 F.3d 566
    , 573 (5th
    Cir. 2017) (citation omitted) (Generally, “this court will not consider issues
    raised for the first time in a reply brief”.), cert. denied, 
    138 S. Ct. 669
    (2018).
    Green does not present an exception to this rule.)
    Under the plain-error standard, Green must show a forfeited plain error
    (clear or obvious, rather than subject to reasonable dispute) that affected his
    substantial rights. Puckett v. United States, 
    556 U.S. 129
    , 135 (2009). If he
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    Case: 19-40097     Document: 00515235325       Page: 3   Date Filed: 12/13/2019
    No. 19-40097
    makes that showing, we have the discretion to correct such reversible plain
    error, but generally should do so only if it “seriously affect[s] the fairness,
    integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings”. 
    Id. Regarding his
    due-process contention, Green cites only Holbrook v.
    Flynn, 
    475 U.S. 560
    (1986), and Estelle v. Williams, 
    425 U.S. 501
    (1976). These
    cases concern constitutional implications of “compel[ling] an accused to stand
    trial before a jury while dressed in identifiable prison clothes”, 
    Estelle, 425 U.S. at 512
    , and “the conspicuous, or at least noticeable, deployment of security
    personnel in a courtroom during trial”, 
    Holbrook, 475 U.S. at 568
    . They do not
    compel   error   in   the    court’s   admitting   the   challenged   photograph.
    Consequently, Green has not shown the requisite plain (clear or obvious) error.
    See United States v. Francisco, 644 F. App’x 358, 359 (5th Cir. 2016) (per
    curiam) (citation omitted).
    As for a limiting instruction, Green cites only Wright v. Texas, in which
    our court concluded that, in the context of “handcuffing a defendant being
    transported to and from the courtroom”, “[t]he inadvertent view by a juror of
    the defendant in such a situation cannot be said to be so inherently prejudicial
    as to be incapable of correction [via a limiting instruction] had the defendant
    made a timely objection”. 
    533 F.2d 185
    , 188 (5th Cir. 1976). Green’s reliance
    on Wright is, therefore, also inapposite. Consequently, he has again failed to
    show the requisite plain (clear or obvious) error. See Francisco, 644 F. App’x
    at 359 (citation omitted).
    AFFIRMED.
    Judge Engelhardt concurs in the judgment only.
    3