Kenneth Steagall v. Comm'r of Social Security , 596 F. App'x 377 ( 2015 )

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 15a0008n.06
No. 14-3370
FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Jan 06, 2015
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk
KENNETH STEAGALL, )
)
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) ON APPEAL FROM THE
v. ) UNITED STATES DISTRICT
) COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, ) DISTRICT OF OHIO
)
Defendant-Appellee. )
Before: COLE, Chief Judge; KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judge; OLIVER, District Judge.
KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judge. The district court affirmed an administrative law judge’s
denial of Kenneth Steagall’s application for social-security disability benefits. We affirm.
I.
In December 2002, Steagall was parked on the side of the road during a winter storm
when another car struck his car. After the accident, Steagall experienced neck and back pain,
which prevented him from doing his job as an electrician. Over the next year, to try to alleviate
his pain, Steagall received epidural steroid injections, participated in physical therapy, and saw a
chiropractor. E.g., A.R. at 157, 179-80.
Steagall found those conservative treatments ineffective, so he elected to have spinal-
fusion surgery in March 2004. The surgery was successful, but Steagall continued to have pain
in his back and right shoulder. Over the next few years, Steagall saw several doctors for

The Honorable Solomon Oliver Jr., Chief District Judge for the Northern District of
Ohio, sitting by designation.
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Steagall v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.
treatment of his pain, and his other medical conditions. Two of those doctors—Steven Wunder
and Andrea Murphy—opined that Steagall suffered from disabling pain and could not work.
Meanwhile, Steagall applied for disability benefits. An ALJ held a hearing on his
disability claim in April 2007. After the hearing, the ALJ denied the claim. Steagall appealed.
The district court reversed and remanded, holding that the ALJ failed to explain adequately why
she gave little weight to the opinions of Drs. Wunder and Murphy.
In February 2011, the ALJ held a second hearing, at which Dr. Richard Hutson, an
orthopedic surgeon, testified. Although Dr. Hutson had not examined Steagall, he had reviewed
Steagall’s entire medical record. He testified that the opinions of Drs. Wunder and Murphy were
medically unsound and unsupported by the rest of the record. Based on his own review, he
concluded that Steagall could physically perform at least sedentary work.
The ALJ again denied Steagall’s disability claim. The ALJ found that Steagall suffered
from degenerative disc disease and shoulder impingement with underlying acromioclavicular
joint arthrosis. A.R. at 594. Although the ALJ found that these “severe impairments” caused
Steagall pain, the ALJ did not find credible Steagall’s reports that his pain was “disabling.” The
ALJ also again found, based in part on the testimony of Dr. Hutson, that the opinions of Drs.
Wunder and Murphy should receive little weight. Finally, after reviewing the record evidence
and giving great weight to the opinion of Dr. Hutson, the ALJ found that Steagall could perform
some jobs that existed in the economy—albeit not his previous job as an electrician. See A.R. at
598. As a result, the ALJ concluded that Steagall was not disabled.
Steagall appealed, and the district court affirmed. The court held that the ALJ had
sufficiently explained her reasons for discounting the opinions of Drs. Wunder and Murphy, and
that substantial evidence supported the denial of benefits. This appeal followed.
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II.
Our review is limited to whether the ALJ applied the correct legal standards and whether
the ALJ’s findings are supported by substantial evidence. See Kyle v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.,
609 F.3d 847, 854 (6th Cir. 2010). Substantial evidence is evidence that “a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Steagall challenges on several grounds the ALJ’s conclusion that he is not disabled. He
first argues that the ALJ should have given greater weight to Dr. Wunder’s and Dr. Murphy’s
opinions that Steagall is disabled because he cannot perform any work. An ALJ must give the
opinions of treating physicians “controlling weight” if those opinions meet certain criteria. See
Wilson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 378 F.3d 541, 544 (6th Cir. 2004). If the opinions do not deserve
controlling weight, the ALJ must determine what weight to give them by considering the
following factors: the length, nature, and extent of the treatment relationship; the supportability
of the physician’s opinion and the opinion’s consistency with the rest of the record; and the
physician’s specialization. Id. The ALJ must explain what weight she gave to treating-physician
opinions. Blakley v. Comm'r Of Soc. Sec., 581 F.3d 399, 406-07 (6th Cir. 2009).
The ALJ found that the opinions of Drs. Wunder and Murphy did not deserve controlling
weight. Steagall does not challenge this finding; instead, he contends that, even if the opinions
were not entitled to controlling weight, the ALJ short-circuited the required analysis and simply
gave the opinions no weight at all. But the ALJ gave Dr. Murphy’s opinion some weight—the
ALJ credited her opinion that Steagall could not sit or stand for an extended period. The ALJ
also explained that Dr. Murphy, a primary-care physician, had treated Steagall for only
10 months, had failed to support her opinion with documentation of testing or other objective
medical bases for her conclusions, and did not appear to understand the Social Security Act’s
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definition of “disability.” Dr. Murphy even conceded that she had never performed a “full
functional evaluation of Steagall.” A.R. at 682. Thus, the ALJ considered the correct factors in
analyzing Dr. Murphy’s opinion. And the ALJ’s findings—which are supported by the record—
justify her decision to give the opinion only a little weight.
As to Dr. Wunder, Steagall correctly asserts that the ALJ apparently gave his medical
opinions no weight. See A.R. at 606. The ALJ explained, however, that Dr. Wunder’s opinions
were inconsistent with the findings of numerous other doctors and unsupported by the rest of
Steagall’s medical record. For example, although Dr. Wunder reported several abnormal
neurological findings, the ALJ counted 11 times in the record when Steagall’s other treating
doctors (including Dr. Murphy) reported “normal” neurological examinations. The ALJ also
relied on Dr. Hutson’s testimony that many of Dr. Wunder’s findings were not only inconsistent
from exam to exam, but “could not be explained orthopedically.” A.R. at 604. In this regard, the
ALJ gave more weight to the opinion of Dr. Hutson because of his greater expertise in
orthopedic medicine than Dr. Wunder, who is a rehabilitative specialist. Finally, the ALJ noted
that Dr. Wunder only treated Steagall a handful of times over several years. Thus, the ALJ also
considered the appropriate factors in analyzing Dr. Wunder’s opinion, and her decision to give
that opinion no weight is supported by the record.
Next, Steagall argues that the ALJ erred by giving great weight to Dr. Hutson’s opinion
that Steagall can physically perform sedentary work. Steagall contends that the ALJ failed to
apply the same rigorous scrutiny to Dr. Hutson’s opinion as she applied to those of Drs. Wunder
and Murphy. The ALJ must determine what weight to give the opinion of a non-treating
physician by applying the same factors discussed above, i.e., the opinion’s supportability and
consistency, and the physician’s specialization. See Gayheart v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 710 F.3d
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365, 379 (6th Cir. 2013). The ALJ cannot apply greater scrutiny to the opinions of treating
sources over those of non-treating sources. See id.
Here, the ALJ explained that Dr. Hutson’s opinion about Steagall’s capabilities was
consistent with, and supported by, the record. As one example, Dr. Hutson’s opinion that
Steagall could sit or stand for six hours per day as long as he could periodically change positions
to relieve discomfort was supported by the assessment of the state medical examiner, Dr. Hill.
See A.R. at 355, 608. In turn, Dr. Hill’s assessment—which the ALJ also gave great weight—is
supported by the opinions of other treating doctors who believed that Steagall had the capability
to return to light-duty work at least. See, e.g., id. at 173, 192, 221. Dr. Hutson also took into
account Steagall’s well-documented pain in formulating his opinion. For example, he
recommended more significant work restrictions than some of Steagall’s other doctors.
Compare id. at 192, with id. at 570, 608. Finally, the ALJ credited Dr. Hutson’s specialization in
orthopedic medicine. Thus, the ALJ again considered the correct factors when she weighed the
opinions of the non-treating physicians, and her findings are likewise supported by the record.
Steagall also argues that the ALJ improperly failed to credit Steagall’s testimony that he
has disabling pain. A claimant’s subjective complaints of pain can support a disability finding if
the record contains “objective medical evidence” of a severe medical condition that “can
reasonably be expected to produce the alleged disabling pain.” Felisky v. Bowen, 35 F.3d 1027,
1038-39 (6th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). Even when the record contains this evidence,
however, the ALJ may also consider the credibility of the claimant’s subjective complaints. See
Jones v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 336 F.3d 469, 475-76 (6th Cir. 2003). The ALJ’s credibility
determinations—when supported by substantial evidence—are entitled to “great weight.” Cruse
v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 502 F.3d 532, 542 (6th Cir. 2007).
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An ALJ may discount a claimant’s credibility when the ALJ “finds contradictions among
the medical reports, claimant's testimony, and other evidence.” Warner v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.,
375 F.3d 387, 392 (6th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the ALJ found that
the record contradicted Steagall’s reports of disabling pain. First, she found that the medical
evidence did not confirm the severity of Steagall’s reported pain. For example, multiple
specialists opined that Steagall could return to work, and Steagall did not consistently report a
disabling level of pain. E.g., A.R. at 192, 309-11, 873. The ALJ also properly found that
Steagall’s decision to stop taking, after many years, prescribed pain medication in favor of over-
the-counter drugs undermined his reports of disabling pain. See Blacha v. Sec'y of Health &
Human Servs., 927 F.2d 228, 231 (6th Cir. 1990). Finally, the ALJ concluded that Dr. Hill’s
assessment—which found that Steagall could care for himself, perform chores, drive, lift 30
pounds occasionally and 20 pounds frequently, sit or stand for six hours a day, and push and pull
at will—also suggested that Steagall’s pain was not disabling. See A.R. at 355, 608. Thus,
substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s finding that Steagall was not fully credible. See, e.g.,
Walters v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 127 F.3d 525, 531-32 (6th Cir. 1997).
Steagall next argues that the ALJ erred in finding that Steagall is not disabled because
jobs exist that he can perform. A disability claimant is not entitled to benefits if the government
offers substantial evidence that the claimant can perform specific jobs that exist in significant
numbers in the economy. See Wilson, 378 F.3d at 548-49. The testimony of a vocational expert
in response to a hypothetical question that accurately describes the claimant’s impairments can
supply this evidence. See Ealy v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 594 F.3d 504, 516 (6th Cir. 2010).
Here, the ALJ credited Dr. Hutson’s testimony that Steagall could perform only sedentary
work and needed to change positions every hour for a few minutes. The ALJ then asked Dr.
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Parsons, a vocational expert, if significant numbers of sedentary-level jobs existed in the
economy that Steagall could perform given his background. Dr. Parsons identified three
qualifying jobs: a dispatcher of maintenance or utility services, an electrical-materials expediter,
and an electrical-equipment assembler. A.R. at 576. Dr. Parsons also testified that these jobs
would allow Steagall to sit or stand at will. See id. at 531-32, 577, 581. Steagall responds that
the ALJ’s hypothetical was flawed, because it did not incorporate Dr. Wunder’s opinion that
Steagall would be absent from work at least four times per month. As shown above, however,
the ALJ properly gave no weight to Dr. Wunder’s opinions. Thus, the ALJ’s hypothetical
accurately described Steagall’s limitations, and Dr. Parsons’s testimony is substantial evidence
that Steagall is not disabled. See Wilson, 378 F.3d at 549.
Finally, Steagall identifies several parts of the record that he argues support his disability
claim. He points to a 2008 MRI that showed impingement of his nerve root, a few consistencies
between Dr. Wunder’s findings and other parts of the record, his prescriptions for back-spasm
and pain medication, and evidence that he says shows his condition is worsening. Regardless of
whether this evidence is “substantial evidence” in support of a finding of disability, we still
“must defer to an agency's decision . . . so long as substantial evidence supports the conclusion
reached by the ALJ.” Foster v. Halter, 279 F.3d 348, 353 (6th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Here, for the reasons discussed, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding
that Steagall is not disabled.
The district court’s judgment is affirmed.
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