Linda Davis v. Progressive Direct Insurance Company ( 2021 )


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  •                                                     RENDERED: JUNE 17, 2021
    TO BE PUBLISHED
    Supreme Court of Kentucky
    2020-SC-0168-DG
    LINDA DAVIS                                                           APPELLANT
    ON REVIEW FROM COURT OF APPEALS
    V.                          NO. 2019-CA-0850
    WAYNE CIRCUIT COURT NO. 18-CI-0224
    PROGRESSIVE DIRECT INSURANCE                                           APPELLEE
    COMPANY
    OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE VANMETER
    AFFIRMING
    Linda Davis appeals the Court of Appeals’ holding which excluded from
    the definition of a “motor vehicle” or “trailer” a horse-drawn wagon, for
    purposes of insurance coverage. Finding that the policy underwritten by
    Progressive Direct Insurance Company was unambiguous and did not violate
    Davis’s reasonable expectations when she purchased her motorcycle coverage,
    we affirm.
    I. Factual and Procedural Background
    The material facts are not disputed. While driving her motorcycle in
    Wayne County, Davis encountered a horse-drawn buggy operated by Danny
    Gingerich. Unfortunately, as Davis was approaching Gingerich, the horse
    became spooked and jumped into oncoming traffic. Consequently, Davis
    collided with the horse and was gravely injured.
    At the time of Davis’s accident, her motorcycle was insured by
    Progressive. As members of the local Amish community neither Danny
    Gingerich, nor his father Abe, carried any form of insurance; either on their
    farm, or on the horse-drawn wagon. Progressive denied Davis’s claim under
    the uninsured motorist provision of her motorcycle coverage on grounds that a
    horse-drawn wagon was neither a “motor vehicle” nor a “trailer of any type” as
    defined by the policy language.
    Davis brought suit in Wayne County, seeking to enforce the uninsured
    motorist provision in her policy. Progressive sought, and the Wayne County
    Circuit Court granted, Progressive’s motion for summary judgment, on the
    basis that Abe Gingerich’s horse-drawn wagon did not qualify as a “motor
    vehicle” or “trailer of any type” under the terms of the policy. The Court of
    Appeals affirmed, and we granted discretionary review to resolve the dispute.
    II. Standard of Review
    On appeal, the standard of review for a summary judgment is to
    ascertain whether the trial court correctly determined that no genuine issue of
    material fact existed, entitling the moving party to judgment as a matter of law.
    Coomer v. CSX Transp., Inc., 
    319 S.W.3d 366
    , 370–71 (Ky. 2010). In
    conducting our review, we give no deference to the rulings below because only
    legal questions are involved. De novo review extends to the trial court’s
    interpretation of the insurance contract as a matter of law. Cincinnati Ins. Co.
    v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co., 
    306 S.W.3d 69
    , 73 (Ky. 2010).
    2
    III. Analysis
    Davis makes two primary arguments on appeal. The first is grounded
    squarely in the following policy language:
    If you pay the premium for this coverage, we will pay for damages
    that an insured person is legally entitled to recover from the owner
    or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle because of bodily injury;
    1. sustained by an insured person;
    2. caused by an accident; and
    3. arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of an
    uninsured motor vehicle.
    (Emphasis original). In the “Additional Definitions” sections of the policy,
    Progressive defined “uninsured motor vehicle” as “mean[ing] a land motor
    vehicle or trailer of any type[.]” Crucial to Davis’s claim is her conclusion that
    a horse-drawn buggy qualifies as a “trailer of any type.” We disagree.
    In reviewing the merits of Davis’s policy language argument, we note that
    terms in insurance contracts do not have any technical legal meaning and
    must be interpreted as a lay consumer would understand the policy. Ky. Ass’n
    of Cnties. All Lines Fund Tr. v. McClendon, 
    157 S.W.3d 626
    , 630 (Ky. 2005).
    During our review we look to see whether a term is ambiguous. If two
    reasonable interpretations exist, the interpretation favoring the insured
    prevails. 
    Id.
     Of course, failing to define a term does not always, or even often,
    result in an ambiguity. Instead, the crux of our analysis is to determine and
    accord the term at issue its ordinary and everyday meaning. 
    Id.
    Davis’s assertion that a buggy qualifies as a trailer is mistaken for
    several reasons. The first is that the horse and buggy operate as a single unit,
    3
    with the buggy functioning as a passenger compartment would in a sedan or
    SUV. Nothing is trailing because the horse and buggy are integral to one
    another. Secondly, and more directly, even if we accepted Davis’s description,
    our common understanding of what a trailer is belies her position.
    The word “trailer” is defined generally as meaning one who or that
    which trails. The term is applied to a variety of vehicles, and in the
    motor vehicle law a trailer is a separate vehicle which is not driven
    or propelled by its own power, but which, in order to be useful,
    must be attached to, and become a part of another vehicle.
    87 C.J.S., Trailer (1954). By contrast, the corresponding definition for “buggy”
    is “a small, light, four-wheeled horse-drawn carriage.”1 While Davis correctly
    points out that Progressive’s choice of terminology, “trailer of any type,” is
    broader than the controlling definitions in the rest of the policy,2 the difference
    here is one of kind and not degree. Simply put, a trailer is generally
    understood as something separate from, and pulled by, another vehicle. The
    horse and buggy do not the meet the common understanding of a trailer.3
    Davis’s claims under Kentucky’s Motorized Vehicle Reparations Act
    (MVRA) fail because of the same categorical deficiencies in her contract
    argument. KRS4 304.39-010, et seq. The MVRA defines a “motor vehicle” as
    1   Buggy, American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language. (1975).
    2  Progressive defines two types of trailers in the “General Definitions” section of
    the policy: (1) “‘Trailer’ means a non-motorized trailer designed to be towed on public
    roads by a motorcycle;” and (2) “‘Transport trailer’ means a non-motorized trailer
    designed to be towed on public roads by a land motor vehicle and principally designed
    for transporting a covered motorcycle.”
    3 A scenario could arise in which a horse-drawn vehicle, whether a buggy or
    wagon, has a trailer attached to it. Whether that might meet the definition of “trailer
    of any type” we do not decide since those facts are not before us.
    4   Kentucky Revised Statutes.
    4
    “any vehicle which transports persons or property upon the public highways of
    the Commonwealth, propelled by other than muscular power….” KRS 304.39-
    020(7). In an attempt to broaden the scope of the statutory definition wide
    enough to encompass a horse and buggy, Davis casts the explanation of KRS
    304.39-020(7) in O’Keefe v. N. Am. Refractories, as including all modes of
    transportation that are primarily used to operate on public highways. 
    78 S.W.3d 760
    , 762 (Ky. App. 2002). As the Court of Appeals opinion below
    correctly explained, Davis’s assertions are unsupported.
    In O’Keefe, our Court of Appeals contemplated whether a forklift was a
    “motor vehicle” under the MVRA. Specifically, the court in O’Keefe examined
    whether a forklift should be treated as construction equipment, which the
    MVRA explicitly excluded, or a “motor vehicle,” and ultimately concluded that
    the forklift was not a “motor vehicle” under the MVRA because while the forklift
    was capable of operating on a highway, that was neither a practical use of the
    forklift, nor its primary function. 
    Id.
    In fact, O’Keefe does not contemplate Davis’s factual circumstance at all
    because the operative language in KRS 304.39-020(7) at issue in this case is
    whether the horse and buggy is “propelled by other than muscular power,” and
    not whether a certain type of “vehicle” is a “motor vehicle” under the MVRA.
    Consequently, O’Keefe does not compel the result Davis seeks. Instead, we
    dismiss Davis’s argument on the plain language of the statute. As the Court of
    Appeals explained, the purpose of including “propelled by other than muscular
    power” was to limit the applicability of the MVRA to vehicles that were self-
    5
    propelled by an internal motor. No ambiguity exists in the language, and any
    discussion trying to create an ambiguity by questioning whether the statute
    referred to human or animal muscles is entirely irrelevant.
    Finally, we address Davis’s public policy argument. Davis argues, and
    we agree, that testimony provided by the Gingeriches clearly shows that the
    horse and buggy was the primary mode of highway transportation for the local
    Amish community. Davis asserts that she reasonably expected the horse and
    buggies she encountered on the highway to be subject to the same “rules and
    regulations as other vehicles operating on the public roads of the
    Commonwealth.” However, Davis concedes that by the policy’s own terms her
    position is counterintuitive. Consequently, given Davis’s failure to present a
    meaningful ambiguity in the contract, or show evidence of a reasonable
    expectation of coverage, so as to implicate public policy concerns, we are
    compelled to deny her final argument.
    In doing so, we note that we have traditionally reserved discussions of
    reasonable expectations to circumstances in which the petitioner has pointed
    to an ambiguity in the contract. Metzger v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 
    607 S.W.3d 695
    , 699 (Ky. 2020); True v. Raines, 
    99 S.W.3d 439
    , 443 (Ky. 2003). Our
    reasoning for requiring an ambiguity is simple; when the policy language
    clearly lays out the duties and expectations of the parties, the contract is their
    clearest evidence of intent and enforcing the terms of the contract is certainly
    an important interest of the Commonwealth.
    6
    Additionally, the General Assembly has already made itself clear, in the
    MVRA, by explicitly excluding “muscle” powered modes of transportation. In
    the absence of legislative action, we adhere to the reasoning of our predecessor
    court in Rosenbaum v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America, which held that the primary
    inducement for uninsured motorist coverage is to protect insureds from
    damage by vehicles “on which liability insurance is customarily carried.” 
    432 S.W.2d 45
    , 47 (Ky. 1968). Davis cannot point to, and no statute supports, the
    proposition that horse and buggy operators customarily purchase insurance
    policies. Consequently, without clear language in the policy we do not presume
    that Progressive is pioneering the field.
    IV. Conclusion
    For the reasons discussed above, the Court of Appeals’ opinion affirming
    the trial court’s summary judgment in favor of Progressive is affirmed.
    All sitting. Minton, C.J.; Conley, Hughes, Keller, Nickell and VanMeter,
    JJ., concur. Lambert, J., dissents without separate opinion.
    COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
    William Matthew Garmon
    Garmon & Ramsey, PLLC
    COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
    Timothy Leigh Mauldin
    Bell Orr Ayers & Moore, P.S.C
    7
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2020 SC 0168

Filed Date: 6/16/2021

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 6/17/2021