In Re: Khan ( 2018 )


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  •        NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Federal Circuit
    ______________________
    IN RE: IFTIKHAR KHAN, NAZIR KHAN,
    Appellants
    ______________________
    2017-2207
    ______________________
    Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark
    Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board in No. 14/509,949.
    ______________________
    Decided: February 15, 2018
    ______________________
    IFTIKHAR KHAN, NAZIR KHAN, Burr Ridge, IL, pro se.
    NATHAN K. KELLEY, Office of the Solicitor, United
    States Patent and Trademark Office, Alexandria, VA, for
    appellee Andrei Iancu. Also represented by MICHAEL
    SUMNER FORMAN, BENJAMIN T. HICKMAN, THOMAS W.
    KRAUSE, FRANCES LYNCH.
    ______________________
    Before PROST, Chief Judge, MOORE, and CHEN, Circuit
    Judges.
    PER CURIAM
    Drs. Iftikhar Khan and Nazir Khan (collectively, “the
    Khans”) appeal from a decision of the United States
    Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) Patent Trial and
    2                                               IN RE: KHAN
    Appeal Board (“Board”) affirming the examiner’s rejec-
    tions of claims 21–41 of U.S. Patent Application No.
    14/509,949 (’949 application) seeking reissue of U.S.
    Patent No. 8,282,591 (’591 patent). Because the claims of
    the reissue application recapture surrendered subject
    matter in violation of 35 U.S.C. § 251, we affirm.
    BACKGROUND
    The ’591 patent describes an “arteriovenous shunt” for
    use in hemodialysis of a patient. ’591 patent at 1:14–18.
    Typically, blood is removed from and returned to the
    patient through a “graft” connected to a vein, which poses
    dangers of infection, clotting, and hyperplasia. 
    Id. at 1:20–36,
    1:39–45, 2:1–32. The Khans’ shunt avoids these
    dangers by connecting a graft to an artery, rather than a
    vein, and passing the returned blood through a “single
    lumen venous outflow catheter” into the right atrium of a
    patient’s heart. 
    Id. at Abstract,
    2:1–5, 2:11–15, 4:14–15,
    4:32–33.
    During prosecution of the ’591 patent, the examiner
    rejected claims 1 and 17 as anticipated by U.S. Patent No.
    6,102,884 (“Squitieri”). The Khans amended these claims
    to require that the “arterial graft has a first diameter,”
    the “venous outflow catheter has a second diameter
    different from said first diameter,” and the shunt includes
    a “cylindrical cuff” that “provide[s] a secure fit for said
    arterial graft first diameter and said venous outflow
    catheter second diameter.” The Khans argued Squitieri
    does not disclose this “cylindrical cuff” limitation. The
    examiner then rejected claims 1 and 17 as unpatentable
    over Squitieri in view of U.S. Patent No. 5,399,173
    (“Parks”) and, later, in view of U.S. Patent No. 5,509,897
    (“Twardowski”). The Khans again argued that none of the
    references disclose the “cylindrical cuff” limitation. The
    examiner maintained the rejections. The Khans appealed
    to the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences, which
    reversed, allowing claims 1 and 17. See Ex parte Khan,
    IN RE: KHAN                                                3
    No. 2012-6569, 
    2012 WL 3067934
    , at *3 (B.P.A.I. July 27,
    2012).
    The Khans sought reissue of the ’591 patent to include
    claims to “[a] method of preparing a patient for hemodial-
    ysis” (claim 21), “[a]n arteriovenous shunt” (claim 29), “[a]
    hemodialysis system” (claim 38), and “[a] method of
    performing hemodialysis on a patient” (claim 39). None of
    the reissue claims expressly recites the “cylindrical cuff”
    limitation.
    The examiner rejected reissue claims 21–41 under
    § 251 as recapturing subject matter surrendered during
    prosecution of the ’591 patent. The examiner concluded
    reissue claims 21 and 39 recapture subject matter sur-
    rendered from patented claim 17, and reissue claims 29
    and 38 recapture subject matter surrendered from pa-
    tented claim 1. The examiner also rejected claims 21, 22,
    and 25–39 for obviousness over Squitieri in view of U.S.
    Patent No. 5,509,897. The Board affirmed all of the
    rejections. It declined to separately consider the patenta-
    bility of dependent claims 22, 24, 30, 40, and 41 under
    § 251, determining the Khans had waived this argument.
    The Khans timely appealed. We have jurisdiction un-
    der 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(A).
    DISCUSSION
    I
    Section 251 permits a patentee to seek a broadening
    reissue of a patent where, “through error and without any
    deceptive intent,” the patentee originally claimed “less
    than he had a right to claim.” In re Youman, 
    679 F.3d 1335
    , 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2012). The “recapture rule,” howev-
    er, “bars a patentee from recapturing subject matter,
    through reissue, that the patentee intentionally surren-
    dered during the original prosecution in order to overcome
    the prior art.” 
    Id. at 1343.
    Whether claims of a reissue
    application implicate the recapture rule is a question of
    4                                                   IN RE: KHAN
    law we review de novo, while the underlying factual
    findings are reviewed for substantial evidence. 
    Id. To determine
    whether recapture has occurred, we ap-
    ply a three-step analysis. Greenliant Sys., Inc. v. Xicor
    LLC, 
    692 F.3d 1261
    , 1267 (Fed. Cir. 2012). At step one,
    we “determine whether and in what ‘aspect’ the reissue
    claims are broader than the original patent claims.” 
    Id. If so,
    we determine at step two “whether the broader
    aspects of the reissue claims relate to surrendered subject
    matter.” 
    Id. At step
    three we “determine whether the
    reissue claims were materially narrowed in other re-
    spects, so that the claims may not have been enlarged,
    and hence avoid the recapture rule.” 
    Id. Under step
    one, reissue claims 21 and 39 are broader
    than patented claim 17, and reissue claims 29 and 38 are
    broader than patented claim 1, because none of the reis-
    sue claims require the “cylindrical cuff” recited in the
    patented claims. The Khans’ argument that the “cylindri-
    cal cuff” limitation is retained in dependent claims cannot
    save reissue claims 21, 29, 38, and 39, since “[t]he pres-
    ence of a dependent claim that adds a particular limita-
    tion raises a presumption that the limitation in question
    is not found in the independent claim,” not that the limi-
    tation is found in the independent claim.            Liebel-
    Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 
    358 F.3d 898
    , 910 (Fed.
    Cir. 2004) (emphasis added).
    Turning to step two, the “cylindrical cuff” omitted
    from the reissue claims relates to surrendered subject
    matter. When the examiner rejected claims 1 and 17 as
    anticipated by Squitieri, the Khans amended these claims
    to require the “cylindrical cuff” and then relied on this
    limitation to distinguish over Squitieri. This constitutes
    surrender. 
    Greenliant, 692 F.3d at 1269
    –71 (finding
    surrender where “[d]uring prosecution . . . , [the appli-
    cant] both amended claim 13 to add the . . . limit and
    relied on the . . . limit . . . to overcome prior art”); see also
    IN RE: KHAN                                              5
    In re Mostafazadeh, 
    643 F.3d 1353
    , 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
    (“[A] limitation that is added during prosecution to over-
    come prior art cannot be entirely eliminated on reis-
    sue . . . .”). We need not address step three, as the Khans
    have not argued that any of reissue claims 21, 29, 38, and
    39 are materially narrowed in other respects.
    On this analysis, we conclude that the reissue claims
    impermissibly recapture subject matter surrendered
    during prosecution of the ’591 patent. Accordingly, we
    affirm the Board’s rejections of reissue claims 21–41
    under § 251.
    II
    On an appeal to the Board, an appellant’s failure “to
    separately argue claims” within a group subject to a
    common ground of rejection “constitute[s] a waiver of any
    argument that the Board must consider the patentability
    of any grouped claim separately.”            37 C.F.R.
    § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
    Dependent claims 22, 24, 30, 40, and 41 are subject to
    a common rejection under § 251 of claims 21–41. Yet in
    their appeal to the Board, the Khans did not separately
    argue these dependent claims. The Khans cannot rely on
    passing references to these dependent claims made in
    their reply brief to the Board, as “[a] statement which
    merely points out what a claim recites will not be consid-
    ered an argument for separate patentability of the claim.”
    37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). In such cases, we have found
    these arguments are waived.
    Accordingly, we find that the Board properly deter-
    mined arguments regarding separate patentability of
    dependent claims 22, 24, 30, 40, and 41 have been waived.
    We have considered the Khans’ other arguments and find
    them without merit.
    6                                           IN RE: KHAN
    CONCLUSION
    Because we decide that reissue claims 21–41 imper-
    missibly recapture subject matter surrendered during
    prosecution of the ’591 patent, we need not reach the
    obviousness rejections. The judgment of the Board is
    affirmed.
    AFFIRMED
    COSTS
    No costs.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 17-2207

Filed Date: 2/15/2018

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021