Nua Gjokaj v. U.S. Steel Corp. , 700 F. App'x 494 ( 2017 )


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  •                 NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
    File Name: 17a0482n.06
    Case No. 16-2658                                 FILED
    Aug 17, 2017
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk
    FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
    NUA GJOKAJ,                                            )
    )
    Plaintiff-Appellant,                            )         ON APPEAL FROM THE
    )         UNITED STATES DISTRICT
    v.                                                     )         COURT FOR THE EASTERN
    )         DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
    UNITED STATES STEEL CORPORATION,                       )
    )                   OPINION
    Defendant-Appellee.                             )
    BEFORE: SUHRHEINRICH, GILMAN, and McKEAGUE, Circuit Judges.
    McKEAGUE, Circuit Judge. Nua Gjokaj crushed the tip of his finger in a steel-rolling
    machine while working at U.S. Steel. After his injury, U.S. Steel sought to provide Gjokaj with
    medical treatment, but he was uncooperative. According to U.S. Steel, Gjokaj showed up late to
    multiple follow-up evaluations and lied to medical personnel about having his finger amputated.
    As a result, U.S. Steel issued three disciplinary notices to Gjokaj—two for failing to follow
    medical directives and one for misrepresenting his medical condition. Each carried a five-day
    suspension. After a series of grievance hearings, U.S. Steel converted Gjokaj’s suspensions into
    a discharge. Gjokaj then sued U.S. Steel a year later, bringing various state and federal claims of
    discrimination, retaliation, and wrongful denials of his statutory rights. The district court granted
    summary judgment to U.S. Steel on all counts. We affirm.
    Case No. 16-2658, Gjokaj v. U.S. Steel Corp.
    I
    Nua Gjokaj worked as an entry-level employee at a U.S. Steel plant in Ecorse, Michigan.
    He helped convert slabs of steel into coiled rolls. Gjokaj was a member of the United Steel
    Workers Union. In November 2011, Gjokaj injured his back while on the job. Dr. Madden, the
    plant medical doctor, diagnosed him with a herniated disc and restricted him to work that
    required limited bending and no lifting of objects over 20 pounds.          She also prescribed
    medication for his pain and recommended surgery. Gjokaj declined both. Throughout 2012,
    Gjokaj continued working; however, because of his restrictions, U.S. Steel assigned him to a
    sedentary job at the company’s training facility. After about nine months, Gjokaj “got tired of []
    just sitting down all day,” so he began performing odd jobs for a supervisor. R. 47-4, Gjokaj
    Dep. at 33–34, PID 1326–27.
    In late 2012, about a year after his back injury, Gjokaj was accepted into an 18-month
    training program to become a maintenance technician mechanic.             He considered this a
    promotion. The program involved classroom and on-the-job training at locations throughout the
    plant. During this time, Gjokaj claims that some of his supervisors made “little remarks” to him
    about his back injury. Id. at 167, PID 1356. For example, Gjokaj explained that when they
    would hand out assignments, he would hear his name followed by, “[w]e can’t have him do
    that.” Id. at 166, PID 1356. He also recalled a time where he picked something up and a
    supervisor asked him, “[o]h, is [that] too heavy for you?” Id. at 168, PID 1356. Gjokaj does not
    remember the names of these supervisors or why the remarks were made.              Despite these
    comments, Gjokaj believes U.S. Steel treated him reasonably after he injured his back. Id. at 33,
    PID 1326.
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    Case No. 16-2658, Gjokaj v. U.S. Steel Corp.
    On July 24, 2013, at about 4:30 P.M., Gjokaj suffered a second workplace injury. As he
    was changing out a roller used to flatten sheets of steel and securing a new one with brackets, the
    roller actuated downwards, crushing the tip of his right middle finger. Gjokaj immediately
    noticed that his finger was bleeding profusely and that it “was hanging just like 90 degrees, just
    flopped over.” Id. at 58–60, PID 1333. Gjokaj informed the on-duty supervisor, Todd Chartier,
    who then called U.S. Steel’s emergency medical personnel. Gjokaj was transported to Henry
    Ford Wyandotte Hospital where he arrived at 5:09 P.M.—approximately forty minutes after his
    injury.
    At the hospital, Gjokaj was triaged and his finger was cleaned, stitched, wrapped, and
    splinted.     His final diagnosis was “Primary:      Acute crush injury to right middle finger,
    Additional:     Acute complete nail avulsion with nail bed injury, acute distal phalangeal
    comminuted fracture.” R. 39-19, Hospital Notes at 4, PID 703. After Gjokaj was released, he
    was transported back to the plant medical department.
    There, Gjokaj met with John Benitez, the on-duty nurse, to complete an injury report.
    Benitez instructed Gjokaj to return to plant medical at 7:00 A.M. the next morning so that Dr.
    Madden could evaluate him. According to Benitez, he scheduled the earliest appointment time
    so that Gjokaj could receive immediate treatment. Gjokaj expressed anger with this instruction
    and indicated that he was not going to return in the morning because the plant was too far away
    and because he would rather see a doctor closer to home. The plant medical department is
    located on-site at the Ecorse plant, where Gjokaj worked daily, and is about an hour away from
    Gjokaj’s home.      Benitez explained to him that, because his finger injury occurred at the
    workplace, U.S. Steel would cover the costs of his medical care only if he saw the plant
    physician.
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    Case No. 16-2658, Gjokaj v. U.S. Steel Corp.
    Gjokaj continued to resist, so Benitez called Laura Lieb, the manager of the plant medical
    department, and she attempted to persuade Gjokaj.        According to Lieb, she explained the
    importance of receiving a follow-up evaluation, reassured him that U.S. Steel would provide him
    with good care, and informed him that a failure to follow this directive could result in
    disciplinary action. Gjokaj says he does not remember this conversation.
    On July 25, Gjokaj did not show up for his 7:00 A.M. appointment. At 7:40 A.M., Dr.
    Madden called Gjokaj, but he did not answer. Dr. Madden’s notes indicate that Gjokaj returned
    her call around 10:00 A.M., at which time he requested authorization to be seen at a medical
    clinic closer to his home. See also R. 39-26, Lieb Notes at 3, PID 736 (writing that Gjokaj
    “called at 10 AM . . . he was at a clinic on Shaner [sic] Road trying to get his own treatment”).
    Although Gjokaj admits that he was not at plant medical at 7:00 A.M., he denies going to a clinic
    that morning. Instead, Gjokaj testified that he “was at home.” R. 47-4, Gjokaj Dep. at 87, PID
    1340.
    Eventually, Gjokaj arrived at plant medical around noon and saw Dr. Madden. Dr.
    Madden took an x-ray of his finger, which revealed that only about half of his fingertip was
    involved in the accident and that his volar skin was still intact—meaning, his finger had not been
    completely severed. She diagnosed him with a “comminuted fracture” and noted that, although
    he had “suffered a partial amputation,” after receiving stitches, his finger had been “repaired.”
    R. 39-22, Dr. Madden Notes at 4, PID 716. She cleared him to return to one-handed or sedentary
    work at the training center.
    Before he went back to work, however, she scheduled him to be seen by Dr. Ottoni, an
    orthopedic hand surgeon, at 1:15 P.M. that afternoon. Before Gjokaj left for his appointment,
    Lieb instructed him to return afterwards for follow-up. Dr. Ottoni diagnosed Gjokaj with a
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    Case No. 16-2658, Gjokaj v. U.S. Steel Corp.
    “partial amputation [and] fracture,” but noted that his “nail bed is still intact,” his “skin was
    closed on each side [of his finger],” and that he had “good volar skin.” R. 39-27, Dr. Ottoni
    Notes at 3, PID 740. Like Dr. Madden, Dr. Ottoni determined that Gjokaj was fit to return to
    work the next day—July 26—with no use of his right upper extremity.
    By 3:00 P.M. on July 25, Gjokaj had not yet returned from his appointment with Dr.
    Ottoni, so Lieb called him to check in. According to Lieb, Gjokaj told her that “he was in Dr.
    Ottoni’s office waiting for transportation to HF Wyandotte Hospital for a procedure” because his
    finger “could not be saved so Dr. Ottoni ha[d] to cut it off.” R. 39-26, Lieb Notes at 3, PID 736.
    After offering her condolences, Lieb told Gjokaj to come to plant medical after the procedure.
    Gjokaj first testified that he did not remember this phone call and later claimed that it “didn’t
    happen” and that he “did not say” those things to Lieb. R. 47-4, Gjokaj Dep. at 103, 149, PID
    1343, 1352. Phone records confirm a call from Lieb to Gjokaj at this day and time.
    Gjokaj ultimately returned to plant medical at 7:40 P.M. on July 25. Benitez, the on-duty
    nurse, and Angela Toland, the medical assistant, were working at the time. Both testified that
    Gjokaj had a brown paper bag over his right hand, secured with duct tape, and that he told them
    that, “[t]hey had to take it off. They could’nt [sic] save the finger.” R. 39-26, Benitez & Toland
    Notes at 4, PID 737. When Benitez asked Gjokaj why his finger had to be amputated, Gjokaj
    replied “[b]ecause it was too infected because of all the grease and dirt, that’s why they had to
    cut it off.” Id. Gjokaj, again, claimed that he did not remember making these statements and
    then denied them outright.
    After Gjokaj informed Benitez and Toland that his finger had to be cut off, Benitez called
    Lieb to inform her of this turn of events. Lieb told Benitez to have Gjokaj return to plant
    medical at 7:00 A.M. the following morning—July 26—so that Dr. Madden could re-evaluate
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    Case No. 16-2658, Gjokaj v. U.S. Steel Corp.
    him following the loss of his finger. Gjokaj was upset with this order, contending that Dr.
    Madden should “come over to see him” and complaining that “[t]here is nothing she can do, the
    finger is gone.” R. 47-2, Benitez Dep. at 105, PID 1299.
    On July 26, Gjokaj once again missed his 7:00 A.M. appointment. He called around 8:00
    A.M. and spoke with Lieb, telling her, “I’m weak. I didn’t eat nothing. I don’t feel safe to
    drive.” R. 47-4, Gjokaj Dep. at 109–10, PID 1344–45. According to Lieb, Gjokaj also stated
    that he had been bleeding heavily during the night. Lieb then transferred Gjokaj to Dr. Madden,
    who asked him to come in because she was concerned about his condition. Gjokaj agreed for a
    cab to pick him up.
    Gjokaj arrived at plant medical around noon on July 26. His hand was still wrapped in a
    brown bag, and he was carrying a box of chocolates. Toland testified that, shortly after his
    arrival, he waived his hand in front of her and said, “just kidding, I got you.” R. 39-7, Toland
    Dep. at 44, PID 622. When Toland asked Gjokaj what he meant, Gjokaj stated, “I have my
    finger. It’s not gone.” Id. at 46, PID 623. According to Lieb’s notes, Gjokaj made a similar
    statement to the x-ray technician.
    Dr. Madden then examined Gjokaj and took another x-ray of his finger. She noted that
    Gjokaj’s “bandaged finger look[ed] good,” there was “minimal blood,” the “x-ray appear[ed] to
    [show] all the bony tissue intact,” and he had a “return to work” slip from Dr. Ottoni. R. 39-22,
    Dr. Madden Notes at 4, PID 716. Dr. Madden again cleared Gjokaj to return to “light duty” in a
    “clean environment,” reiterating that he “was completely capable of doing one handed work, at
    any time post injury.” Id. She also clarified that, contrary to Gjokaj’s statements the night
    before, “there was never an amputation of the bone.” Id.
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    Case No. 16-2658, Gjokaj v. U.S. Steel Corp.
    Lieb and Dr. Madden then asked Gjokaj why he previously told several medical
    personnel that his finger had to be cut off. According to Lieb’s notes, Gjokaj replied, “I was so
    happy that it was not cut off that [I] decided to play a trick on you.” R. 39-26, Lieb Notes at 3,
    PID 736. When asked where he was instead of having this procedure, Gjokaj told Lieb that he
    went out to dinner with a friend. Lieb reported Gjokaj’s behavior to her supervisor, Steve
    Kovalchik. Kovalchik referred Gjokaj’s case to U.S. Steel’s Labor Relations Manager, Jennifer
    Hickey, who then assigned the matter to Michael Simpson, the Labor Relations Representative
    assigned to the region.
    Simpson issued three notices of discipline to Gjokaj, each carrying a five-day suspension
    from work. The first was for Gjokaj’s failure to follow Lieb’s medical directive to arrive at plant
    medical at 7:00 A.M. on July 25, the morning after his finger injury. The second was for falsely
    telling Lieb, Benitez, and Toland that Dr. Ottoni had to cut off his finger. The third was again
    for failing to return to plant medical at 7:00 A.M. on July 26 for another follow-up appointment.
    Once Gjokaj received notice of his suspensions, he filed a grievance with U.S. Steel
    according to the terms of the Basic Labor Agreement (BLA) signed between the company and
    his union.   For suspensions of five calendar days or more, an employee is entitled to a
    preliminary fact-finding hearing—a “9-B Hearing.”        At the conclusion of this hearing, the
    company has the authority to “convert the suspension to a discharge.” See R. 39-9, BLA
    Agreement at 18–19, PID 657–658.
    Gjokaj’s 9-B Hearing took place on August 2, 2013. Gjokaj, Simpson, and four union
    representatives attended. Simpson led the hearing and took handwritten notes, which are the
    subject of an evidentiary dispute between the parties. During the hearing, Simpson explained the
    basis for Gjokaj’s disciplinary suspensions and gave him an opportunity to offer his own story.
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    Case No. 16-2658, Gjokaj v. U.S. Steel Corp.
    According to Simpson’s notes, neither Gjokaj nor his union representatives disputed Gjokaj’s
    failure to arrive on time for his July 25 and July 26 appointments; instead, they argued that five-
    day suspensions for these infractions were “too harsh” since Gjokaj eventually “c[a]me in later”
    both days. R. 39-33, 9-B Minutes at 2–3, PID 754–55. Simpson, however, reiterated the
    importance of following medical directives and noted that Lieb warned Gjokaj about the
    consequences of failing to do so.
    In discussing his suspension for misrepresenting his medical condition, Gjokaj initially
    denied telling Lieb that his finger was cut off. Later in the hearing, however, he no longer
    refuted this statement. See id. at 3, PID 755 (union rep stating that “[Gjokaj] wants to explain
    why he said his finger was cut off,” and Gjokaj explaining that it was “still cut off to me”). The
    union rep attempted to re-characterize Gjokaj’s false statement as a practical joke. Id. (union rep
    claiming that “[h]e likes to joke a lot”).
    On August 8, a week after the 9-B Hearing, Simpson converted Gjokaj’s 5-day
    suspensions into a discharge. The union appealed this discharge through the remaining steps of
    the grievance process, arguing that the penalty was too severe for Gjokaj’s actions. Simpson
    upheld Gjokaj’s termination. The union then sought arbitration, but later withdrew its request,
    and Gjokaj’s termination became final.
    Approximately a year later, Gjokaj filed this lawsuit against U.S. Steel, asserting claims
    under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 
    42 U.S.C. § 12101
     et seq., Michigan’s
    Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act (PDCRA), 
    Mich. Comp. Laws § 37.1101
     et seq.,
    Michigan’s Worker’s with Disabilities Compensation Act (WDCA), 
    Mich. Comp. Laws § 418.300
     et seq., and the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 
    29 U.S.C. § 2601
     et seq. After
    discovery, U.S. Steel filed a motion for summary judgment. Gjokaj responded to this motion
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    Case No. 16-2658, Gjokaj v. U.S. Steel Corp.
    and filed his own cross-motion, seeking a declaration that he was “disabled” within the meaning
    of the ADA and the PDCRA. Additionally, Gjokaj filed a motion to strike several exhibits
    related to the grievance process that were attached to U.S. Steel’s motion. The only exhibit
    relevant to this appeal—Exhibit 32—contained Simpson’s handwritten notes from Gjokaj’s 9-B
    Hearing. The district court denied Gjokaj’s motion to strike Exhibit 32, granted summary
    judgment to U.S. Steel on all substantive claims, and denied Gjokaj’s cross-motion as moot.
    Gjokaj appealed.
    II
    A. Standard of Review
    We review a district court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion, see Flagg v.
    City of Detroit, 
    715 F.3d 165
    , 175 (6th Cir. 2013), but review de novo whether a statement
    qualifies as inadmissible hearsay, Stalbosky v. Belew, 
    205 F.3d 890
    , 894 (6th Cir. 2000).
    Likewise, we review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment. Branham v. Gannett
    Satellite Info. Network, Inc., 
    619 F.3d 563
    , 568 (6th Cir. 2010). Summary judgment is proper
    when “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant
    is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). We construe all evidence and
    draw reasonable inferences against the moving party. Martin v. Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co., 
    561 F.3d 439
    , 443 (6th Cir. 2009). Although the moving party bears the initial burden of production,
    the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to present significant and probative evidence to
    support his claim, including “specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”
    Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 
    477 U.S. 242
    , 248–49 & n.4 (1986). When the evidence is so
    one-sided that a reasonable jury could not find for the nonmoving party, the moving party must
    prevail as a matter of law. 
    Id.
     at 251–52.
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    Case No. 16-2658, Gjokaj v. U.S. Steel Corp.
    B. Evidentiary Issues
    Gjokaj moved to strike on evidentiary grounds Simpson’s 9-B Hearing notes. These
    notes reveal Gjokaj’s admissions of showing up late to plant medical and his concession that he
    “might have said that [his finger was cut off],” and serve as evidence supporting his termination.
    The district court denied Gjokaj’s motion, concluding that the notes themselves were admissible
    under the business-records exception to the hearsay rule, Fed. R. Evid. 803(6), and that the
    relevant statements contained therein were opposing party statements, and thus non-hearsay, Fed.
    R. Evid. 801(d)(2). This ruling was proper.
    Gjokaj first contends that Simpson’s notes are inadmissible under Federal Rule of
    Evidence 408 as statements made during compromise negotiations between Gjokaj and U.S.
    Steel. Rule 408 prohibits the admission, for certain purposes, of offers to compromise along
    with any statement made during the course of such compromise negotiations. See Fed. R. Evid.
    408(a)(1)–(2). However, this Rule applies only to preclude evidence related to the claim “that
    was the subject of the compromise.” See Uforma/Shelby Bus. Forms, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 
    111 F.3d 1284
    , 1293–94 (6th Cir. 1997) (quoting 23 Charles Alan Wright & Kenneth W. Graham, Jr.,
    Federal Practice and Procedure: Evidence § 5314 n.25 (1st ed. 1980)).
    Here, the subject of Gjokaj’s 9-B Hearing had nothing to do with the discrimination,
    retaliation, and interference claims he now asserts. Gjokaj did not lodge those claims against
    U.S. Steel until more than a year later. In fact, Gjokaj had not yet been fired at the time of the 9-
    B Hearing, nor did he dispute any of the behavior that formed the grounds for his discipline. He
    merely requested leniency in punishment.        But he never claimed that his punishment was
    imposed because of the improper behavior of any U.S. Steel employee. Rule 408 is simply
    inapplicable to this fact-finding hearing that occurred well before the formulation of the claims
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    Case No. 16-2658, Gjokaj v. U.S. Steel Corp.
    Gjokaj now asserts. See Josephs v. Pac. Bell, 
    443 F.3d 1050
    , 1064 (9th Cir. 2006) (finding no
    abuse of discretion in admission of statements made during a grievance proceeding because that
    proceeding “did not concern [plaintiff’s] not-yet-filed discrimination claim[s]”).
    Moreover, Gjokaj’s notes are not precluded from consideration on hearsay grounds.
    First, the notes themselves qualify as a business record under Rule 803(6). See United States v.
    Collins, 
    799 F.3d 554
    , 582 (6th Cir. 2015). Gjokaj argues that the notes cannot be properly
    authenticated under this exception because the author, Michael Simpson, is deceased. But it is
    not necessary that the preparer of the business record be the one to authenticate it. Rather, this
    can be done through the testimony of any qualified witness. See 
    id. at 583
    . And to be a qualified
    witness, one simply needs to be “familiar with the record-keeping procedures of the
    organization.” Dyno Constr. Co. v. McWane, Inc., 
    198 F.3d 567
    , 576 (6th Cir. 1999). U.S. Steel
    has indicated that Jennifer Hickey, as Labor Relations Manager and Simpson’s boss, will testify
    that the notes meet the requirements of the business records exception. This satisfied the
    company’s burden on summary judgment. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 
    477 U.S. 317
    , 324
    (1986). Hickey is clearly familiar with the company’s grievance process and easily meets the
    criteria of a qualifying witness. Although Gjokaj alternatively argues that Simpson’s notes
    cannot be authenticated under Rule 901, a business record certified by a qualified witness such as
    Hickey is self-authenticating. See Fed. R. Evid. 902(11).
    Second, the relevant statements contained within Simpson’s notes are opposing-party
    statements and thus themselves non-hearsay. Rule 801(d)(2) excludes from the rule against
    hearsay those statements that are “offered against an opposing party” and that were either made
    “by the party,” made “by a person whom the party authorized to make a statement on the
    subject,” or made “by the party’s agent,” among others. See Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(A), (C)-(D).
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    Case No. 16-2658, Gjokaj v. U.S. Steel Corp.
    Here, the statements in Simpson’s notes are being offered by U.S. Steel against Gjokaj, and were
    either made by Gjokaj—the opposing party—or his union representatives—persons who were
    “authorized to make a statement” on his behalf and who were acting as his “agents.” Thus, the
    district court did not err in considering Simpson’s 9-B Hearing notes in granting summary
    judgment to U.S. Steel.
    C. Americans with Disabilities Act and Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act
    Gjokaj first argues that U.S. Steel used his lack of cooperation following his finger injury
    as a basis for firing him when in actuality it was frustrated with having to accommodate him
    after his 2011 back injury. He brings disability discrimination claims under the Americans with
    Disabilities Act (ADA) and Michigan’s state-law analogue, the Persons with Disabilities Civil
    Rights Act (PDCRA).        The ADA prohibits an employer from “discriminat[ing] against a
    qualified individual on the basis of disability in regard to . . . [the] discharge of employees.” See
    
    42 U.S.C. § 12112
    (a). Claims of disability arising under the PDCRA “essentially track those
    under [the ADA].” See Demyanovich v. Cadon Plating & Coatings, L.L.C., 
    747 F.3d 419
    , 433
    (6th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original). Therefore, we analyze
    the two claims together.
    When a plaintiff seeks to prove disability discrimination through reliance on indirect
    evidence—as Gjokaj does here—the burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
    Green, 
    411 U.S. 792
     (1973), applies. Talley v. Family Dollar Stores of Ohio, Inc., 
    542 F.3d 1099
    , 1105 (6th Cir. 2008). A plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of disability
    discrimination. 
    Id.
     If he does, then the burden shifts to the defendant “to articulate some
    legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions.” 
    Id.
     (internal quotation marks and citation
    omitted). Finally, it is up to the plaintiff to show that the defendant’s proffered explanation is
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    really a pretext for discrimination. 
    Id.
     The parties dispute whether Gjokaj made out a prima
    facie case, but we need not address this issue. For even assuming that he has, we find that
    Gjokaj has not shown a genuine dispute as to whether U.S. Steel’s stated reasons for firing him
    were pretextual. See Ferrari v. Ford Motor Co., 
    826 F.3d 885
    , 895 (6th Cir. 2016).
    U.S. Steel offered a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for firing Gjokaj: He failed to
    follow two medical directives requiring him to return to the plant medical department for doctor
    appointments at 7:00 A.M. on July 25 and 26, and he affirmatively misrepresented the nature of
    his finger injury to Lieb, Benitez, and Toland when he claimed that Dr. Ottoni had to “cut it off.”
    The burden then shifts to Gjokaj to demonstrate that a jury could find that this stated reason was
    really pretext for discriminating against him because of his back injury.
    An employee can prove pretext by showing that the proffered reason (1) “had no basis in
    fact,” (2) “did not actually motivate the employer’s action[s],” or (3) was “insufficient to
    motivate the employer’s actions.” Ferrari, 826 F.3d at 895 (quoting Romans v. Mich. Dep’t of
    Human Servs., 
    668 F.3d 826
    , 839 (6th Cir. 2012)). The employee must set forth enough
    evidence so that a reasonable jury could find “both that the [employer’s] reason was false, and
    that discrimination was the real reason” for termination. Seeger v. Cincinnati Bell Tel. Co., 
    681 F.3d 274
    , 285 (6th Cir. 2012) (internal citation omitted). Thus, to survive summary judgment,
    Gjokaj must show that U.S. Steel did not fire him because of insubordination, and that the real
    reason was because of his back injury.
    Although the grounds for Gjokaj’s pretext argument are unclear from his brief, he cannot
    seriously contend that his firing had no basis in fact because he admitted to much of the behavior
    that formed the basis of U.S. Steel’s stated reason for terminating him. See Chattman v. Toho
    Tenax Am., Inc., 
    686 F.3d 339
    , 349 (6th Cir. 2012).           Moreover, Michael Simpson—the
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    Case No. 16-2658, Gjokaj v. U.S. Steel Corp.
    individual responsible for terminating Gjokaj—“honestly believed” that Gjokaj failed to follow
    medical directives and misrepresented his medical condition. In our circuit, an employer is
    entitled to summary judgment on pretext so long as it honestly believed in the non-
    discriminatory, factual basis for firing an employee, even if that decision later turns out to be
    incorrect.1 Majewski v. Automatic Data Processing, Inc., 
    274 F.3d 1106
    , 1117 (6th Cir. 2001).
    An employer has an honest belief when it makes a reasonably informed decision grounded in
    particularized facts. 
    Id.
    Here, Simpson collected notes and statements from three witnesses prior to issuing
    Gjokaj’s notices of discipline, and each corroborated Gjokaj’s disobedience. First, Lieb, the
    manager of the plant medical department, confirmed that Gjokaj did not arrive at plant medical
    until noon on July 25 and July 26, well after his scheduled appointment times. Additionally,
    Lieb stated that when she called Gjokaj around 3:00 P.M. on July 25, he told her that “he was in
    Dr. Ottoni’s office waiting for transportation to HF Wyandotte Hospital for a procedure” because
    his finger “could not be saved so Dr. Ottoni ha[d] to cut it off.” R. 39-26, Lieb Notes at 3, PID
    736. Similarly, the joint statement of Benitez and Toland aligns with Lieb’s story. When Gjokaj
    returned to plant medical on July 25—several hours after his appointment with Dr. Ottoni and his
    phone call with Lieb—Benitez and Toland were the two medical personnel on duty. According
    to them, Gjokaj returned “with a brown paper bag” over his right hand and informed them that
    “[t]hey had to take [his finger] off.” 
    Id.
     He told them that it could not be saved “[b]ecause it
    was too infected because of all the grease and dirt, that’s why they had to cut it off.” 
    Id.
    1
    Gjokaj challenges the application of the honest belief rule in the aftermath of the Supreme Court’s decision in
    Staub v. Proctor Hospital, 
    562 U.S. 411
     (2011), which established the “cat’s paw” theory of liability. This theory
    holds employers liable for the actions of biased, non-decisionmaking supervisors who influence the ultimate
    decisionmaker. However, our circuit has continued to apply the honest belief rule post-Staub to the actions of the
    decisionmaker. See, e.g., Marshall v. The Rawlings Co., 
    854 F.3d 368
    , 379 (6th Cir. 2017). If a plaintiff also raises
    a cat’s paw theory as to the actions of a biased low-level supervisor (as Gjokaj later does here), our circuit simply
    analyzes the two arguments separately. 
    Id.
     at 379–80. We do the same here.
    - 14 -
    Case No. 16-2658, Gjokaj v. U.S. Steel Corp.
    Furnished with this evidence, Simpson issued notices of discipline to Gjokaj, and
    scheduled the 9-B Hearing, at which time Gjokaj did not deny his misconduct. And throughout
    the remainder of the grievance process, his behavior remained undisputed. Therefore, at the time
    Simpson made the decision to terminate Gjokaj, he did so based on Gjokaj’s own admissions as
    well as the statements of three employees who interacted directly with Gjokaj during the relevant
    time period. This evidence is sufficient to find that, after a reasonable investigation, Simpson
    formed an “honest belief” that Gjokaj’s actions warranted termination.           Although Gjokaj
    attempts to raise a factual dispute by claiming that he never told Lieb, Benitez, or Toland that Dr.
    Ottoni had to “cut his finger off,” his argument is irrelevant to the honest belief analysis, which
    asks only whether the information available to Simpson at the time of Gjokaj’s firing was
    sufficient to support his termination. See Marshall v. The Rawlings Co. LLC, 
    854 F.3d 368
    , 380
    (6th Cir. 2017).
    Finally, Gjokaj has pointed to no evidence supporting either of the other bases for
    proving pretext—that his actions following his finger injury did not actually motivate Simpson’s
    decision or that they were insufficient to warrant his termination. Although Gjokaj claimed that
    he was really discharged because of his back injury, when pressed as to why he thought this,
    Gjokaj merely responded that he “d[id]n’t know” and couldn’t “pinpoint it.” R. 47-4, Gjokaj
    Dep. at 166–67, PID 1356. Additionally, Gjokaj has not identified any other similarly situated
    U.S. Steel employee who engaged in comparable behavior, but was not terminated—the typical
    way an employee shows that an employer’s stated reasons for termination were insufficient. See
    Smith v. Leggett Wire Co., 
    220 F.3d 752
    , 762 (6th Cir. 2000). Instead, U.S. Steel’s policy
    provides that insubordination—which Gjokaj was cited for twice in addition to
    misrepresentation—may be grounds for suspension, and later discharge.
    - 15 -
    Case No. 16-2658, Gjokaj v. U.S. Steel Corp.
    Unable to attribute a discriminatory motive to Simpson, Gjokaj argues in the alternative
    that Lieb harbored bias against him and that she improperly influenced Simpson’s decision to
    fire him. Under this so-called “cat’s paw” theory of liability, if a low-level supervisor is
    motivated by actionable animus and influences a decisionmaker to undertake an adverse
    employment action against an employee, an employer may be liable for wrongful termination.
    See Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 
    562 U.S. 411
    , 422 (2011). In such cases, the bias of the non-
    decisionmaker is imputed to the employer. Here, Gjokaj’s cat’s paw theory is a non-sequitur
    because he has presented no evidence that Lieb harbored any bias against him, let alone bias
    stemming from his back injury.
    Gjokaj claims generally that Lieb “was angered by [his] resistance to her methodology
    for minimizing lost time” and that she had a “genuine dislike of him following his back injury
    and history of declining medical treatment.” Neither of these accusations is supported by the
    record. Gjokaj spends a substantial portion of his brief recounting his theory that U.S. Steel
    manipulates the recording of its employees’ “lost time,” or days away from work, in order to
    avoid OSHA reporting requirements and escape scrutiny for workplace injuries. But he never
    connects this theory to his claims of disability discrimination. In particular, there is no evidence
    that Gjokaj expressed any disagreement with Lieb about her lost time “methodology.” Nor did
    Gjokaj even have any recordable lost time following his finger injury.
    Similarly, Gjokaj presented no evidence that Lieb “disliked” him following his back
    injury. To the contrary, Gjokaj admits that he was treated reasonably. While he proclaims that
    various plant supervisors made “little remarks” to him in regards to his lifting restrictions post-
    back injury, his allegations are vague at best—he cannot remember the date, location, or names
    of any of these supervisors. And importantly, Gjokaj testified that none of these remarks were
    - 16 -
    Case No. 16-2658, Gjokaj v. U.S. Steel Corp.
    made by Lieb. To the contrary, there is no evidence that Lieb had any interaction with Gjokaj or
    these unnamed supervisors at all in the two years between his back and finger injuries.
    At oral argument, Gjokaj’s counsel pointed to several purported facts as a means to infer
    Lieb’s animus. First, counsel contended that Lieb was “frustrated” with Gjokaj after his back
    injury and stated that he was being “difficult” after his finger injury. But these statements
    mischaracterize the record. In her deposition, Lieb explains that Dr. Madden “express[ed]
    frustration” to her about Gjokaj’s refusal to obtain treatment for his back. R. 47-8, Lieb Dep. at
    92, PID 1429. There is no evidence that Lieb herself was frustrated with Gjokaj. Nor, contrary
    to Gjokaj’s assertion, did she ever say that Gjokaj was being “difficult.” Rather, that was how
    Kovalchik explained Gjokaj’s behavior. Lieb simply informed Kovalchik that she was “having
    difficulty getting Nua to agree to come in.” R. 47-7, Lieb Dep. at 102, PID 1409. This was, by
    all accounts, a true statement, and not a basis upon which a reasonable jury could infer that Lieb
    harbored discriminatory animus.
    Second, counsel stated that Lieb made “24 phone calls” on July 24, the evening of
    Gjokaj’s injury, including numerous calls to Kovalchik and VanBuren, both employee relations
    personnel. Since some of these calls occurred before Gjokaj returned from the hospital and
    began exhibiting defiant behavior, a jury could infer, according to Gjokaj, that Lieb contacted
    them prematurely to begin the disciplinary process. But Lieb’s phone records show that she
    placed only four calls collectively to these two individuals. Moreover, discovery did not reveal
    whether Gjokaj was even the subject of these phone calls. Given the absence of any prior
    indication of animus, these four phone calls to Kovalchik and VanBuren, standing alone, are also
    insufficient to attribute animus to Lieb.
    - 17 -
    Case No. 16-2658, Gjokaj v. U.S. Steel Corp.
    Lastly, Gjokaj’s counsel claimed that there was no medical purpose for Gjokaj to return
    to the plant medical department after his July 25 appointment with Dr. Ottoni, so Lieb’s directive
    requiring him to do so must have been rooted in discriminatory animus. But once Gjokaj
    returned, he met with Benitez, who completed a summary of his appointment with Dr. Ottoni and
    scheduled him for a follow-up visit with Dr. Madden. This was regular protocol followed by
    U.S. Steel, and therefore no basis for inferring that Lieb had an improper motive.
    Because Gjokaj has not shown that Simpson’s basis for firing him was false, improperly
    influenced by Lieb, or at all connected to his back injury, his discrimination claims fail.
    D. Workers’ Disability Compensation Act
    Next, Gjokaj argues that U.S. Steel retaliated against him in violation of the WDCA by
    firing him after he asserted various rights under the Act. The WDCA provides that “[a] person
    shall not discharge an employee or in any manner discriminate against an employee . . . because
    of the exercise by the employee . . . of a right afforded by this act.” 
    Mich. Comp. Laws § 418.301
    (13). However, the rights to which Gjokaj claims he is entitled were either provided by
    U.S. Steel or are not protected by the statute.
    First, Gjokaj asserts that he had the right to seek reasonable medical treatment and that
    U.S. Steel prevented him from doing so. The WDCA does require an employer to “furnish, or
    cause to be furnished, to an employee who receives a personal injury arising out of and in the
    course of employment, reasonable medical, surgical, and hospital services and medicines . . .
    when they are needed.” 
    Mich. Comp. Laws § 418.315
    (1); see Cuddington v. United Health
    Servs., Inc., 
    826 N.W.2d 519
    , 523 (Mich. Ct. App. 2012) (per curiam). But U.S. Steel complied
    with this statutory provision. After Gjokaj was injured, his supervisor called EMS and Gjokaj
    was promptly transported to the nearby hospital. The following day, U.S. Steel scheduled
    - 18 -
    Case No. 16-2658, Gjokaj v. U.S. Steel Corp.
    appointments for Gjokaj to be seen by Dr. Madden, the plant medical doctor, and Dr. Ottoni, an
    orthopedic hand surgeon. U.S. Steel then continued to monitor Gjokaj’s condition over the next
    several days.
    What Gjokaj really argues is that he was entitled to see a doctor of his own choosing. But
    that is not a right compensable under the WDCA. To the contrary, in order for Gjokaj’s medical
    care to be reimbursable, he was initially required to see U.S. Steel’s choice of provider. See
    
    Mich. Comp. Laws § 418.315
    (1) (providing that “[a]fter 28 days from the inception of medical
    care . . . the employee may treat with a physician of his or her own choice”). And U.S. Steel did
    not prevent him from seeing his own doctor, in any event. Cf. Cuddington, 826 N.W.2d at 521.
    According to both Lieb and Dr. Madden, Gjokaj called at 10:00 A.M. on July 25—the morning
    after his injury—to inform them that he was at a medical clinic near his home. While Gjokaj
    disputes that he ever went to a clinic, he at least acknowledges that he did not come to plant
    medical until noon that day, and that he was just “at home” all morning. R. 47-4, Gjokaj Dep. at
    87, PID 1340. There is no reason, then, why he otherwise couldn’t have seen a doctor during
    this time, or alternatively, at any other time after leaving the plant medical department on July 25
    and 26. In any event, Gjokaj admits that he eventually saw a non-U.S. Steel doctor regarding his
    finger.
    Second, Gjokaj contends that the WDCA affords him the right to refuse unreasonable
    treatment. Yet, he offers no support for this contention, claiming only that the district court erred
    in construing the WDCA “too narrowly.” Just as with the right to see his own doctor, while
    Gjokaj had the right to refuse treatment generally—which Gjokaj knew since he refused surgery
    following his back injury—this is not a right compensable under the WDCA. Plus, U.S. Steel
    never required him to submit to treatment; rather, it directed him to be evaluated by plant
    - 19 -
    Case No. 16-2658, Gjokaj v. U.S. Steel Corp.
    medical doctors in order for his workplace injury to be compensable by the company. In
    essence, Gjokaj seeks to recast his failure to follow medical directives as merely the exercise of
    his “right” to refuse treatment. We decline to give this argument credence.
    Finally, Gjokaj argues that he should have received a specific loss benefit, i.e.,
    compensation, for the partial amputation of his finger. While 
    Mich. Comp. Laws § 418.361
    (2)
    provides employees with a right to compensation for the loss of digits, Gjokaj was not entitled to
    monetary payment because his finger was never actually “lost.” After Gjokaj’s finger was
    crushed, he described it as “hanging just like 90 degrees, just flopped over.” R. 47-4, Gjokaj
    Dep. at 58–60, PID 1333. But after a trip to the hospital, both sides of his finger were stitched up
    and his “wound was repaired.” R. 39-19, Hospital Notes at 4, PID 703. Within two months,
    Gjokaj’s finger was completely healed. Because Gjokaj never lost his finger, the WDCA does
    not entitle him to a specific loss benefit. Gjokaj’s WDCA claim therefore fails.
    E. Family and Medical Leave Act
    In a reformulation of his WDCA claim, Gjokaj asserts that U.S. Steel interfered with his
    rights under the FMLA by prohibiting him from seeing his own doctor and preventing him from
    calling in sick after he injured his finger. In order to establish an FMLA-interference claim
    under 
    29 U.S.C. § 2615
    (a)(1), a plaintiff must demonstrate that:          (1) he was an eligible
    employee; (2) the defendant was an employer as defined under the FMLA; (3) the employee was
    entitled to leave under the FMLA; (4) the employee gave notice of his intention to take leave;
    and (5) the employer denied the employee FMLA benefits to which he was entitled. Killian v.
    - 20 -
    Case No. 16-2658, Gjokaj v. U.S. Steel Corp.
    Yorozu Auto., Tenn., Inc., 
    454 F.3d 549
    , 556 (6th Cir. 2006). Gjokaj at least cannot establish that
    U.S. Steel denied him either of the rights he asserts entitlement to under the FMLA.2
    As discussed in the context of his WDCA claim, Gjokaj was not prevented from seeing
    his own doctor. Nor did U.S. Steel refuse to allow him to call in sick. When Gjokaj called plant
    medical the morning of July 26, he informed Lieb and Dr. Madden that he felt weak, hadn’t
    eaten, and didn’t feel safe to drive. Additionally, he said he had been bleeding a lot during the
    night. Concerned with Gjokaj’s symptoms, Dr. Madden offered to send a cab to bring him to
    plant medical so that she could evaluate him. Gjokaj testified that he had “no problem” with that
    solution. R. 47-4, Gjokaj Dep. at 109–10, PID 1344–45. Rather than being “required to come to
    the [plant medical department],” Gjokaj willingly agreed to do so in order to receive medical
    treatment.
    III
    For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s grant of summary judgment to U.S. Steel is
    AFFIRMED.
    2
    Although the district court based its rejection of Gjokaj’s FMLA claim on the third and fourth elements, we are
    free to affirm its decision on any grounds supported by the record. See Murphy v. Nat’l City Bank, 
    560 F.3d 530
    ,
    535 (6th Cir. 2009).
    - 21 -
    Case No. 16-2658, Gjokaj v. U.S. Steel Corp.
    RONALD LEE GILMAN, Circuit Judge, concurring. I concur in the conclusion
    reached by the lead opinion and in most of its reasoning. But I respectfully disagree with the
    lead opinion’s conclusion that Gjokaj’s ADA and PDCRA claims fail to survive summary
    judgment because of the application of the “honest-belief rule.” To the contrary, I am of the
    opinion that a genuine dispute of material fact exists regarding whether U.S. Steel’s
    decisionmaker had an honest belief that Gjokaj misrepresented his medical condition.
    I would nevertheless affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment to U.S. Steel
    because Gjokaj has failed to demonstrate a causal connection between his back injury and his
    termination. Similarly, he has not pointed to any evidence in the record to support the “cats-
    paw” theory of liability on which he relies for his argument that the reasons given for his
    termination were intended to mask unlawful discrimination.
    The lead opinion concludes that Simpson, the decisionmaker responsible for Gjokaj’s
    termination, had an honest belief that termination was justified because Gjokaj had (1) failed to
    follow medical directives by twice showing up late to the Plant Medical Department (PMD), and
    (2) made misrepresentations about his medical condition to PMD staff. I agree with the lead
    opinion’s analysis insofar as it relates to Gjokaj’s tardy arrivals to the PMD. Gjokaj does not
    dispute that he arrived late on both occasions.
    But whether Simpson had an honest belief that Gjokaj had misrepresented his medical
    condition is a much closer question. First, the lead opinion concludes that Gjokaj admitted to
    making this representation during the grievance proceedings, but I find the record far from clear
    on this point. Simpson’s handwritten notes from those proceedings relay that Gjokaj said: “I
    didn’t tell [Lieb] the finger tip was cut off. I never said it was cut off.” After a recess, Gjokaj’s
    union representative stated that “Nua wants to explain why he said his finger was cut off.”
    - 22 -
    Case No. 16-2658, Gjokaj v. U.S. Steel Corp.
    Gjokaj then went on to say that “I might have said that [be]cause I thought it was cut off” and
    that “It’s still cut off to me. L[o]sing it was different.” The union representative added both that
    “In [Gjokaj’s] mind, his finger was cut off” and that “he likes to joke a lot.” A reasonable juror
    could conclude that Gjokaj actually denied making the alleged misrepresentation, and that his
    statement that he “might have said that” did not amount to an admission.
    Second, and relatedly, Gjokaj explains on appeal that “amputation” is an ambiguous term
    because it could mean either a surgical amputation, in which the bone is severed, or a partial
    amputation, in which the skin is almost severed but the bone remains intact. He thus argues that
    any statements that he made about his finger being “cut off” were not misrepresentations because
    his finger was actually partially amputated. His statement about how his finger was “still cut off
    to me” could make sense in this context to a reasonable juror.
    The medical evidence could also be viewed by a reasonable juror to support this
    conclusion. Dr. Ottoni’s notes indicate that a “partial amputation” occurred. Likewise, the result
    of Dr. Madden’s x-ray confirmed the partial amputation of the distal portion of the tip of
    Gjokaj’s finger.   Benitez’s deposition testimony indicates that he understood that a partial
    amputation had occurred. Gjokaj argues that the PMD staff should have known both that Dr.
    Ottoni did not perform a surgical amputation and that Gjokaj’s statements about his finger being
    cut off were true insofar as they referred to a partial amputation. In this context, a reasonable
    juror could find that Simpson did not have an honest belief that a misrepresentation had
    occurred.
    I also note that there is no indication that Gjokaj conceded, or even came close to
    conceding, that he “might have said” that his finger was cut off due to an infection resulting from
    grease and dirt specifically. This statement was instead attributed to him by Benitez and Toland.
    - 23 -
    Case No. 16-2658, Gjokaj v. U.S. Steel Corp.
    If Gjokaj had admitted to it, my conclusion might be different. But Gjokaj has offered a
    plausible explanation for anything that he “might have said.”
    Finally, Gjokaj points out that U.S. Steel failed to produce several documents that could
    have shed light on whether the alleged misrepresentations occurred and on how the
    decisionmakers viewed those alleged misrepresentations. Benitez’s medical-summary notes,
    which would have been taken contemporaneously with Gjokaj’s PMD visit, are either missing or
    were not made. In addition, Lieb requested statements from Benitez and Toland, but never
    requested a statement from Dr. Madden, to whom a misrepresentation was also allegedly made.
    Dr. Madden’s notes from Gjokaj’s visit contain a “clarification” that “there was never an
    amputation of the bone,” but the notes do not explain why the “clarification” was entered, nor do
    they refer to any misrepresentation or statement by Gjokaj.
    I acknowledge that Gjokaj admitted in his deposition to telling Dr. Madden that he could
    count only to 9.5. Gjokaj explained, however, that he said so in the context of explaining that he
    had not yet lost his finger, but worried that he might lose it after Dr. Ottoni gave him an
    uncertain prognosis. According to Gjokaj, having his finger cut off—i.e., partially amputated—
    and losing it were different, as he mentioned in his grievance hearing. U.S. Steel has offered
    nothing to contradict this explanation with regard to what Dr. Madden actually heard.
    This court has previously concluded that, in order to invoke the honest-belief rule, an
    employer must conduct a reasonable investigation into the employee’s alleged misconduct. See
    Smith v. Chrysler Corp., 
    155 F.3d 799
    , 808 (6th Cir. 1998).            Although this reasonable
    investigation need not be perfect or involve interviews of every possible witness, see Seeger v.
    Cincinnati Bell Telephone Co., LLC, 
    681 F.3d 274
    , 286 (6th Cir. 2012), Dr. Madden’s testimony
    is especially important in my view because she not only allegedly heard the misrepresentations,
    - 24 -
    Case No. 16-2658, Gjokaj v. U.S. Steel Corp.
    but also performed the x-ray that confirmed the true condition of Gjokaj’s finger. U.S. Steel’s
    failure to obtain a statement from Dr. Madden undercuts its argument that Simpson had an
    honest belief that the misrepresentation occurred, especially given that a genuine dispute of
    material fact exists with regard to whether Gjokaj actually admitted to having made any
    misrepresentations.
    I therefore believe that Gjokaj has established the existence of a genuine dispute of
    material fact with regard to whether Simpson had an honest belief that Gjokaj had
    misrepresented his medical condition. But even if I am mistaken in my analysis, I see no need to
    decide this difficult question. Instead, I believe that this case can be decided on much clearer
    grounds.
    The district court granted summary judgment to U.S. Steel on Gjokaj’s ADA and
    PDCRA claims upon concluding both that (1) the honest-belief rule applied; and (2) Gjokaj had
    failed to show that Lieb, or any other supervisors who influenced Gjokaj’s termination, harbored
    any animus against Gjokaj based on his disability. The lead opinion analyzes the lack of
    evidence of discrimination in the context of discussing Gjokaj’s cats-paw theory. I agree with
    that analysis, and I write to explain my belief that the lack of animus is the crux of this case.
    Gjokaj’s claims of disability discrimination are based on his back injury, which occurred
    almost two years before his finger injury and resulted in the need for an accommodation. I
    believe that Gjokaj has waived any claim based on his finger injury by failing to adequately raise
    the issue in his brief. See Hayward v. Cleveland Clinic Found., 
    759 F.3d 601
    , 618 n.9 (6th Cir.
    2014). And in any event, Gjokaj’s finger injury cannot constitute a disability because it was a
    short-term impairment that was expected to heal, and that in fact did heal completely within two
    - 25 -
    Case No. 16-2658, Gjokaj v. U.S. Steel Corp.
    months. See Cardenas-Meade v. Pfizer, Inc., 510 F. App’x 367, 370 (6th Cir. 2013) (noting that
    short-term restrictions typically do not qualify as a disability).
    To prevail on his disability-discrimination claim, Gjokaj therefore has to demonstrate that
    discriminatory animus based on his back injury was a “but for” cause of his termination. See
    Tennial v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 
    840 F.3d 292
    , 306 (6th Cir. 2016). Yet Gjokaj has produced
    no evidence to establish a causal link between his back injury and his termination. Gjokaj does
    not assert that Simpson himself ever exhibited any signs of discriminatory animus based on
    Gjokaj’s back injury. Although Gjokaj claimed in his deposition that various supervisors made
    disparaging remarks toward him based on his lifting restrictions, he could recall only a few
    specific remarks and was unable to remember the names of the supervisors who made them.
    These vague allegations cannot support an inference of discrimination because Gjokaj failed to
    attribute these remarks to any supervisors who were involved in the decision to terminate him.
    Furthermore, when asked what evidence he had that U.S. Steel harbored animus towards
    him based on his lifetime lifting restriction, Gjokaj insisted that “I just know that’s why it
    happened.” As the district court noted, such speculation is insufficient to raise an inference of
    discrimination. See Wexler v. White’s Fine Furniture, 
    317 F.3d 564
    , 584 (6th Cir. 2003) (en
    banc).
    Gjokaj also conceded that U.S. Steel accommodated his back injury by placing him on
    lifting restrictions. U.S. Steel never asked him to exceed those restrictions and found work for
    Gjokaj to perform within those limitations. And U.S. Steel essentially promoted Gjokaj by
    accepting him into an advanced training program after he had injured his back. Gjokaj was
    successfully participating in the program at the time of his termination. These facts indicate that
    U.S. Steel did not terminate Gjokaj because of his back injury.
    - 26 -
    Case No. 16-2658, Gjokaj v. U.S. Steel Corp.
    I would thus affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment based on Gjokaj’s
    failure to meet the but-for causation requirement. For the same reasons, I agree with the lead
    opinion’s conclusion that Gjokaj’s cats-paw theory fails because, even assuming that Lieb played
    a role in Gjokaj’s termination, Gjokaj failed to produce any evidence that Lieb ever made any
    discriminatory remarks or otherwise exhibited animus relating to his back injury. I therefore
    concur in the judgment rendered by the lead opinion.
    - 27 -
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 16-2658

Citation Numbers: 700 F. App'x 494

Filed Date: 8/17/2017

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 1/13/2023

Authorities (18)

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Jackie Killian v. Yorozu Automotive Tennessee, Inc. , 454 F.3d 549 ( 2006 )

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Michael J. Stalbosky v. William Christopher Belew and Three ... , 205 F.3d 890 ( 2000 )

Boyce A. Smith, A/K/A Woody Smith v. Leggett Wire Company , 220 F.3d 752 ( 2000 )

Talley v. Family Dollar Stores of Ohio, Inc. , 542 F.3d 1099 ( 2008 )

Joshua Liam Josephs, AKA Joshua Liam Joesphs, Joshua Liam ... , 443 F.3d 1050 ( 2006 )

James P. Smith v. Chrysler Corporation , 155 F.3d 799 ( 1998 )

Dyno Construction Company v. McWane Inc. , 198 F.3d 567 ( 1999 )

Ronald C. Majewski v. Automatic Data Processing, Inc. , 274 F.3d 1106 ( 2001 )

Murphy v. National City Bank , 560 F.3d 530 ( 2009 )

Martin v. Cincinnati Gas & Electric Co. , 561 F.3d 439 ( 2009 )

Seeger v. Cincinnati Bell Telephone Co., LLC , 681 F.3d 274 ( 2012 )

uformashelby-business-forms-inc-dba-miami-systems-corporation-shelby , 111 F.3d 1284 ( 1997 )

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green , 93 S. Ct. 1817 ( 1973 )

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 106 S. Ct. 2505 ( 1986 )

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, Administratrix of the Estate of ... , 106 S. Ct. 2548 ( 1986 )

Staub v. Proctor Hospital , 131 S. Ct. 1186 ( 2011 )

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