HOLIDAY CITY HOMEOWNERS CORPORATION VS. SCOTT KERICO (C-000074-18, OCEAN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (CONSOLIDATED) ( 2021 )


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    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
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    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-5542-181
    A-0199-19
    HOLIDAY CITY HOMEOWNERS
    CORPORATION,
    Plaintiff-Respondent,
    v.
    SCOTT KERICO,
    Defendant-Appellant,
    and
    TOWNSHIP OF BERKELEY,
    Defendant-Respondent.
    _____________________________
    HOLIDAY CITY HOMEOWNERS
    CORPORATION,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    SCOTT KERICO and
    1
    These are back-to-back appeals consolidated for the purpose of this opinion.
    TOWNSHIP OF BERKELEY,
    Defendants-Respondents.
    _____________________________
    Argued October 13, 2020 – Decided September 7, 2021
    Before Judges Hoffman, Suter, and Smith.
    On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
    Chancery Division, Ocean County, Docket No.
    C-000074-18.
    Lauren M. Dooley argued the cause for appellant Scott
    Kerico in A-5542-18 and respondent Scott Kerico in A-
    0199-19 (Novins, York & Jacobus, PA, attorneys;
    Lauren M. Dooley, on the briefs).
    Paul Leodori argued the cause for respondent Holiday
    City Homeowners Corporation in A-5542-18 and
    appellant Holiday City Homeowners Corporation in A-
    0199-19 (Paul Leodori, attorney; Amy Huber, on the
    briefs).
    Michael S. Nagurka argued the cause for respondent
    Township of Berkeley (Rothstein, Mandell, Strohm,
    Halm & Cipriani, attorneys, join in the briefs of
    respondent Holiday City Homeowners Corporation in
    A-5542-18).
    Barry S. Goodman argued the cause for amicus curiae
    New Jersey Realtors in A-5542-18 (Greenbaum, Rowe,
    Smith & Davis, LLP, attorneys; Barry S. Goodman, of
    counsel and on the brief; Cameryn J. Hinton, on the
    brief).
    PER CURIAM
    A-5542-18
    2
    In A-5542-18, defendant Scott Kerico appeals the August 1, 2019 order
    awarding a judgment against him for unpaid homeowner assessments and unpaid
    capital contribution maintenance fees following the denial of his motion for
    summary judgment. At the time, he owned two properties in the Holiday City
    development in Berkeley Township.              In A-0199-19, plaintiff Holiday City
    Homeowners Corporation (Holiday City) appeals the portion of the August 1,
    2019 order that denied its request for attorney's fees and costs.
    We affirm the August 1, 2019 order denying Holiday City's request for
    attorney's fees. We otherwise dismiss these appeals as moot.
    I.
    We glean the facts from the parties' summary judgment motions. Holiday
    City is a non-profit age-restricted community organized under N.J.S.A. 15A:1-
    1(a).    Defendant is a real estate broker who was fifty-three years old in
    November 2017, when he purchased two properties in Holiday City at a sheriff's
    sale. He purchased the properties to rehabilitate and resell them to persons who
    are fifty-five or older. Defendant did not intend to reside in either property. At
    oral argument in these appeals, counsel for Holiday City advised us that both
    properties have been sold.
    A-5542-18
    3
    Holiday City is governed by a Board of Directors (Board) pursuant to a
    Declaration of Covenants and Restrictions (Declaration) and other governing
    documents. Article X of the Declaration provides that "[n]o [owner] as defined
    in this [Declaration] shall be less than 55 years of age[,]" although there are
    exceptions. For married couples, only one owner is required to be fifty-five. If
    an owner dies and his or her heirs do not meet the age restriction, the heirs can
    own the property but not occupy it until they reach fifty-five. Section four of
    the Declaration requires unit owners to advise the Board in advance if the
    property is to be sold, providing evidence the buyer will meet the age
    requirements. Property owners are required to pay an annual assessment as fixed
    by the Board. There are sanctions for non-payment and if a dispute is litigated.
    Holiday City advised defendant in December 2017, and again in February
    2018, that there were unpaid assessments for the properties. 2 Because defendant
    was not fifty-five years old and could not own property in Holiday City, it
    offered him a consent agreement that would allow him to sell the properties
    within a reasonable time to persons who met the age requirements.           This
    agreement was a "special accommodation" to defendant to permit him to
    2
    At oral argument, counsel for Holiday City advised these have been paid.
    A-5542-18
    4
    rehabilitate the properties and then sell them. He was required to pay a $5000
    security deposit and all unpaid assessments. The parties were not able to reach
    an agreement on the terms.
    On April 6, 2018, Holiday City filed a two-count complaint in the
    Chancery Division against defendant and the Township of Berkeley (Berkeley).
    Count One requested a declaratory judgment that defendant violated Holiday
    City's governing documents because he was the record owner of two properties
    within the development and was not fifty-five years old. It sought a declaration
    that various statutes, a local ordinance, and federal laws and regulations were
    violated. The complaint alleged Holiday City 3 does not allow any person under
    fifty-five to purchase a home within its community, and that this restriction was
    approved in 1977 by the Department of Community Affairs and by Berkeley
    Township. The age restriction was implemented "as a way to demonstrate [the]
    community's intent to operate as housing for persons fifty-five years of age or
    older in accordance with 
    24 C.F.R. §100.306
    ."
    Count Two sought specific performance requiring defendant to transfer
    the properties to persons aged fifty-five or older "as soon as practicable." If not,
    3
    The complaint alleges that ten other communities have similar restrictions.
    A-5542-18
    5
    Holiday City requested its appointment as attorney-in-fact to transfer title.
    Holiday City requested an award of attorney's fees and costs.
    Defendant filed an answer and counterclaim seeking a declaration that his
    ownership was not in violation of the law, and that plaintiff was not entitled to
    attorney's fees. Defendant alleged in his counterclaim that he purchased, fully
    renovated and listed both properties for sale. He claimed he "never intend[ed]
    on occupying the [p]roperties."         Holiday City filed an answer to the
    counterclaim. Berkeley filed an answer to the complaint.
    Holiday City and defendant both filed motions for summary judgment.
    Following oral argument on March 29, 2019, the trial court granted summary
    judgment to Holiday City, concluding that "the governing documents require
    ownership to be over [fifty-five], that there's nothing in the Rules that . . .
    requires that the plaintiff open ownership up to those people that are under [fifty-
    five] . . . ." The order provided defendant did not have standing because he
    owed maintenance fees and a capital contribution fee. It found defendant's
    ownership was in violation of the Declaration, the Retirement Community Full
    Disclosure Act, N.J.S.A. 45:22A-2, the Municipal Land Use Law, N.J.S.A.
    40:55D-1 to -163, Berkeley Township Ordinance § 35-101.1, 
    42 U.S.C. § 3601
    ,
    and 
    4 C.F.R. § 100.306
     because he purchased the property when he was not yet
    A-5542-18
    6
    fifty-five. The order required defendant to transfer title of the property to
    someone fifty-five or older as soon as practicable. In a separate order on the
    same date, the trial court denied defendant's motion for summary judgment.
    Shortly after, Holiday City filed a motion seeking attorney's fees and
    costs, and a judgment for unpaid maintenance assessments and capital
    contribution fees. The motion, which defendant opposed, was supported by a
    certification from Holiday City's counsel requesting $20,587.37 in attorney's
    fees and costs for the litigation.
    On August 1, 2019, the trial court entered a judgment against defendant
    for $700.34 in assessments and $500 in administrative fees relative to the two
    properties. However, it denied Holiday City's application for more than $20,000
    in attorney's fees, finding Holiday City "never accepted or understood the
    defendant to be a shareholder." The court found defendant's arguments were not
    frivolous because certain regulations "created a substantial issue that has been
    undecided by the courts up until this point." Holiday City also did not serve the
    notice required by Rule 1:4-8 for frivolous claims.
    Defendant appealed the August 1, 2019 order under A-5542-18. Holiday
    City appealed the portion of the August 1, 2019 order that denied its request for
    attorney's fees and costs under A-0199-19.
    A-5542-18
    7
    In A-5542-18, defendant raises these issues:
    POINT I
    KERICO IS NOT IN VIOLATION OF THE
    RETIREMENT COMMUNITY FULL DISCLOSURE
    ACT, N.J.S.A. 45:22A-l [to -56] ("RCFDA")
    RELATIVE    TO   HIS   ACQUISITION   AND
    OWNERSHIP OF THE PROPERTIES.
    POINT II
    KERICO IS NOT IN VIOLATION OF BERKELEY
    TOWNSHIP ORDINANCE 35-101 OR MUNICIPAL
    LAND USE LAW, N.J.S.A. 40:55D-l [to -163]
    RELATIVE   TO   HIS   ACQUISITION   AND
    OWNERSHIP OF THE PROPERTIES.
    POINT III
    KERICO IS NOT IN VIOLATION OF THE FAIR
    HOUSING ACT OR THE HOUSING FOR OLDER
    PERSONS ACT RELATIVE TO HIS ACQUISITION
    AND OWNERSHIP OF THE PROPERTIES.
    POINT IV
    A RESTRICTION ON KERICO'S ACQUISITION
    AND OWNERSHIP OF THE PROPERTIES IS A
    VIOLATION   OF  THE   LAW    AGAINST
    DISCRIMINATION.
    In A-0199-19, Holiday City raises these issues:
    I. KERICO LACKS STANDING TO EITHER
    AMEND OR CHALLENGE HOLIDAY CITY'S
    GOVERNING DOCUMENTS SINCE HE WAS NOT
    A BONAFIDE PURCHASER, NOT AN OWNER
    PURSUANT TO HOLIDAY CITY'S GOVERNING
    A-5542-18
    8
    DOCUMENTS, AND SIMPLY REFUSED TO PAY
    THE ASSESSMENTS AND FEES DUE TO
    HOLIDAY CITY RELATIVE TO THE PROPERTY
    WHICH RENDERED KERICO'S DEFENSE TO BE
    FRIVOLOUS ENTITLING HOLIDAY CITY AN
    AWARD OF ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS
    PURSUANT TO N.J.S.A. 2A:15-59.1 AND THE
    GOVERNING DOCUMENTS.
    II. KERICO'S PURCHASE OF THE PROPERTY
    VIOLATED HOLIDAY CITY'S GOVERNING
    DOCUMENTS, THE RETIREMENT COMMUNITY
    FULL DISCLOSURE ACT, N.J.S.A. 45:22A-1 [to -
    56], MUNICIPAL LAND USE LAW, N.J.S.A. 40:55D-
    1 [to -163], BERKELEY TOWNSHIP ORDINANCE
    35-101.1,    FEDERAL   REGULATIONS       AND
    FEDERAL LAW WHICH RENDERED KERICO'S
    DEFENSE TO BE FRIVOLOUS ENTITLING
    HOLIDAY CITY TO AN AWARD OF ATTORNEYS'
    FEES AND COSTS PURSUANT TO N.J.S.A. 2A:15-
    59.1 AND THE GOVERNING DOCUMENTS.
    III.  KERICO FORCED HOLIDAY CITY TO
    INITIATE THIS LITIGATION BY VIOLATING THE
    RETIREMENT COMMUNITY FULL DISCLOSURE
    ACT, N.J.S.A. 45:22A-1 [to -56], BERKELEY
    TOWNSHIP ORDINANCE 35-101.1, MUNICIPAL
    LAND USE LAW, N.J.S.A. 40:55D-1 [to -163], THE
    HOUSING FOR OLDER PERSONS ACT, 42 U.S.C.
    3601 ET SEQ. AND HOLIDAY CITY'S GOVERNING
    DOCUMENTS WHICH RENDERED KERICO'S
    DEFENSE TO BE FRIVOLOUS ENTITLEING [SIC]
    HOLIDAY CITY TO AN AWARD OF ATTORNEYS'
    FEES AND COSTS PURSUANT TO N.J.S.A. 2A:15-
    59.1 AND THE GOVERNING DOCUMENTS.
    IV. KERICO'S DEFENSE HAS NO REASONABLE
    BASIS IN THE RECORD, IN LAW OR IN EQUITY
    A-5542-18
    9
    AND HOLIDAY CITY IS ENTITLED TO RECOVER
    ALL ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS UNDER THE
    FRIVOLOUS CLAIM ACT, N.J.S.A. 2A:15-59.1.
    II.
    We first address the issues in A-5542-18. We review a court's grant of
    summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard as the trial court.
    Conley v. Guerrero, 
    228 N.J. 339
    , 346 (2017). Summary judgment must be
    granted if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions
    on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue
    as to any material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to a
    judgment or order as a matter of law." Templo Fuente De Vida Corp. v. Nat'l
    Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 
    224 N.J. 189
    , 199 (2016) (quoting R. 4:46-
    2(c)).
    In A-5542-18, defendant argues the trial court erred by granting summary
    judgment to plaintiff because none of the statutes or other authorities cited
    require ownership in an age-restricted community to be limited to persons who
    are fifty-five or older. Defendant argues that Holiday City's restriction on
    ownership violates the prohibition against familial status discrimination under
    the Law Against Discrimination (LAD), N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -49, and the federal
    Fair Housing Act (FHA), 
    42 U.S.C. §§ 3601
     to 3619. However, Holiday City
    A-5542-18
    10
    contends defendant does not have standing to challenge the Declaration
    requiring owners to be fifty-five or older because he failed to appeal the trial
    court's order of March 29, 2019. Holiday City also argues defendant had nothing
    to lose in this litigation. It notes defendant did not appeal the August 1, 2019
    order that he owed maintenance assessments and capital contributions and thus,
    lacked standing on that basis.
    Standing is "a threshold justiciability requirement . . . [which] must be
    determined before a court may proceed to consider the substantive merits of the
    case." Watkins v. Resorts Int'l Hotel & Casino, 
    124 N.J. 398
    , 424 (1991).
    Standing is to be measured by an adverse litigant's "stake in the outcome of the
    case." See Jersey Shore Med. Ctr.-Fitkin Hosp. v. Est. of Baum, 
    84 N.J. 137
    ,
    144 (1980).
    The March 29, 2019 order was interlocutory because it did not decide the
    amount of the outstanding assessments nor attorney's fees. Defendant appealed
    the August 1, 2019 order and referred therein to the March 29, 2019 order. The
    March 29, 2019 order included several paragraphs that found defendant did not
    have standing to challenge the age fifty-five requirement.
    We disagree with those portions of the orders that determined defendant
    did not have standing. Defendant had a sufficient stake in the outcome of this
    A-5542-18
    11
    case, since Holiday City's claims for relief were adverse to his purchase and
    ownership rights of the properties. In fact, the March 29, 2019 order required
    defendant to transfer the ownership of these properties to persons who are fifty -
    five years of age or older without apparent compensation. Plainly, litigation
    requiring defendant to transfer property gave defendant a direct outcome in this
    case.    Holiday City's argument about waiver is lacking sufficient merit to
    warrant discussion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
    Holiday City, a common interest housing subdivision, is managed by its
    homeowners' association through privately created governing documents. See
    Cape May Harbor Vill. & Yacht Club Ass'n, Inc. v. Sbraga, 
    421 N.J. Super. 56
    ,
    70 (App. Div. 2011) (providing that "[h]omeowners' associations in common
    interest developments (as opposed to condominiums) do not arise out of a
    statute" (quoting Highland Lakes Country Club & Cmty. Ass'n v. Franzino, 
    186 N.J. 99
    , 110 (2006))). The covenants that form these associations "include
    restrictions and conditions that run with the land and bind all current and future
    property owners." 
    Ibid.
    Article X of Holiday City's Declarations includes a restrictive covenant
    that prohibits anyone who is younger than fifty-five from purchasing one of the
    properties in the development.      In this litigation, Holiday City seeks an
    A-5542-18
    12
    affirmative declaration that the governing documents that prevent sale to
    someone under fifty-five are in conformity with various statutes and a local
    ordinance. Defendant filed a counterclaim seeking the reverse declaration.
    "It is firmly established that the policy of the law is against the imposition
    of restrictions upon the use and enjoyment of land and such restrictions are to
    be strictly construed." Hammett v. Rosensohn, 
    46 N.J. Super. 527
    , 535 (App.
    Div. 1957). The issues raised here implicate a number of statutes, regulations
    and an ordinance.
    The federal Fair Housing Act prohibits discrimination in housing based
    on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or familial status. 
    42 U.S.C. § 3604
    (a); see Phillips v. Hunter Trails Cmty. Ass'n, 
    685 F.2d 184
    , 189-90 (7th
    Cir. 1982) (finding a violation of the FHA where an association used a right of
    first refusal to discriminate on the basis of race); Wolinsky v. Kadison, 
    114 Ill. App. 3d 527
    , 535 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983) (holding that a right of first refusal violates
    the FHA when used against a prospective purchaser because of his or her race,
    religion, sex, sexual preference, marital status or national origin). Age is not
    one of the enumerated criteria. "Familial status" is defined as "one or more
    individuals (who have not attained the age of [eighteen] years) being domiciled
    A-5542-18
    13
    with . . . a parent or another person having legal custody of such individual or
    individuals . . . ." 
    42 U.S.C. § 3602
    (k)(1).
    In 1995, Congress passed amendments to the FHA that broadened
    opportunities for adult communities through the Housing for Older Persons A ct
    (HOPA), 
    42 U.S.C. § 3607
    . Recognizing "the particular needs of older people
    to live among their peers in age-restricted communities," H.R. Rep. No. 104-9,
    at 3 (1995), Congress specifically exempted housing communities that qualify
    as "housing for older persons" from the provisions of the FHA regarding familial
    status.   
    42 U.S.C. § 3607
    .     The private club exemption contained in 
    42 U.S.C. § 3607
    (b) provides in relevant part:
    (1) Nothing in this title limits the applicability of
    any reasonable local, State, or Federal
    restrictions regarding the maximum number of
    occupants permitted to occupy a dwelling. Nor
    does any provision in this title regarding familial
    status apply with respect to housing for older
    persons.
    (2) As used in this section, “housing for older
    persons” means housing—
    ....
    (C) intended and operated for occupancy
    by persons 55 years of age or older, and—
    A-5542-18
    14
    (i) at least 80 percent of the occupied
    units are occupied by at least one
    person who is 55 years of age or
    older;
    ....
    [
    42 U.S.C. § 3607
    (b).]
    Communities claiming the exemption must establish age verification
    procedures. 
    24 C.F.R. § 100.307
    . Holiday City argues that its restriction on
    who can buy property in the community is one of the means of showing that this
    is an age restricted community.
    Berkeley Township has an ordinance addressing planned residential
    retirement communities, defining them as a community where
    the land shall be restricted by bylaws, rules, regulations
    and restrictions of record, and services for the benefit
    of permanent residents of communities which require
    that residents comply with the provisions, stipulations
    and restrictions regarding senior communities allowing
    occupancy of units by persons [fifty-five] years of age
    or older, as contained in the Federal Fair Housing Act,
    as amended in 1988.
    [Township of Berkeley, N.J. Ordinance, ch. 35, art. XI,
    § 101.1. (emphasis added).]
    In these appeals, Berkeley supports Holiday City's argument that only persons
    fifty-five or older can own or occupy a unit within Holiday City.
    Under LAD, it is considered a discriminatory practice:
    A-5542-18
    15
    [f]or the owner, lessee, sublessee, assignee or managing
    agent of, or other person having the right of ownership
    or possession of or the right to sell, rent, lease, assign,
    or sublease any real property or part or portion thereof,
    or any agent or employee of any of these:
    (1) To refuse to sell, rent, lease, assign, or
    sublease or otherwise to deny to or withhold from
    any person or group of persons any real property
    or part or portion thereof because of race, creed,
    color, national origin, ancestry, marital status,
    civil union status, domestic partnership status,
    pregnancy or breastfeeding, sex, gender identity
    or expression, affectional or sexual orientation,
    familial status, disability, liability for service in
    the Armed Forces of the United States,
    nationality, or source of lawful income used for
    rental or mortgage payments;
    [N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(g)(1) (emphasis added).]
    The Division on Civil Rights (DCR) recently promulgated a regulation
    addressing familial status discrimination. Under that regulation:
    (a) The provisions regarding familial status in the Law
    Against Discrimination do not apply to housing that
    satisfies the requirements of N.J.A.C. 13:15-1.3, 1.4, or
    1.5 [age-restricted communities]. Nothing in the
    requirements of N.J.A.C. 13:15-1.3, 1.4 or 1.5 shall be
    construed to restrict the age of any purchaser or grantee
    of housing who does not reside in, or intend to reside
    in, such housing.
    [N.J.A.C. 13:15-1.2(a).]
    In explaining the amendment of these regulations, the DCR wrote:
    A-5542-18
    16
    DCR agrees that the LAD's definitions of housing for
    older persons address only the ages of the occupants of
    any housing, and do not address the ages of the non-
    occupant owners of such housing. Accordingly, as
    adopted, DCR has added clarifying language to
    N.J.A.C. 13:15-1.2(a) to prevent any inaccurate
    interpretation of the LAD or the rule.
    [51 N.J.R. 216(a) (2019).]
    The regulation was adopted after defendant purchased the property and after this
    complaint was filed.
    "An issue is considered 'moot when our decision . . . can have no practical
    effect on the existing controversy.'" Wisniewski v. Murphy, 
    454 N.J. Super. 508
    , 518 (App. Div. 2018) (citations omitted). Mootness may occur because the
    controversy lacked "concreteness from the outset" or it may result "by reason of
    developments subsequent to the filing of suit . . . ." 
    Ibid.
     (quoting State v.
    Davila, 
    443 N.J. Super. 577
    , 584 (App. Div. 2016)). We do not "resolve issues
    that have become moot due to the passage of time or intervening events." 
    Ibid.
    There are limited instances when we might choose to resolve an issue that
    is moot. We may elect to do so "where the underlying issue is one of substantial
    importance, likely to reoccur but capable of evading review." 
    Ibid.
     (quoting
    Zirger v. Gen. Accident Ins. Co., 
    144 N.J. 327
    , 330 (1996)). We may also do so
    where there is "an important matter of public interest." 
    Ibid.
     (citing Reilly v.
    A-5542-18
    17
    AAA Mid-Atl. Ins. Co. of N.J., 
    194 N.J. 474
    , 484 (2008)). In such cases, "there
    must be an 'issue of great public importance compelling definitive resolution
    despite mootness[.]'" 
    Ibid.
     (alteration in original) (quoting Oxfeld v. N.J. State
    Bd. of Educ., 
    68 N.J. 301
    , 303 (1975)).
    The parties seek a ruling about whether defendant can own property within
    Holiday City in light of its governing documents, but the issue is moot.
    Defendant no longer owns either of the properties in Holiday City. He now is
    fifty-five years of age or older, and the restriction on his ownership of property
    in this development cannot reoccur. Although the parties might argue the issues
    raised here are of public importance, we decline the opportunity to decide them
    because we do not know what the parties will do considering the DCR's
    regulation. None of the parties has addressed familial status discrimination; it
    is that which is listed in the FHA and other statutes, not "age." None of the
    parties addressed the constitutional issues involving the inability to alienate
    property. We are mindful other communities may be affected. Considering
    these concerns, we decline to address the ownership issue, which is moot
    between the present parties.
    That said, we affirm the trial court's order denying attorney's fees and
    costs to Holiday City. The assessment of attorney's fees is an issue left to the
    A-5542-18
    18
    sound discretion of the trial court. Tannen v. Tannen, 
    416 N.J. Super. 248
    , 285
    (App. Div. 2010). It is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Packard-
    Bamberger & Co. v. Collier, 
    167 N.J. 427
    , 443-44 (2001). An award of fees,
    generally, is not disturbed unless the award was "so wide of the mark as to
    constitute a mistaken exercise of discretion." Chestone v. Chestone, 
    322 N.J. Super. 250
    , 258 (App. Div. 1999). "[A]buse of discretion is demonstrated if the
    discretionary act was not premised upon consideration of all relevant factors,
    was based upon consideration of irrelevant or inappropriate factors, or amounts
    to a clear error in judgment." Masone v. Levine, 
    382 N.J. Super. 181
    , 193 (App.
    Div. 2005) (citing Flagg v. Essex Cnty. Prosecutor, 
    171 N.J. 561
    , 571 (2002)).
    In this case, the trial court declined to award attorney's fees to Holiday
    City. The issues raised in this litigation were not frivolous. Although moot in
    this context, it does not appear the issues have been resolved previously.
    Holiday City failed to send the required notice to defendant that it would
    consider his defenses to be frivolous. Holiday City never argued that $20,000
    in fees was reasonable to collect for $1200 in past due assessments. Thus, we
    find no abuse of discretion by the trial court in its order denying attorney's fees.
    The August 1, 2019 order denying attorney's fees is affirmed. The appeals
    otherwise are dismissed as moot.
    A-5542-18
    19