Jared Rapp v. Robert Dutcher , 557 F. App'x 444 ( 2014 )

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
File Name: 14a0137n.06
No. 13-1286
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
)
JARED RAPP; MOTI GOLDRING, ) FILED
) Feb 18, 2014
Plaintiffs-Appellants, ) DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk
)
v. )
)
ON APPEAL FROM THE
ROBERT DUTCHER; ANNETTE IRWIN; CITY )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT
OF EAST LANSING, a Michigan municipal )
COURT FOR THE WESTERN
corporation; THOMAS YEADON; DOUGLAS )
DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
STOVER; EAST LANSING CITY CENTER )
CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, a Michigan non- )
profit corporation, )
)
)
Defendants-Appellees. )
)
BEFORE: COLE and GRIFFIN, Circuit Judges; and PEARSON, District Judge.*
GRIFFIN, Circuit Judge.
Plaintiffs Jared Rapp and Moti Goldring jointly own a condominium in the City of East
Lansing, Michigan, and rented it out without a landlord license in violation of certain municipal
ordinances. As a result, the City issued plaintiffs 173 citations. The state court held plaintiffs
responsible for all citations and ordered them to pay $45,480 in fines. While the state court
proceedings were ongoing, plaintiffs filed the instant federal case against defendants alleging a
*
The Honorable Benita Y. Pearson, United States District Judge for the Northern District
of Ohio, sitting by designation.
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variety of constitutional and state law claims relating to the ordinance enforcement. The district
court granted defendants’ motions to dismiss; we affirm.
I.
In the summer of 2008, plaintiffs Jared Rapp and his second cousin Moti Goldring each
owned a one-half interest of a residential condominium unit in East Lansing, Michigan.
Plaintiffs—both lawyers—traveled considerably for their work. If a property owner in the City
wants to rent their property to more than one person, the owner must obtain a rental license. See
East Lansing, MI, Code of Ordinances, pt. II, ch. 6, art III, §§ 1010.1-1010.2. Plaintiffs do not
hold, nor have ever held, a rental license for their condo.
In September of 2008, defendant Douglas Stover, president of defendant East Lansing
City Center Condominium Association (“ELCCCA”), told the City that he believed that
plaintiffs were illegally renting their condo without a license. The City subsequently began an
investigation.
On November 1, 2009, City police were called to plaintiffs’ condo for a noise complaint.
Police officers encountered two residents at the condo other than plaintiffs, and issued them
citations for noise violations and for being minors in possession of alcohol. Sometime between
then and January 2010, the citations were forwarded to the City’s code enforcement division. As
a result, in January 2010, defendant Robert Dutcher, a code enforcement officer for the City,
visited the condo to speak with the owners and further investigate Stover’s earlier allegations.
Dutcher spoke with three individuals at the condo, none of which were plaintiffs.
Based on Dutcher’s observations during his visit, on March 15, 2010, the City issued one
citation to each plaintiff for violating the rental license ordinances on November 1, 2009.
Plaintiffs promptly hired an attorney and met with defendant Annette Irwin, another code
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enforcement officer for the City, and defendant Thomas Yeadon, the prosecuting attorney, to
discuss the citations. The parties could not resolve their dispute over the applicability of the
rental license ordinances to plaintiffs’ circumstances. After the meeting, on March 29, 2010, the
City served each plaintiff with an additional 85 citations, one for each day they were in violation
of the rental ordinance (from November 2, 2009, through January 25, 2010).1
Plaintiffs challenged the citations in a Michigan district court. After a three-day hearing
where the court considered witness testimony, oral argument, and briefing, the court issued a
written order and opinion ruling that plaintiffs had violated the City’s rental license ordinances.
The district court ordered plaintiffs to pay $300 per citation, in addition to certain costs
established by state law, for a total of $53,300. Plaintiffs appealed as of right to a Michigan
circuit court.
During the pendency of that appeal, plaintiffs filed—but did not serve—a 179-count
complaint against defendants in federal court. Counts 1 through 173—one count for each of the
disputed citations issued, each count labeled “Abuse of Process – 42 USC § 1983”—alleged that
the City, Dutcher, Irwin, and Yeadon had numerous “ulterior purposes” in issuing the citations to
plaintiffs that were unrelated to ordinance enforcement. Count 174 alleged a state-law nuisance
claim against Stover and the ELCCCA. Count 175 alleged a civil conspiracy claim against all
defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Count 176 alleged an equal protection claim under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 against the City, Dutcher, Irwin, and Yeadon. Count 177 alleged an “Excessive
Fines – 42 USC § 1983” claim against the City, Dutcher, Irwin, and Yeadon. Count 178 alleged
1
The ordinance provides for a separate violation for every day a violation of the
ordinance occurs. See East Lansing, MI, Code of Ordinances, pt. II, ch. 6, art III,§ 1010.10.
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a state-law civil rights claim against Stover and the ELCCCA. And Count 179 alleged an
“Exemplary Damages” claim against all defendants.
While plaintiffs’ federal complaint remained filed but not yet served, the state circuit
court issued a written opinion affirming the state district court’s finding that plaintiffs violated
the rental license ordinances. However, the circuit court agreed with plaintiffs’ argument that the
amount of fines levied against them violated the excessive fines clause of the Eighth Amendment
and therefore remanded the case for a redetermination of fines. One week after the state circuit
court issued its opinion, plaintiffs served their federal complaint on all defendants. Plaintiffs
then filed an application for leave to appeal the state circuit court’s opinion with the Michigan
Court of Appeals, which was denied. Plaintiffs subsequently filed an application for leave to
appeal with the Michigan Supreme Court, which was also denied. City of E. Lansing v. Rapp,
830 N.W.2d 395 (Mich. 2013). Plaintiffs then filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the
United States Supreme Court, which was denied. Rapp v. City of E. Lansing, Mich., 134 S. Ct.
522 (2013).
On remand from the state circuit court, the state district court issued a new order,
imposing only the minimum fines allowed under the rental ordinance—$250 per citation—and
state-ordered costs, for a total of $45,480. Plaintiffs appealed; the state circuit court affirmed.
Plaintiffs then filed an application for leave to appeal the state circuit court’s opinion with the
Michigan Court of Appeals, which was denied. City of E. Lansing v. Jared Rapp, No. 315433
(Mich. Ct. App. Dec. 6, 2013) (order).
After the state circuit court affirmed the $45,480 fine entered on remand, defendants
moved for dismissal of plaintiffs’ federal complaint under Rule 12(b)(1) and (6), or for summary
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judgment under Rule 56. The district court granted defendants’ Rule 12(b) motions, and
plaintiffs timely appealed.
II.
“We review a district court’s dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(1) de novo.” Taylor v. KeyCorp, 680 F.3d 609, 612 (6th Cir. 2012). “When the defendant
challenges the existence of subject-matter jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears the burden of
establishing that jurisdiction exists.” Lewis v. Whirlpool Corp., 630 F.3d 484, 487 (6th Cir.
2011).
We review de novo a district court’s order dismissing a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).
Glazer v. Chase Home Fin. LLC, 704 F.3d 453, 457 (6th Cir. 2013). In doing so, we accept all
well-pled factual allegations as true and determine whether they plausibly state a claim for relief.
Roberts v. Hamer, 655 F.3d 578, 581 (6th Cir. 2011). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a
cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice[,]” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)), and
we “need not accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation, or an unwarranted
factual inference[.]” Handy–Clay v. City of Memphis, Tenn., 695 F.3d 531, 539 (6th Cir. 2012)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
III.
Plaintiffs challenge the district court’s dismissal of the abuse of process claim, the
excessive fines claim, the equal protection claim, and the civil conspiracy claim.2 We address
each in turn, starting with the abuse of process claim.
2
Plaintiffs abandoned all state law claims at oral argument.
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A.
The district court offered three reasons why it dismissed the abuse of process claim.
First, the Rooker–Feldman doctrine barred the court from exercising subject-matter jurisdiction
over the claim because it arises from injury caused by the state court judgment ordering plaintiffs
to pay $45,480 in fines. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284
(2005) (the Rooker–Feldman doctrine precludes lower federal courts from entertaining suits
“brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered
before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection
of those judgments”). Second, even if the court had jurisdiction, plaintiffs failed to state an
actionable claim because we have never recognized the existence of a federal “abuse of process”
claim. See Voyticky v. Vill. of Timberlake, Ohio, 412 F.3d 669, 676 (6th Cir. 2005) (“This court
has never specifically determined whether a claim for abuse of process is a cognizable
constitutional claim that can be redressed pursuant to § 1983.”); see also Garcia v. Thorne, 520
F. App’x 304, 311 (6th Cir. 2013) (observing that the existence of a federal abuse of process
claim in our circuit remains an open question). And third, even if such a claim exists, it is
nevertheless barred by the Heck doctrine because the basis of the claim necessarily impugns the
validity of the state court’s judgment finding plaintiffs responsible for the citations. See Hensley
v. Gassman, 693 F.3d 681, 693 (6th Cir. 2012) (the Heck doctrine, arising from Heck v.
Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), holds that “a plaintiff may not sue under § 1983 when the basis
for the claim necessarily implies the invalidity of a previous state criminal conviction”).
We need only address the district court’s second reason as it provides the most
appropriate basis to affirm the dismissal of plaintiffs’ abuse of process claim. Assuming
arguendo that the Rooker–Feldman doctrine does not apply because plaintiffs’ abuse of process
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claim purportedly challenges how they were cited for violating the rental license ordinances and
not their liability for the violations, the district court properly dismissed the claim because a
federal abuse of process claim does not exist in the law of this circuit. See Garcia, 520 F. App’x
at 311; Voyticky, 412 F.3d at 676.
Plaintiffs acknowledge this categorical bar but fail to articulate why we should recognize
an abuse of process claim under § 1983. Indeed, other than offering vague and undeveloped
references to the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, plaintiffs do not connect the alleged
“abuse of process” to a violation of any “rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and [federal] laws[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. And at oral argument, plaintiffs candidly
admitted that an abuse of process claim is available in state court. In sum, plaintiffs offer no
good reason to federalize the abuse of process claim presented in this case.
Comparatively, the district court offered a persuasive reason why we should not:
The facts of this case demonstrate good reason not to [recognize the existence of a
§ 1983 abuse of process claim]. In essence, [plaintiffs’ abuse of process] theory
could potentially open the federal courts to every person who litigates and loses a
ticket in state court, as long as the person can allege some motive beyond simple
enforcement of the law. There is no reason to do so. In cases of genuine First
Amendment retaliation or racial discrimination, the law already provides redress
apart from a genuine abuse of process theory. There is no good reason to open
the federal court to generic arbitrary and capricious review of state enforcement of
civil infractions.
We agree with the district court’s rationale. Therefore, because we have not recognized the
existence of a § 1983 abuse of process claim, and because plaintiffs offer no persuasive reason
why we should on the facts of this case, the abuse of process claim was properly dismissed.
B.
Next, the district court held that the Rooker–Feldman doctrine barred the excessive fines
claim based on a presumption that plaintiffs were challenging the $45,480 in fines that the state
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district court issued on remand after the state circuit court found that the $53,300 in fines
originally assessed violated the Eighth Amendment’s excessive fines clause. Plaintiffs take great
exception to this holding. They repeatedly insist that they “are not complaining about the fines
imposed by the state trial court after remand but they are only complaining of the fines imposed
by the state trial court which were declared unconstitutional by the state [circuit] court.” Despite
this qualification, Rooker–Feldman remains applicable.
We understand plaintiffs’ position that they are not disputing the $45,480 in fines ordered
on remand. However, they unambiguously admit that they are challenging “the fines imposed by
the state trial court which were declared unconstitutional by the state [circuit] court.” (Emphasis
added.) Consequently, it is apparent that but-for the original $53,300 judgment, the “excessive
fines” claim would not exist. Therefore, the “source of injury” is a state-court judgment and
Rooker–Feldman applies. Kovacic v. Cuyahoga Cnty. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 606
F.3d 301, 309–10 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that if a state-court judgment is the source of injury,
then Rooker–Feldman applies). Further, even if Rooker–Feldman did not apply, plaintiffs offer
no authority establishing a right to recovery for “excessive fines” under § 1983, nor have they
suffered any injury because the original judgment was vacated on direct appeal and plaintiffs are
not challenging the amount of fines ordered on remand. Accordingly, we affirm the dismissal of
the “excessive fines” claim but for different reasons than those stated by the district court. See
Campbell v. BNSF Ry. Co., 600 F.3d 667, 677 (6th Cir. 2010) (“[W]e may affirm on any grounds
supported by the record even if different from the reasons of the district court.” (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted)).
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C.
As for the equal protection claim, the district court determined that plaintiffs pleaded
three different theories of liability. First, plaintiffs alleged that the ordinance enforcement action
was impermissibly based on their age and Jewish heritage. Second, they alleged a “class of one”
theory, claiming that the enforcement of the ordinance was “arbitrary and capricious.” Third,
plaintiffs alleged that they were “singled out” because of prior lawsuits between Rapp, his
parents, and the City. The district court held that plaintiffs failed to state a claim under all three
theories; plaintiffs appeal only the dismissal of the second.
To prevail on a “class of one” equal protection claim challenging as “arbitrary and
capricious” the discretionary enforcement of a municipal ordinance—and assuming arguendo
that such a claim escapes the holding of Engquist v. Oregon Dep’t of Agriculture, 553 U.S. 591,
598 (2008), which strongly suggests that a “class of one” equal protection theory is unavailable
in the discretionary decision-making context—plaintiffs must plead and prove that they were
“intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis
for the difference in treatment.” Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000). To
meet that standard and survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the plaintiffs’ complaint must
contain enough factual matter to plausibly show there was not “any conceivable basis” that
rationally supported the enforcement of the rental license ordinances. TriHealth, Inc. v. Bd. of
Comm’rs, 430 F.3d 783, 790 (6th Cir. 2005).
The conclusory allegations in plaintiffs’ complaint fail to make that showing; it is
axiomatic that defendants have an interest in enforcing the applicable ordinances against those
who openly violate them. See 16630 Southfield Ltd. P’ship v. Flagstar Bank, F.S.B., 727 F.3d
502, 504 (6th Cir. 2013) (“[A] plaintiff cannot overcome a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss
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simply by referring to conclusory allegations in the complaint that the defendant violated the
law.”). Moreover, the complaint contains no facts showing that the City treated plaintiffs
differently from other individuals who violated the rental license ordinances. In the absence of
something more than plaintiffs’ speculation and conjecture that the City acted in an “arbitrary
and capricious” manner, the equal protection claim was properly dismissed.3
D.
The parties’ final dispute concerns whether the district court erred in dismissing the civil
conspiracy claim under § 1983. A claim for civil conspiracy under § 1983 exists only where the
plaintiff has established a separate and actionable constitutional injury. Bauss v. Plymouth Twp.,
233 F. App’x 490, 500 (6th Cir. 2007); see also Wiley v. Oberlin Police Dep’t, 330 F. App’x
524, 530 (6th Cir. 2009) (“[Plaintiff] cannot succeed on a conspiracy claim because there was no
underlying constitutional violation that injured her.”). The conspiracy claim in this case depends
entirely on the viability of the federal abuse of process claim. For the reasons expressed above,
such a claim is not available in this circuit. Consequently, the conspiracy claim fails as a matter
of law.
IV.
For these reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
3
To be clear, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of the “class of one” equal protection
claim but for a different reason than that stated by the district court. See Campbell, 600 F.3d at
677. The district court dismissed this claim by holding that it was “no different from the claim
the Supreme Court rejected in Engquist[,]” whereas we assume without deciding that the claim
survives Engquist but nevertheless fails the Twombly–Iqbal plausibility analysis.
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