United States v. Pierre Washington ( 2018 )


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  •                  NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
    Case No. 17-5903
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
    FILED
    Jun 07, 2018
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                          )
    DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk
    )
    Plaintiff-Appellee,                         )
    )      ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED
    v.                                                 )      STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
    )      THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF
    PIERRE STEPHAN WASHINGTON,                         )      KENTUCKY
    )
    Defendant-Appellant.                        )
    )
    ____________________________________               )
    BEFORE: KEITH, ROGERS, and KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judges.
    DAMON J. KEITH, Circuit Judge. Appellant Pierre Stephan Washington challenges his
    classification as an armed career criminal under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA),
    18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1), and the district court’s imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence of
    180 months as a result of his ACCA classification. Washington raises three arguments on appeal.
    Washington’s first argument, that the maximum term of imprisonment associated with his prior
    convictions should be determined under the current version of state law, is clearly foreclosed by
    the Supreme Court’s decision in McNeill v. United States, 
    563 U.S. 816
    (2011), which defense
    counsel concedes abrogated United States v. Morton, 
    17 F.3d 911
    (6th Cir. 1994), and remains
    binding precedent. His second argument is also easily rebuffed under Supreme Court precedent,
    Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 
    523 U.S. 224
    (1998) and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S.
    Case No. 17-5903
    United States v. Pierre Washington
    466 (2000), where the Court established and reaffirmed that related prior convictions need not be
    proven beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury or included in the charging document. See 
    Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490
    (“Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for
    a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond
    a reasonable doubt.”) (emphasis added).1 Washington’s final argument, alleging that the term
    “serious drug offense” is unconstitutionally vague based on the same rationale articulated in
    Johnson v. United States, 
    135 S. Ct. 2551
    (2015), is wholly unsupported by legal authority in this
    circuit.
    Setting aside our analysis of the merits of Washington’s claims for the moment, we turn to
    defense counsel’s preservation of these issues for review on appeal. Washington’s Morton claim,
    having been asserted and later withdrawn, is now waived, and is thus unreviewable on appeal. See
    United States v. Saucedo, 
    226 F.3d 782
    , 787 (6th Cir. 2000); United States v. Jackson, 23 F. App’x
    254, 255 (6th Cir. 2001). Washington’s two remaining arguments, raised for the first time on
    appeal, fall outside the scope of the general objection to his ACCA classification asserted at
    sentencing and are now subject to plain error review. See United States v. Aparco-Centeno,
    
    280 F.3d 1084
    , 1087 (6th Cir. 2002); see also United States v. Yancy, 
    725 F.3d 596
    , 600 (6th Cir.
    2013) (“We have also applied plain-error review to forfeited claims when ‘well-settled’ law . . .
    made objection ‘futile.’”) (citations omitted).
    1
    Although aspects of the Supreme Court’s decision in Almendarez-Torres have been called into question, the prior
    conviction exception remains intact. See Alleyne v. United States, 
    570 U.S. 99
    , 111 n.1 (2013). Moreover, prior
    panels of this court confronted with the same inquiry—“is Almendarez-Torres still good law based on the Supreme
    Court cases over the last fifteen years [?]”— have repeatedly answered affirmatively. See United States v. Nagy, 
    760 F.3d 485
    , 488 (6th Cir. 2014) (“Almendarez-Torres is still good law and will remain so until the Supreme Court
    explicitly overrules it.”) (quoting United States v. Anderson, 
    695 F.3d 390
    , 398 (6th Cir. 2012)); see also Bosse v.
    Oklahoma, 
    137 S. Ct. 1
    , 2 (2016) (“Our decisions remain binding precedent until we see fit to reconsider them,
    regardless of whether subsequent cases have raised doubts about their continuing vitality.”) (quotations and citations
    omitted).
    -2-
    Case No. 17-5903
    United States v. Pierre Washington
    In order for a court of appeals to exercise discretion to correct a forfeited objection, there
    must be: (1) an error; (2) that is plain; (3) that affects substantial rights; and (4) seriously affects
    the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings. See United States v. Olano,
    
    507 U.S. 725
    , 732 (1993). “‘Plain’ is synonymous with ‘clear’ or, equivalently, ‘obvious.’” 
    Id. at 734.
    On review for plain error, Washington has failed to identify any relevant legal authority in
    support of his remaining arguments that would have rendered any alleged error “clear” or
    “obvious” to the district court at the time of sentencing, or to this panel at the time of appellate
    review. Absent a showing of legal authority clearly demonstrating an error in the district court’s
    application of the ACCA, Washington cannot establish that plain error was committed. See United
    States v. Lantz, 443 F. App’x 135, 139 (6th Cir. 2011) (“A lack of binding precedent on the specific
    issue indicates that there is no plain error.”) (citation omitted).
    Accordingly, the district court’s sentence and judgment are affirmed.
    -3-