David Wilburn, Jr. v. United States , 616 F. App'x 848 ( 2015 )

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
File Name: 15a0600n.06
No. 14-5732
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
DAVID J. WILBURN, JR., as guardian and next )
friend and on behalf of his minor adopted son, Eion ) FILED
M. Burke; as guardian and next friend and on behalf ) Aug 21, 2015
of his minor adopted daughter, Raegan A. Burke; as ) DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk
the duly appointed representative of the Estate of )
Tracy D. Burke; MICHAEL D. PETE, JR., as )
guardian and next friend and on behalf his minor son, )
ON APPEAL FROM THE
Matthew T. Pete; KURT COMER, As the duly )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT
appointed representative of The Estate of Karen )
COURT FOR THE WESTERN
Comer, )
DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
)
Plaintiffs-Appellants, )
OPINION
)
v. )
)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )
)
Defendant-Appellee. )
BEFORE: MERRITT, STRANCH, and DONALD, Circuit Judges.
JANE B. STRANCH, Circuit Judge. This appeal concerns the murder of Tracy Burke
and Karen Comer by Tracy’s estranged husband, Brent Burke. At the time of the incident, Burke
was stationed at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, where he served as a military police officer for the
U.S. Army and held the rank of sergeant. Plaintiffs—the estates and immediate family members
of Tracy Burke and Karen Comer—brought various survival and wrongful death claims against
the United States through the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), alleging that the Army breached
a duty of reasonable care to the victims by failing to warn them about the danger Burke posed or
take action to protect them from him. Upon finding that Plaintiffs’ claims were barred by the
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FTCA’s intentional tort exception, the district court granted the Government’s motion to dismiss
under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). We hold that Plaintiffs have
stated claims under Kentucky law, and that it is not evident from the pleadings that either the
FTCA’s intentional tort exception or its discretionary function exception would bar these claims.
Accordingly, we REVERSE the district court’s dismissal and REMAND the case to the district
court so that Plaintiffs may proceed with discovery.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Burke displayed violent tendencies at least as early as 2005, while he was deployed in
Egypt. There, members of his platoon observed that he was extremely upset about his
relationship with his wife, Tracy: at one point he told his platoon leader, Lt. Perez, that he would
kill himself, Tracy, or both if Tracy left him. Due to this and other similar statements, while
Burke was in Egypt the Army twice placed him under the supervision of other soldiers and
confiscated his weapons. Burke also told another soldier he had found the perfect location to
murder Lt. Perez. Based on this threat, the Army removed Burke from his platoon, transferred
him to mental health counseling, and ultimately returned him early to Fort Campbell, Kentucky.
At Fort Campbell, Burke continued to receive mental health treatment and prescription
medications to help control his anger, depression, and other psychological disorders. In January
2006, while Burke was still taking the medication, the Army released him to active duty and
deployed him to Afghanistan, where his violent behavior continued. Burke was eventually
removed from his post as a detention center guard due to his repeated expressions of hatred of
the detainees and an incident in which he engaged in the unauthorized use of an “O/C fogger”
spray on some detainees.
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Upon returning to Fort Campbell, Burke lived off-base with Tracy and their children and
subsequently committed two acts of domestic violence against Tracy, both requiring police
intervention. The first incident occurred on May 26, 2007, when Burke tried to physically
prevent Tracy from leaving him and moving in with her former mother-in-law, Karen Comer.
Local law enforcement was summoned and the incident was reported to Burke’s chain of
command (referred to as his “command” below). The Army investigated the situation pursuant
to a written internal policy titled “Policy 7: Command Response to Incidents of Domestic
Violence,” which requires all Unit Commanders to respond to credible reports of domestic
violence. After an investigation, the Army ordered a 72-hour cooling off period between Burke
and Tracy, provided Burke with a room in the Fort Campbell barracks, and ordered Burke to
attend counseling and social services sessions. His privately-owned weapons were marked as
having been confiscated on the resulting report but they had not in fact been confiscated.
After the May 26 incident, Burke and Tracy physically separated and Tracy filed for
divorce. Burke moved into the barracks, where Army regulations required his privately-owned
weapons to be registered and stored in the unit arms room. The Army failed to inquire about
Burke’s weapons or determine whether they were properly registered and stored. An Army
investigation report dated December 12, 2007 indicates that Burke’s command could and should
have controlled Burke’s privately-owned weapons.
During the period of separation, Tracy told Burke’s command that she feared Burke and
worried about his access to his weapons. She also requested a protective order to keep Burke
away from her. Around June 2007, Burke told a fellow soldier that “I’m going to shoot that
bitch [Tracy]” and that he was “going to take her into the woods and shoot her.” The soldier
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promptly reported the threats to Burke’s supervisor, who dismissed them, saying that Burke was
just “blowing off steam.”
On August 11, 2007, local law enforcement responded to a second domestic violence
incident between Burke and Tracy. Though the Army had been notified, it did not conduct a
standard investigation of the incident as required under Policy 7 and neither secured Burke’s
firearms nor referred him to counseling. After this second incident, Burke told another soldier
that “he would be better off if his wife [Tracy] was dead.” A sergeant at the base, Jonathan
Dean, noted that Burke was extremely agitated and “did not need to have a weapon in his
possession in the condition he was in.” Sgt. Dean reportedly took Burke’s privately-owned 9mm
pistol away from him out of concern for Tracy’s well-being and because he knew it was against
Army regulations for Burke to store the unregistered weapon at his residence or in his vehicle.
On Friday August 31, 2007, Burke asked Sgt. Dean to return his pistol for recreational
use, and Sgt. Dean arranged for its return several days later. On September 11, 2007, ten days
after Burke’s pistol was returned to him, he drove about two hours to Comer’s home, where
Tracy was living at the time, and used the weapon to murder both Tracy and Comer. Burke was
tried in military court and a seven-person panel found him guilty of the murders.
II. ANALYSIS
A. The 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) Standards
We review de novo the district court’s dismissal of an action for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(1) and for failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted under Rule 12(b)(6). When a defendant challenges subject
matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), the plaintiff must meet the
burden of proving jurisdiction. Golden v. Gorno Bros., Inc., 410 F.3d 879, 881 (6th Cir. 2005).
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Here, the Government’s motion to dismiss was a facial attack on the complaint—it did
not contest the veracity of Plaintiffs’ allegations. If a motion attacks the face of the complaint,
the plaintiff’s burden “is not onerous.” Musson Theatrical, Inc. v. Federal Express Corp., 89
F.3d 1244, 1248 (6th Cir.1996). The plaintiff need only demonstrate that the complaint alleges a
“substantial” federal claim, meaning that prior decisions do not inescapably render the claim
frivolous. Id. A court evaluating a facial attack must consider the allegations of fact in the
complaint to be true. Gentek Bldg. Prods., Inc. v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 491 F.3d 320, 330 (6th
Cir. 2007). Thus, “the plaintiff can survive the motion by showing any arguable basis in law for
the claim made.” Musson Theatrical, 89 F.3d at 1248.
In deciding a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), the court
will “construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accept its allegations as
true, and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Directv, Inc. v. Treesh,
487 F.3d 471, 476 (6th Cir. 2007). Under Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a
complaint must provide a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief in order to give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds
upon which it rests. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). This notice
pleading standard does not require “detailed” factual allegations, but it does require more than
the bare assertion of legal conclusions. Id. To establish the “facial plausibility” required to
“unlock the doors of discovery,” the plaintiff must plead “factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009).
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B. The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA)
The FTCA waives the federal government’s sovereign immunity in limited contexts, and
“is the exclusive remedy for suits against the United States or its agencies sounding in tort.”
Himes v. United States, 645 F.3d 771, 776 (6th Cir. 2011) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2679(a)). Under
the FTCA, federal district courts have jurisdiction over claims against the United States for
personal injury or death caused by the “negligent or wrongful act or omission” of any
government employee acting within the scope of his employment, “under circumstances where
the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law
of the place where the act or omission occurred,” 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1)—Kentucky law, in this
case.
The FTCA excludes several types of claims from its waiver of sovereign immunity. 28
U.S.C. § 2680. If a case falls within one of these statutory exceptions, the court lacks subject
matter jurisdiction over it. Feyers v. United States, 749 F.2d 1222, 1225 (6th Cir. 1984). The
Government argues that two distinct exceptions apply here, the intentional tort exception and the
discretionary function exception. We first consider the viability of Plaintiffs’ claims under
Kentucky law, then address each of the two exceptions.
C. Application of Kentucky Tort Law
Over the course of this litigation, Plaintiffs have advanced three distinct theories
supporting the origin of the duty of reasonable care that the Army purportedly owed Tracy and
Comer under Kentucky law: (1) that the Army voluntarily assumed a duty to Tracy; (2) that a
statutory duty governing mental health professionals applies; and (3) that a duty arose out of a
special relationship between Tracy and the Army. We discuss each of the three in turn.
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1. The Army’s voluntary assumption of a duty
Plaintiffs argue that the Government voluntarily assumed a duty to Tracy and Comer by
undertaking to protect members of the military community in three ways: through the passage
and implementation of Policy 7 and other regulations concerning firearms on base; through
Tracy’s interactions with Burke’s command; and through Sgt. Dean’s confiscation of Burke’s
pistol. When determining whether a defendant has voluntarily assumed a duty to a plaintiff,
Kentucky courts apply § 323 of the Restatement (Second) of the Law of Torts. Horn v. Horn,
630 S.W.2d 70, 73 (Ky. 1982) (Stephenson, J., dissenting); Murphy v. Second St. Corp.,
48 S.W.3d 571, 575 n.16 (Ky. Ct. App. 2001). Section 323 provides that:
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to
another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of the other’s
person or things, is subject to liability to the other for physical harm resulting
from his failure to exercise reasonable care to perform his undertaking, if
(a) his failure to exercise such care increases the risk of such harm, or
(b) the harm is suffered because of the other’s reliance upon the undertaking.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323 (1965).1
When considering whether a defendant “increased the risk” of harm to the plaintiff under
§ 323(a), the pertinent question is not whether the risk was increased by the defendant’s failure
to adhere to an internal policy compared to what the risk would have been had it adhered to the
policy. Rather, the correct question is whether the defendant’s adoption of and subsequent
failure to adhere to the policy increased the risk of harm to the plaintiff over the risk the plaintiff
would have faced had the policy never been adopted at all. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323,
1
Rather than citing Restatement § 323, Plaintiffs reference Restatement § 324A, which governs voluntarily-
assumed duties to third parties. At argument the Government noted that § 323 is more applicable because Plaintiffs
are asserting a duty that flows directly from the Army to Tracy, not through Burke. We agree. This does not alter
our analysis, however, as the pertinent requirements of both are identical: subsections (a) and (b) of § 323
correspond exactly to subsections (a) and (c) of § 324A, and subsection (b) of § 324A has no application here.
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cmt. c; see also Morgan v. Scott, 291 S.W.3d 622, 632-33 (Ky. 2009). Here, Plaintiffs argue that
the Army assumed a duty to Tracy because Tracy relied upon Policy 7 and Burke’s command to
protect her.
Policy 7 contains a “Domestic Violence Checklist,” which lists the “minimum actions
required of Commanders” in domestic violence situations. The checklist’s protective measures
“are designed to safeguard members of the military community while the case is assessed by
Social Work Services and investigated by the Fort Campbell Police.” It directs Unit
Commanders to, among other things, “Order the soldier to move into the barracks for a minimum
of seventy-two (72) hours,” “Order the soldier to immediately turn in all privately owned
firearms to the unit arms room,” and “Contact the Family Advocacy Victim Advocate Program .
. . to ensure the victim is aware of the programs and policies that provide support and
protection.” Unit Commanders are further directed to “issue a Military Protective Order [MPO] .
. . to safeguard victims, quell disturbances, and maintain good order and discipline providing
victims time to pursue protective orders through civilian courts, or to support existing civilian
orders of protection.” Unit Commanders must then “[r]eassess the situation at the end of the
forty-eight hour period, and determine if the above restrictions should be modified, or canceled.”
Here, Plaintiffs note that “it is reasonable to infer that Tracy relied upon” the Army’s
inquiry into the location of Burke’s privately owned weapons “because Policy 7 expressly
requires that the Domestic Violence Checklist be forwarded to the victim.” Furthermore, their
complaint alleges that after the May 26 incident, Tracy informed Burke’s command that she
feared Burke and his access to his weapons, and that she requested a protective order to keep
Burke away from her. At oral argument, Plaintiffs represented that Tracy had multiple
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conversations with members of Burke’s command about her fear of Burke during the summer
leading up to her murder.
Plaintiffs also note that when Burke moved into the barracks during the separation from
Tracey, Fort Campbell Regulation 190-1 and Army Regulation 190-11 required that his
privately-owned weapons be registered and stored in the unit arms room, and point out that Sgt.
Dean took Burke’s pistol from him of Dean’s own volition, then returned it to Burke a week
before the murders.
Each bare fact—that the Army did not follow its own regulations, that Sgt. Dean took and
then returned Burke’s gun, or that Tracy told Burke’s command that she feared Burke—is not
sufficient to show that the Army assumed a duty to warn or protect her. Tracy must also show
that the army took some action upon which she relied. Here, Plaintiffs have asserted that Tracy
discussed her fear of Burke with Burke’s command multiple times in the months leading up to
her murder, and that Policy 7 requires that a Military Protective Order be implemented and
forwarded to Tracy. It is plausible that representations Burke’s commanding officer made in
those conversations or actions mandated in an MPO caused Tracy to reasonably rely on Burke’s
command to enforce its rules and protect her. We therefore conclude that she has stated a claim
under Kentucky law based on a reliance theory.
At the summary judgment stage, Plaintiffs will have to present evidence sufficient to
enable a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that Tracy reasonably relied on some action taken by
the Army. But it would be premature to dismiss the complaint without first affording Plaintiffs
the opportunity to take discovery to explore what was said to Tracy during her interactions with
Burke’s command and whether she was given a basis to believe that Policy 7, a Military
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Protective Order, the confiscation of Burke’s weapon, or some other action would be
implemented by the Army to provide for her protection.
2. Mental health professionals’ duty under Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) § 202A.400
Plaintiffs’ complaint asserts that the Government had a duty to warn Tracy and Comer
under the Kentucky statute codifying a mental health care providers’ duty to warn potential
victims of their patients. The duty is created once “the patient has communicated to the mental
health professional an actual threat of physical violence against a clearly identified or reasonably
identifiable victim.” Ky. Rev. Stat. § 202A.400(1),(2). The statute defines a “mental health
professional” to include psychiatrists and physicians engaged in mental health services,
registered nurses, and various other professional therapists and counselors. Id. § 202A.400(4).
The district court noted that the amended complaint alleges that Burke communicated
threats to his fellow officers and those in his chain of command as opposed to mental health
professionals. In their response to the Government’s motion to dismiss, Plaintiffs argued that
without the benefit of discovery, they could not determine whether Burke communicated a threat
to the Army’s medical officers. The district court, however, found this unconvincing because
paragraph 31 of Plaintiffs’ complaint alleged that there was “no indication that the Army took
any steps to assess, counsel or treat Burke’s long history of psychological disorders[.]” The
complaint, however, places this allegation in a fuller context: that sentence continues with “—
which include depression, anger management issues, and explosive personality disorder—when
he was referred to counseling following the May 26, 2007 incident.” And the preceding
paragraph in the complaint states that “the Army ordered Burke to attend counseling and social
services.” Read in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, these paragraphs allege that though
Burke was ordered to attend counseling, there is no sign that he was treated for his longstanding
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psychological disorders during those sessions. Given that Burke repeatedly made statements
about killing Tracy to various members of the military community, Plaintiffs’ assertions
concerning Burke’s interactions with mental health professionals are at least plausible.
Accordingly, we find that it is appropriate for Plaintiffs to have the opportunity to conduct
discovery on the issue.
3. A tort duty arising from a special relationship between the Army and Tracy
Plaintiffs also argue that simply by implementing Policy 7 the Army created a special
relationship with Tracy and thereby assumed an ongoing duty to warn Tracy about Burke’s
comments and ensure that Burke’s weapons were secured.
A Kentucky Supreme Court case surveying the state of the law pertaining to duties to
prevent harm directly caused by a third party notes that “[a]s a general rule” under Kentucky
law, “an actor whose conduct has not created a risk of harm has no duty to control the conduct of
a third person to prevent him from causing harm to another.” Grand Aerie Fraternal Order of
Eagles v. Carneyhan, 169 S.W.3d 840, 849 (Ky. 2005). A duty to exercise “reasonable care to
prevent harm by controlling a third person’s conduct” can, however, arise where: “(a) a special
relation exists between the actor and the third person which imposes a duty upon the actor to
control the third person’s conduct, or (b) a special relation exists between the actor and the other
which gives rise to a right of protection.” Id. at 849 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 315)). Though Plaintiffs assert that a special relationship existed between Tracy and the Army,
they fail to explain how Kentucky law makes this so.
Grand Aerie mentions that courts outside of Kentucky have found special relationships
rooted in the defendant’s failure to warn potential victims of impending harm in certain
situations, but the examples it provides point only to state/parolee and psychotherapist/patient
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relationships. Grand Aerie, 169 S.W.3d at 851-52. Plaintiffs have provided no legal support
indicating that the Kentucky Supreme Court would hold that such a duty would apply in the
instant case outside the context of Burke making a statement to a mental health professional.
Such statements are covered by statute in Kentucky as discussed above, and are unrelated to
Policy 7 or the confiscation of Burke’s firearm.
Grand Aerie further acknowledged that the Second and Third Restatements of Torts have
found a special relationship to exist between master and servant that could give rise to a duty of
reasonable care based on the exercise of control—such a duty arising only if “the servant is using
an instrumentality of the employment relationship to cause the harm” (Second Restatement) or
“the employment facilitates the employee’s causing harm to third parties” (Third Restatement).
169 S.W.3d at 852. Because Burke committed the tort outside of the employment relationship
and without the assistance of the Army’s equipment or facilitation, finding that the Army had a
duty to control him based on the employment relationship would require an expansion of the
principles of Grand Aerie.
Plaintiffs have not made a legal argument that such an expansion is appropriate, or that
the Kentucky Supreme Court would extend the law in that manner if presented with the issue.
Plaintiffs have also failed to provide any other legal support for the concept that the mere
existence or implementation of Policy 7 or the cited regulations created a special relationship
with Tracy that would require it to warn or protect her absent the additional requirements voiced
in Restatement § 323, discussed above. Accordingly, we conclude that the plaintiffs have not
sufficiently demonstrated that the Army had any duty to Tracy independent of the requirements
of Restatement § 323 or the obligations of a mental health professional duty expressed in KRS
§ 202A.400.
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D. The Intentional Tort Exception
The district court held that the intentional tort exception barred Plaintiffs’ claims because
they “have not alleged that the United States had a duty to warn or protect Tracy that is
independent from its employment relationship with Burke.” The intentional tort exception does
bar a claim that the Army failed to adequately supervise or control Burke by not fully
implementing Policy 7. But it provides no basis to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims that the Army
assumed a duty to Tracy under Restatement § 323 by inducing reliance in her, or through the
mental health care provider duty in KRS § 202A.400. Those potential sources of the Army’s
duty are independent of negligent supervision and failure to control, and are independent of
Burke’s employment relationship with the Army. They therefore stand outside the intentional
tort exception.
Under the FTCA’s intentional tort exception, the United States retains sovereign
immunity for claims “arising out of” assault, battery, or several other specified intentional torts.
28 U.S.C. § 2680(h). Courts have interpreted “arising out of” broadly. In 1985, the Supreme
Court decided a case in which an Army private had been kidnapped and murdered by another
soldier. United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52 (1985). The Shearer plaintiff—the murdered
soldier’s mother—argued that the Army’s negligent supervision of and failure to control the
perpetrator had caused her son’s death. Id. at 53-54. The Court applied the Feres doctrine2 and
ruled against the mother, but four justices further found that the mother’s case would be barred
2
In Feres, the Supreme Court held that “a soldier may not recover under the Federal Tort Claims Act for
injuries which ‘arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to service.’” Shearer, 473 U.S. at 57 (quoting
Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950)). Feres does not apply in the instant case because here the victims
were civilians.
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under the FTCA’s intentional tort exception because the suit arose from the intentional act of
murder. Chief Justice Burger, writing for the plurality, explained:
Respondent cannot avoid the reach of § 2680(h) by framing her complaint in
terms of negligent failure to prevent the assault and battery. Section 2680(h) does
not merely bar claims for assault or battery; in sweeping language it excludes any
claim arising out of assault or battery. We read this provision to cover claims like
respondent’s that sound in negligence but stem from a battery committed by a
Government employee. Thus the express words of the statute bar respondent’s
claim against the government.
Shearer, 473 U.S. at 55 (plurality opinion) (emphasis in the original) (internal quotation marks
removed). We later adopted the Shearer plurality’s reasoning in an opinion holding that the
intentional tort exception barred a mother’s claim that the Army negligently supervised
servicemen who beat her son, also a soldier, to death while they were on leave together.
Satterfield v. United States, 788 F.2d 395, 399-400 (6th Cir. 1986).
Several years after Shearer, however, the Supreme Court held that the intentional tort
exception does not categorically ban all claims alleging negligence against government
employees who permit a foreseeable battery to occur. Sheridan v. United States, 487 U.S. 392,
403 (1988). The Sheridan plaintiffs filed suit under the FTCA after an armed, drunken, off-duty
serviceman named Carr fired several shots into their vehicle, causing injuries and property
damage. Id. at 395. They alleged that three naval corpsmen working in Bethesda Naval Hospital
had observed Carr—also a naval corpsman—on the hospital premises and saw that he was both
drunk and armed, yet they neither prevented him from leaving nor reported him to the
authorities, id. at 395, as required by Navy regulations, id. at 401 n.5.
The lower courts held that the intentional tort exception barred the plaintiffs’ claims
because the government’s liability arose out of an intentional tort committed by a government
employee. The Supreme Court reversed. The Court started by assuming, as had the courts
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below, that the plaintiffs’ allegations would support a negligence claim under Maryland tort
law’s “good Samaritan provision.”3 Sheridan, 487 U.S. at 401. It then held that the “arising out
of” language in the FTCA’s intentional tort exception does not reach claims that rest on a theory
of liability “entirely independent of” the intentional tortfeasor’s status as a government
employee. Id. The holding emphasized the disconnect between Carr’s employment status and
the conduct of the allegedly-negligent servicemen who allowed him to roam the hospital grounds
while drunk and armed:
[T]he negligence of other Government employees who allowed a foreseeable
assault and battery to occur may furnish a basis for Government liability that is
entirely independent of Carr’s employment status . . . [I]t seems perfectly clear
that the mere fact that Carr happened to be an off-duty federal employee should
not provide a basis for protecting the Government from liability that would attach
if Carr had been an unemployed civilian patient or visitor in the hospital. Indeed,
in a case in which the employment status of the assailant has nothing to do with
the basis for imposing liability on the Government, it would seem perverse to
exonerate the Government because of the happenstance that Carr was on a federal
payroll.
In a case of this kind, the fact that Carr’s behavior is characterized as an
intentional assault rather than a negligent act is also quite irrelevant. If the
Government has a duty to prevent a foreseeably dangerous individual from
wandering about unattended, it would be odd to assume that Congress intended a
breach of that duty to give rise to liability when the dangerous human instrument
was merely negligent but not when he or she was malicious. In fact, the human
characteristics of the dangerous instrument are also beside the point. For the
theory of liability in this case is analogous to cases in which a person assumes
control of a vicious animal, or perhaps an explosive device. Cf. Palsgraf v. Long
Island R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928). Because neither Carr’s
employment status nor his state of mind has any bearing on the basis for
3
On appeal of summary judgment following the Supreme Court’s remand, the Fourth Circuit considered
whether the Navy’s promulgation of the base regulations at issue indicated that it had voluntarily assumed a duty
under Maryland’s “Good Samaritan” theory of liability. Sheridan v. United States, 969 F.2d 72, 74 (4th Cir. 1992).
The court concluded that it did not because “[t]here is simply no evidence that the actions of the government in
promulgating and carrying out, or failing to carry out, the regulations increased the risk of harm to the plaintiffs or
induced reliance in the plaintiffs, prerequisites to the imposition of liability under a Maryland ‘Good Samaritan’
theory.” Id. Restatement § 323 imposes the same conditions and leads to the same conclusion here: absent a
showing of resulting increased risk of harm or reliance, simply promulgating or being subject to the regulations does
not create the assumption of a tort duty under Kentucky law.
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petitioners’ claim for money damages, the intentional tort exception to the FTCA
is not applicable in this case.
Sheridan v. United States, 487 U.S. at 401-03.
After Sheridan, then, it is clear that the intentional tort exception does not apply to
liability that is independent of the intentional tortfeasor’s status as a government employee.
Numerous subsequent district and appellate court decisions have held that the intentional tort
exception does not apply where the United States breached a duty independent of its duty to
supervise the tortfeasor who perpetrated the assault and battery. See, e.g., Mackay v. United
States, 247 F. App’x 641, 645 (6th Cir. 2007); Cline v. United States, 13 F. Supp. 3d 868, 873-74
(M.D. Tenn. 2014) (collecting cases).
Though Sheridan expressly declined to decide whether negligent training or negligent
supervision claims can ever survive the intentional tort exception, id. at 403 n.8, our precedent in
Satterfield establishes that the exception bars such claims here. See Estate of Smith v. United
States, 509 F. App’x 436, 437, 442-43 (6th Cir. 2012). Accordingly, in the instant case, the
intentional tort doctrine blocks claims based on a duty owed to Tracy that simply amounted to a
negligent supervision or training of Burke, but does not block claims based on a duty owed to
Tracy that was independent of Burke’s employment status as a government employee at the time
of the murders.
Evidence of assurance from Burke’s command that the Army would restrict Burke to the
base, secure all of his weapons, or take some other action that Tracy reasonably relied on would
create a duty to her under Kentucky law. See Morgan, 291 S.W.3d at 632-33. This duty is not
subject to the intentional tort exception because it arises from a direct relationship that the Army
established with Tracy independent of Burke’s employment relationship.
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As was the case in Sheridan, the fact that the Army caused Tracy to rely on it to lessen
her risk of an intentional tort rather than an act of negligence would be irrelevant. Had Tracy
reasonably relied on the Army’s assertion that it would protect her from a non-employee, a
vicious animal, or a non-human hazard, the intentional tort exception would not apply.
Following Sheridan’s logic, there would be no basis to conclude that the exception would apply
simply because Burke happened to be an employee. Based on Plaintiffs’ allegations, the duty
flows under Restatement § 323 simply because the Army took on an affirmative duty to Tracy—
the assertion that it would mitigate a risk to her—upon which she reasonably relied. This is not a
negligent supervision claim, nor is it based on the Army’s employment relationship with Burke.
The fact that Burke was employed by the Army would also not be of any consequence with
respect to the mental health professional’s duty to disclose under Kentucky law: the mental
health professional would have a duty to warn about a patient’s threat regardless of whether the
patient was a soldier or civilian. Thus, in the narrow confines of the two claims presented, the
intentional tort exception does not apply.
E. The Discretionary Function Exception
The discretionary function exception states that the FTCA’s waiver of sovereign
immunity does not apply to “[a]ny claim . . . based upon the exercise or performance or the
failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or
an employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2680(a). Claims that fall within this exception are not within our subject matter jurisdiction
and must be dismissed. See Kohl v. United States, 699 F.3d 935, 940 (6th Cir. 2012).
To determine whether a claim falls within the discretionary function exception, courts
apply a two-part test. United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 322-23 (1991). Step one “requires
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a determination of whether the challenged act or omission violated a mandatory regulation or
policy that allowed no judgment or choice.” Rosebush v. United States, 119 F.3d 438, 441 (6th
Cir. 1997) (citing Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 322-23). If there was such a violation, then the
discretionary-function exception will not apply, because “there was no element of judgment or
choice,” id., and thus “the employee has no rightful option but to adhere to the directive.”
Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536 (1988).
But if, on the other hand, there was room for judgment or choice in the decision made,
then the challenged conduct was discretionary. See Rosebush, 119 F.3d at 441. In that case, step
two of the Gaubert test requires a court to evaluate “whether the conduct is ‘of the kind that the
discretionary function exception was designed to shield’” from liability. Id. (quoting Gaubert,
499 U.S. at 322-23). This element of the test is meant “to prevent judicial ‘second-guessing’ of .
. . administrative decisions grounded in social, economic, and political policy through the
medium of an action in tort.” United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense
(Varig Airlines), 467 U.S. 797, 814 (1984).
Here, we conclude that any liability of the Government resulting from KRS § 202A.400
would not be subject to the discretionary function exception because there is no discretionary
choice to be made in compliance with that statute: if a patient communicates to a mental health
professional “an actual threat of violence” against a “clearly identified” victim, the mental health
professional incurs a duty to warn that is only discharged once “reasonable efforts are made to
communicate the threat to the victim, and to notify the police department closest to the patient’s
and the victim’s residence of the threat of violence.” Ky. Rev. Stat. § 202A.400(1),(2).
Likewise, Army Regulation 190-11 is mandatory:
Commanders will ensure privately-owned arms and ammunition . . . are protected
on their installations and facilities. Commanders will . . . [s]ecure arms and
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ammunition belonging to Soldiers living on the installation in the installation
armory or unit arms room in approved locked containers . . .
A.R. 190-11 4–5. A duty under Kentucky law rooted in either AR 190-11 or KRS §202A.400
would therefore not meet the first step of the discretionary function exception, as neither affords
those implementing the rules any choice but to follow them.
Policy 7, on the other hand, becomes discretionary after 48 hours, as it requires
commanders to “[r]eassess the situation” at that time to “determine if the above restrictions
should be modified, or cancelled.” And implementation of Policy 7 after those first 48 hours
involves sufficient policy considerations to satisfy step two of the Gaubert test. See Rosebush,
119 F.3d at 443. We are less convinced, however, that a claim based on a direct representation
from the Army to Tracy that induced reliance in Tracy would entail judicial second guessing of
an “administrative decision[] grounded in social, economic, and political policy,” Varig Airlines,
467 U.S. at 814, such that it would invoke the discretionary function exception.
The government’s management of its resources and response to threats invokes policy
concerns about soldiers’ privacy, discipline, and the safety of the military community. But a
direct representation by the government to a domestic violence victim that it will take certain
action, followed by a failure to take that action, is not subject to the same policy analysis. An
initial decision by a member of Burke’s command about whether or not to make a representation
that would reasonably induce Tracy’s reliance is both discretionary and subject to policy
analysis. But the decision to follow through once reliance has been induced is not subject to the
same policy analysis. Similarly, while the allocation of resources and decisions of what to
include in a Military Protective Order are often discretionary functions, the execution of the
MPO once drafted is usually not: typically, its language is mandatory. We conclude that the
discretionary function exception does not bar Plaintiffs’ claims here at the pleading stage.
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III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, we REVERSE the district court’s dismissal of this case and
REMAND the case to the district court for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
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