Carter v. Univ of Toledo ( 2003 )

RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206 2 Carter v. University of Toledo No. 02-3842
ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2003 FED App. 0401P (6th Cir.)File Name: 03a0401p.06 Rowen, SPENGLER NATHANSON, Toledo, Ohio, for
Appellee.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS _________________
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT OPINION
_________________ _________________
CAROLYN CARTER , X RONALD LEE GILMAN, Circuit Judge. Dr. Carolyn
- Carter, who is African-American, brought suit against her
Plaintiff-Appellant, former employer, the University of Toledo, alleging that the
-
- No. 02-3842 University failed to renew her contract as a visiting professor
v. - because of her race. The district court granted the
> University’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that
, Carter had failed to show any direct evidence of
UNIVERSITY OF TOLEDO, -
Defendant-Appellee. - discrimination and had also failed to establish that the
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons given by the University
N for not renewing her contract were a pretext to disguise racial
Appeal from the United States District Court discrimination. For the reasons set forth below, we
for the Northern District of Ohio at Toledo. REVERSE the judgment of the district court and REMAND
No. 01-07307—David A. Katz, District Judge. for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Argued: October 22, 2003 I. BACKGROUND
Decided and Filed: November 12, 2003 The University of Toledo hired Carter in January of 1996
as an Assistant Professor of Curriculum and Instruction in the
Before: KEITH, DAUGHTREY, and GILMAN, Circuit University’s College of Education. Carter’s assistant
Judges. professorship was a tenure-track faculty position. In October
of 1996, the University’s Personnel Committee recognized
_________________ Carter as having shown “good progress in her teaching,
professional activities and service.” The Personnel
COUNSEL Committee unanimously recommended that her faculty
appointment be renewed. Professor James R. Gress, the
ARGUED: John D. Franklin, LAW OFFICES OF JOHN D. chairman of Carter’s department, echoed the Committee’s
FRANKLIN & ASSOCIATES, Toledo, Ohio, for Appellant. sentiments in his support for Carter’s reappointment.
Cheryl F. Wolff, SPENGLER NATHANSON, Toledo, Ohio,
for Appellee. ON BRIEF: John D. Franklin, LAW As a result of these favorable recommendations, the
OFFICES OF JOHN D. FRANKLIN & ASSOCIATES, University renewed Carter’s appointment for two years and
Toledo, Ohio, for Appellant. Cheryl F. Wolff, Theodore M. awarded her a merit pay increase. Carter, however,
1
No. 02-3842 Carter v. University of Toledo 3 4 Carter v. University of Toledo No. 02-3842
voluntarily resigned from her tenure-track faculty position in two were Sandra McKinley and Robin Rayfield, both
May of 1997 to take an administrative position in the Jackson, Caucasian.
Michigan school district. She left the University in July of
1997 after teaching the first of the summer school sessions. When she had not heard anything about the renewal of her
visiting professorship, Carter contacted Dr. Earl Murry, the
Due to another change in career plans, Carter returned to University’s Vice Provost. Murry’s duties as Vice Provost
the University of Toledo as a visiting faculty member for the included acting as chief negotiator for the faculty’s collective
1999-2000 academic year. Dr. Charlene Czerniak, who was bargaining agreements, coordinating faculty recruiting, hiring,
then Interim Dean of the College of Education, extended training, and orientation, advising the Provost on tenure and
Carter an offer for the visiting professorship in the promotions, reviewing salary matters, and ensuring
Educational Administration and Supervision (EDAS) compliance with affirmative action requirements. According
program in the College of Education’s Department of to Carter, Murry said that he would investigate the matter and
Foundations and Leadership. Carter accepted the get back to her. When Murry did not promptly get in touch
appointment in the EDAS program, as did three other visiting with Carter, she called him back to ask whether he had any
professors—Louis Barsi, Brenda Lanclos, and Richard St. information about the renewal of her contract.
John—who were all Caucasian.
Murry told Carter that he had not yet discussed the issue
The University did not renew Carter’s visiting-professor with Czerniak, and then, according to Carter, volunteered that
appointment after the 1999-2000 academic year. In July of “[Czerniak] is trying to whitewash the college of education
2000, Carter sent an e-mail message to Czerniak inquiring and I am not going to let her do this.” Carter also asserts that
about the renewal of her contract with the University for the Murry “told me that [Czerniak] was trying to get rid of the
following year. Czerniak responded that the University had black professors and that he was in a struggle with her
met its hiring needs for the year and would not be extending involving the appointment of an additional black professor.”
Carter’s appointment. When she contacted him a third time to find out whether her
appointment would be renewed, Carter claims that Murry said
Carter was not the only visiting professor whose contract “I don’t know what’s going on, they’re a bunch of racists over
was not renewed for the 2000-2001 academic year. Neither there.” Murry denies making any of these statements.
St. John, who like Carter was teaching in the EDAS program,
nor Mary Anne Stibbe, a visiting professor in the College of Carter sued the University of Toledo in June of 2001. She
Education’s Department of Curriculum and Psychological alleged that the University discriminated against her because
Studies, were reappointed for 2000-2001. Both St. John and of her race in violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(e)-2000(e)-17
Stibbe are Caucasian. (Title VII), 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and Ohio Revised Code
§ 4112.02 and § 4112.99. Carter also claimed that the
Barsi and Lanclos, the other two EDAS visiting professors, University subjected her to a racially hostile work
were rehired for the following academic year, but not in the environment in violation of Title VII and Ohio law. The
EDAS program. Three new visiting professors were hired in University moved for summary judgment, arguing that Carter
the EDAS program for the 2000-2001 academic year. One had failed to present either direct or circumstantial evidence
was Bunk Adams, who is African-American, and the other of racial discrimination, and asserting that her hostile work
No. 02-3842 Carter v. University of Toledo 5 6 Carter v. University of Toledo No. 02-3842
environment claims were without merit because she had not discrimination claim, Carter was required to either “present
presented any evidence supporting these claims. direct evidence of discrimination or introduce circumstantial
evidence that would allow an inference of discriminatory
In June of 2002, the district court granted the University’s treatment.” Johnson v. Kroger Co., 319 F.3d 858, 864-65
motion for summary judgment. Carter filed a timely appeal. (6th Cir. 2003). Carter argues that the alleged comments
In her briefs on appeal, however, Carter does not address the made by Murry constitute direct evidence of discrimination.
district court’s ruling on her claims of a racially hostile work She points to three comments purportedly made by him:
environment. We therefore consider those arguments waived. (1) that Czerniak was “trying to whitewash the College of
See Farm Labor Org. Comm. v. Ohio State Highway Patrol, Education” faculty, (2) that Murry was struggling with
308 F.3d 523, 544 n.8 (6th Cir. 2002) (“It is well established Czerniak to appoint African-American professors, and (3) that
that an issue not raised in a party’s briefs may be deemed “the decision-makers at the College of Education are a bunch
waived.”). of racists.”
II. ANALYSIS The district court began its analysis by considering whether
or not Carter would be allowed to testify as to these
A. Standard of review comments allegedly made by Murry. We do not need to
address this evidentiary issue with regard to our analysis of
We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de the direct-evidence argument, however, because even if
novo. Therma-Scan, Inc. v. Thermoscan, Inc. 295 F.3d 623, Murry’s comments are admissible as nonhearsay, they do not
629 (6th Cir. 2002). Summary judgment is proper where constitute direct evidence of discrimination against Carter
there exists no genuine issue of material fact and the moving under controlling Sixth Circuit precedent.
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(c). In considering a motion for summary judgment, the This court has held that comments made by individuals
district court must construe all reasonable inferences in favor who are not involved in the decision-making process
of the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. regarding the plaintiff’s employment do not constitute direct
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). The central evidence of discrimination. See Hopson v. DaimlerChrysler
issue is “whether the evidence presents a sufficient Corp., 306 F.3d 427, 433 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding that a
disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is company manager’s opinion that “race was a factor” in the
so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” company’s decision not to promote the plaintiff was not direct
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 evidence for purposes of the plaintiff’s discrimination claim
(1986). because the manager had “no involvement in the decision-
making process with respect to the particular jobs at issue”).
B. Direct evidence of discrimination Murry was not a decision-maker with regard to the renewal of
Carter’s visiting professorship. His statements therefore
We shall consider Carter’s federal and state-law cannot be considered direct evidence of racial discrimination
discrimination claims under the Title VII framework because against Carter.
Ohio’s requirements are the same as under federal law. See
Ohio Civil Rights Comm’n v. Ingram, 630 N.E.2d 669, 674
(Ohio 1994). To establish a Title VII employment
No. 02-3842 Carter v. University of Toledo 7 8 Carter v. University of Toledo No. 02-3842
C. Circumstantial evidence 3. Carter spent approximately half of her time in the
1999-2000 academic year providing consulting
Where a plaintiff fails to present direct evidence of services to the operators of charter schools in
discrimination, the burden-shifting framework first articulated Detroit.
in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973),
and refined by Texas Department of Community Affairs v. 4. Carter was occasionally unavailable to students due
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981), applies. Johnson, 319 F.3d at to her charter school activities.
865-66. The plaintiff must first present a prima facie case of
discrimination. Id. at 866. Establishing a prima facie case The burden thus shifted back to Carter to show that the
creates a rebuttable presumption of discrimination, and the University’s reasons were pretextual. St. Mary’s Honor
burden then shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 508 (1993). Determining
nondiscriminatory reason for taking the challenged whether the reasons proffered by an employer are pretextual
employment action. Id. If the defendant satisfies this burden, requires a heightened examination of “the specific proofs and
the plaintiff “must then prove that the proffered reason was rebuttals of discriminatory motivation the parties have
actually a pretext to hide unlawful discrimination.” Id. introduced.” Id. at 516. To demonstrate pretext, a plaintiff
(internal citation omitted). may show that the defendant’s proffered reason “(1) has no
basis in fact, (2) did not actually motivate the defendant’s
To establish a prima facie case of discrimination, a plaintiff challenged conduct, or (3) was insufficient to warrant the
must show that (1) she is a member of a protected group, challenged conduct.” Seay v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 339
(2) she was subject to an adverse employment decision, F.3d 454, 463 (6th Cir. 2003) (internal citations omitted).
(3) she was qualified for the position, and (4) she was
replaced by a person outside of the protected class. Kline v. Carter puts forth two arguments as to why the University’s
Tennessee Valley Auth., 128 F.3d 337, 349 (6th Cir. 1997). proffered reasons for not renewing her contract “did not
The University does not dispute that Carter could establish a actually motivate the defendant’s challenged conduct.” See id.prima facie case of race discrimination. First, she contends that Murry’s alleged comments concerning
the “bunch of racists” at the University and Czerniak’s
In response, however, the University offered the following purported attempt to “whitewash the faculty” show that the
“legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons” for not retaining above reasons were pretextual. Second, Carter points out that
Carter as a visiting professor: two similarly situated Caucasian visiting professors in the
EDAS program had their contracts renewed.
1. Carter did not apply for a regular tenure track faculty
position in the EDAS program when one was Carter’s stronger argument is that Murry’s alleged
advertised in 2000. comments demonstrate that the University’s proffered reasons
did not actually motivate its conduct. To analyze Carter’s
2. Carter, whose regional educational experience was argument on this point, we must decide whether Carter would
based upon her work in Michigan, did not have the be allowed to testify at trial regarding Murry’s alleged
appropriate Ohio connections to aid in University comments. If the comments are deemed to be hearsay, then
recruiting. the evidence could not be considered on summary judgment.
See Jacklyn v. Schering-Plough Healthcare Prods. Sales
No. 02-3842 Carter v. University of Toledo 9 10 Carter v. University of Toledo No. 02-3842
Corp., 176 F.3d 921, 927 (6th Cir. 1999) (“Hearsay evidence that he had had with other Spiegel employees about Hill’s
may not be considered on summary judgment.”). Whether the termination. According to Baker, three Spiegel employees
proffered evidence is hearsay under the Federal Rules of told him that Hill had been discharged because of his age.
Evidence is a question of law that we review de novo. Id. The court held that “there was no basis for finding that the
statements of these declarants concerned ‘a matter within the
The district court found that Murry’s alleged comments as scope of [their] agency,’” reasoning that there was no
offered by Carter in her deposition were admissible as evidence that any of the declarants were involved in the
nonhearsay under Rule 801(d)(2)(D) of the Federal Rules of decision to terminate Hill. Id. at 237 (alteration in original).
Evidence. This rule provides, in relevant part, that a
“statement is not hearsay if . . . [t]he statement is offered At first glance the holding appears to support the
against a party and is . . . a statement by the party’s agent or University’s argument that only comments by direct decision-
servant concerning a matter within the scope of the agency or makers can qualify as nonhearsay under Rule 801(d)(2)(D).
employment, made during the existence of the relationship.” The court’s analysis, however, went beyond the simple
Although the district court concluded that the alleged question of whether the declarants were direct decision-
comments would be admissible as nonhearsay, it reasoned makers. It looked to the scope of each declarant’s
that the purported remarks were too isolated to show pretext employment and noted that there was one “about whose
on the part of the University. duties and responsibilities [the plaintiff] testified he was
uncertain,” a second who became a regional manager of
The University defends the district court’s basis for Spiegel’s catalog order division after Hill was discharged,
discounting the proffered testimony, but also argues that the and a third whose job was unrelated to Hill’s. Id. The court
alleged comments do not satisfy the requirements of Rule concluded that “[t]he mere fact that each of these men was a
801(d)(2)(D) because “[t]he record is clear that Murry had ‘manager’ within the expansive Spiegel organization is
nothing to do with the College of Education’s substantive clearly insufficient to establish that matters bearing upon
decisions regarding the hiring and retention of visiting Hill’s discharge were within the scope of their employment.”
professors.” Its position appears to be that only statements Id. Whether a statement qualifies as nonhearsay under Rule
made by declarants who are direct decision-makers 801(d)(2)(D), therefore, goes beyond simply determining if
concerning the adverse employment action at issue can the declarant is a direct decision-maker with regard to the
qualify as nonhearsay under Rule 801(d)(2)(D). adverse employment action.
The University cites Hill v. Spiegel, Inc., 708 F.2d 233 (6th In addition to Hill, two other Sixth Circuit cases support
Cir. 1983), to support its argument. In Hill, the court this broader reading of Rule 801(d)(2)(D). This court rejected
discussed the application of Rule 801(d)(2)(D) in an age an employer’s argument that statements made by someone
discrimination case. Spiegel, the well-known mail order who was not a direct decision-maker were irrelevant in
company, had terminated Emery Hill, who was 56 years old Johnson v. Kroger Co., 319 F.3d 858, 868 (6th Cir. 2003).
at the time and a regional manager of Spiegel’s catalog-order The court reasoned that “[a]lthough remarks made by an
division. In appealing an adverse jury verdict against it, individual who has no authority over the challenged
Spiegel argued that the admission of testimony given by employment action are not indicative of discriminatory intent,
Matthew Baker was erroneous. Baker, a former district the statements of managerial-level employees who have the
manager at Spiegel, testified on Hill’s behalf to conversations ability to influence a personnel decision are relevant.” Id.No. 02-3842 Carter v. University of Toledo 11 12 Carter v. University of Toledo No. 02-3842
And in Jacklyn v. Schering-Plough Healthcare Products University places his statements concerning the racial
Sales Corp., 176 F.3d 921, 928 (6th Cir. 1999), this court composition of the workforce within the ambit of his
considered whether the declarant was “involved in any of the authority.” Indeed, Murry testified that he ensures that the
critical appraisals of [plaintiff’s] performance that preceded deans comply with affirmative action requirements when
her leaving work,”—not whether the declarant was a direct hiring faculty. We agree with the district court’s analysis on
decision-maker—in determining if the declarant’s remarks this point and conclude that because Carter has shown that
qualified as nonhearsay under Rule 801(d)(2)(D). Being a Murry’s comments were within the scope of his employment,
direct decision-maker, of course, constitutes strong proof that Murry’s alleged comments are admissible nonhearsay. Fed.
a statement was made within the scope of employment, but R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(D).
the “scope of employment” criterion extends beyond direct
decision-makers. We are thus left with the question of whether the district
court erred in discounting Murry’s alleged comments because
We also note that our prior decisions are consistent with the they were “isolated.” See, e.g., Ercegovich v. Goodyear Tire
reasoning of the Seventh Circuit in Williams v. Pharmacia, & Rubber Co., 154 F.3d 344, 355 (6th Cir. 1998) (“Isolated
Inc., 137 F.3d 944 (7th Cir. 1998), where the court rejected and ambiguous comments are too abstract, in addition to
the employer’s argument that being irrelevant and prejudicial, to support a finding of age
discrimination.”) (internal quotation marks and citations
an employee’s statement regarding a particular action of omitted). The district court gave no explanation for its
the employer qualifies as a vicarious admission under conclusion on this point, and we respectfully disagree that the
Rule 801 only if the employee-declarant was involved in alleged comments can be so categorized. They were allegedly
the decisionmaking process leading up to the employer’s made in direct response to Carter’s inquiries as to why she
action. . . . The precise reach of Rule 801(d)(2)(D) is was not rehired. Under these circumstances, we find no
sometimes difficult to discern, as there has been justification to regard them as isolated.
considerable debate about the justification for classifying
various admissions as non-hearsay. We are reluctant to In sum, we conclude that a genuine issue of material fact
follow [the employer’s] suggestion and read into the rule exists as to whether Carter can show pretext on the part of the
a generalized personal involvement requirement, University. We recognize that, but for Murry’s alleged
especially in light of the Advisory Committee’s comments, Carter’s claims would not likely survive summary
admonition that the freedom which admissions have judgment. But if the jury were to believe that Murry in fact
enjoyed . . . from the restrictive influences of . . . the rule made the remarks attributed to him, then they might find that
requiring firsthand knowledge . . . calls for generous the University’s proffered reasons “did not actually motivate
treatment of this avenue to admissibility. the defendant’s challenged conduct.” Seay v. Tennessee
Valley Auth., 339 F.3d 454, 463 (6th Cir. 2003). This is a
Id. at 950 (quotation marks and internal citations omitted). credibility determination that must be resolved by the
factfinder, not by the court as a matter of law. We therefore
The district court distinguished Hill from the instant case conclude that the district court erred in granting the
by reasoning that “[a]lthough Murry did not have direct University’s motion for summary judgment.
authority to decide whether Carter’s appointment was
renewed, his oversight of the affirmative action process at the
No. 02-3842 Carter v. University of Toledo 13
III. CONCLUSION
For all of the reasons set forth above, we REVERSE the
district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the
University and REMAND for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.