Smith v. United States Postal ( 2004 )

RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206 2 Smith v. Henderson No. 02-6073
ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2004 FED App. 0228P (6th Cir.)
File Name: 04a0228p.06 Hill, ASSISTANT UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,
Louisville, Kentucky, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Karen L.
Stewart, LAW OFFICE OF KAREN L. STEWART,
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Louisville, Kentucky, for Appellant. Candace G. Hill, Terry
M. Cushing, ASSISTANT UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT Louisville, Kentucky, for Appellee.
_________________
_________________
MARY CHRISTINE SMITH, X
Plaintiff-Appellant, - OPINION
- _________________
- No. 02-6073
v. - CLAY, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff Mary Christine Smith
> appeals the August 1, 2002, order of the United States District
, Court for the Western District of Kentucky, granting
WILLIAM J. HENDERSON , -
Postmaster General, United Defendant United States Postal Service’s1 motion for
- summary judgment on her claims for sex discrimination, in
States Postal Service, - violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as
Defendant-Appellee. - amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq.; age discrimination, in
- violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
- 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq.; disability discrimination, in
N violation of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 791,
Appeal from the United States District Court et seq.; and for violations of the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C.
for the Western District of Kentucky at Louisville. § 206(d). Because the district court erred in granting
No. 00-00515—Charles R. Simpson, III, District Judge. summary judgment for the United States Postal Service on
Smith’s claims for sex, age and disability discrimination, but
Argued: January 27, 2004 not in dismissing the Equal Pay Act claim, the Court
AFFIRMS, in part, and REVERSES, in part, the judgment
Decided and Filed: July 15, 2004 below.
Before: SUHRHEINRICH, CLAY, and SUTTON, Circuit
Judges.
_________________
COUNSEL 1
The Defendant named in Smith’s complaint is William J.
Henderso n, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service. The
ARGUED: Karen L. Stewart, LAW OFFICE OF KAREN L. complaint appears to sue H enderson in his official capacity. For purposes
STEWART, Louisville, Kentucky, for Appellant. Candace G. of this opinion, the Court refers to Defendant as the United States Postal
Service or USPS.
1
No. 02-6073 Smith v. Henderson 3 4 Smith v. Henderson No. 02-6073
I. Elizabethtown Post Office, Mullin assigned Conklin to
supervise Smith and the acting Tour II Supervisor, who was
Substantive Facts a male. According to Mullin, and confirmed by Conklin,
Conklin altered Smith’s staff assignments because “the work
In July, 1979, Plaintiff Mary Christine Smith began her she anticipated that her staff would do that following night
career for the USPS as a distribution clerk in Evansville, had been done during the day while she was gone, or because
Indiana. In September, 1986, Smith was transferred to she had not most efficiently used her staff, and had made
Elizabethtown, Kentucky, where her title remained assignments which were going to cause overtime to be used.”
distribution clerk. At some point in 1986, Smith disclosed to (J.A. 50, 63.)
her supervisors that she has rheumatoid arthritis, which
“affects the mobility of [her] hands, legs and feet.” (J.A. 7, Smith next complains that Mullin refused to authorize
Complaint, ¶ 8.) In 1997, Smith’s physician limited her work Smith to approve overtime for her employees. Smith claims
time to 8 hours per day, 40 hours per week, and limited her that the overtime was necessary to manage the Tour I
lifting to no more than 20 pounds. The USPS’s physicians workload. According to Mullin, he refused the overtime
and supervisory personnel approved of these work requests because a supervisor “must balance work-load,
restrictions. overtime hours considering employees on vacation, and what
work will be accomplished by the next tour after that
In early 1998, a panel of postmasters from the area Supervisor’s employees leave for the day.” (J.A. 48.) All of
surrounding Elizabethtown, Kentucky recommended Smith this balance must be accomplished with “an eye towards
for promotion to customer service supervisor, Tour I, keeping costs down, and keeping efficiency – moving the
effective March 15, 1998. Tour I is the night shift at the post mail – up.” Id.
office when all mail must be off-loaded from the trucks,
sorted and dispatched out to the associate post offices. One Smith also complains that Mullin refused to permit her to
day before the effective date of her promotion, Smith met delegate the duty of facility-wide financial accounting to a
with her immediate supervisor, Tom Mullin, and Tony subordinate employee, as he had permitted the male Tour I
Conklin, a customer service supervisor. Mullin and Conklin supervisors who had preceded her in that position. As a
allegedly attempted to talk Smith out of accepting the result, Smith’s work day was lengthened, requiring her to
supervisor position. Smith nevertheless accepted the work between 10 and 12 hours a day, in contravention of her
promotion. medical restriction. For one stretch of time (between June 5
and July 5, 1998), Smith worked for thirty days straight
According to Smith, after she became the Tour I without a day off. For another stretch (between July 2 and 17,
Supervisor, she suffered through a series of events that 1998), Smith was required to work with only one or two days
ultimately left her no choice but to quit her job only four off.
months later. Smith first complains that Conklin, with
Mullin’s consent, unilaterally altered work schedules that The USPS concedes that the Tour I Supervisor’s accounting
Smith had prepared for the employees she supervised. She duties are time-consuming. It points out that Conklin,
argues that male supervisors’ work schedules were never Smith’s male predecessor as Tour I Supervisor, used to spend
changed without their prior consent. In response, USPS two to three hours per day on the accounting function. The
explains that, because of the pending relocation of the USPS argues that Mullin would have permitted Smith to
No. 02-6073 Smith v. Henderson 5 6 Smith v. Henderson No. 02-6073
delegate the accounting functions to a subordinate, as long as On July 17, 1998, Mullin directed Smith to report for duty
“the assignment did not result in mail being delayed, if it did the following Monday, which was one of Smith’s scheduled
not violate the terms of the union contract, if it did not cause days off. “[E]xhausted and in constant pain,” Smith resigned
an increase in work hours and if it did not cause her position. (J.A. 10.) She applied for and was granted a
Elizabethtown to incur unnecessary overtime.” (J.A. 48-9.) disability retirement based on her physician’s statement that
Mullin did not permit Smith to delegate these duties because she could not hold a full-time job.
Smith’s mail production numbers were down, while the costs
were up. Smith has acknowledged that production was down Procedural History
on Tour I because she was pulling a subordinate from the
production line to perform the accounting work. On June 5, 2000, Smith filed a complaint in the United
States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Kentucky
Smith next alleges that Mullin verbally berated her in front against the United States Postal Service. The case
of subordinates, calling her “incompetent” on at least one subsequently was transferred to the U.S. District Court.
occasion. (J.A. 9, 105-06.) Smith also points to deposition Smith’s complaint alleged the following claims: (1) failure
testimony of a USPS employee who stated that Mullin would to reasonably accommodate her “medical limitations” as
publicly point out “every picky little thing he could possibly required by the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 791,
find” about Smith’s job performance. (J.A. 102-03.) Mullin et seq.; (2) sex discrimination under Title VII of the Civil
has not denied that he called Smith incompetent, but he does Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq.,
indicate that he held Smith accountable for doing her job, because she was required to perform duties not required of
including with respect to the mistakes in her bookkeeping similarly situated male employees; (3) violation of the Equal
duties. Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d), because Smith was required to
perform “duties in excess of the number of hours allocated
On May 3, 1998, Smith wrote Mullin a letter complaining therefor”; and (4) age discrimination in violation of the Age
about (a) the fact that she needed either Mullin’s or Conklin’s Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 621,
authorization for her requests for overtime, allegedly resulting et seq.
in reduced staffing for Tour I; (b) harassment by Conklin,
including his alleged mocking of her hand movements and On November 30, 2001, the USPS moved for summary
statements about her standing with her hands in her pockets; judgment on Smith’s complaint, and the district court granted
and (c) being disparately treated in not being permitted to USPS’s motion on August 1, 2002. In its memorandum
delegate some of her job duties, as Conklin had been opinion, the court ruled that Smith could not state a prima
permitted when he was the Tour I Supervisor. Mullin facie case for her discrimination claims under Title VII, the
allegedly responded to Smith’s letter by telling her that she ADEA and the Rehabilitation Act because she did not suffer
was “now in a man’s world” and accusing her of “always an adverse employment action. The court rejected Smith’s
whining.” (J.A. 9-10.) argument that her voluntary resignation was a constructive
discharge. The court reasoned that the alleged conduct by the
Finally, Smith complains that Mullin directed her to USPS was not “‘so intolerable that a reasonable person would
underreport the hours she worked. Mullin denies this feel compelled to resign.’” Smith v. Henderson, No. 3:00CV-
allegation, claiming that such a direction would have violated 515-S, slip op. at 4 (W.D. Ky. Aug. 1, 2002) (quoting Turner
USPS policy. v. Pendenis Club, 19 S.W.3d 117, 121 (Ky. Ct. App. 2000)
No. 02-6073 Smith v. Henderson 7 8 Smith v. Henderson No. 02-6073
(citing Darnell v. Campbell Cty. Fiscal Ct., 731 F. Supp. 2. Remaining Employment Discrimination Claims
1309 (E.D. Ky. 1990)). In support of her Equal Pay Act
claim, Smith had argued that although her salary had been the Like the district court below, both Smith and the USPS
same as her male counterparts, she was required to work have limited their legal argument as to the viability of Smith’s
longer hours and thus was effectively paid less for the same age, sex and disability claims to the issue of whether Smith
job. The court rejected this argument because Smith actually was constructively discharged. Accordingly, this Court has
was complaining of the same wages for different work, a limited its analysis to whether summary judgment was
claim which is not colorable under the Equal Pay Act. Smith warranted solely on the ground that Smith did not suffer an
filed her notice of appeal on August 29, 2002. adverse employment action in the form of a constructive
discharge.
II
The existence of a constructive discharge “depends upon
A. Standard of Review the facts of each case and requires an inquiry into the intent of
the employer and the reasonably foreseeable impact of the
The Court reviews a district court’s grant of summary employer’s conduct upon the employee.” Held v. Gulf Oil
judgment de novo, and affirms such a judgment only if there Co., 684 F.2d 427, 432 (6th Cir. 1982). A constructive
is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled discharge requires a determination that “‘working conditions
to judgment as a matter of law. Cotter v. Ajilon Serv., Inc., would have been so difficult or unpleasant that a reasonable
287 F.3d 593, 597 (6th Cir. 2002). “The Court should believe person in the employee’s shoes would have felt compelled to
the evidence presented by the nonmovant, and draw all resign.’” Id. (quoting Bourque v. Powell Elec. Mfg., 617 F.2d
justifiable inferences in [her] favor.” Id. (citing Plant v. 61, 65 (5th Cir. 1980)). See also Policastro v. Northwest
Morton Int’l, Inc., 212 F.3d 929, 933-34 (6th Cir. 2000)). Airlines, Inc., 297 F.3d 535, 539 (6th Cir. 2002) (conditions
supporting a constructive discharge “must be objectively
B. Analysis intolerable to a reasonable person”) (citations omitted).
1. Equal Pay Act Claim Smith points to the following facts in support of her
constructive discharge claim: (1) Conklin, a supervisor like
Smith has presented absolutely no argument on appeal Smith, unilaterally altered the work schedules Smith had
regarding the district court’s dismissal of her Equal Pay Act prepared for her employees; (2) Mullin, Smith’s direct
claim. Accordingly, she has waived her right to challenge the supervisor, refused to authorize Smith to approve overtime for
district court’s grant of summary judgment for the USPS on her employees, which Smith claims was necessary to manage
that claim. See Smoot v. United Transp. Union, 246 F.3d 633, the Tour I workload; (3) Mullin refused to permit Smith to
647 (6th Cir.2001) (“This Court deems issues presented in a delegate the duty of facility-wide financial accounting to a
perfunctory manner on appeal to have been waived.”). subordinate employee, as he had permitted other Tour I
Supervisors to do, resulting in her working between 10 and 12
hours a day, in contravention of her medical restrictions; (4)
Mullin criticized Smith in front of subordinates, calling her
“incompetent” on at least one occasion; (5) Mullin called
Smith a whiner after she had complained in writing about
No. 02-6073 Smith v. Henderson 9 10 Smith v. Henderson No. 02-6073
Mullin’s failure to authorize overtime for her employees, § 791(g) (providing that complaints of nonaffirmative action
statements by Conklin that she perceived as “mocking,” and disability discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act are
not being permitted to delegate some of her job duties to governed by the standards under Title I of the ADA); 39
subordinates; and (6) Mullin allegedly directed Smith to C.F.R. § 255.5 (USPS Rehabilitation Act regulation that
underreport the hours she had worked. adopts by reference the EEOC’s ADA regulations set forth at
29 C.F.R. part 1614); 29 C.F.R. § 1614.203(b) (EEOC
The above-described actions involve the manner in which regulation providing that the Rehabilitation Act standards are
the USPS supervised and/or criticized Smith’s job the same as the ADA standards set forth at 29 CFR part
performance and assigned job duties to her, actions which 1630). Under these regulations, it would have been unlawful
normally are insufficient to establish a constructive discharge for the USPS not to make reasonable accommodation to
as a matter of law. E.g., Policastro, 297 F.3d at 539 (holding Smith’s known physical limitations, unless the
that employee was not constructively discharged where the accommodation would have imposed “an undue hardship on
only aspect of her job that changed was that she would have the operation of its business.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.9(a). A
to travel more frequently); see also Tidwell v. Meyer’s reasonable accommodation means, among other things,
Bakeries, Inc., 93 F.3d 490, 496 (8th Cir. 1996) “[m]odifications or adjustments … to the manner or
(“Dissatisfaction with a work assignment is, as a matter of circumstances under which the position held or desired is
law, normally not so intolerable as to be a basis for customarily performed.” Id. § 1630.2(o)(ii).
constructive discharge.”) (citing Carter v. Ball, 33 F.3d 450,
459 (4th Cir. 1994) (“Dissatisfaction with work assignments, Smith was entitled to a reasonable accommodation at the
a feeling of being unfairly criticized, or difficult or unpleasant USPS so long as she was a “qualified” individual with a
working conditions are not so intolerable as to compel a disability, meaning that the modifications and adjustments
reasonable person to resign.”)); King v. AC & R Advertising, she sought would have enabled her to perform the “essential
65 F.3d 764, 768-69 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding no constructive functions” of the Tour I Supervisor job. Id.; see also id.
discharge where the plaintiff’s employment status was § 1630.2(m); 39 C.F.R. § 255.5. The essential functions
changed from “for cause” to “at-will”; plaintiff’s managerial means the “fundamental job duties” of the position, not
responsibilities were reduced; and his base salary was “marginal functions.” Id. § 1630.2(n).
reduced). But this case is not the typical constructive
discharge case. Smith is alleging that the USPS failed to The USPS has conceded that Smith, who suffers from
reasonably accommodate her disability as required by the rheumatoid arthritis, is disabled and that it provided her a
Rehabilitation Act and that the failure-to-accommodate reasonable accommodation in 1997 so that she could perform
precipitated her involuntary resignation. Thus, the central her non-management position as a distribution clerk. See J.A.
issue is whether the USPS’s alleged rescission of, or refusal 42, Mem. in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at 9
to provide, a reasonable accommodation converted her (“The record demonstrates and the Postal Service
resignation into a constructive discharge. acknowledges that plaintiff is a person with a disability, and
that the disability was accommodated given the restrictions
The EEOC’s regulations pursuant to Title I of the that were in place for plaintiff since 1997.”). That
Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 accommodation limited her work to no more than eight hours
et seq., set forth the relevant legal standards for a per day, 40 hours per week. It can be inferred from the record
Rehabilitation Act claim against the USPS. See 29 U.S.C. that the Tour I Supervisor position that Smith assumed in
No. 02-6073 Smith v. Henderson 11 12 Smith v. Henderson No. 02-6073
1998 generally demanded more than 40 hours of work per would no longer apply to her job as a Tour I Supervisor.
week due in part to the accounting responsibilities. Further, Further, Smith’s predecessor in the Tour I Supervisor job has
if this Court assumes the truth of Smith’s deposition stated that the accounting duties would take him anywhere
testimony (as it must in this context), a reasonable jury could from 45 minutes to three hours a day, suggesting that a
infer that, after Smith became Tour I Supervisor, Mullin delegation of these duties would have substantially shortened
rescinded the hours-of-work accommodation that she had Smith’s day. Taken together, these facts create a genuine
enjoyed as a distribution clerk and/or refused to extend this issue of material fact as to whether the May 3, 1998 letter,
accommodation to her new job. See J.A. 148 (Smith’s which sought to delegate the accounting duties, was a request
deposition testimony; testifying that Mullin reminded her for a reasonable accommodation that triggered the USPS’s
numerous times after she became a supervisor that she “was obligation to participate, in good faith, in an “interactive
an exempt employee and [she] could work over 40 hours and process” with Smith as to potential reasonable
[her] medical restrictions didn’t apply because [she] was an accommodations. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.02(o)(3); Brown v. Chase
exempt employee”) (emphasis added). Brass & Copper Co., Inc., 14 Fed. Appx. 482, 487 n.2 (6th
Cir. 2001) (“If an employer's unwillingness to engage in such
Additionally, it can be inferred from the record that, after a process leads to a failure to reasonably accommodate an
Mullin refused to honor the hours-of-work accommodation, employee, the employer might be liable under the ADA.”)
he subsequently denied Smith another form of (citing Beck v. University of Wis. Bd. of Regents, 75 F.3d
accommodation that effectively would have reduced her work 1130, 1135 (7th Cir.1996)). According to Smith, Mullin
hours in the Tour I Supervisor position. Via a letter dated rejected her proposed accommodation, telling her that she was
May 3, 1998, Smith asked Mullin if she could delegate her “now in a man’s world” and accusing her of “always
financial accounting duties to a subordinate, as other Tour I whining.” Thus, if a jury were to find that Smith’s May 3,
Supervisors had done in the past. Since it is undisputed that 1998, letter constituted a request for a reasonable
the accounting duties were time-consuming and Mullin was accommodation, there appears to be little dispute that the
aware of Smith’s disability and her need to work restricted USPS flatly denied that request.
hours, a factfinder could infer that Smith’s letter constituted
a request for an accommodation that would have substantially The USPS argues that Smith waived her right to request a
shortened her work day, in line with her medical restrictions. delegation-of-accounting-duties accommodation because “she
was told before she assumed the duties she would not be
Such an inference would be reasonable even though allowed to delegate [the financial accounting duties].”
Smith’s letter did not use the word “accommodation” or Appellee’s Br. at 26. The USPS, however, fails to cite to any
specifically mention that she was seeking to delegate the record evidence in support of this assertion. In any event, a
accounting function because of her disability. The context in qualified individual with a disability does not waive her right
which the letter was written permits an inference that Mullin to an accommodation in the form of a modification of job
knew or should have known that Smith sought to delegate her duties simply by being apprised of the job duties before she
accounting duties in order to make her job conform with her commences work. If this were the rule of law, it is difficult
medical restrictions. Mullin was well aware of Smith’s to see how a disabled individual ever would be entitled to a
disability and her need for a medical restriction on her hours reasonable accommodation, since people usually are aware of
of work when she was a distribution clerk. As previously what their duties will be before they start a new job.
noted, Mullin told Smith that her medical accommodation
No. 02-6073 Smith v. Henderson 13 14 Smith v. Henderson No. 02-6073
Given the precedent of prior Tour I Supervisors delegating when the USPS had permitted other Tour I Supervisors to use
the accounting function to subordinate employees (including subordinate employees for the accounting function.
to Smith before she was promoted), there also is a genuine
issue of material fact as to whether the accounting duty was The USPS further argues that Smith was not permitted to
an essential function of the Tour I Supervisor position. As a delegate the accounting function because she did not know
non-essential function, the accounting duty potentially could how to do it correctly. See Appellee’s Br. at 26-27 (“It was
have been reassigned to subordinate employees as a not unreasonable to … not allow her to delegate the
“reasonable” accommodation of Smith’s disability. See 29 accounting until she, like Conklin [the former Tour I
C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3) (noting that “[j]ob restructuring” may Supervisor], knew how to correctly perform it.”). But the fact
be a reasonable accommodation”); Id. Part 1630, App. that Smith could not adequately perform a marginal job
(Interpretive Guidance on Title I of the ADA) (“An employer function suggests that it would have benefitted the USPS to
or other covered entity may restructure a job by reallocating assign that function to another employee. Ironically, the
or redistributing nonessential, marginal job functions.…An USPS’s argument tends to show that the accommodation
employer or other covered entity is not required to reallocate Smith requested was reasonable.
essential functions.”).
The USPS also has presented no evidence regarding other
And if a factfinder reasonably could infer that the factors relevant to the “undue hardship” defense, such as the
accounting duty was a non-essential job function that could overall financial resources of the Elizabethtown Post Office,
have been reassigned, there also is a genuine issue of material the overall financial resources of the USPS, and the impact on
fact as to whether this accommodation would have imposed the Elizabethtown Post Office’s ability to conduct business.
an “undue hardship” on the USPS, a circumstance that would 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(p)(ii), (iii),(v). On the facts of this case,
have justified the USPS’s denial of that accommodation. 29 we believe that a jury is in the best position to weigh these
C.F.R. § 1630.9(a). The USPS bears the burden of providing factors.
undue hardship,2 but it has not set forth specific facts
indisputably demonstrating that such an accommodation To summarize, prior to Smith’s promotion to Tour I
would have resulted in “significant difficulty or expense.” 29 Supervisor, the USPS was aware of Smith’s disability and her
C.F.R. § 1630.2(p). Mullin states generally that he did not medical need to avoid working overtime so as not to
want Smith to delegate her accounting duties because exacerbate her rheumatoid arthritis. The USPS had granted
“production was down and costs were up” due to Smith’s use her an accommodation that limited her work as a distribution
of clerks to perform the accounting. But it is not clear from clerk to no more than eight hours per day, 40 hours per week.
the record that the lower production and increased costs After Smith’s promotion, however, the USPS refused to apply
amounted to significant difficulty or expense, especially the restricted hours accommodation to her new position.
There also is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
Smith requested, and was denied, an alternative
accommodation in the form of being permitted to delegate the
accounting duties of her supervisory position to a subordinate.
2
See Smith v. Ameritech, 129 F.3d 857 , 866 (6th Cir. 1997) (noting This form of accommodation would have shortened Smith’s
that the employer bears the burden of proving undue hardship) (citing work hours to better conform with her medical restrictions.
Mo nette v. Electronic Data Sys. Corp., 90 F.3d 117 3, 1183 (6th Cir. In addition, there is a genuine issue of material fact as to
199 6)).
No. 02-6073 Smith v. Henderson 15 16 Smith v. Henderson No. 02-6073
whether the two accommodations Smith sought (restricted the employee to get to work”). The district court erred in
hours and/or delegated accounting duties) would have ruling, as a matter of law, that Smith had not suffered a
constituted “reasonable” accommodations under the constructive discharge.
Rehabilitation Act, or would have posed an undue hardship to
the USPS. The fact that the USPS had permitted Smith’s We do not believe that Smith’s situation is comparable to
predecessor in the supervisor position to delegate the that of employees who prematurely quit their jobs in
accounting duties suggests that these duties were non- apprehension that their situations would not improve. See,
essential job functions that could have been delegated without e.g., EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 233 F.3d 432, 441 (7th
posing such a hardship. Cir. 2000) (affirming summary judgment on constructive
discharge claim premised on failure to accommodate
Assuming that Smith was denied a reasonable disability; holding that quitting was not the only option
accommodation that forced her to work well in excess of her available to the plaintiff because she could have discussed the
medical restrictions, a jury reasonably could infer that the need for accommodations with her supervisor). Those cases
USPS (through Mullin) knew that Smith’s working conditions do not involve an individual like Smith, who allegedly was
would become intolerable to a reasonable person suffering worked to exhaustion and poor health by an employer who
from her particular disability. As noted, Mullin rescinded was aware of the individual’s disability, but nevertheless
and/or refused to honor Smith’s hours-of-work refused to honor a reasonable accommodation, and denied
accommodation that had been in place since 1997, denied another, that would have precluded such an overwhelming
Smith the reasonable accommodation of delegating her non- workload.
essential accounting duties, and forced her to work long
stretches of over-forty-hour weeks with few or no days off, We also do not believe that Smith had an affirmative duty
resulting in the foreseeable consequence that Smith’s health under the Rehabilitation Act to request her old job back as a
would markedly deteriorate. Thus, a reasonable jury could distribution clerk (along with the hours restriction that
conclude that the USPS knowingly and deliberately “turned accompanied it) once she realized that she could not work the
its back” on Smith and, therefore, the USPS could foresee that hours of a Tour I Supervisor. In many situations, such as the
Smith would be compelled to quit her job in order to preserve instant case, the duty to request one’s former job back would
her health. Cf. Johnson v. Shalala, 991 F.2d 126, 132 (4th immunize the employer’s failure to abide by its legal
Cir. 1993) (holding that an employee who was provided obligation to provide a reasonable accommodation. The
some, but not all, of the reasonable accommodations she purpose of statutes like the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA
requested, could not quit and sue her employer under a is to prevent employers from discriminating “based on
constructive discharge theory, but recognizing “that a characteristics that are beyond the control of such individuals
complete failure to accommodate, in the face of repeated and resulting from stereotypic assumptions not truly
requests, might suffice as evidence to show the deliberateness indicative of the individual ability of such individuals to
necessary for constructive discharge”); Hurley-Bardige v. participate in, and contribute to, society.” 42 U.S.C.
Brown, 900 F. Supp. 567, 573 n.7 (D. Mass. 1995) (noting § 12101(a)(7). Requiring a disabled employee to relinquish
that a failure to provide a reasonable accommodation could a promotion because an employer refuses to comply with the
result in a constructive discharge when, for example, an law by looking beyond the disability and providing a
employer “refuse[s] to build a ramp or elevator for an reasonable accommodation would flout this fundamental
employee confined to a wheelchair, making it impossible for goal.
No. 02-6073 Smith v. Henderson 17
The Court also finds our Circuit’s prior decision in Johnson
v. City of Saline, 151 F.3d 564 (6th Cir. 1998), to be
instructive. There, this Court rejected the argument that a
disabled plaintiff, who allegedly had been denied a reasonable
accommodation, could not sue the City of Saline for
compensatory damages on the ground that the Plaintiff
“himself chose to violate his medical restrictions” after being
denied the requested accommodation. Id. at 573. The Court
held that “the doctrine of avoidable consequences does not
apply to intentional or continuous torts to which the city’s
actions [denying a reasonable accommodation] appear
analogous.” Id. 573-74 (citations omitted). If a disabled
individual can recover damages even though he chooses to
work beyond his medical restrictions after being denied a
reasonable accommodation, it necessarily follows that such an
individual can impose liability on a covered entity in this
circumstance. Thus, in this case, Smith was not required to
request her old job back after being denied accommodations
that possibly would have enabled her to perform the Tour I
Supervisor job, even though by failing to make this request
she knowingly (but not willingly) worked beyond her medical
restrictions, thereby hastening her physical deterioration.3
III.
For the foregoing reasons, the district court erred in
granting summary judgment for the United States Postal
Service on Smith’s claims for sex, age and disability
discrimination, but not with respect to her claim under the
Equal Pay Act. The district court’s summary judgment order
is AFFIRMED, in part, REVERSED, in part, and the case
is REMANDED for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
3
In any event, it is not clear from the record below whether Sm ith
could have asked for her old job back because there is no indication that
her former position was available.