Heiser v. Union Carbide Corp ( 2004 )

RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206 2 Ball, et al. v. Union Nos. 02-6289/6311
ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2004 FED App. 0334A (6th Cir.) Carbide Corp., et al.
File Name: 04a0334a.06
_________________
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS COUNSEL
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT ARGUED: Edmund L. Carey, Jr., BARRETT, JOHNSTON
_________________ & PARSLEY, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellants.
Christopher Landau, KIRKLAND & ELLIS, Washington,
FANNIE BALL , et al. X D.C., John T. Buckingham, ASSISTANT UNITED STATES
(02-6289); STEPHEN HEISER, - ATTORNEY, Knoxville, Tennessee, for Appellees.
et al. (02-6311), - ON BRIEF: Edmund L. Carey, Jr., George E. Barrett,
- Nos. 02-6289/6311 BARRETT, JOHNSTON & PARSLEY, Nashville,
Plaintiffs-Appellants, - Tennessee, for Appellants. Christopher Landau, Susan E.
> Kearns, KIRKLAND & ELLIS, Washington, D.C., John T.
,
v. - Buckingham, ASSISTANT UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,
- Knoxville, Tennessee, Kevin T. Van Wart, KIRKLAND &
UNION CARBIDE CORP ., et al., - ELLIS, Chicago, Illinois, E. H. Rayson, Thomas M. Hale,
KRAMER, RAYSON, LEAKE, RODGERS & MORGAN,
Defendants-Appellees. - Knoxville, Tennessee, for Appellees.
-
N _______________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Tennessee at Knoxville AMENDED OPINION
Nos. 01-00022; 01-00037—James H. Jarvis, District Judge. _______________________
Argued: April 27, 2004 JUDITH M. BARZILAY, Judge. This is a consolidated
case. The Heiser Plaintiffs are individuals who live or have
Decided and Filed: September 30, 2004 lived in or near Oak Ridge, Tennessee, and who allegedly
have cancer or have an increased risk of acquiring cancer or
Before: GUY and GILMAN, Circuit Judges; BARZILAY, other diseases. The Ball Plaintiffs are African-Americans
Judge.* who live or have lived in a community known as Scarboro in
Oak Ridge. Plaintiffs claim that they have been harmed
through exposure to radioactive and other toxic substances
over the period when nuclear weapons were manufactured in
Oak Ridge. Defendants are private contractors of the United
States government that operate or have operated nuclear
weapons manufacturing and research facilities in the Oak
* Ridge Reservation (“Contractor-Defendants”), and Secretary
The Honorable Judith M. Barzilay, Judge, United States Court of Spencer Abraham of the United States Department of Energy
International Trade, sitting by designation.
1
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Carbide Corp., et al. Carbide Corp., et al.
and John A. Gordon of the National Nuclear Security predominantly African-American community in Oak Ridge.”
Administration (“Government-Defendants”). Plaintiffs (JA 192.)
appeal from a final order granting summary judgment to both
the Contractor-Defendants and Government-Defendants, and In addition to federal agencies, the following private
the denial of Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification. contractors operate or have operated the Oak Ridge facilities
Plaintiffs seek injunctive and equitable relief for medical and are named as Contractor-Defendants in Plaintiffs’
monitoring and environmental cleanup, and, in Heiser, complaint: the University of Chicago; Monsanto Company;
damages.1 For all the reasons stated below, we AFFIRM. Union Carbide Corporation; Roane-Anderson Company;
Management Services, Inc.; Eastman Chemical Company;
BACKGROUND Eastman Kodak Company; Turner Construction Company;
UT-Battelle, LLC; Martin-Marietta Energy Systems, Inc.;
The federal government established the Oak Ridge Lockheed Martin Energy Systems, Inc.; BWXT Y-12 LLC;
Reservation (“ORR”) as part of the Manhattan Project in and Bechtel Jacobs Company, LLC. (JA 32, 147.)
1942. The ORR includes three production facilities, each in
a separate valley. The city of Oak Ridge was established in In 1992 the state and federal governments collaborated in
the ORR to house thousands of civilian workers and military forming a panel (Oak Ridge Health Agreement Steering Panel
personnel. The federal ownership and control of the area (“ORHASP”)) to study the health effects of the release of
ended when the City of Oak Ridge received a charter of radioactive and other toxic substances from the Oak Ridge
incorporation from the State of Tennessee in 1959. facilities. The ORHASP periodically disclosed the results of
its ongoing study and held open meetings throughout the
In the early 1940s, African-American workers were 1990s. The study was covered by the news media.
recruited from Tennessee and other southern states to work as
common laborers, janitors, and domestic workers in Oak On January 15, 2000, the ORHASP issued its final report
Ridge. These workers were housed in a separate camp, which to the public. The report was dated December 1999. The
came to be known as Scarboro, near one of the Oak Ridge ORHASP final report determined:
plants, code named Y-12, that enriched uranium and produced
nuclear weapon components. It is undisputed that Scarboro The results suggest it is likely that some people were hurt
was established and maintained as a segregated community in by the releases. The project reports present estimates of
the 1940s. The district court noted that “Scarboro remains a the number of people who could have become ill as a
result of exposure to the ORR environmental pollutants.
Two groups were most likely to have been harmed: local
children drinking milk from a “backyard” cow or goat in
1
The Ball Plaintiffs no longer ask for d amages, Pls.’ B all Br. at 1-2,
the early 1950s, and fetuses carried in the 1950s and
19, even though initially they sought damages along with injunctive relief early 1960s by women who routinely ate fish taken from
and never amended their comp laint to that effect. (JA 51, 5 2.) the contaminated creeks and rivers located downstream
Contracto r-Defendants argue that the Ball Plaintiffs cannot “amend” their from the ORR.
complaint in their briefs to this court. See Con-D efs.’ Ba ll Br. at 17. In
any event, the Ball Plaintiffs’ arguments on this issu e are without merit, (JA 1329.)
as exp lained below.
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Carbide Corp., et al. Carbide Corp., et al.
The Heiser Plaintiffs claim personal injury from emissions. limitations issue. Pls.’ Ball Br. at 21-25; Pls.’ Heiser Br. at
Four of the Heiser Plaintiffs allege they have developed 33, 35-36. Contractor-Defendants counter that a separate
thyroid cancer due to radioactive emissions. The remaining notice was not required because their motion was for
three allege they are at risk of developing thyroid cancer. dismissal or, in the alternative, for summary judgment, which
provided notice to Plaintiffs. Con-Defs.’ Heiser Br. at 13-16.
The Ball Plaintiffs allege discrimination under a number of
civil rights statutes and the Equal Protection and Due Process A district court’s decision to convert a motion to dismiss
Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the under Rule 12(b)(6) into a motion for summary judgment
United States Constitution. In particular, the Ball Plaintiffs under Rule 56 is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See Shelby
allege that “Defendants located and maintained, and continue County Health Care Corp. v. S. Council of Indus. Workers
to maintain, Scarboro in an area known by Defendants to be Health & Welfare Trust Fund, 203 F.3d 926, 931 (6th Cir.
the most contaminated and the most vulnerable to ongoing 2000).
pollution because of its proximity to the Y-12 plant.” Pls.’
Ball Br. at 13-14. Plaintiffs maintain that as a result, the When deciding on a motion for summary judgment, Fed. R.
housing in Scarboro is less desirable, worth less, and accorded Civ. P. 56(f) allows the court to order discovery if it “should
lower priority in terms of cleanup than other parts of Oak . . . appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion
Ridge. Plaintiffs also maintain that “Defendants, by placing that the party cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit
Plaintiffs in the location of Scarboro and the immediate facts essential to justify the party’s opposition.” Further,
environs of the Y-12 plant, created a condition which was under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b), before the district court may treat
inherently unsafe and unhealthy; and is the proximate cause a motion to dismiss as a summary judgment motion, it must
of Plaintiffs’ injuries and of their higher risk of injuries, give “all parties . . . reasonable opportunity to present all
creating the need for medical monitoring and surveillance.” material made pertinent to” the issue. The Sixth Circuit
Id. at 15. interpreted this requirement to mean that it is “serious error”
for a district court to convert the motion sua sponte to a
Plaintiffs commenced this action within one year of the summary judgment motion without notice to parties and
date of the release of the ORHASP final report on January 15, without further discovery. Helwig v. Vencor, Inc., 251 F.3d
2000. 540, 552 (6th Cir. 2001) (en banc).
DISCUSSION Here, the district court did not act sua sponte in converting
the motion to dismiss to a summary judgment motion.
A. Notice and Discovery. Contractor-Defendants moved for summary judgment in the
alternative. Moreover, as Contractor-Defendants correctly
Plaintiffs first challenge the district court’s grant of assert, Plaintiffs responded to the summary judgment motion
summary judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 on the basis that by submitting materials outside the pleadings, such as
the statute of limitations had run on Plaintiffs’ claims. affidavits. See Con-Defs.’ Heiser Br. at 14-15. Therefore,
Plaintiffs argue that the district court should not have granted Plaintiffs’ insistence that they “genuinely were surprised that
the summary judgment without first giving notice to Plaintiffs the Court would have any intention to convert the motion,”
and without permitting Plaintiffs discovery as to the statute of Pls.’ Heiser Br. at 34, is not supported by the facts. They had
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Carbide Corp., et al. Carbide Corp., et al.
notice that the district court might treat the motion as one for The Sixth Circuit generally applies the abuse of discretion
summary judgment because such a motion was actually filed, standard to the district court’s decision to deny discovery
and they responded to it. whether such request was made on a motion or by a Rule
56(f) affidavit. See Plott, 71 F.3d at 1196-97. It is not an
Accordingly, the only remaining issue is whether the abuse of discretion for the district court to deny the discovery
district court abused its discretion in denying Plaintiffs’ request when the party “makes only general and conclusory
request for discovery before it granted the summary judgment statements [in its affidavit] regarding the need for more
motion. discovery and does not show how an extension of time would
have allowed information related to the truth or falsity of the
It is well-established that the plaintiff must receive “a full [document] to be discovered.” Ironside v. Simi Valley Hosp.,
opportunity to conduct discovery” to be able to successfully 188 F.3d 350, 354 (6th Cir. 1999). It is also not an abuse of
defeat a motion for summary judgment. See Anderson v. discretion to reject a Rule 56(f) affidavit as insufficient to
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 257 (1986); see also support further discovery when the affidavit lacks “any
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (“the plain details” or “specificity.” Emmons v. McLaughlin, 874 F.2d
language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary 351, 357 (6th Cir. 1989).
judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion,
against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to The affidavit in question here was submitted by Plaintiffs’
establish the existence of an element essential to that party's attorney and included the following statements in support of
case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at the discovery request:
trial”); White’s Landing Fisheries, Inc. v. Buchholzer, 29 F.3d
229, 231-32 (6th Cir. 1994) (“[in light of Anderson and In my opinion, to respond with due diligence,
Celotex,] a grant of summary judgment is improper if the discharging my responsibilities to the class, to the
non-movant is given an insufficient opportunity for materials outside the pleadings which these defendants
discovery”). urge the Court to consider by converting their motion to
one for summary judgment, would require obtaining the
The district court’s decision to deny further discovery is, results of substantial written and document discovery,
however, generally unreviewable unless the appellant has and a number of depositions, on the subjects of when
filed “a Rule 56(f) affidavit or a motion that gives the district plaintiffs’ claims accrued, and what information was
court a chance to rule on the need for additional discovery.” released by any defendants to members of the public and
Plott v. Gen. Motors Corp., 71 F.3d 1190, 1196 (6th Cir. when and how such releases occurred, and on a variety of
1995). “Beyond the procedural requirement of filing an statements, and agents of defendants, over the years on
affidavit, Rule 56(f) has been interpreted as requiring that a the subject of the safety of their operations and their
party making such a filing indicate to the district court its impact upon the environment surrounding their
need for discovery, what material facts it hopes to uncover, operations. Only this type of discovery would produce
and why it has not previously discovered the information.” an adequate response to the many partial documents, and
Cacevic v. City of Hazel Park, 226 F.3d 483, 488 (6th Cir. partial collections of documents, submitted by
2000). Defendants, who appear upon inspection of the
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Carbide Corp., et al. Carbide Corp., et al.
documents to have selected some, and omitted others affidavit was “irrelevant” to the issue of statute of limitations.
bearing on the same subjects. (JA 88.)
(JA 508; 1181.) B. Statute of Limitations.
Plaintiffs argue that the district court erred because the A district court’s decision to grant summary judgment is
affidavit was sufficient and specific. See Pls.’ Heiser Br. at reviewed de novo. Higgason v. Stephens, 288 F.3d 868, 874
49. Contractor-Defendants counter that Plaintiffs’ discovery (6th Cir. 2002).
request does not include any specific statements as to which
“material facts [they] hope[d] to uncover.” Con-Defs.’ Heiser (i) Personal injury claims.
Br. at 18 (quoting Cacevic, 226 F.3d at 488). Contractor-
Defendants additionally argue that “when plaintiffs’ claims The ultimate issue in this case is when the statute of
accrued” is not a discoverable fact, but is a legal question. limitations was triggered. Plaintiffs maintain that the district
See id. court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of all
Defendants on the grounds that Tennessee’s one-year statute
The district court here stated (without explanation) that of limitations barred Plaintiffs’ claims. Pls.’ Ball Br. at 25;
Plaintiffs “have not satisfied the requirements of Rule 56(f).” see also Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 28-3-104(a)(1), (3) (2000).
(JA 87.) The district court additionally noted, however, that Plaintiffs argue that the statute did not begin to run with
“even if they had, they have not described any helpful respect to their personal injury claims until January 15, 2000,
discovery in light of the fact that it has been publicly debated when the final report of the ORHASP was released.
since the early 1980s that toxins are present in the Oak Ridge
community.” (Id.) The district court further observed that the “The statute of limitations commences to run when the
ORHASP final report contained no information “not plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is
previously available to the public.” (Id.) The district court the basis of his action.” Sevier v. Turner, 742 F.2d 262, 273
took judicial notice of “such publicity” under Fed. R. Evid. (6th Cir. 1984); Carvell v. Bottoms, 900 S.W.2d 23, 29 (Tenn.
201. (JA 88.) 1995) (the statute is triggered when the plaintiff becomes
“aware of facts sufficient to put a reasonable person on notice
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying that he has suffered an injury as a result of wrongful
Plaintiffs’ discovery request. Plaintiffs’ Rule 56(f) affidavit conduct”). “A plaintiff has reason to know of his injury when
does not state how any discovery would have shed further he should have discovered it through the exercise of
light on the issue of when the statute of limitations began to reasonable diligence.” Sevier, 742 F.2d at 273. The Sixth
run. Plaintiffs merely hint at concealment on the part of Circuit explained the duty to inquire as follows:
Defendants with respect to adverse health effects of the
emissions. See discussion, infra. The reality of toxic [I]f greater than de minimis harm is discernable at the
emissions from the Oak Ridge facilities has, however, been in time of the tortious event, then the time of the event rule
the public domain for some time. Accordingly, as the district applies . . . [I]f the injured person sustains an injury
court stated, the discovery requested in Plaintiffs’ Rule 56(f) which cannot itself be reasonably discovered, or the
cause of which cannot reasonably be discovered, until
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Carbide Corp., et al. Carbide Corp., et al.
some time following the tortious event and the running is whether a typical person would have been aware of a
of the statue of limitations, courts often apply the possible link between emissions and health risks.3
“discovery” rule, tolling the running of the statute of
limitations to the date by which the plaintiff reasonably Given that local and national news media repeatedly
should have discovered both cause and injury. covered the issue, and that the ORHASP publicized the
progression of its study since its inception in 1992 and issued
Hicks v. Hines, Inc., 826 F.2d 1543, 1544 (6th Cir. 1987) its preliminary results throughout, Plaintiffs should have been
(quotations omitted); see Mich. United Food & Commercial
Workers Unions & Drug & Mercantile Employees Joint
Health & Welfare Fund v. Muir Co., 992 F.2d 594, 600 (6th unpersuasive. See P ls.’ Ball Br. at 41-44. The Hughes court reach ed its
Cir. 1993) (in defining the concept of due diligence, this court conclusion about the plaintiff’s possession of constructive knowledge
has “looked to what event should have alerted the typical lay before noting the admission in the com plaint. Hughes, 215 F.3d at 548-
person to protect his or her rights.” (quoting Dixon v. 49.
Anderson, 928 F.2d 212, 215 (6th Cir. 1991)); Overberg v. 3
Lusby, 921 F.2d 90, 91 (6th Cir. 1990) (noting that plaintiff W ith respect to the interpretation of widespread publicity, Plaintiffs
rely on the Ninth Circuit’s decision in O’Connor. See Pls.’ Heiser Br. at
had a duty to inquire when she became knowledgeable about 53-55. The O’Connor court held that “[t]he d istrict court erred in
her medical condition); accord O’Connor v. Boeing North concluding as a ma tter of law that newspaper reports concerning the
Am., Inc., 311 F.3d 1139, 1146-48 (9th Cir. 2002) (accrual of Defend ants' facilities were sufficiently ‘num erous and notorious’ to
claim must be based on “knowledge” and not “mere impute knowledge of them to Plaintiffs.” O’Connor, 311 F.3d at 1152.
suspicion”). The O’Connor court pronounced that the determination of widespread
publicity
As rightly observed by Contractor-Defendants, the public required a fact-intensive examination of the geo graphic scope of
record here was sufficient to alert Plaintiffs as to a possible the circulation of various publications, the level of saturation of
connection between emissions and health risks near Oak each publication within the relevant communities, the frequency
Ridge long before January 15, 2000. The rule in this Circuit with which articles on the Rocketdyne facilities appeared in each
is that “[w]here events receive . . . widespread publicity, publication, the prominence of those articles within the
publication, and the likelihood that a reaso nable person living in
plaintiffs may be charged with knowledge of their Plaintiffs' various com munities at the same time as P laintiffs
occurrence.” Hughes v. Vanderbilt Univ., 215 F.3d 543, 548 would have read such articles. These are all factual questions
(6th Cir. 2000) (quotation omitted). A plaintiff is charged unsuitab le for sum mary judgm ent.
with constructive knowledge even when she claims that “she
did not hear or read any of the media reports.” Hughes, 215 Id. W e are of the belief that the O’Connor decision does not announce a
bright-line rule with resp ect to the nature of pub licity about potentially
F.3d at 548. “The relevant inquiry in [such] cases . . . is an hazardous conditions like Oak Ridge emissions. We also observe that the
objective one.” Id. (citations omitted).2 That is, the question facts in O’C onnor are substantially different than the present case. The
O’Connor opinion cited at least three prior studies that undermined the
link betwe en the contam inants and the cancer. The O’Connor court
2
rightly observed that the media coverage did not “connect [the] dots”
Plaintiffs’ attempt to distinguish Hughes on the basis that there was dispersed by unclear scientific reports. Here, on the other hand, an
an admission by the named Hughes plaintiff in her complaint that she had amb iguity to that degree was not present. There has been no scientific
actual knowledge of the facts sufficiently in advance of her suit is repo rt negating the link b etween releases and health risks.
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Carbide Corp., et al. Carbide Corp., et al.
aware of a potential personal injury claim connected to Oak opposed to the disease itself. When the increased risk of
Ridge emissions or releases in 1998 or 1999 at the latest, disease is the injury claimed, the threshold of finding a “duty
when the ORHASP preliminary reports became available. to inquire” under Hicks is lower. That is, individuals should
(JA 213, 1391-1401, 1600-1603.) It is true that the ORHASP know that they are “at risk” as soon as a link between cancer
final report constitutes the first instance when a definite link and emissions becomes apparent. On the other hand, when
was established with finality. However, Plaintiffs do not the injury is contracting cancer, the claim will accrue when
allege that they belong to the two groups “most likely to have the plaintiff knew or should have known of the disease, not
been harmed” by the Oak Ridge releases.4 The issue of the just the risk of acquiring the disease. In that event, a plaintiff
final report did not by itself trigger Plaintiffs’ duty to inquire must clearly plead that the injury occurred within the statute
under Hicks. Accordingly, Plaintiffs should have raised their of limitations period. Plaintiffs here face a formidable statute
claims sometime in the late 1990s when it became apparent of limitations hurdle. The reason is in part that individuals
that they may have had a viable claim.5 not similarly situated became plaintiffs in one and the same
suit.6 It is possible the weaker claims have obscured the
More importantly, none of the Plaintiffs here claim that stronger claims. From this vantage point, however, it is
they have contracted a disease attributable to the toxic impossible to discern who would have a viable claim,
releases within the one-year statute of limitation period. Only especially given that no argument was advanced that plaintiffs
some of the Heiser Plaintiffs allege they have actually were diagnosed with any disease during the limitations
contracted cancer, while others claim increased risk of cancer. period. The district court noted correctly that “conceivably a
Yet, there must necessarily be different accrual dates when plaintiff with a still viable claim could exist (i.e., a person
the injury complained of is the increased risk of disease as who was diagnosed with thyroid cancer within one year of
filing suit).” (JA 88.). This opinion does not address such a
claim.
4
Even that finding had been released in draft form in March 1998 and On a different note, we find Plaintiffs’ claims alleging the
reported in local newspapers. The first paragraph of a March 1998
Knoxville News-Sentinel article reads “Releases of radioactive iodine from Contractor-Defendants’ “fraudulent acts” of concealment to
Oak Ridge National Laborato ry during the 1940 s and ‘50s p robably be without merit. Pls.’ Ball Br. at 45. Plaintiffs claim no
exposed thousands of children to radiation and increased their lifetime specific act of concealment, but underline that a number of
risk of developing thyroid cancer, scientists repo rted T hursday in the articles that covered Oak Ridge were equivocal and
preliminary findings.” Report Ties Releases of Iodine, K NOXVILLE N E W S- contained phrases such as “no harm” from the emissions, “no
S ENTINEL, March 20, 1998. An Oak Ridg er article of the same date had
the headline: “Releases Linked to Thyroid Cancer.” T HE O AK R IDGER , link” to cancer, and “no health concern.” Id. 52; Pls.’ Heiser
May 20, 1998. Br. at 53. Plaintiffs also point to “national security
classification” of information regarding Oak Ridge. Pls.’ Ball
5 Br. at 38.
Plaintiffs’ attorney specifically states in his affidavit that a lawsuit
during the 1990s would have been premature and frivolous under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 11. (JA 509.) “A principal reason was that most relevant
information was classified, unrelease d, and therefore unavailable and
would remain unavailable.” (Id.) However, as urged by Contractor- 6
Defend ants, the stand ard is an objective one and does not relate to what Indeed, the district court devoted most of its opinion to explaining
Plaintiffs’ attorney m ay subjectively have b elieved or no t believe d. why a class certification of these ind ividuals was no t appropriate.
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Carbide Corp., et al. Carbide Corp., et al.
We recognize that when a government project such as Oak Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992); Columbus Board of
Ridge is shrouded in secrecy, it may be difficult to collect the Education v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979); and Dayton Board
necessary facts to make a case. However, it was well known of Education v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526 (1979). Plaintiffs
that plants in Oak Ridge engaged in nuclear weapons also rely on various affirmative action cases for the
manufacturing and other nuclear research, that they released proposition that “affirmative action may be used to eradicate
toxic materials, and that such toxic materials may be continuing effects (i.e., “vestiges”) of discrimination that
hazardous to human health depending on the dosage. (JA occurred in the past.” Pls.’ Ball Br. at 33-34. The cases cited
303-12; 988-1001; 1599-1603.) Plaintiffs needed to present by Plaintiffs include Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education,
to this court with sufficient clarity and “particularity” what 476 U.S. 267 (1986); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448
they claim was fraudulently concealed by government (1980) (including the concurring opinion by Justice Powell);
officials and contractors and how that affected their case. United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193
Dayco v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 523 F.2d 389, 394 (1979); Regents of University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
(6th Cir. 1975). We find nothing in the record of this case 265 (1978); Hazelwood School District v. United States, 433
that exhibits any concealment motivated by bad faith on the U.S. 299 (1977); and Hammon v. Barry, 813 F.2d 412 (D.C.
part of Defendants. We further note that the duty to inquire Cir. 1987).
applies even when the government may have engaged in
concealment of facts. See Kronisch v. United States, 150 F.3d Contractor-Defendants counter that Plaintiffs’ alleged
112, 121 (2d Cir. 1998).7 exposure to Oak Ridge emissions is not a “vestige” of racial
discrimination. Con-Defs.’ Ball Br. at 19-22. Contractor-
(ii) Civil rights claims. Defendants alternatively argue that they have no ongoing
affirmative duty to remedy the effects of discrimination by
The Ball Plaintiffs additionally argue that the statute of governmental entities. Id. at 22, 29. Contractor-Defendants
limitations does not apply because Contractor-Defendants finally argue that, in any event, there is no affirmative duty to
have a continuing affirmative duty to remedy effects of remedy the effects of residential segregation.
exposure to emissions as such effects constitute “vestiges” of
historical de jure racial segregation. Pls.’ Ball Br. at 28. The district court observed that “the Scarboro community
Plaintiffs charge that “the continuing existence of Scarboro as has been integrated since the 1950s.” (JA 89.) The district
a segregated community is attributable (and attributed by the court went on to say: “To find otherwise would mean the
Amended Complaint) to all Defendants’ unconscionable statute of limitations would never be tolled unless every black
actions.” Pls.’ Ball Br. at 29. Plaintiffs attempt to derive person left Scarboro.” (Id.) The district court specifically
support from a number of school desegregation cases, such as discounted the de facto discrimination cases regarding school
desegregation finding them “not applicable here.” (Id.)
7 The district court is correct. The factual patterns of school
Mo reover, we are of the opinion that Contractor-Defendants’ raising
the issue of statute of limitations gave Plaintiffs sufficient notice of the desegregation cases bear little resemblance to the facts alleged
viability of this issue w ith respe ct to G overnment-Defendants. here. Moreover, Plaintiffs do not seek to eliminate the
Accordingly, we do not believe that the district court erred in resolving “vestige” of past discrimination by asking for the
this issue with resp ect to G overnment-Defendants as well. Cf. Haskell v.
Wa shing ton T ownship, 864 F.2d 12 66, 1273 n.3 (6th Cir. 1988).
desegregation of Scarboro. See Con-Defs.’ Ball Br. at 20.
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Carbide Corp., et al. Carbide Corp., et al.
“Rather, [they] are seeking remedies for potential personal have any such duty under the school desegregation and
injuries and property damage relating to alleged exposure to affirmative discrimination cases.
Oak Ridge emissions.”8 Id. at 20-21. As Contractor-
Defendants correctly explain: On the issue of affirmative duty, the case Plaintiffs rely on
is distinguishable. In Hills v. Gautreaux, the Supreme Court
[T]he fact that [Plaintiffs’] alleged personal injuries and sustained “[a]n order directing HUD to use its discretion
property damage might not have occurred (or might not under the various federal housing programs to foster projects
have been so serious) but for the racial discrimination located in white areas of the Chicago housing market,”
that led to the establishment of Scarboro in the first finding that such an order would be “consistent with and
instance does not mean that the discrimination was the supportive of well-established federal housing policy.”
proximate cause of those injuries and that damage. The 425 U.S. 284, 301 (1976). HUD was ordered to remedy its
concept of the “vestiges” of discrimination has never own “wrong” of “confin[ing black tenants] to segregated
been stretched so far as to encompass anything bad that public housing.” Id. at 299. In this case, there is no
happens to someone that might not have happened but allegation here that Contractor-Defendants initiated the
for racial segregation. Under [P]laintiffs’ logic, anything segregation.
bad that happens as a result of Scarboro’s location can be
deemed a “vestige” of discrimination, since Scarboro Accordingly, we find that neither the United States
itself would not exist but for discrimination. Constitution nor federal civil rights statutes afford the relief
Plaintiffs ask.9
Id. at 21. It would indeed be a stretch to rely on the school
desegregation cases to require Contractor-Defendants to C. Class certification.
eliminate any lingering effects of past governmental
discrimination by paying for cleanup and medical monitoring. Plaintiffs next challenge the district court’s denial of their
class action certification motion. In Heiser, Plaintiffs sought
The affirmative action cases Plaintiffs reference are to certify as a Rule 23(b)(2) or Rule 23(b)(3) class:
similarly not dispositive. Those cases stand for the
proposition that affirmative action is not prohibited by the [P]ersons who lived in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, or
Constitution or the federal civil rights statutes. See Con- otherwise resided in a nearby geographic area under the
Defs.’ Ball Br. at 26-27. These cases do not, however, go as influence of the Defendants from 1943 to the present
far as to interpret the Constitution and the federal civil rights who have not yet contracted thyroid cancer but who have
statutes as mandating government contractors to remedy past been exposed and put at risk by Defendants’ act.
discrimination. That is, contractors have no affirmative duty
to eliminate current effects of past discrimination by In Ball, Plaintiffs sought to certify as a Rule 23(b)(2) class:
governmental entities. Neither do the government officials
9
Because we find the Ball Plaintiffs’ civil rights claim s without merit
8
in any event, we need not reach the issue of which statute of limitations
See supra note 1, regarding the remedy the Ball Plaintiffs are now applies to the claims: the four-year statute of limitations of 28 U.S.C.
seeking. § 16 58, the one-year T ennessee statute, or another statute.
Nos. 02-6289/6311 Ball, et al. v. Union 19 20 Ball, et al. v. Union Nos. 02-6289/6311
Carbide Corp., et al. Carbide Corp., et al.
[A]ll individuals of African American descent who certification is appropriate. See Pls.’ Ball Br. at 53. Plaintiffs
currently live in and/or currently own property in also challenge the district court’s focus on individualized
Scarboro and/or once lived in the Scarboro community issues of proof with respect to commonality because they
and continue to frequently visit the Scarboro community. assert that the predominance analysis is inappropriate in
analyzing commonality. See id. at 56. Plaintiffs explain that
(JA 203.) The district court first emphasized that class action “[i]f the issue of liability is common to all class members then
certification is generally not appropriate in mass tort cases. Rule 23(a)(2) commonality and Rule 23(a)(3)’s typicality
The district court further denied the motion because it found requirements are satisfied.” Id. at 57 (citing Mayer v. Mylod,
that Plaintiffs failed to show commonality and typicality of 988 F.2d 635, 640 (6th Cir. 1993)). Plaintiffs identify the
claims, and failed to meet the adequate representation commonality issue as Defendants’ obligation to remedy
requirement under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a).10 present discriminatory effects of past discrimination, and the
typicality issue as Defendants’ same unlawful conduct being
Plaintiffs charge that the district court abused its discretion directed at both Plaintiffs and the other members of the
when it ignored “five separate sworn affidavits or declarations putative class. See id. at 54, 59.
submitted” in support of their class certification motion. Pls.’
Heiser Br. at 57. Plaintiffs further charge that the district Contractor-Defendants claim that the Ball case “is
court abused its discretion by treating the Ball Plaintiffs as a essentially the Heiser case, dressed up as a civil rights case.”
subclass of the Heiser Plaintiffs because, where race Con-Defs.’ Ball Br. at 32 (emphasis in the original).
discrimination is alleged and injunctive relief is sought, class Contractor-Defendants maintain that the true remedy sought
here is compensation for personal injury, property damage,
and medical monitoring, all of which are individual remedies.
10 See id. at 36.
Rule 23(a) reads as follows:
Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more memb ers of a class
may sue or be sue d as represe ntative p arties on behalf of all only As to the proposed class in Heiser, the district court found
if (1) the class is so nume rous that joinder of all me mbe rs is that the commonality requirement is not satisfied because
impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact comm on to “there are multiple issues not common to all class members.”
the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties
are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the
(JA 77-78.) The district court further found that the
representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the individual Plaintiffs’ claims were not typical of the claims of
interests of the class. the class as a whole because “many of the class members
were not even living in Oak Ridge in the 1950s, which is
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (a). Mo reover, an “action may be m aintained as a class when the most significant emissions complained of occurred.”
action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:
(JA 78.) For similar reasons, the district court also found that
... Plaintiffs were not adequate representatives of the class.
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on
grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby m aking As to the proposed class in Ball, the district court
app ropriate final injunctive relief, or corresponding declaratory observed:
relief with respect to the class as a whole . . . .”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2).
Nos. 02-6289/6311 Ball, et al. v. Union 21 22 Ball, et al. v. Union Nos. 02-6289/6311
Carbide Corp., et al. Carbide Corp., et al.
Even if it is assumed there are common issues with pass at least one of the tests set forth in Rule 23(b).”11 Id.
regard to de jure segregation and whether vestiges of that (citation omitted).
segregation remain in Scarboro, those questions do not
predominate over the innumerable individualized Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
questions that would exist with respect to each plaintiff. denying class certification. The district court analyzed the
Each member of the proposed class lived in Scarboro for Rule 23(a) requirements in concluding that Plaintiffs did not
a discrete period of time and was exposed to mercury or have claims common and typical to the class. The district
other toxins in a discrete way. Some may have lived court was correct in treating the Ball plaintiffs as a subset of
there for fifty or more years and some for a week or less. the Heiser plaintiffs because of the same underlying claim of
Some were there in the late 1950s when emissions were environmental injury in both. The Ball case is “simply not a
greatest and some were not. A few may have consumed case about racial discrimination in the abstract, but a case
milk from a backyard farm animal in the 1950s, most did alleging that racial discrimination caused environmental
not. As in Heiser, each individual plaintiff, if he or she injuries.” Con-Defs.’ Ball Br. at 40. Even though liability
has a claim, has a highly individualized claim based on issues may have been common to the putative class, by
his or her total exposure time, exposure period, medical seeking medical monitoring and environmental cleanup of
history, diet, sex, age, and a myriad of other factors. The property, Plaintiffs have raised individualized issues. Each
court finds that the individualized issues far outweigh individual’s claim was for that reason necessarily proportional
any common ones. to his or her exposure to toxic emissions or waste. Similarly,
the Heiser Plaintiffs’ claims depended on their period of
(JA 80-81.) The district court then pointed to differences residency in Oak Ridge and levels of exposure. Also, the
among the named Ball Plaintiffs, such as the duration of time “named plaintiffs who already have thyroid cancer have
they lived in Scarboro or their property ownership. (JA 81.) fundamentally different interests than those named and
The district court opined that, therefore, “there is no ‘typical’ unnamed plaintiffs who do not.” Con-Defs.’ Heiser Br. at 47
Scarboro resident for purposes of Rule 23.” Finally, the (emphasis in the original). Indeed, the Heiser Plaintiffs who
district court noted that the proposed class in Ball, as in had thyroid cancer were not even members of the proposed
Heiser, was too “vague.” (JA 82.) class, which was defined as consisting of individuals who
were at risk of developing the cancer.
The district court’s decision to deny class certification is
reviewed for abuse of discretion. See Sprague v. Gen. Motors Furthermore, Plaintiffs’ reliance on Sterling v. Velsicol
Corp., 133 F.3d 388, 397 (6th Cir. 1998) (en banc). The Chemical Corporation, 855 F.2d 1188, 1197 (6th Cir. 1988),
district court must “rigorously” analyze the requirements of is misplaced. In Sterling, this court observed that “the mere
Rule 23. See id. (citation omitted). “No class that fails to
satisfy all four of the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) may be
certified, and each class meeting those prerequisites must also 11
For that reason and contrary to Plaintiffs’ assertion, the district
court could no t have certified the Rule 2 3(b)(2 ) class without first finding
that all the req uirements of Rule 23(a) have been satisfied. The corollary
is that the district court need not have reached the Rule 23(b) issues after
finding the requirements of R ule 23 (a) have not been met.
Nos. 02-6289/6311 Ball, et al. v. Union 23 24 Ball, et al. v. Union Nos. 02-6289/6311
Carbide Corp., et al. Carbide Corp., et al.
fact that questions peculiar to each individual member of the error for the district court to refer to the fact that Plaintiffs’
class remain after the common questions of the defendant's individualized claims predominated over their claims in
liability have been resolved does not dictate the conclusion common.
that a class action is impermissible.” 855 F.2d at 1197. The
court went on to say that “where the [one] defendant's liability D. Sovereign immunity.
can be determined on a class-wide basis because the cause of
the disaster is a single course of conduct which is identical for Plaintiffs also challenge the grant of summary judgment as
each of the plaintiffs, a class action may be the best suited to Government-Defendants on the basis that Government-
vehicle to resolve such a controversy.” Id. Here, however, Defendants did not request that their motion be treated as a
there are multiple Defendants with presumably differing Rule 56 motion. See Pls.’ Ball Br. at 23. Government-
liability levels, if any. Accordingly, there is no “single course Defendants respond that the district court should have
of conduct.” Therefore, Sterling is distinguishable on its dismissed the case as against them for lack of subject matter
facts. Moreover, Sterling affirmed the class action jurisdiction. See Gov-Defs.’ Br. at 12. Government-
certification, emphasizing the district court’s discretion in Defendants contend that because Secretary Abraham and Mr.
making such decisions. Norton are sued in their official capacity as officers of a
governmental agency, they are immune from suit, and that
Finally, the fact that the district court’s discussions of the sovereign immunity has not been waived for any claim
commonality and typicality issues were intertwined is not against them. Id. at 12-13.
fatal. We have recognized that the “commonality and
typicality requirements of Rule 23(a) tend to merge.” This court reviews de novo determinations on questions of
Rutherford v. City of Cleveland, 137 F.3d 905, 909 (6th Cir. subject matter jurisdiction. See Singleton v. United States,
1998). Plaintiffs additionally charge that the district court 277 F.3d 864, 870 (6th Cir. 2002). Here, the district court did
should not have used the term “predominance” found in Rule not rule on Government-Defendants’ motion to dismiss. In
23(b)(3) in its analysis of commonality and typicality. 12 granting the summary judgment motion in favor of all
However, “the predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3) Defendants, the district court merely remarked that its ruling
[has been found] similar to the requirement of Rule 23(a)(3).” “pretermit[ed] other issues including those raised by the
Amchem Prods. Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 623 n.18 United States.” (JA 89, 215.)
(1997). As any claim the class may have had in common
threatened to splinter into individualized claims, it was not The district court should have explicitly dismissed
Plaintiffs’ claims against Government-Defendants. It is true
that federal courts have jurisdiction to provide injunctive
12 relief against unconstitutional actions by federal officials. See
According to Rule 23(b )(3), an “action may be maintained as a
class action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in
Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946). However, the district
add ition: court already ruled against Plaintiffs’ civil rights claims. As
... explained above, no case cited mandates the remedy sought
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the by Plaintiffs under the facts of this case. On the other hand,
members of the class predominate over any questions affec ting only it is well established that the United States as a sovereign
individual mem bers, and that a class action is superior to o ther available cannot be sued without its explicit consent. See Hercules,
methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.”
Nos. 02-6289/6311 Ball, et al. v. Union 25
Carbide Corp., et al.
Inc. v. United States, 516 U.S. 417, 422 (1996). Moreover,
sovereign immunity is a defense in suits against government
officials when sued in their official capacity. See Kentucky v.
Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166-67 (1985). Absent such consent,
the district court should have dismissed the claims against
Government-Defendants instead of including Government-
Defendants’ objections in its summary judgment ruling.
Nevertheless, remand is unnecessary since the case is
dismissed in any event against all Defendants.
CONCLUSION
For all the reasons stated above, we AFFIRM the judgment
of the district court.