In Re: R Scheiderer v. ( 2005 )


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  •             By order of the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel, the precedential effect
    of this decision is limited to the case and parties pursuant to 6th
    Cir. BAP LBR 8013-1(b). See also 6th Cir. BAP LBR 8010-1(c).
    File Name: 05b0003n.06
    BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL OF THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
    In re: ROGER SCHEIDERER,                     )
    )
    Debtor.                   )
    )
    )
    ROGER SCHEIDERER,                            )
    )
    Appellant,                )
    )
    v.                                           )           No. 04-8066
    )
    PRODUCERS CREDIT CORPORATION,                )
    )
    Appellee.                 )
    )
    Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court
    for the Southern District of Ohio, Eastern Division
    Chapter 7 Case No. 01-65198
    Submitted: May 4, 2005
    Decided and Filed: May 19, 2005
    Before: GREGG, PARSONS, and WHIPPLE, Bankruptcy Appellate Panel Judges.
    __________________
    COUNSEL
    ON BRIEF: Grady L. Pettigrew, Jr., COX, STEIN & PETTIGREW, Columbus, Ohio, for
    Appellant. Robert A. Bell, Jr., VORYS, SATER, SEYMOUR & PEASE, Columbus, Ohio, for
    Appellee.
    OPINION
    PER CURIAM. Roger Scheiderer (the “Debtor”) appeals an order enforcing his obligations
    under his confirmed Chapter 11 plan. Upon examination of the record and the briefs, the Panel
    unanimously agrees that oral argument is not needed because the decisional process would not be
    aided by oral argument. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8012. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that
    the order on appeal should be AFFIRMED.
    I. ISSUE ON APPEAL
    The issue presented is whether the bankruptcy court erred in determining that the Debtor’s
    Second Amended Plan of Reorganization requires him to pay to Producers Credit Corporation, then
    known as Producers Livestock Credit Association (“Producers”), the annual sum of $25,000 plus
    interest.
    II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
    An order interpreting and enforcing a Chapter 11 plan constitutes a final order, see UNR
    Indus., Inc. v. Bloomington Factory Workers (In re UNR Indus., Inc.), 
    173 B.R. 149
    , 154 n.6 (N.D.
    Ill. 1994), so the order being challenged may be appealed as of right. 
    28 U.S.C. § 158
    (a)(1). The
    United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio has authorized appeals to the
    Bankruptcy Appellate Panel, and neither party has timely elected to have this appeal heard by the
    district court. 
    28 U.S.C. § 158
    (b)(6), (c)(1). Accordingly, the Panel has jurisdiction to decide this
    appeal.
    A bankruptcy court’s interpretation of the provisions of a plan it has confirmed is entitled
    to “full deference,” and its exercise of equitable powers to “breathe life” into the provisions of a plan
    is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Terex Corp. v. Metro. Life Ins. Co. (In re Terex
    2
    Corp.), 
    984 F.2d 170
    , 172 (6th Cir. 1993); see United States v. Graham (In re Monclova Care Ctr.,
    Inc.), No. 01-3636, 
    2003 WL 463486
    , at **2 (6th Cir. Feb. 18, 2003); In re Dow Corning Corp., No.
    01-CV-71843-DT, 
    2004 WL 764654
    , at *3 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 31, 2004). “An abuse of discretion
    occurs only when the [trial] court relies upon clearly erroneous findings of fact or when it
    improperly applies the law or uses an erroneous legal standard.” Schmidt v. Boggs (In re Boggs),
    
    246 B.R. 265
    , 267 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2000). “An abuse of discretion is defined as a ‘definite and firm
    conviction that the [court below] committed a clear error of judgment.’ The question is not how the
    reviewing court would have ruled, but rather whether a reasonable person could agree with the
    bankruptcy court’s decision; if reasonable persons could differ as to the issue, then there is no abuse
    of discretion.” Mayor of Baltimore, Md. v. W. Va. (In re Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc.), 
    285 F.3d 522
    ,
    529 (6th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted).
    III. FACTS
    The Debtor filed a voluntary petition for relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code on
    December 28, 2001. He filed a proposed Plan of Reorganization and a Disclosure Statement on May
    23, 2002, an Amended Plan of Reorganization and a Debtor’s Amended Disclosure Statement on
    September 16, 2002, and a Second Amended Plan of Reorganization and a Second Amended
    Disclosure Statement on October 8, 2002. The Second Amended Plan of Reorganization provides
    that the claim of Producers constitutes Class B-3, and provides the following treatment of that claim:
    Producers will be paid an annual payment of $25,000.00 on the anniversary date of
    confirmation. An interest rate of 8% will apply to its claim and a 2% interest rate
    will be applied to the solvent estate factor of Producers Livestock’s Claim.
    Producers will receive upon recovery 50% of the proceeds of the Eagle Capital
    litigation estimated at $100,000, plus the proceeds from sale or refinance of assets.
    Upon payment to Producers Livestock from recovery from Eagle Capital litigation
    or refinance of debt or sale of assets, annual payments to Producers Livestock will
    be adjusted to provide for payment for the allowed secured claim on or before the
    tenth (10th) anniversary date of the confirmation of the plan.
    3
    (Second Amended Plan of Reorganization, art. VIII, at 8, App. at 73.) The plan provides that the
    bankruptcy court retained jurisdiction “to secure the execution of the provisions of this Plan.” (Id.,
    art. X, § 1, App. at 76.) Appendix D to the plan (App., at 83) states that the annual “Secured Debt
    Payments by Roger Scheiderer” include payments to Producers of $25,000.00 plus interest. The
    plan specifically incorporates all of the appendices by reference. (Second Amended Plan of
    Reorganization, art. I, ¶ 8, App. at 68.)
    The disclosure statement was approved by an order entered on November 5, 2002, and a con-
    firmation hearing was conducted on December 16, 2002. Following that hearing, the bankruptcy
    court confirmed the plan – presumably the Second Amended Plan of Reorganization – on February
    12, 2003. There is no indication in the record that Producers received any sum from the Eagle
    Capital litigation or from the proceeds of a sale or refinancing, so there does not appear to be a need
    for a recomputation of the ten-year amortization of the debt.
    On February 19, 2004, the Debtor sent Producers a check for $15,000 and, on April 5, 2004,
    the Debtor paid an additional $10,000. The Debtor refused to pay any interest as part of its annual
    payment, so Producers filed a Motion to Require Compliance with Second Amended Plan of Reor-
    ganization on March 18, 2004. The bankruptcy court conducted a hearing on the motion on June
    15, 2004, and granted the motion by an order entered on June 30, 2004. On July 12, 2004, the
    Debtor filed a motion to reconsider, and that motion was denied on July 28, 2004. The Debtor
    timely filed a notice of appeal on August 6, 2004.
    IV. DISCUSSION
    The only argument made by the Debtor in seeking reversal of the bankruptcy court’s order
    is as follows:
    The action of the Bankruptcy Court was erroneous because it was
    inconsistent with the Plan confirmed and the evidence submitted in support of the
    Plan. Appellant’s Plan included an exhibit of annual Plan payments. In the exhibit,
    Appellant’s payment to Appellee was clear and did not need clarification. Second,
    Appellant committed in his Plan to pay Appellee’s Claim in full before completion
    of the Plan. The source of payment was Appellant’s income, litigation proceeds or
    4
    proceeds of refinance. Because the estate was solvent, Appellant had a duty to pay
    the full claim. Appellee had a right under the Plan to receive the full payment but
    not to dictate the amount and timing of the plan payments.
    (Brief of Appellant Roger Scheiderer, at 3.) Article VIII of the plan provides for annual payments
    to Producers of $25,000 and that the claim would bear interest. If there is any question that the
    annual payments were to include accrued interest, as well as $25,000 principal, that question was
    resolved by Appendix D to the plan, which the Debtor acknowledges is “clear and did not need
    clarification.” The appendix explicitly provides for annual payments to Producers of $25,000 “plus
    interest,” and nothing in the plan or its appendices provides that interest is to be deferred. Moreover,
    even if Article VIII and Appendix D leave any ambiguity, “[T]he debtor as draftsman of the plan
    has to pay the price if there is any ambiguity about the meaning of the terms of the plan. This
    comports with the long-standing rule that ambiguous terms of a document are to be interpreted
    against the party that drafted them.” In re Tucker, 
    231 B.R. 284
    , 287 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1999)
    (construing Chapter 13 plan against debtor) (quoting Fawcett v. United States (In re Fawcett), 
    758 F.2d 588
    , 591 (11th Cir. 1985)); accord, e.g., Ice Cream Liquidation, Inc. v. Calip Dairies, Inc. (In
    re Ice Cream Liquidation, Inc.), 
    319 B.R. 324
    , 333 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2005) (resolving ambiguities
    in Chapter 11 plan against debtor as drafter).
    It is the plan that “dictate[s] the amount and timing of the plan payments,” and the plan pro-
    vides for Producers to receive annual payments of $25,000 plus interest starting on the first anniver-
    sary date of confirmation, February 12, 2004. A reasonable person could agree with the bankruptcy
    court’s interpretation of the plan and direction that the Debtor comply therewith, so its order does
    not constitute an abuse of discretion.
    V. CONCLUSION
    For the foregoing reasons, the bankruptcy court’s order granting the Motion to Require
    Compliance with Second Amended Plan of Reorganization filed by Producers is hereby
    AFFIRMED.
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